The focus of this article is an interpretation of the key Kantian thesis, “being is not a real predicate”, advanced by Heidegger in his lecture course, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology (1927) wherein it is presented as one of the four fundamental theses on ‘being’ in the history of philosophy. The article describes the historical-philosophical context for Kant’s critique of the ontological proof of the existence of God. This critique is based on three interconnected components: logical, epistemological, and ontological. Next, it describes the specificities of the Kantian conceptual apparatus, with a detailed analysis of concepts key to understanding Kant’s thesis — ‘reality’, ‘real predicate’, and ‘being’ — and explains the relation of these concepts to the Kantian categories. I submit that Heidegger is interested not so much in the content of the Kantian critique of the ontological argument as in Kant’s interpretation of the concepts of ‘being’ and ‘existence’, which are central to the development of a fundamental ontology. Heidegger reduces the opaqueness of these concepts to the problem of the definition of the concept of ‘perception’; and, challenging Kant’s identification of existence with ‘perception’, argues that existence cannot be identical either to the act of perception, or to the perceived object, nor to its ‘perceivedness’ (Wahrgenommenheit). Heidegger accuses Kant of a lack of clarity, and of a positive definition of the concept of ‘existence’ — which, however, does not undermine the relevance of Kant’s thesis as a starting point for his own fundamental ontology. I demonstrate that, in spite of its shortcomings, Heidegger sees the Kantian thesis as a solid foundation upon which to pursue further the project of building ontology as phenomenology. This, however, calls for a more solid grounding and clarification of the horizon within which the question of ‘being’ is raised.
In this article, I attempt to reconstruct Kant’s enlightenment project, viewed as a complex phenomenon which combines various programmatic principles of all three Critiques, and which offers a special perspective on the perception of modernity. I have chosen, as the lens for my analysis, the interpretation of Michel Foucault, who presents Kant’s project as a phased transition from philosophical critique to political pragmatics. Following the path charted by Foucault, I analyse a number of ideas developed by Kant within the framework of his critical philosophy, which laid the theoretical foundations for subsequent implementations of his enlightenment project in daily political practices. The first part of my study examines the concept of epistemic autonomy as a prerequisite of legitimate governance, first of oneself, and then of others. The second part analyses the experience of ‘heroisation of the present’, which determines people’s attitudes toward their historical epoch. The third part explores the concept of ‘common sense’ as the basis of the political mechanism that makes agreement possible among citizens with respect to social issues. I arrive at conclusions which present the perception of modernity, in the context of Kant’s enlightenment project, as the experience of existence within a special historical space that is open not only to critique but also to action and dialogue, and in which the three Kantian Critiques appear as mutually complementary aspects of a single critique of the present moment in modern discourse.
Nikolai Alekseev’s article was written whilst in exile and belongs to the Eurasian period of his philosophical work. It draws on ideas developed in articles from 1926 and 1927, written for the journal “Put’ [The Way]: A Journal of Russian Religious Thought”. Based on the research of nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Russian historians, Alekseev demonstrates how the Russian people’s views on state power and the figure of the ruler took shape. From his perspective, these views uniquely combine, on one hand, attachment to an absolutist monarchical form of government, and, on the other, a preference for an anarchic principle of social organisation.
Kant scholars traditionally trace the origin of Kant’s doctrine of revolution in the disposition to the Pietist teaching on a new birth whose main tenets are most fully set forth in the programmatic works of its founder, Philipp Jakob Spener. However, in spite of some similarities between these teachings there are important differences between them. Chief of them is Kant’s characteristic reduction of the usefulness of religion to its impact on the moral sphere and the search for the possibility of a moral interpretation of all the main Chrisitan dogmas, an approach to religion for which there are no grounds in Pietism. Furthermore, it is impossible, proceeding from the Pietist teaching on a new birth, to explain the transformation of the concept of Gesinnung (disposition), which we find in Religion Within the Bounds of Bare Reason. There is enough evidence pointing to another influence on Kant in this issue, and that is the philosophical-theological views of Johann Joachim Spalding on conversion and the related radical change of heart, most clearly observed in Thoughts on the Value of Feelings in Christianity (1761). An outstanding representative of neology, Spalding stresses the moral significance of religion and seeks opportunities for a moral interpretation of the foundations of the Christian faith, an approach that is much closer to Kant’s. Furthermore in this work the concept of Gesinnung is used in the meaning similar to that which would later appear in Kant’s Religion Within the Bounds of Bare Reason. Spalding’s book was well-known to Kant, such that it may well have influenced the transformation of the concept of Gesinnung observed in Kant’s philosophy.
The later self-assessment of Nikolai N. Alekseev concerning his independence from the philosophical trends of his time led researchers to believe that the philosophical foundations of his worldview were remote from the Neo-Kantian principles of philosophy. And yet, an attentive reading of his philosophical and public writings, as well as the study of archive materials and the origins of his views, warrant the conclusion that he was among the Russian Neo-Kantians, many of whom would subsequently follow their own intellectual paths while, however, preserving some significant Neo-Kantian references. Alekseev’s focus on the question of the people’s political ideal was conditioned by his involvement in the movement of Eurasianism during the 1920s and 1930s; but there are signs that he was edging toward this theme already during the period of the two 1917 Russian revolutions and the Civil War. Analysing the political situation of the time, Alekseev drew attention to the fact that the anarchic inclinations of the people concerning the running of public life, as well as the people’s views on the social “truth-justice”, were linked to the idea of autocratic monarchy, an idea which had been dominant for much of Russian history and was apparent even in cases where the people revolted. In his reflections on the Russian people, Alekseev links the Neo-Kantian doctrine of values with the principles of “folk psychology” (Völkerpsychologie) which influenced intellectual life at least until the Second World War. In conclusion, I demonstrate the connection between Alekseev’s German-language article “The Origin of the Russian People’s Political Ideals” (1931) — Russian and English translations of which are included in this issue of the “Kantian Journal” — and the 1917—1919 texts reworked in 1927 for the journal “Put’”.
