
ABSTRACT No one describes a passionate night using the language of consent. Partners in long‐term relationships rarely think of intimacy in terms of permission. If consent is absent precisely when things go well, why does it dominate sexual ethics? Critics have pressed this challenge but have failed to explain why consent is irrelevant rather than merely unspoken. I argue that consent is a tool whose authority rests on three conditions: opacity of wills, risk of wrongful invasion, and the value of sovereignty. When relationships are marked by trust, these conditions are substantially altered. The operative norm shifts from consent‐sensitivity to dissent‐sensitivity—from “do not act without permission” to “you may act unless there is dissent.” The moral work performed by trust is not consent in disguise: consent authorizes particular acts, while trust can make such authorization unnecessary. Consent is a problem‐solving device that presupposes a problem. In the ideal case, there is no problem to solve.
ABSTRACT The authors both accept the non‐consequentialist principle that prohibits an agent from killing one to save five. The authors argue about whether that principle similarly prohibits an agent from letting herself kill one in order to save five: Byrne insists it does; Sridharan insists it doesn't. The authors do not resolve much, but they consider a variety of cases along the way. In the end, the authors suspect that their disagreement stems from a deeper disagreement about whether the relevant moral facts are grounded in metaphysical facts or just further moral facts.
ABSTRACT Expected utility maximization with unbounded utilities implies that tiny probabilities of huge positive or negative payoffs can dominate overall expected‐utility calculations. In other words, it leads to fanaticism . Fanaticism is counterintuitive, as illustrated by cases such as Pascal's Mugging and the St. Petersburg paradox. However, these cases do not illustrate the most counterintuitive implications of fanaticism. This paper shows, in the form of a dialogue, how a world filled with fanatical agents can be almost certain to be devoid of value—and by their own choice. The case presented here does not involve infinities, and it avoids the criticisms that have been raised against earlier cases.
ABSTRACT Egalitarian critics of gentrification argue that urban growth controls protect the worst off from market‐driven change in cities. A growing body of empirical literature shows that growth controls cause the problems these critics want them to solve: they raise housing costs and exclude the poor from cities. But these egalitarian critics also face deeper philosophical problems. First, they assume (but do not argue) that neighborhoods are the sites of communal goods that are undermined by new entrants. This conflicts with the feature of cities that generates economic mobility: allowing cooperation with culturally dissimilar newcomers. Second, the democratic land‐use governance these theorists call for already exists, and it enforces stasis precisely by distributing participation costs so as to exclude the poor. Egalitarian arguments for stasis are self‐undermining.
ABSTRACT Many people accept pluralism about welfare or well‐being: there is more than one thing that is finally good for us. Philosophers have discussed extensively the question of how welfare should be distributed, whether across people or states of nature. But how should we distribute individual welfare goods across these dimensions? I argue that certain principles connecting the distribution of welfare to the distribution of welfare goods fail, and explore the connection between these principles and the project of devising an appropriate quantitative measure of welfare. As it turns out, the failure of these principles corresponds to a conflict between different approaches to constructing a quantitative measure of welfare. I identify one such approach, based on tradeoffs across welfare goods, as superior to its alternatives, which are based on tradeoffs across people and states of nature respectively. I explain how this conclusion provides a measurement‐theoretic argument for prioritarianism over utilitarianism, and for risk‐sensitivity in welfare over risk‐neutrality.