This study is dedicated to the elusive and relatively under -researched group of super -rich Russians. The research focuses on Russians on the Forbes list of the wealthiest people from 2004 to 2021. Based on a specially compiled empirical database, the composition of the group was analyzed according to key socio-economic and demographic indicators. The changes throughout Russia's recent history and the overall dynamics of the group were assessed. It was shown that the group largely reproduces its composition-almost 90 % annually and approximately two-thirds in the medium term. Over the past decade, due to the low rate of renewal, the main features of its composition have changed little, but certain trends are noteworthy. Today's super -rich are predominantly male, although women have entered the ranks in recent years. They are characterized by high levels of education, although the relative importance of postgraduate education has declined over time, partly replaced by foreign education, including for their children. Most members tend to have a relatively high social origin, although data for the older generation, who dominate the group, in this regard are limited. In terms of place of birth and place of higher education, there is an increasing shift towards the capitals where opportunities are concentrated, although some diversity remains. This diversity is accentuated by a shift in its composition toward older Russians whose places of birth and education are more varied. Due to the stability of its composition, the group continues to age. The career trajectories of super -rich Russians vary widely: the group includes businessmen who started from both high and low professional positions. Over time, the proportion of entrepreneurs has grown. The sectoral composition of the businesses of Russia's super rich has changed little over the past decade, reflecting the lack of fundamental structural changes in the economy. However, sectors related to services and information/technology are becoming more prominent. The identified characteristics and dynamics of the group reflect the country's developmental nuances with the changing relative roles of different sectors, the declining importance of the public sector as a starting point, and the concentration of opportunities in the capital cities, among other factors. On the other hand, the stability of the group ensures the inertia of its characteristics and the absence of significant changes in its composition from the 2000s to the 2020s, in contrast to the 1990s when the group underwent much more significant renewal, and its evolving profile was more evident.

Инвестиции населения в человеческий капитал обычно оцениваются с помощью расходов на образование, но этот подход имеет свои ограничения, поскольку соответствующие затраты могут быть не денежными, а временны́ми. В данном исследовании авторы обращаются к анализу включенности взрослого населения страны в широкий спектр образовательных практик, а затем фокусируются только на тех из них, которые нацелены на повышение навыков и знаний, приносящих потенциальную отдачу на рынке труда. Эмпирической базой выступают данные проекта «Выборочное наблюдение участия населения в непрерывном образовании» Росстата за 2020 г. Включенность в разнообразные образовательные практики не так широко распространена среди россиян; еще реже наблюдается вовлеченность в те формы получения знаний, которые связаны с повышением своего профессионального уровня. При этом далеко не все из них воспринимаются как инвестиции в человеческий капитал самим населением. Результаты регрессионного анализа показывают, что включенность в образовательные практики, формирующие человеческий капитал, во многом детерминируется особенностями положения работника на рынке труда и «требованиями профессии» — уровнем образования, его профилем, профессиональной позицией. Влияют на этот выбор и внешние факторы структурного характера, связанные с характеристиками предприятия и отрасли, а также спецификой локальных рынков труда. Благодарность. Статья подготовлена в рамках гранта, предоставленного Министерством науки и высшего образования Российской Федерации (№ соглашения о предоставлении гранта: 075-15-2022-325).

The presented article is devoted to changes in the scale and qualitative characteristics of objective and subjective poverty in Russian society over the past 20 years. Based on the data of all-Russian empirical studies conducted by the Federal Research Center of the Russian Academy of Sciences in 2003, 2013 and 2023, the dynamics of the number of objectively and subjectively poor Russians, the areas of intersection of these groups, their living conditions, their perception of their situation and ideas about the future of the country are traced. The obtained results indicate a noticeable reduction in both objective poverty (by income level) and subjective poverty (by self-assessment of their financial situation) among Russians over the past 20 years, which mainly occurred in the first half of this period. The reduction in the shares of objective and subjective poverty was accompanied by their divergence. As a result, an ever smaller share of Russians find themselves in the poverty zone simultaneously in both of these dimensions, and the portraits and characteristics of these groups differ increasingly. The objectively poor differ less in their assessments of their situation and opportunities in various spheres from the population as a whole, which indicates, on the one hand, the relatively shallow nature of income poverty, and on the other, the modest standard of living of the “typical Russian”. The subjectively poor are characterised by more noticeable differences from the population as a whole, in particular, negative assessments of many spheres of their lives. A similar situation is observed with the socio-psychological well-being of representatives of these groups: although over the past 20 years it has improved both among the poor by income and among the poor by self-assessment, positive changes in the first group occurred faster. As a result, the poor by self-assessment are characterised by a higher level of pessimism and anxiety compared to other Russians. In terms of assessments of Russia's development path, both objectively and subjectively the poor differ little from other Russians, demonstrating a public consensus: the population believes in a bright future for the country, but on the condition that it follows a special path that allows for social stability. Finally, it is important to note that the subjectively poor cannot be reduced to pensioners: the data confirm that this group is heterogeneous in its composition, which determines the absence of a clear portrait and the impossibility of identifying it as a "single addressee" of socio-economic policy.

The study focuses on a hard-to-reach and relatively little-studied group that largely determines the configuration of wealth inequality in Russia today- the super-rich Russian businessmen. n. The object of the study are businessmen who have appeared on the Forbes lists from 2004 to 2021. Based on the analysis of the specially collected empirical database, e, the composition of the group by key socio-economic and demographic indicators is analyzed, d, its changes in the course of Russia's modern history are traced, and the overall dynamics of the group are assessed. d. The high degree of stability of this group is demonstrated, d, as well as the high degree of internal inequality within it. Differences in the two sub-groups of the super-rich- those who entered the labor market in the pre-reform and post-reform periods- are identified. d. It is shown that these differences highlight the gradual changes taking place in this group. p. However, r, even today the pre-reform super-rich dominate the group and therefore determine its generalized portrait. t.

The article explores various aspects of howRussians perceive the development and preservation of their human potential. We demonstrate that, despite some positive changes, Russians mostly view their own situation and opportunities in relation to human potential as average. This finding aligns with the overall perception of the population's subjective social well-being. The way Russians have assessed various aspects of human potential over the past 20 years has followed a general trend in their subjective social well-being. Between 2003 and 2013, most aspects experienced positive changes. However, from 2013 to 2023, the situation stabilized and became more balanced in different groups, including those with more advantages. Today, self-assessments of human potential show the greatest differences between various social and professional groups. There are also smaller differences between urban and rural residents, and the inequality between them has decreased over the past 20 years. Similarly, the differences between groups with various levels of education and income have also been reduced. For the population as a whole, the dynamics of evaluations of human potential have been mixed during this period. The share of average evaluations has increased due to a decrease in both negative and positive evaluations for some aspects, especially the level of health. One positive change that Russians have noticed in the past 10 years is the increased availability of necessary education. The trend towards more balanced assessments and the specific way inequalities are being reduced in this area may pose new challenges for the search for a model of sustainable development based on human potential. This trend implies a relative deterioration in the situation of the most advantaged groups in terms of human potential, which could serve as a social base for this process.

The article examines the monetary and non-monetary inequalities dynamics in Russian society over the last decade through the prism of social stratification models using the RLMS HSE data. It is shown that the general configurations of monetary and non-monetary inequalities share similar characteristics and similar trends. As a result, Russian society today is not only a society of dominant middle strata, both in terms of income and quality of life, but is also characterized by a further dynamic of “median averaging” in the mass strata of the population. The middle stratum in terms of quality of life is larger than the median group in terms of income: more than two thirds of the population are now in a very similar position in terms of the qualitative characteristics of their daily lives, regardless of the fact that their income levels may differ. The configuration of non-monetary inequalities is characterized by greater volatility in the shares of the polar groups , which are more responsive to external changes in the socio-economic context, while the configuration of monetary inequality (assessed using the relative approach based on median income), is characterized by greater monotonicity and a slower rate of change over the last 10 years. In the long run, however, the configuration of income inequality has also changed quite significantly: the dominance of the median group became characteristic only in the last decade. At the micro level, the position in the income hierarchy is not strictly linked to the respective position in the quality of life hierarchy. The results show that the task of reducing inequality is not trivial.

Исследование посвящено труднодоступной и сравнительно мало изученной группе – сверхбогатым россиянам. Объектом исследования выступили россияне, входившие в списки богатейших бизнесменов Forbes с 2004 по 2021 г. На основании специально собранной эмпирической базы проанализирован состав группы по ключевым социально-экономическим и демографическим показателям, прослежены его изменения в ходе новейшей истории России, оценена общая динамика группы. Выявлено, что группа в значительной степени воспроизводит свой состав – ежегодно практически на 90%, в среднесрочной перспективе – примерно на две трети. За последнее десятилетие ключевые характеристики ее состава в силу невысокой степени обновления изменились слабо, но ряд тенденций заслуживает внимания. Группа сверхбогатых сегодня состоит преимущественно из лиц мужского пола, хотя в последние годы в ней появились и женщины. Она характеризуется высоким образовательным уровнем ее представителей, хотя сравнительная значимость образования сверх высшего для них со временем снижается, и оно частично замещается зарубежным образованием, в том числе для детей. Представителям группы свойственно скорее высокое социальное происхождение (однако данные для старшего поколения бизнесменов, преобладающих в составе группы, в этом отношении ограничены). По характеристикам места рождения и места получения высшего образования группа все больше сдвигается в сторону столиц, где концентрируются жизненные возможности, хотя в этом отношении пока все же остается неоднородной. Этой неоднородности способствует смещение в ее составе в сторону россиян старших возрастов, места рождения и образования которых более дифференцированы. В силу устойчивости состава группы она пока продолжает стареть. Сверхбогатые россияне сегодня неоднородны и по карьерным траекториям обретения успеха: в группе представлены бизнесмены, начинавшие свой трудовой путь как с высоких профессиональных позиций, так и с низких; со временем растет доля тех, кто начинает свой путь с позиций вне найма. Показано, что за последнее десятилетие отраслевой срез бизнесов российских сверхбогатых изменился слабо, отразив отсутствие фундаментальных структурных трансформаций в экономике, хотя все большую роль в нем начинают играть отрасли, связанные с сектором услуг и созданием информации/технологий. Выявленные характеристики и динамика группы, с одной стороны, отражают особенности развития страны с изменением сравнительной роли разных отраслей, снижением роли государственного сектора как «точки старта», концентрацией возможностей в столичных городах. С другой стороны, устойчивость группы обеспечивает инертность ее характеристик и отсутствие качественных преобразований в ее составе и портрете в 2000–2020-х гг., в отличие от периода 1990-х гг., когда обновление группы было гораздо более высоким, а изменения в ее портрете заметными.

The article presents the results of the empirical analysis of the relationship between the Russians' perceptions of inequality and their behavior in relation to investments in human capital. Empirical analysis of such a relation is based on the RLMS HSE data. The investments in human capital are operationalized by the expenditures for adult education, and the perceptions of inequality are measured by the subjective degree of fairness of access to higher education, and also by subjective factors of poverty and well-being that population finds most important in contemporary Russian society. The results of the analysis demonstrate that perceptions of inequality held among the population affect their behavior in relation to the adult’s human capital. The population's perception of access to higher education as fair, and the reasons for wealth as meritocratic, leads to a greater propensity to invest in the adults’ human capital. The perception of the causes of wealth as related to the specific parental family support or the institutional environment, which does not meet the principles of equality of opportunity, on the contrary, has a disincentive effect on investment in adult Russians human capital; understanding poverty as a consequence of the current institutional environment specifics in the country works in a similar way. The obtained results demonstrate another consequence of the population's perception of inequality as non-meritocratic (quite typical for Russians in general), affecting the range of possibilities for the implementation of Russia's development vector based on human capital as its driver.

The article focuses on individual income mobility amongst Russians in the years 2009-2017. As in previous periods of post-Soviet development, income mobility in Russia remains high. In comparison to OECD member countries, income mobility is higher, while the level of persistent well-being is lower. Subjective individual assessments of income situation are more volatile than objective positions, with persistent subjective well-being almost non-existent. Subjective mobility does not correlate closely with its objective counterpart. Persistent well-being is determined by a combination of class and non-class factors, including labour market position, dependency burden and health status.

This study explores the roots and details of the Russian population’s demand for broad state interventions in three areas: labour market, social investment, and material support. Demands in labour market policy are the most frequent among the Russian population and stem from the need to eliminate inequalities in access to ‘good’ jobs and ensure fair remuneration of skilled labour. In Russia, unlike in Europe, needs in social investment policy do not stem from individualistic interests and the imperative to compensate for market failure. Instead, they result from state failure, leading in particular to growing inequality of life chances in healthcare and worsening health of the broader society. These impacts are perceived as a fundamental adverse effect of unsuccessful social policy changes, and this type of demand for state support is growing alongside household income. At the same time, wealthy Russians also hardly believe in state efficiency in the labour market, show less demand for employment policy interventions, and generally prefer ‘state escapism’. The study argues that an individualistic mindset per se is a cornerstone of the absence of request for state support in any form. These findings support the concept of bottom-up sociocultural modernisation while helping explain state escapism in post-communist welfare regimes. In general, the study provides empirical contributions to the literature on diversity of statist expectations in post-communist welfare regimes.

We use RLMS HSE data to assess unequal investments in the human capital of children in Russia. Our analysis shows that the position of households in socio-economic hierarchies by the level of education, professional status, income and subjective positioning differentiates investing in children's education. The increase in the share of households that invest in the human capital of children occurs while moving from less to more prosperous positions in each of these hierarchies. Between 2013 and 2018, the number of households spending on children's education increased, but the pandemic caused the situation to reverse, offsetting these results in all but the most affluent groups. In terms of children engagement in additional educational activities (for schoolchildren - apart from school, for preschoolers - in addition to home and family activities), it turns out that children are highly engaged in creative activities, to a lesser extent in sports, and to the least extent in child development courses. At times of the Covid pandemic engagement in sports and creative activities reduced for children from advantaged and less advantaged households. Engagement in development courses proved to be most resilient to this external shock. Children participating in development activities belong to households with high social status, given various axes of social differentiation, but even in these they are a minority. Multilateral engagement of the child, i.e. participation in all three types of additional educational activities, is uncommon, while complete exclusion from any forms of extracurricular or extrafamilial activities is widespread.

В статье на данных общероссийских репрезентативных исследований, проведенных в рамках международной программы ISSP в 1992—2019 гг., а также исследования ФНИСЦ РАН 2020 г. рассматривается восприятие социального неравенства населением, его динамика и роль социальной мобильности как фактора его дифференциации. Показано, что по восприятию доходного неравенства ситуация остается схожей с картиной, характерной еще для 1990-х годов — совсем другого этапа развития страны. Подавляющее большинство россиян и сегодня считают неравенство доходов излишне высоким и несправедливым. Такие представления и связанный с ними высокий запрос на перераспределение не различаются в разных социально-демографических и социально-экономических группах. Опыт социальной мобильности также не приводит к значимой дифференциации в этом отношении; слабым влиянием характеризуется и ожидаемая мобильность в среднесрочной перспективе. Относительно заметно «работают» в этом отношении только краткосрочные ожидания: если они позитивны, то снижают негативное восприятие доходного неравенства и запрос на перераспределение. Что касается восприятия немонетарных неравенств, то нормативные представления о том, минимизация каких из них необходима для достижения социальной справедливости, оказываются схожими в группах с разным направлением ожидаемой или уже совершенной мобильности. Это позволяет сделать вывод о том, что восприятие и монетарного, и немонетарных неравенств, как и запросы на их сокращение, формируются в большей степени исходя из нормативных представлений о «должном» устройстве общества и оценки его соответствия наблюдаемой реальности, чем из особенностей индивидуальной ситуации, в том числе и ожидаемой или фактической мобильности. Благодарность. Статья подготовлена в рамках гранта, предоставленного Министерством науки и высшего образования Российской Федерации (№ соглашения о предоставлении гранта: 075-15-2020-928).

This article examines the features of the social status of modern youth in its objective and subjective dimensions. The objective social statuses of young people are characterised by the position of their representatives in the key hierarchies in terms of education level, professional positions and income level. It is shown that the level of education of the Russian youth has increased noticeably over the past twenty years; the socio-professional structure of the youth group also underwent certain changes, reflected in a decrease in the proportion of the unemployed, as well as workers of various skill levels, in its composition. The space of socio-professional statuses of young people does not demonstrate significant differences compared to Russians of middle and older ages, and this is also typical for models of income stratification of these groups. In general, speaking about the space of the objective statuses of young people in modern Russian society, it can be stated that young people are not in a disadvantaged position in this respect due to the specifics of this stage of the life cycle - on the contrary, already in the youth group one can observe the existing configuration of the social structure, that is also characteristic of Russians of working age as a whole (that is reflected, in particular, in a similar share of the middle class in these groups). With regard to subjective statuses, young Russians, like citizens in general, tend to place themselves in middle positions in society. However, the position they consider “fair” for themselves, as well as their desired position, turn out to be much higher than the current one, that can also lead to the accumulation of discontent, since it reflects obviously unrealistic expectations regarding social mobility. And although young Russians are quite positive about the medium-term future, their expectations for the next 2-3 years are more restrained. A negative indicator is the fact that young people share with adult Russians a sense of the unfairness of the structure of Russian society, and these perceptions have little to do with their objective statuses. At the same time, young Russians see principles related to the instrumentalisation of the principle of equal opportunities as key elements of a just society.

This paper addresses the issue of the interrelation between different types of social mobility and support for reducing income inequality in contemporary Russia. Drawing from the Russian subsets of the International Social Survey Programme’s (ISSP) surveys, we estimate how this support is differentiated across experienced and expected subjective mobility. Official statistics and empirical survey data widely confirm that the large-scale socioeconomic changes that took place in Russia during the 2000s brought an increase in living standards for most population groups and a more-than-twofold reduction in poverty. However, according to the ISSP data, demand for the government to reduce income differences is at its highest level since 1992. More than 90 per cent of Russians unequivocally perceive income gaps in the country as too high (the same as in the late 1990s) and unfair. We test the effects of actual and expected mobility, showing that, in contrast to the literature, including earlier studies on Russia, past mobility and expected medium-term mobility do not have any significant effect on levels of support for reducing income differences, and only the effect of short-term expectations can be seen. We argue that the effect of social mobility in Russia is limited by a widespread consensus across the population that preexisting inequalities in Russia are too high and unfair – a viewpoint based mostly not on the specifics of individual situations, including experienced or expected mobility, but on shared subjective norms and beliefs about inequality and their contrast with existing reality.

This paper addresses the issue of the interrelation between different types of social mobility and support for reducing income inequality in contemporary Russia. Drawing from the Russian subsets of the International Social Survey Programme's (ISSP) surveys, we estimate how this support is differentiated across experienced and expected subjective mobility. Official statistics and empirical survey data widely confirm that the large-scale socioeconomic changes that took place in Russia during the 2000s brought an increase in living standards for most population groups and a more-than-twofold reduction in poverty. However, according to the ISSP data, demand for the government to reduce income differences is at its highest level since 1992. More than 90 per cent of Russians unequivocally perceive income gaps in the country as too high (the same as in the late 1990s) and unfair. We test the effects of actual and expected mobility, showing that, in contrast to the literature, including earlier studies on Russia, past mobility and expected medium-term mobility do not have any significant effect on levels of support for reducing income differences, and only the effect of short-term expectations can be seen. We argue that the effect of social mobility in Russia is limited by - a widespread consensus across the population that preexisting inequalities in Russia are too high and unfair a viewpoint based mostly not on the specifics of individual situations, including experienced or expected mobility, but on shared subjective norms and beliefs about inequality and their contrast with existing reality.

Based on data from the all-Russian representative studies carried out by FCTAS RAS in 2018-2020, the system of non-monetary inequalities in modern Russian society and the changes that have occurred under the influence of the crisis caused by the first wave of the pandemic are analyzed. The key axes of non-monetary inequalities show a high degree of concentration: "safety cushion", favorable employment conditions, good health and education, subjective well-being are typical for only a minority of the population. Along all these axes, the very nature of inequality is determined by the qualitative differences between the small-sized "top" and the rest of the mass strata. The position in the system of non-monetary inequalities to a greater extent differentiates the most high-income strata from other Russians, rather than the low-income. The availability of digital opportunities is no longer concentrated in the upper strata, but their absence characterizes the lower strata. The differentiation of the working population occurs by the degree of infringement of basic rights and alienation of labor, i.e. by deprivation, while the additional benefits are available only for a minority of working Russians. The last crisis impacted differently on non-monetary inequalities, but the changes did not affect the general configuration of social space. Research findings have confirmed that inequality in the mass strata of the Russian population is associated not only with differences in the level of current income. Non-monetary inequalities are superimposed on monetary inequalities and exacerbate them rather than smooth them out.

The paper examines specifics of inequalities perceptions by the Russian middle class on the eve of the 2020 crisis. The empirical analysis is based on the data from the International Social Survey Program (ISSP). The middle class was defined in the tradition of multidimensional stratification according to the criteria of socio-professional status, education and income levels. It is shown that the middle class shares with other groups of the population a common understanding of the system of inequalities that characterizes modern Russian society. Despite a more advantageous position of its representatives in this system and higher chances for its positive dynamics, the existing inequalities are assessed by middle class, as well as by Russians in general, as excessively deep and illegitimate. It is shown that middle class representatives consider themselves representatives of the "middle", not upper strata. In this regard, when discussing inequality, they mean not a gap between their position and the position of other mass population groups, but a significant and growing gap between the very small elite and all other Russians, to whom they belong themselves. This fact is reflected in the specific perceptions of the social conflicts as seen by the population, the key to which they currently consider to be a conflict between the poor and the rich. Dissatisfaction with the lack of action on the part of the state in regard to inequalities among the middle class, which concentrates the most educated, qualified and independent Russians, becomes an important challenge that raises the question of the social contract revision.

Научный центр международного уровня «Центр междисциплинарных исследований человеческого потенциала» Распределенная исследовательская группа «Сеть исследователей неравенства» Редакционная коллегия

Цитирование: Аникин В.А., Лежнина Ю.П., Мареева С.В., Слободенюк Е.Д. (2020) Кто и почему ищет государственной поддержки в новой России? // Мир России. Т. 29. № 1. С. 31–52. DOI: 10.17323/1811-038X-2020-29-1-31-52 В статье анализируется вопрос о том, какова природа запросов россиян на содействие государства в сферах занятости, социального инвестирования и материальной поддержки. На основании современной теории изучения общественного мнения, социальной стратификации и рынка труда был протестирован вклад четырех механизмов: (а) демографических особенностей населения, (б) доходов домохозяйств и располагаемых ресурсов, в том числе нематериальных активов, включая человеческий и социальный капитал, (в) индивидуальных интересов, а также (г) социально-психологических установок. По итогам эконометрического анализа, проведенного на базе Всероссийского мониторинга ФНИСЦ РАН 2018 года, авторы пришли к выводу, что запросы на содействие государства имеют сложную природу и существует всего лишь один универсальный фактор – доход, однако его влияние носит неоднозначный характер. Данные показывают, что с повышением дохода вероятность запроса на помощь государства в области материальной поддержки только возрастает, что корреспондирует с недавними выводами зарубежных исследователей об «альтруизме богатых». Тем не менее с ростом дохода она снижается только у россиян, которые не испытывают нужды в помощи государства в сфере занятости. Таким образом, социальная политика, построенная исключительно на монетарных инструментах, без необходимых институциональных мер на рынке труда обречена на провал с точки зрения реализации гетерогенных потребностей и интересов населения.