This study examines the feedback effect of investor-generated information on corporate investment decisions. Using a sample of Chinese listed firms from 2010 to 2023, we find that the useful informational content of investor posts on exchange-sponsored platforms (Hu Dong Yi and e Hu Dong) is positively associated with firms' investment-Tobin's Q sensitivity. The effect is more pronounced when stock prices convey less information to managers and in firms with weaker corporate governance, consistent with managerial learning and corporate governance channels. We further find a stronger effects among non-state-owned enterprises and a positive association between useful investor posts and firms' future operating performance. These findings highlight the role of structured investor-firm interactions in transmitting valuable information from market participants to managers, with implications for regulators, corporations, and investors.

This study examines whether auditors develop expertise in audit risk homogenous industries. Using critical audit matters (CAMs) disclosed in audit reports of Chinese listed companies, we construct a homogeneity measure that captures the similarity of audit risks in a client industry. We find that individual partner expertise occurs in industries with high levels of CAM similarity. We also find that industry expert partners provide fee discounts in more homogenous industries, whereas audit quality is unchanged. These results suggest that auditors benefit from achieving economies of scale rather than providing quality-differentiated audits, by specializing in industries with similar audit risks.

Using a natural experiment mandatorily requiring listed firms to disclose R&D activities in the context of China, this paper quantifies the effects of such mandatory disclosure on analyst forecasts, and show that mandatory R&D disclosure significantly decreases analyst forecast accuracy and increases the dispersion of analyst forecasts. Then, we present the underlying mechanisms driving our findings: the ability of analysts and detailed R&D information. Finally, our results are more pronounced in state-owned enterprises and industries with little competition. We show the economic significance of mandatory R&D information disclosure on capital markets. Overall, this study contributes to the literature by evaluating the unintended consequences of mandatory R&D information disclosure on analyst forecasts.

Using data from Chinese A-share listed firms from 2015 to 2022, a difference-in-differences model is employed to empirically examine the impact of bankruptcy regimes, marked by the establishment of the bankruptcy court, on firms' total factor productivity (TFP). The results show a significant decline in TFP among firms in regions following the establishment of the bankruptcy court. This result remains valid after a series of robustness tests. Mechanism tests reveal that bankruptcy court heightens firms' risk aversion by endowing excessive rights to creditors. Consequently, firms tend to downwardly adjust capital structure, curtail innovation investment, and accumulate liquid assets as coping measures, ultimately contributing to a decline in TFP. However, well-developed market mechanisms can alleviate the negative impact of bankruptcy court excessively protecting creditors. Specifically, when firms are located in regions with weak government intervention and strong financial development, as well as in market environments with low uncertainty and strong competition, this negative impact can be mitigated. Moreover, we find that under bankruptcy court operations, while a series of risk reduction measures taken by firms triggers a decline in TFP, it mitigates financial distress. These findings provide fresh insights into the dual nature of creditor protection and offer valuable references for governments to improve the bankruptcy legal system.

Using data from 123 reverse mergers (RMs) in China, this study investigates the determinants and economic consequences of auditor choice in RMs. We find that the choice of a new auditor instead of the incumbent auditor is not related to auditor competence but to the relative bargaining power of RM firms and publicly listed firms (shell firms), and that the probability of choosing new auditors is higher when RM firms have more bargaining power relative to shell firms. We also find that hiring new auditors in the RM is associated with a higher valuation of injected assets and higher pre-listing income-increasing discretionary accruals in RM firms. Furthermore, post-merger firms exhibit drops in accounting performance and firm value and are more likely to restate their financial reports within 3 years of listing when new auditors are appointed in RMs. Finally, the cross-sectional test shows that this effect mainly exists in the context of RMs where the newly appointed auditor is a non-Big 10 auditor and a non-specialist auditor. Overall, our results emphasize the role of RM firms and shell firms in auditor choice for RMs and highlight the implications of such a joint decision on investor protection.

This study investigates the competitive strategies of the international Big 4 audit firms when faced with regional competition from the local Big 6 audit firms. We find that for the Big 4, competition reduces their audit fee premiums and forces them to recruit high-risk clients, while does not affect their audit quality. In further analyses, we find that competition led to greater changes for the Big 4 after the CICPA’s proposal in 2007 and when the local Big 6 are in leading positions. We also find that the local Big 6 compromise on audit quality in addition to audit fee premiums and client criteria when faced with competition from small local audit firms. Overall, this study reveals the competitive strategies of the Big 4 under competitive pressure from the local Big 6, which suggests that local audit firms can compete with international audit firms for audit services by scale development.

以某中央高校智能财务系统建设作为实践案例,分析该高校实施财务智能化的动因与目标,介绍该高校智能财务系统建设方案,包括总体架构、业务模块与流程;在此基础上,提出智能财务系统实施的路径和保障以及智能财务系统推进过程中面临的问题与障碍,并给出相应的解决措施;最后,为满足财务智能化对会计人才的需求,提出新时代会计人才培养思路.

基于中国证券市场准入监管的制度背景,本文对IPO公司研发支出的会计政策选择进行了理论分析和实证检验.研究发现,IPO公司在上市之前研发支出资本化程度要显著低于上市之后.并且,在IPO审核监管更为严格的期间,IPO公司进一步降低了研发支出资本化的概率.研究还发现,上市前会计业绩更差的公司,在IPO审核阶段更可能对研发支出进行资本化,但这些公司在招股说明书中会对研发支出进行更充分的信息披露.本研究为证券准入监管如何塑造公司的会计政策选择和信息披露提供了新的视角和新的证据.

以2007-2017年完成重大资产重组且签订了业绩补偿承诺协议的A股上市公司为研究样本,以业绩补偿承诺是否到期为信号,研究信号影响管理者计提商誉减值的会计选择的作用.研究发现,在业绩补偿承诺期间管理者计提商誉减值的概率和金额均显著高于业绩补偿承诺到期之后,说明信号对管理者计提商誉减值的会计选择具有正向作用.进一步检验信号影响管理者计提商誉减值的作用机制后发现,具有外部可验证性的信号能够约束管理者的机会主义行为,从而影响管理者计提商誉减值的会计选择.

随着国家对高校投入的不断增加,我国高校综合实力显著增强,高校财务工作的业务量和管理复杂度均显著上升.在不断变化的时代环境下,高校财务工作实践不断演变,而其中信息技术对高校财务工作的影响尤为重要.本文在信息技术推动组织管理实践变革的理论框架下,以C大学为例,对我国高校财务信息化实践及其变迁进行回顾,并给出了初步的理论解释.最后,本文对C大学财务信息化未来发展进行了展望,以期为其他高校财务信息化建设提供参考.

本文采用2008-2017年国有上市公司股权转让数据,从财政动因和企业效率的角度分析政府放权意愿,综合考察国企混改的成因、效果及作用机理.结果 发现,政府放权进行国企混改的主因是提升企业效率,而非缓解财政压力.国企通过混改可以提高企业员工效率,降低冗员程度,进而提升企业绩效.进一步分析发现,在政府放权程度越高,混改采用渐进式或分散式时,国企混改的效果越强.本文的结果为拓展国企改制相关理论文献,并据此深化推进国企混改,完善国企治理实践,提供了经验证据和政策建议.

本文以我国各城市的高铁开通为准自然实验,采用双重差分法考察交通基础设施建设如何影响当地公司的上市行为.结果发现,一个城市开通高铁之后,当地公司上市申请数量显著增加,公司上市成功的概率显著提高.其作用机制是:高铁开通降低了监管者、中介机构和投资者获取公司信息的成本,使公司更容易获得风险投资参股、聘请到高质量的中介机构,进而增强了公司上市的动机,提高了公司上市的过会率.同时,本文还发现,高铁开通之后,监管者、中介机构以及投资者对上市申请公司的信息获取成本降低,不但使其能挑选出更优质的上市公司,还能降低公司上市的融资成本.本研究说明,交通基础设施建设能改善当地公司在资本市场中的融资活动,优化资本市场的资源配置效率.

We examine the impact of two alternative approaches to regulating auditing of cross-listed firms on audit fees and audit quality. Prior to 2010 Hong Kong-listed mainland Chinese firms (i.e., H share firms) were required to employ Hong Kong domiciled auditors for their Hong Kong audits. A 2010 regulation allows H share firms to employ either Hong Kong or mainland China domiciled audit firms. We find that H share firms experienced a reduction in audit fees and frequency of modified audit opinions after the regulation. However, H share firms' reduction in modified audit opinions appears to be a correction of Hong Kong auditors' excessive conservatism rather than a reduction in audit quality. We find no evidence that H share firms' financial reporting quality declines following the regulation. Taken together, our study sheds light on the costs and benefits of adopting alternative regulatory approaches to auditing cross-listed firms.

Using the high-speed rail opening of each city in China as a natural experiment, we apply the difference-in-differences model to investigate how the transportation infrastructure in a region affects the behaviour of local company going public. We find that after high-speed rail runs through a city, the number of local company going public increases significantly, and the approval probability of going public is improved significantly. Further mechanism analysis shows that the high-speed rail opening reduces the cost of obtaining private information about local companies, making it easier for them to absorb venture capital and hire high-quality intermediary institutions. In addition, the decline of information cost both enables external stakeholders to select better companies and lowers the financing cost of these companies. This paper shows that the improvement of transportation infrastructure can improve corporate financing efficiency and optimise the efficiency of resource allocation in capital markets.

In relationship-based economies, operating transactions are carried out not in markets but within networks of related stakeholders. The paper presents a contracting framework to show that the primary objective of corporate governance and accounting in these economies is to facilitate firms’ relational contracts with their related stakeholders and protect the interests of these stakeholders. Resolving the firms’ agency conflicts with arm’s length capital providers is not necessarily the primary goal of corporate governance and accounting. Thus, to reduce the agency costs of raising arm’s length capital, firms will have to consider the interests of all its stakeholders when developing governance mechanisms that protect arm’s length capital providers. I discuss two recent China papers that show how information intermediaries’ embeddedness in firms’ social network bridges the information gap between the firms and their arm’s length shareholders. We also propose research opportunities for studying how accounting and corporate governance can bridge this information gap between relational networks and markets. I benefited from conservation with Zengquan Li while researching on relational contracts together, and my discussion with Kaiwen Wu and the rest of the China research discussion group at USC. I appreciate the comments by Donghua Chen, Pingyang Gao, Donghui Wu, Lijun Xia, Qingquan Xin and Tianyu Zhang and other workshop participants at the Chinese University of Hong Kong (Shenzhen), Fudan University, the Shenzhen Financial Institute and the 2019 Annual Conference of China Accounting Review.

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to provide an introduction to the reverse mergers (RMs) conducted in the Chinese stock market by summarizing the regulatory system, surveying the literature on RMs and analyzing the major characteristics of 161 RM cases. Design/methodology/approach This paper introduces the characteristics and evolution of the regulatory framework governing RM activity in China. Then the paper reviews relevant academic studies on the RMs in China and other countries. Finally, the paper identifies and discusses the major characteristics of 161 RM cases in the Chinese stock market from 2006 to 2016. Findings Private companies that go public via RMs in China not only have superior asset quality but also demonstrate good accounting and stock price performance after listing, and these results are unlike those of studies on the quality of RMs in other countries. Research limitations/implications - This paper is based on a survey of 161 RM cases in China's stock market, with the major characteristics of the RMs being identified and analyzed. The limitations of previous studies and suggestions for further research are discussed. Originality/value - This paper suggests that the relative superior performance of RMs in the Chinese stock market is caused by the interplay of market forces and regulatory oversight. The Chinese regulator's pragmatic and flexible approach plays an important role in formulating regulatory policies that respond to the changing macroeconomic environment and financial markets.

State-owned enterprises (SOE) are essentially extensions of the government and are therefore responsible for multi-task objectives. The incentive system for SOE managers consists of both monetary compensation and promotion within the bureaucratic system. Political promotion is key to understanding the incentives of SOE managers. In the reform and opening up era, SOEs have been reformed and exposed to political and market forces. The design of incentive systems for SOE managers has thus become complicated and challenging. Our study provides important implications for this key issue of SOE reform.