This study analyzes the financing strategy of a two-echelon supply chain, consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer, both subject to capital constraints. Specifically, the bank provides loans to the manufacturer, who then grants trade credit to the retailer. Based on the three-party game analysis framework of the bank, manufacturer, and retailer, this paper constructs a supply chain financing model under the information symmetry and information asymmetry structures, respectively; measures the maximum financing ability of the manufacturer; and discusses the influence of trade credit, moral hazard, and information structure on the manufacturer's and bank's strategies. The results show that under the trade credit situation, it is critical for the bank to provide loan to manufacturer who does not have moral hazard. The maximum financing capacity of the manufacturer is affected by the rate of return on moral hazard and the intensity of trade credit default. The increase of trade credit default intensity and risk exposure will lead to the increase of the interest rate of bank loan, and in the case of information asymmetry, the bank will often ask for a higher interest rate to deal with the information disadvantage. The strategy for the bank to make the credit line is more complex, and the degree of information asymmetry plays a positive moderating effect on the influence of trade credit on the credit line. Our findings provide implications for participants who implement financing actions to improve their financial performance and control the moral hazard and default risk along a supply chain.

Associate credit risk is a kind of credit risk among the associated credit enterprises formed by credit-related enterprises. Based on the mean field theory of complex network and the classical model Susceptible-Infected-Recovered (SIR) of risk propagation dynamics, this paper explores the influence mechanism of the influence of corporate senior executives' alertness promoted by risk information on the contagion of associated credit risk. The results show that the corporate senior executives' alertness does not change the contagion threshold of associated credit risk. (C) 2021 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.

关联信用风险及其传染是现代信用风险管理的热点和难点问题.本文基于复杂网络的平均场理论,运用传染病模型刻画关联信用个体之间关联信用风险的传染机制;并考虑潜伏期和感染期均具传染性的双重传播路径,分析了网络中关联信用风险传染的稳定状态;进一步,在一般关联信用个体网络环境中,探讨了关联信用风险传染的影响因素对稳定状态的影响.研究表明:关联信用风险传染的临界值和网络结构有关,与潜伏期和感染期呈反向变化,与潜伏个体和感染个体的相互转化率呈同向变化,与潜伏期传染率和感染期传染率呈同向变化;稳定状态时潜伏个体密度与潜伏期和传染率呈同向变化,与感染期呈反向变化;稳定状态时感染个体密度与感染期和传染率呈同向变化,与潜伏期呈反向变化.本文的研究丰富了信用风险的研究范畴,为企业和银行等信用个体管控信用风险提供了新的视角.

Under the current situation of complexity and uncertainty of public health risks, the elderly in nursing homes are at the highest risk of being infected.For the research of pension institution of emergent public health risk prevention strategy, this paper constructs the Long-term Care Facilities based on prospect theory of emergent public health risk behavior decision model, analyses the pension agency care personnel and managerial risk behavior strategy, reveals the risk management cost and risk loss and external supervision of pension agency care staff and managers risk behavior decision-making.The study of this paper has important theoretical and practical significance for the prevention and control of novel Coronavirus pneumonia and other emergent public health risks in pension institutions.

Based on the SIRS epidemic model embedded in complex network theory and the COVID-19 spreading characteristics, the influence of prevention & control and treatment on the ontagion of COVID-19 and the stability of social network is analyzed separately in this paper. The results show that the contagion of COVID-19 leads to the risk stability of social network. The number of infected persons is decreased by prevention & control and treatment which drives social network to risk-free stability. The treatment is more effective than prevention & control against COVID-19. Compared with prevention & control, treatment can make social network more risk-free and stable faster.

供应链企业之间的多重关联关系导致其信用风险传染愈加复杂.本文基于供应链双渠道融资模式,针对供应链上同时存在交易关联、资产关联和人际关联等三重关联关系的情景,揭示了关联信用风险微观传染机理,构建了关联信用风险传染强度模型,分别探讨了三种关联关系以及链外市场对传染效应的影响.为研究关联信用风险传染的外溢效应,在银行未识别出供应链上关联关系时,探讨了银行面临的期望损失.结合仿真分析发现,相较于单一商业信用融资,双渠道融资模式下传染效应更弱;在最优交易关联强度下,商业信用额度和成本(反映了供应链上的一种资产关联关系)在不同方向上对传染效应产生影响,人际关联关系以及链外市场均负向影响传染效应;银行期望损失则与贷款利率和贷需比相关,人际关联关系将导致银行更大的潜在损失.

企业高管间的风险信息传播与所经营企业之间的关联信用风险传染交互影响。本文基于复杂网络理论,在高管社交-企业关联耦合的双重网络中,探讨了风险信息传播与关联信用风险传染交互影响的机理,构建了风险信息传播与关联信用风险传染的交互模型。结合仿真分析发现:关联信用风险传染阈值与关联企业网络结构和风险信息传播的范围有关;在一定的条件下,高管之间的风险信息传播对企业之间关联信用风险的传染会产生抑制作用。企业及政府等监管部门采取适当的措施促进风险信息传播,可以有效地抑制关联信用风险在关联企业网络中的传染。

Associated credit risk is a kind of credit risk among the associated credit entities formed by credit-related entities. Focusing on this hot topic of associated credit risk and the relevant contagion and considering the latent entities and their incubatory period, this paper builds an infectious dynamic model to describe the associated credit risk contagion of associated credit entities based on the mean-field theory of complex networks. Firstly, this paper analyzes the stable state of the associated credit risk contagion in the associated entity network, considering the latent entities and their incubatory period. Secondly, from the perspective of complex network and considering the incubatory period, a SHIS model is built to reveal how the incubatory period influences associated credit risk contagion. Finally, the sensitivity of some parameters is analyzed in the Barabási–Albert (BA) scale-free network. The results show the following: (i) the contagion threshold of associated credit risk is related to the incubatory period of latent entities, the recovery rate and infectivity of infected entities, and the newborn rate of credit entities; (ii) the infectious rate of infected entities, the mortality rate of credit entities, and the important factors stated in (i) are all significantly correlated with the density of infected entities.

关联信用风险及其传染是现代信用风险管理的热点和难点问题.本文基于复杂网络的平均场理论,运用传染病模型,来刻画关联主体网络中关联信用风险的传染机理;并引入潜伏主体及其潜伏期,分析了网络中关联信用风险的传染过程;进一步,在关联主体BA无标度网络中,探讨了关联信用风险特征对传染过程中稳定状态的影响.研究结果表明:潜伏主体的平均潜伏期、感染主体的传染率和恢复率及传染力、信用主体的新生率和死亡率,均会影响关联信用风险传染阈值和稳定状态时感染主体密度.

针对关联信用风险及其传染这一热点和难点问题,本文基于复杂网络异质平均场理论,运用风险传播动力学SIR经典模型,探讨风险信息促成的个体保护意识对关联信用风险传染的影响机理,并在BA无标度网络中进行数值仿真分析.研究结果表明:被感染个体数量、个体反应强度、有保护意识的易感个体比例与关联信用风险传染阈值正相关;考虑个体保护意识、增强易感个体反应强度以及提高有保护意识的易感个体比例能够有效抑制关联信用风险的传染速度和传染规模,并且能够延缓关联信用风险高峰期的到来.

基于嵌入复杂网络的传染病模型,探讨了信息双向传播和个体反应对关联信用风险传染的影响机理.研究表明:关联信用风险的传染阈值与警觉度、救助度和邻居节点数相关,且个体反应对关联信用风险的爆发具有明显的抑制作用;警觉度和救助度均是影响感染个体密度和免疫个体密度的重要因素;警觉度和救助度的强弱会影响关联信用风险的传染规模,对比分析发现“存在关联信用风险”信息对关联信用风险传染规模影响较大,而“如何有效预防关联信用风险”信息只在特定的有效传染率区间,对关联信用风险传染规模产生比较小的影响.

In recent years, the credit crisis of Hainan Airlines Holding Co., Ltd., (HNA), Suntech, Bogang, Dunan, Chengxing and other enterprises, as well as the fact that many enterprises and financial institutions in the supply chain suffer heavy losses caused by the credit crisis, make the associated credit risk in the supply chain widely concerned by the industry and academia, and also warn the importance of commercial banks to strengthen the credit risk management of supply chain customers. In order to correctly understand and understand the associated credit risk in the supply chain, this paper reveals the contagion mechanism of the associated credit risk in the supply chain based on multiple perspectives such as the origin, contagion path and basic characteristics of the associated credit risk in the supply chain. The research shows that factors such as supply chain enterprises’ own factors, the association relationship in the supply chain, the external environment of the supply chain and the relationship with the core enterprises form the contagion source of the associated credit risk in the supply chain. Trade credit, loan guarantee and interpersonal relationship constitute the contagion channel of associated credit risk in the supply chain. The contagion effect caused by the association relationship in the supply chain makes the associated credit risk in the supply chain present the characteristics of infectivity, systematization and spillover. This study is helpful for the regulatory authorities to strengthen the management of enterprise credit risk in the supply chain.

This paper considers a two-echelon supply chain with a supplier and a retailer both having capital constraints. The capital-constrained retailer first applies for loans from the commercial bank, and then applies for trade credit from the supplier. Compared with the single trade credit financing mechanism, what are the similarities and differences in the contagion and evolution of the associated credit risk in the supply chain when the retailer adopts both trade credit and bank credit (dual-channel financing) mechanism. Based on Stackelberg game analysis framework of the supplier and retailer, this paper clarifies the contagion mechanism of the associated credit risk in the supply chain and discusses the influences of financing structure, financing channel and financing costs on the contagion effect of the associated credit risk in the supply chain under dual-channel financing mechanism. Combined with the case simulation analysis, it is found that: Compared with the single trade credit financing mechanism, the contagion effect is weaker under the dual-channel financing mechanism. The financing structure significantly affects the contagion effect, which increases with the increase of the proportion of trade credit financing. Both bank credit and trade credit financing costs can positively affect the contagion effect. Our research can enrich the existing credit risk management and supply chain finance literature and provide decision support for the selection of financing methods and risk control of commercial banks and supply chain enterprises.

In the current complex and uncertainty of the risk of COVID-19 in long-term care facilities, the elderly in the long-term care facilities are at the highest risk of being affected by COVID-19. There is still uncertain relationship between the identification of this risk and the care management, caring behavior, cannot achieve management optimization. Matrix analysis the change relation between the conditions for the COVID-19 risk identification and risk behavior. The results show that there are N equilibrium points for the risk management of COVID-19 in long-term care facilities. The complexity of the risk of COVID-19 in long-term care facilities and the cognitive deviations caused by the limited rationality of managers and caregivers make the COVID-19, the risk early warning system is not easy to converge to a stable point in the real environment, so as to achieve the best management status of the COVID-19 risk in long-term care facilities. Nursing staff behavior, risk management cost, risk loss and other parameters have different risk management effects for the COVID-19. When the selected parameter is adjusted through the threshold, reflects the stability and selection tendency of the COVID-19 risk management strategy. Promote institutional managers and caregivers to adopt active risk management strategies: Strengthen the awareness of institutional managers and caregivers about the complexity and uncertainty of risks; Optimize the COVID-19 risk management system, process and procedures; Strengthen the research on risk accidents, serious consequences and effective prevention of COVID-19; Strengthen the review and supervision of the risk management of COVID-19 and improve its value perception of the effective prevention of the risk of COVID-19.

In this paper, a theoretical framework is proposed to analyze how trade credit effect bank credit in circumstance of supply chain. We constructed a model to describe information asymmetry among lender and borrower based on game theory and conducted numerical simulation to discuss risk contagion. The static comparison and numerical results illustrate that the loan interest in symmetric case is significantly lower than it in asymmetric case. Default risk of buyer increases the cost of borrower compared to the case when buyer pays for sure and massive trade credit associated with higher loan interest. However the impact on loan amount of credit risk and default risk is more complex. It turns out that information asymmetry can be seen as a moderating factor in the impact on loan amount of default risk and credit risk. Generally this study may not only bring some policy implications for banks to control credit risk along supply chain, but also shed lights in theoretical analysis of trade credit.

We consider a two-echelon supply chain with a supplier and a retailer, both with capital constraints. The capital-constrained retailer will first apply for loans from the bank, and then apply for trade credit from the supplier. Compared with the single trade credit financing mode, what are the similarities and differences in the contagion and evolution of the associated credit risk in the supply chain when the retailer adopts both trade credit and bank credit (dual-channel financing) mode. Based on Stackelberg game, this paper clarifies the contagion mechanism of the associated credit risk in the supply chain and discusses the influence of financing structure, financing channel and financing costs on the contagion effect of the associated credit risk in the supply chain under a dual-channel financing mode. Combined with the simulation analysis, it is found that compared with the single trade credit financing mode, the contagion effect is weaker under the dual-channel financing mode. The financing structure will significantly affect the contagion effect, which will increase with an increase of the proportion of trade credit financing. Both bank credit and trade credit financing costs can positively affect the contagion effect. Our research can enrich the existing credit risk management literature and provide decision support for the selection of financing methods and risk control of supply chain enterprises.

在一个典型的存在资金约束的二级供应链上,通常存在两类不同的信用风险:一是供应商向银行信用贷款所形成的信贷信用风险;二是供应商为零售商提供商业信用而形成的商业信用风险.本文针对上述两类不同信用风险之间的关联性及传染问题展开研究,揭示了两类风险之间的传染机理,度量了风险的传染强度,并分析了传染强度的影响因素.研究表明:两类不同信用风险之间的关联性,导致供应链上存在由非同类信用风险构成的关联信用风险(Different types of associated credit risk),本文简称为供应链上的D类关联信用风险.结合数值分析发现:D类关联信用风险的传染强度与供应商的生产成本及无风险利率正相关,而与商品的市场价格负相关.特别地,当市场需求服从指数分布时,关联信用风险的传染强度与商业信用成本和零售商的特质有关,供应商通过调整商业信用成本和选择零售商类型可以降低D类关联信用风险的传染强度,进而降低自身的银行信贷风险.本文将同类型信用风险之间的关联和传染问题引申到不同类型的信用风险之间,进一步深化和拓展了关联信用风险的内涵.

We take the supply chain with a supplier and a retailer as the research objects and study the contagion and spillover effect of the associated credit risk in the supply chain under the scenario of the buy-back guarantee contract. The associated credit risk in the supply chain refers to the phenomenon that the credit default of the retailer causes the credit default of the supplier or increases the probability of default. The buy-back guarantee in the supply chain refers to the assumption by the retailer of the supplier's buy-back contract as a financing mechanism. At present, the buy-back guarantee has become a new channel of contagion for the associated credit risk in the supply chain. Under the dual Stackelberg game analysis framework of the lending institutions, suppliers, and retailers, this paper clarifies the contagion mechanism of associated credit risk in the supply chain under the condition of the buy-back guarantee and constructs mathematical models to explore the contagion and spillover effect of the associated credit risk in the supply chain. The results show that, under the condition of the buy-back guarantee, the contagion effect of the associated credit risk in the supply chain has trigger thresholds, and the probability of triggering the contagion effect is related to the retailer's order quantity, supplier's wholesale price, and product's market price. The contagion effect is positively affected by the buy-back rate, production costs, and loan interest rates and negatively affected by the product's market price. In contrast, the degree of buy-back guarantee aggravates the negative spillover effect of the associated credit risk and raises the risk level of lending institutions.

随着经济全球化和金融市场的快速发展,关联信用风险在关联企业之间普遍存在,寻找有效的风险管控策略成为关联信用风险管理的热点和难点问题.本文结合传染病模型和复杂网络理论,探讨了管控策略对关联信用风险传染及关联企业网络稳定的影响.研究表明:关联信用风险的传染导致关联企业网络最终趋于不同的稳定状态,当关联企业网络处于有风险稳定时,通过管控策略可以使其达到无风险稳定;当关联企业网络处于无风险稳定时,通过管控策略可以缩短网络达到无风险稳定的时间,且能降低关联信用风险传染过程中感染企业出现的峰值;在一定条件下,救治策略相较于免疫策略对关联信用风险的管控有更高的效率.

Capital constraints in the supply chain have linked trade credit to the banks’ credit risk exposure. This paper focuses on how trade credit, which is widespread in the supply chain, affects the banks’ risk exposure by constructing a two-echelon Stackelberg framework in a case involving supplier dominance. A numerical analysis illustrates the following: First, the contagion intensity, which measures trade credit’s impact on the banks’ risk exposure, positively relates to the uncertainty of demand. Second, the retailer’s characteristics have a significant, moderating effect on this positive relationship between the banks’ risk exposure and the uncertainty demand. Finally, suppliers can reduce the contagion intensity by screening different types of retailers, which consequently decreases the banks’ risk exposure.