
We can distinguish two senses of the Given, the nonconceptual and the non-doxastic. The idea of the nonconceptual Given is the target of Sellars’s severe attack on the Myth of the Given, which paves the way for McDowell’s conceptualism, while the idea of the non-doxastic Given is largely neglected. The main target of the present paper is the non-doxastic Given. I first reject the idea of the nonconceptual Given by debunking the false assumption that there is a systematic relation between the conceptual and the nonconceptual. I then propose a constitutive understanding of experience and concept, which at once challenges the idea of the non-doxastic Given. Unlike the more familiar Davidsonian challenge, which questions the transition from the non-doxastic to the doxastic, the constitutive understanding implies that the idea of the non-doxastic Given endangers the very possibility of having thought about the world. I urge an exorcism of the Myth of the Given by proposing doxasticism, the view that experience is essentially a doxastic attitude towards that which is experienced.
This note is devoted to the problem of signaling (marginal inconsistency) in the Bell-type experiments with physical and cognitive systems. It seems that in quantum physics, this problem is still not taken seriously. Only recently have experimenters started to check the signaling hypothesis for their data. For cognitive systems, signaling was statistically significant in all experiments (typically for decision making) performed up to today. Here, one cannot simply ignore this problem. Since signaling contradicts the quantum theory of measurement for compatible observables, its statistical significance in experiments with humans can be considered as an objection for quantum-like modeling-applications of quantum theory to cognition, decision making, psychology, economics and finance, social and political science. In this paper, we point to two possible sources of signaling generation that are consistent with quantum measurement theory. Thus, the signaling objection for quantum-like modeling is not catastrophic. One of these sources is the direct physical signaling about selection of experimental settings, questions or tasks in quantum-like studies. Another possible source is a state modification dependent on experimental settings. The latter was a rather common source of signaling in quantum physics. Since the physical size of the brain is very small comparing with the light velocity, it seems to be impossible to prevent the direct physical signaling (with electromagnetic waves) between the brain's areas processing two questions a and b. However, if, for these questions, not the electromagnetic waves, but electrochemical communication plays the crucial role, the experimenter may hope to make signaling weaker by answering the questions faster. The problem of question-dependent mental state modification seems to be solvable via smarter experimental design. This paper can be useful both for physicists interested in quantum foundations and for researchers working in quantum-like studies, e.g., applying the quantum theory to model decision making or psychological effects. This paper is solely about quantum theory. Thus, we do not consider general contextual probabilistic models.
The contemporary debate on collective intentionality in analytic philosophy has lasted several decades,but questions concerning the nature of we and the relation between the individual and the community are obviously far older.We can find a particularly rich discussion in early phenomenology.Indeed,while starting out with an interest in the individual mind,phenomenologists began their exploration of dyadic forms of interpersonal relations shortly before the start of World War I and were already deeply engaged in extensive analyses of collective forms of intentionality a few years later.A distinctive feature of the phenomenological contribution was its exploration of the relation between the first-and second-person singular and the first-person plural perspectives.How are I,you and we intertwined?The aim of the present paper is to present some core insights from this early debate.
The issue of evolutionary progress is a significant topic in the philosophical debates on the theory of evolution.Did Darwin oppose the idea of evolutionary progress?Through an analysis of his works from different periods,we find that Darwin himself recognized the existence of a progressive trend in the biological evolution process.In his travel logs,he regarded the development of organisms from simplicity to complexity as progress.In later manuscripts,he attributed the reasons for progress to natural selection.In the book On the Origin of Species,he considered the standard of progress to be the specialization and division of labor in biological physiological structures.In his later works,he associated human progress with the development of intelligence and civilization.Darwin also provided answers to some challenging questions regarding the progressiveness of evolution.The difference between Darwin's view of progress and Lamarck's view lies in the fact that Lamarck saw progress as an inherent tendency within organisms to develop towards higher levels,while Darwin considered progress as the result of the action of outside natural selection.
Explanation aims at understanding,which is a mainstream view no matter in philosophy of science or epistemology.But whether all understanding is subject to explanation is in debate.Lipton claims that there are unexplained understandings,Kvanvig believes that there is an"explanatory understanding"only in the deterministic system of causality,and Khalifa believes that there is also such explanatory understandings in the relationship of logic,probability,etc.According to the article,this question involves what is explanation,the explanatory relationship and the standard of explanation,and the relationship of explanation is regarded as that of giving reasons.It is manifested in:if the explanans a gives a rational explanation for the nature,relationship,style,etc.of the explanandum,so that people can not only know what it is,but also understand the"why"of things,that is to give an explanation.It is this relationship of reasons that enables us to explain things clearly,thereby grasping the ground of things and gaining understanding.