This paper examines the constitutionalisation of the right of self-determination in Quebec's draft constitution (the Loi constitutionnelle de 2025 sur le Qu & eacute;bec, currently before the National Assembly) and sets it against the evolution of the Catalan conflict from STC 31/2010 to the Constitutional Court's rulings of 2017. It argues that Canadian federalism generates a framework of clarity designed to compel negotiation wherever both the question and the majority are clear, whereas the Spanish State of Autonomies has deployed judicial clarity to foreclose any unilateral route to secession. The article foregrounds the underlying asymmetry between a federal system open to plurinationality and a constitutional model premised on indivisibility. On that basis, it considers how the Quebec precedent might be politically instrumentalised in Catalonia, and how much genuine scope the Spanish legal order has, amid complex parliamentary majorities, to accommodate it without constitutional reform.
Salvador de Madariaga (1886-1978) was a multifaceted intellectual of the Silver Age with a notable international profile. Like other liberals of this period -such as Mara & ntilde;& oacute;n and Ortega- his knowledge of economics was very limited. Although his education would have allowed him to understand the new currents of economic thought, he attached much greater importance to spiritual factors than to material ones and was always highly critical of what he called & laquo;economism & raquo;. Precisely because of the characteristics of the national character, he considered that a comprehensive corporate model was the only viable option for Spain in the 1930s: politically, as opposed to classical parliamentarianism, it would allow for greater representativeness, stability, and decentralization; economically, far removed from both American capitalism and Soviet communism, it would free the technical management of economic affairs from political interference and particular interests. Curiously, he maintained his corporatist stance until the end of his life, considering it a third way that was compatible with liberal ideology. However, this work concludes that economic liberalism and integral corporatism are incompatible, after comparing Madariaga's & laquo;liberal & raquo; corporate proposal with Eduardo Aun & oacute;s's & laquo;anti-liberal & raquo; corporate proposal from the same period in practical economic terms.
This article offers a critical reassessment of Nicos Poulantzas's theory of fascism as developed in Fascism and Dictatorship: The Third International and the Problem of Fascism (1970), situating it within contemporary debates on the relationship between social structures, state dynamics, ideology, and political mobilization. It argues that Poulantzas's most significant contribution lies not only in his interpretation of historical fascism, but also in his early formulation of the problem of the relative autonomy of the political sphere against the economic reductionism and instrumentalist approaches that dominated much Marxist thought at the time. Through a reconstruction of his main analytical categories, the article examines both the strengths and limitations of his framework. It contends that, despite breaking with economic determinism, Poulantzas's theory tends to subsume the dynamics of fascism within a relatively unified functional logic, thereby limiting its capacity to account for the contingent interaction between class relations, state actors, political cultures, ideological processes, and concrete historical experiences. Engaging critically with authors such as Fraenkel, Broszat, Mann, Hall, Traverso, Jessop, Mosse, Griffin, Gentile, and Costa Pinto, the article shows how subsequent historiographical developments have enriched the study of fascism by incorporating institutional, cultural, symbolic, and geopolitical dimensions. It concludes that Poulantzas's work retains considerable theoretical relevance, not as a comprehensive explanation of fascism, but as a key intervention in the debate over the articulation of structure, agency, and political autonomy.
This paper seeks to deepen our understanding of the difficulties the Constitutional Court has been grappling with in its commendable endeavour to assume a certain role as a European judge. The Court is weighed down by a doctrinal burden that prevents it from taking a broader view to recognise that the situation in 2026 is no longer the same as that which it faced in its first decade of jurisprudence. A comparative examination of the dialogical practice of other Constitutional Courts might encourage the Constitutional Court to resume the pending dialogue, following its frustrated Melloni attempt, on which the plenary has been divided in the recent LOA saga. The Constitutional Court could restore its institutional normality and jurisdictional functionality if it were to better align the constitutional foundations of its topical European law.
The term social security has a vague meaning in Spain despite its common use. This is because the term and its meaning were developed abroad by the Allied countries during the Second World War and the international organisations they supported, but it was adopted in Spain by Franco's dictatorship. By using the term, the dictatorship sought to align its social policy with that of the victorious powers in the war. Its repeated use in legislation and politics eventually permeated doctrine and colloquial usage. This study examines the original meaning of the term, its reception and adoption during the Franco regime and its consequences until 1990. In that year, a law was passed in Spain that attributed the original meaning of the term social security to it in the legislative sphere. This is demonstrated by the study of programmatic statements, positive legislation and doctrinal studies.
