The CC has now ruled on nearly all of the appeals and challenges of unconstitutionality brought against Organic Law 1/2024, which aims to restore institutional, political and social normality in Catalonia. The rulings follow the legal doctrine established in CCR 137/2025, which sets out the interpretation on issues directly related to the amnesty. CCR 165/2025 addresses, in addition, the issue concerning the standing of the Autonomous Communities to challenge the law. Ruling 18/2026, meanwhile, restricts the organic nature of the Act to just a few of its articles. The CC dismisses the appeals in substance, save for a few minor issues, from a doctrinal standpoint. It upholds the admissibility of amnesty under our Constitution and likewise upholds the constitutionality of the specific amnesty established in the Organic Law. The text analyses the reasoning on which the CC grounds these two conclusions and discusses what the author considers to be the weakness or flimsiness of the reasoning used, calling into question some aspects of the decision, particularly the issue of arbitrariness which, in his view, the Organic Law entails.
This paper analyzes the principle of subsidiarity and its potential application within the Spanish legal system. Although it is not explicitly recognized in the Spanish Constitution, subsidiarity has been codified in several Statutes of Autonomy as well as in certain national and regional laws. The main objective of this study is to contextualize the principle in both its theoretical and practical dimensions in order to assess its feasibility within the Spanish legal framework. To this end, the paper examines its codification and regulatory development in the Spanish legal order to evaluate its potential operability. Furthermore, based on an analysis of the current legislation and the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court, the paper explores how subsidiarity can be integrated and articulated with other principles governing the Spanish legal system.
This study addresses the lack of a national budget in Spain, starting from the special position that the budgetary function occupies at the heart of parliamentary democracy and the fiduciary relationship between government and parliament. It analyzes the jurisdictional impossibility of correcting the government's failure to fulfill its duty to present a budget proposal to Parliament, and subsequently proposes a constitutional reform that incorporates two automatic response mechanisms: the early dissolution of Parliament in the event of a failure to present the budget, and an automatic vote of confidence in the event of parliamentary rejection of any budget that has been presented.
