
This study's findings are of significant importance to the Italian judicial system, which is grappling with prolonged proceedings, particularly in civil courts. The research focuses on key factors that influence a judge's duration of legal disputes, using panel data from an Italian court for civil cases filed between 2015 and 2019. A multivariate linear model with high dimensional fixed effects is adopted. The evidence underscores the influence of the judge's right working approach, their commitment, the procedure's complexity, and the degrees of judgment on the trial's length. The policy recommendations, aimed at enhancing the overall quality of the existing judicial system, include minimizing task juggling to resolve disputes, increasing the number of scheduled hearings per week, and effectively managing complexity to ensure accurate judgments.
This Special Issue marks the tenth anniversary of the "economic analysis of litigation" academic journey that began in 2014 in Catania with an international workshop. This event has since become an annual meeting point, held in various European cities and online during the pandemic. Over the past decade the field has grown substantially and the contributions collected in this issue reflect the vitality and the maturity of this research agenda. At the same time they highlight the continuing importance of understanding how litigation and judicial institutions shape economic outcomes.
This paper examines the relationship between attorneys' representation of litigants and mediation outcomes in Italy. Based on exclusive data from a selection of Italian cities during the 2011-2017 period, we investigate whether attorneys' involvement in a case is related to the parties' probability to enter into a mediation agreement. We are particularly interested in Italian mediation because of its mandatory nature for selected categories of cases. Findings supply evidence on the puzzling role of lawyers in mediation. While plaintiffs' legal representation turns out to be positively related to an increase in the likelihood of a mediation success, the sign is, unexpectedly but robustly, opposite in the case of defendants. Similar results seem to suggest that in the case of attorneys' presence, the outcome of mediation mainly depends on their incentives and clients' motivation within the process of dispute resolution. Beyond the scholarly interest, such results have also interesting policy implications.
This article offers a comparative economic analysis of remuneration models for bankruptcy administrators, examining the extent to which current practices across jurisdictions align with the goals of efficiency and creditor protection. Drawing on law and (micro)economics methodology, the paper models two simplified systems of administrator compensation: one centralized, where remuneration is fixed and largely uncorrelated with outcomes, and one decentralized, where creditors direct litigation and administrator involvement. While the Swiss legal framework is used as an illustrative example, the models and findings are applicable to a broad range of legal systems that face similar structural and incentive-based challenges. The analysis suggests that decentralized approaches may offer greater economic efficiency by discouraging opportunistic behavior and better aligning administrator incentives with creditor outcomes. A hybrid system is proposed, integrating performance-based elements to enhance estate management.