为探讨DRGs支付方式的实施对公立医院高质量发展的影响,并针对可能发生的问题提出应对措施,参考公立医院DRGs实施及高质量发展的相关文献,结合时代背景分析我国DRGs改革对公立医院带来的影响,对于如何将DRGs应用于公立医院的高质量发展展开了思考和分析;整理了DRGs支付方式的改革对我国公立医院高质量发展提出的要求,并就在医改背景下如何应用DRGs提高公立医院管理水平提出可行建议.研究表明:DRGs积极应用于医院内涵管理中,有助于公立医院的高质量发展.

Sustained economic growth at the macro level requires effective support from corporate governance structures at the micro level. However, both in practice and theory, current research on Chinese corporate governance appears to be in a state of ambiguity. The discrepancy between appearance and essence in practice and between essence and form in theory presents a dilemma and challenge for research on Chinese corporate governance. This paper proposes a new perspective on corporate governance—an implicit contract explanation within the Chinese Guanxi structure —to help address this dilemma. Corporate governance comprises a collection of contracts among various stakeholders, with the content and form of these contracts embedded within the social structure of the parties involved in transactions. Without an understanding of contracts, it is difficult to comprehend corporate governance; similarly, without an understanding of Guanxi structures, it is challenging to grasp contracts. From a historical analysis perspective that draws upon ancient Chinese Confucian moral philosophy as well as recent insights from Liang Shuming on Chinese culture and sociologists such as Tao Menghe, Fei Xiaotong, and Zhai Xuewei, this paper outlines the fundamental logic underpinning contemporary society; analyzes social determinants behind contract content and form; identifies key differences between Eastern and Western contract forms; proposes cultural and ethical origins for implicit contracts formed within Chinese society; clarifies characteristics of implicit contracts including their advantages/disadvantages and suitability for use;explains an analytical framework for Chinese corporate governance built upon implicit contracts including reasons for transaction cost savings through implicit contracts as well as their implementation mechanisms within Chinese social Guanxi structures. This paper also reviews existing empirical research findings and analyzes how implicit contracts can stimulate transactions and promote economic growth, providing new insights into Coase’s theorem from a different angle. The perspective on implicit contracts proposed in this paper differs from those based on explicit contracts under Anglo-American models. It offers an effective path for introspection and analysis of corporate governance mechanisms within China’s historical traditions while meeting the requirements for modernization deeply rooted in China’s excellent traditional culture. This approach presents a new vision distinct from Western modernization models and strives for innovation within philosophical and social science disciplines. While this paper does not reject the existing logic of Western corporate governance theories, it emphasizes deeper analysis and expansion based on China’s institutional, social, and cultural background concerning different contract forms and situations.

After the share structure reform, controlling shareholder embraces more intimate related-party transactions to tunnel. Under the split of the CEO duality, the agency of the controlling shareholder is more complicated, and its cost is higher. This article focuses on the impact of controlling shareholder features and board characteristics on related-party transactions and examines their influence under the regulation. The empirical research reveals: (1) Cash flow rights are partly negatively related to related-party transactions and deliver a U-shaped non-linear curve relationship, suggesting the “incentive-barrier” effect. Pyramid shareholdings provide a natural barrier for controlling shareholders to the tunnel. (2) From the second-largest shareholders to the tenth-largest shareholders, it is challenging to balance the hidden tunneling behavior of the controlling shareholder, and they are possible to conspire with the controlling shareholder. (3) The CEO duality can enhance the influence of controlling shareholder characteristics on related-party transactions. (4) Under the regulation of the board’s independence, the influence of controlling shareholder characteristics has weakened on related-party transactions. These findings ascertain new proof on the influencing factors of related-party transactions.

中国社会历来(特别自宋以降)"家国一体",家族为个体的延伸,国家为家族的延伸,二者休戚相关,命运与共.了解家族治理及其背后的文化传统,是研究中国国家、社会、组织与企业等治理问题的先决因素.然而,翔实及足够跨度的家族内部治理史料的匮乏阻碍了这一研究的有效推进.本文通过对《红楼梦》的量化文学实证,研究家族礼治秩序对权力分配与组织激励的影响,探索关系结构下中国社会的治理机制.实证结果发现,礼治秩序在权力分配方面,亲者更易获取外部政治联系和内部事务权力,说明权力分配沿着关系结构的延展而铺开;在组织激励方面,亲者做对天经地义,做错则实属不该,因此亲者奖少罚多,疏者奖多而罚少,即对亲疏实行差别化的奖惩标准.本文发现支持了关系结构中各方权利义务的双向(而非单向)存在,为我们完整理解关系结构的重要价值提供了新的实证证据.作为建立在差序格局社会中显示组织一体对待、展现公平性的方式,该标准保证了整个社会的均衡发展,更是一种嵌入中国社会的治理智慧与治理经验.本研究沿用陈冬华等(2017)的文学实证研究路径,揭示中国传统文化在历史繁荣时期产生的真正具有治理意义的影响,有利于正本清源,重新评估历史与文化对于当下中国治理能力现代化的重要借鉴意义.

文章基于中国的制度背景,以政府的经济发展和社会福利动机为出发点,借鉴Granovetter(1985)的嵌入理论,试图为中国公司治理与政府行为之间构建一个新的分析框架.文章将政企关系解释为政府以资源分配为激励,委托企业实现特定经济和非经济目标的隐性契约关系,并揭示了"政府—企业"契约中存在的委托代理结构,将两者的二元对立范式更新为有机整体范式.进一步将公司治理纳入这一整体框架,指出中国公司治理结构和内容上的诸多特征,根源于其既要追求经典的股东价值又要兼顾政府委托责任的嵌入属性.从嵌入视角研究公司治理与政府行为的整体关系,在理论上可以进一步推进中国公司治理的研究范式,更客观地评价和指导中国公司治理实践,更好地构建符合中国有为政府情境下的公司治理理论.

Formulae display:?Mathematical formulae have been encoded as MathML and are displayed in this HTML version using MathJax in order to improve their display. Uncheck the box to turn MathJax off. This feature requires Javascript. Click on a formula to zoom.

2019年11月2日,第八届“宏观经济政策与微观企业行为交叉研究”学术研讨会在南京大学商学院顺利召开,会议由中国社会科学院经济研究所《经济研究》杂志社、北京大学财务分析与投资理财研究中心、南京大学商学院、暨南大学管理学院、清华大学中国经济社会数据研究中心、重庆大学经济与管理学院六方联合主办.本次研讨会共收到148篇投稿,经过匿名评审和专家委员会评审,最终确定30篇论文作为报告论文.在论文汇报环节,每篇报告论文由两名专家进行现场点评.来自全国各大高校和科研机构的600多名专家学者、青年教师、博士研究生参加了本次研讨会.

2018年11月3日,第七届“宏观经济政策与微观企业行为交叉研究”学术研讨会在北京大学光华管理学院召开.本次研讨会由北京大学财务分析与投资理财研究中心、重庆大学经济与管理学院、暨南大学管理学院、南京大学商学院、清华大学中国经济社会数据研究中心、中国社会科学院经济研究所《经济研究》编辑部联合主办,旨在进一步推动“宏观经济政策与微观企业行为”交叉研究领域的发展.

郭庆旺(中国人民大学):“增长动力转换与高质量发展”在宏观经济理论上就是从需求管理到供给管理,从短期调控到长期发展,从规模扩张到效率提升.这样一个题目蕴含着在动力转换和高质量发展过程中如何看待投资的问题. 第一,全要素增长率核算.理论上,在分析时应把理论基础的产出核算和统计中的增长核算区别开来.过去,大家在分析的时候把这两个内容弄混了.投资、出口、消费等是从产出核算的角度,也就是从凯恩斯国民收入决定的角度进行讨论的.其中,消费、投资、政府购买性支出加上净出口,这些都涉及投资.而讨论动力转换依据的则是增长核算体系,比如劳动力投入增长率、资本存量增长率、全要素增长率等.以全要素生产率为例,中国的全要素生产率并不低.1978-2013年中国全要素生产率是1.98,而同期日本是-0.14,韩国是1.46,美国是1.82.如果比较投资率非常高(资本存量的增长率非常高)时期的全要素生产率,中国(1993-2013年)达到2.4,日本(1960-1982年)是1.99,韩国(1966-1996年)是1.75.总的来看,不管是改革开放初期,还是高增长时期,中国的全要素生产率都大大高于相应国家.

通常认为,弱产权保护下,政府行为带来的不确定性会加大,会阻碍信息的套利交易,引发噪音交易,减少公司特质信息,提高股价同步性.本文发现,在特定条件下,政府行为也可能会降低股价同步性,提高股价中公司特质信息的含量.以我国产业政策实施的影响为切入点,研究发现:(1)产业政策的宣告使获得产业政策支持的企业股价同步性下降,且在受到重点支持的企业中更加明显;(2)截面分析发现,上述结果主要存在于分析师较多、机构投资者较多及媒体报道较多的企业中;(3)机构投资者的信息作用主要依赖于证券投资基金、社保基金、保险基金、证券公司等,合格的境外投资者作用不明显.文章从新的视角解释了我国股价同步性形成机制,说明政府的宏观政策同样是具有微观个体差异的公司特质信息,对政府行为与股价同步性的研究形成了有益补充,有助于重新认识“信息效率观”及我国证券市场的信息传递机制.

本文认为家族传承是一个控制权传递的长期过程,是一项期间事件,而非时点事件,其中既包含显性控制权的转移,也包含隐性控制权的转移.通过对一个成功实现传承的典型案例分析,我们发现,控制权来源侧重点的不同决定了传承方式和过程的差异,只有显性控制权和隐性控制权都传递完成才能视为家族传承的真实终点.更重要的是,隐性控制权在显性控制权传递之后才能最终完成传递.在显性控制权传递完成之后,传承人和继承人可以通过控制权分享机制保障继承人顺利获得掌握隐性控制权所必需的个人资本,从而实现继承人隐性控制权的“跳跃”式发展.本文的研究为传承中的“扶上马送一程”提供了经济学的刻画与解释,也有助于我们理解在转型和新兴背景下嵌入于传统文化和外部制度环境下的家族传承模式,并对家族传承实践带来一定的启示.

2017年12月16—17日,第十六届中国实证会计国际研讨会在南京大学仙林国际会议中心召开. 本次研讨会由《中国会计评论》理事会主办、南京大学会计学系承办,旨在深化对会计研究的现状与发展前景的探讨,推进中国实证会计研究高质量地发展.

We use a hand-collected data set of firm-level foreign direct investment in China to examine the impact of home countries' institutional elements on the investment co-movement between foreign and domestic firms. We find that foreign firms from countries with well-developed financial markets or a strong rule of law experience less co-movement with Chinese domestic firms. Our evidence also suggests a contingency impact between the two channels of home country institutions; the capital markets effect exists only for foreign firms from countries with strong rule of law, whereas the rule-of-law effect holds only for firms from countries with well-developed financial markets. Finally, we show that firms from countries with better institutional quality exhibit greater investment efficiency than firms from countries with weaker institutions.

<span id="ChDivSummary" name="ChDivSummary" class="abstract-text">本文结合中国特有的制度背景,从财务总监在企业高管中的地位这一独特视角出发,系统分析与检验了财务总监地位影响企业股价崩盘风险的客观表现与传导路径。本文认为财务总监在高管序列中的排名越靠前则其地位越高。研究结果显示:首先,财务总监地位与股价崩盘风险之间呈现显著负向关系,表明处于较高地位的财务总监能够降低崩盘风险,而随着财务总监个人地位的下降,股价崩盘风险则会增加;其次,截面分组发现财务总监地位的作用仅在民营企业存在;最后,拓展性检验发现财务总监的高地位强化了其薪酬契约有效性,并且财务总监的作用主要通过提高企业投资效率和降低研发投入强度来影响股价崩盘风险。总之,本文验证了上市公司财务总监地位有利于降低股价崩盘风险的研究推论。</span>

2017年11月4日,第六届宏观经济政策与微观企业行为研讨会在暨南大学管理学院召开.本次研讨会由《经济研究》编辑部、暨南大学管理学院、北京大学财务分析与投资理财研究中心和南京大学商学院联合主办,旨在深化经济与管理等领域的交叉研究,进一步推动“宏观经济政策与微观企业行为”方面的深入研讨.

We examine whether Chinese firms whose controlling persons have foreign residency rights are more likely to engage in corporate fraud. We find a positive association between foreign residency rights and corporate fraud with causality likely going from the former to the latter. Such a finding is robust to an estimation of a bivariate probit model that incorporates undetected fraud. In the cross section, higher managerial ownership, greater analyst coverage and higher institutional holdings mitigate this association. The link, however, diminishes in more recent years after high-profile extraditions of businessmen and regulatory focus on foreign residency rights in the political sector. We conclude that a lower expected probability of getting caught and punished associated with executives with foreign residency rights induces corporate fraud.

ABSTRACT Managers of China's state-owned firms work in a closed pyramidal managerial labor market. They enjoy non-transferable benefits if they choose to stay within this system. The higher up are they in this labor market hierarchy (their political ranks), the fewer are their outside employment opportunities. Due to career and wealth concerns, they are cautious and risk-averse when managing firms. We examine the effect of managers' political ranks on firms' stock price crash risk and find a negative association. This association mainly exists in firms with younger managers and managers with shorter tenure. Further, this effect is only significant in regions with weak market forces, in firms without foreign investors, without political connections, and during periods with no local government leaders' or managers' political promotions. We conclude that the political ranking system reduces the stock price crash risk. JEL Classifications: G30; J33.

文章在详细论述我国产业政策制度背景、国内外产业政策研究差异的基础上,兼顾理论分析和实证发现,对国家产业政策如何影响中国微观企业行为这一领域进行了综合整理和回顾;解析和对比各个研究范围的研究进程,提出了相关领域的研究不足和局限;结合产业政策的缘起、制定、传导、实施背景,致力于产业政策研究问题的探讨与理论框架的构建,进而提出了中国产业政策与微观企业行为研究领域未来有价值的研究方向与契机.

经济的全球化发展,带动了学术市场的全球化.然而,世界范围内语言存在巨大差异的现实,使得学术评价的跨语言进行面临难以逾越的障碍,稍有不慎,就会带来弱势语言的学术成就(尤其是人文社会科学)面临系统性低估的风险,本文将之称为学术评价中的“巴别塔”问题.以会计与财务研究领域中的中国问题研究为对象,本文实证比较了中文期刊与英文顶级期刊在原创性方面的表现,结果发现中文期刊在中国问题研究的原创性上并不逊色,部分还领先一步.这一实证发现,支持了学术评价中“巴别塔”问题的存在.最后,在上述基础上,提出了减轻“巴别塔”问题的对策,并说明了本研究的局限.本文并不否认英文顶级期刊在中国问题研究上的先进性,也不否认在过去二十余年中国会计及财务研究国际化的成就,本文的主旨是运用科学研究的方法,阐述并检验发表在中文期刊的研究成果在学术评价上是否受到了低估,并找到了有说服力的支持性证据,对未来如何开展更好的国际化具有一定的启发.

《劳动合同法》是否提高了企业劳动力成本,一直存有争议.本文以2001-2013年中国A股主板上市公司为样本,从企业劳动力成本总量和结构两个层面研究了《劳动合同法》对微观企业劳动力成本上涨的影响.《劳动合同法》实施之前,企业劳动力成本已经处于快速上涨期,本文没有发现足够的证据表明《劳动合同法》的实施改变了微观企业劳动力成本总量的上涨趋势.进一步研究发现,五险一金比例的增加对劳动力成本总量上升具有增量影响,但这可能并不是《劳动合同法》造成的,而更可能是由《社会保险法》及《住房公积金管理条例》的规定所致,《劳动合同法》强化的是对上述两项法规的执行.但是,由《劳动合同法》实施带来的职工维权环境的改善以及地方政府对企业执行《劳动合同法》不同程度的干预,导致企业五险一金比重出现不同程度的变化.分样本看,《劳动合同法》的实施对不同类型企业的劳动力成本总量和结构产生不同程度的影响.本文的研究发现为正处于争议中的《劳动合同法》是否提高企业劳动力成本提供了实证证据,对以“三去一降一补”为基本内容的供给侧结构性改革提供了实证参考.