Technological innovation of industrial cluster is an important measure to realize low-carbon development. However, the uncertainty associated with new technologies can have a significant impact on the earnings of enterprises. This paper examines the benefit distribution of collaborative technological innovation in industrial clusters through the gray Shapley value, which makes up for the problem that existing research ignores the impact of the uncertainty of technological innovation on the distribution of benefits and provides a new research perspective. In addition, this paper also provides some countermeasures for the Chinese government to encourage enterprises in industrial clusters carry out low-carbon innovation activities.

Against the backdrop of the development of "dual carbon" and "new quality productivity", in-depth exploration of how companies' adherence to ESG concepts affects investors' choices is particularly important for promoting high-quality and sustainable development of companies. To compensate for the lack of existing research on corporate ESG performance and investor attention at the strategic level of analysis, this paper proposes a research paradigm based on GMCR-AHP-TOPSIS, constructs a conflict analysis graph model and does an arithmetic case analysis. The study found that if companies choose to follow the concept of ESG development and take the initiative to do a good job of ESG information disclosure, it is easier to win the attention of investors, and the better the ESG performance of the company, the easier it is to win the investment of investors. At the same time, along with the high quality and sustainable development of typical Chinese new energy companies with good ESG performance, the industry's new quality productivity improvement will help promote the implementation of China's "dual carbon" goal in the long run. The findings of this paper may be of great value to investors in making ESG investment decisions.

Previous subsidy policies have helped tremendously in the development of new energy vehicles (NEVs) in China. However, with the removal of subsidies, how to continue to promote the development of China’s NEVs industry has become an important issue that needs to be addressed today. Existing research has only studied the behavior of consumers in purchasing NEVs, ignoring the strong substitution effect of conventional energy vehicles for NEVs. To fill this gap, this paper takes full account of the different utilities that conventional energy vehicles and NEVs bring to consumers, and constructs a three-party evolutionary game model to analyze the strategic choices of automobile enterprises, consumers, and the Chinese government in the “post-subsidy era”. Through parameter assignment and simulation, this paper draws the following conclusions: (1) The support policy of the Chinese government for the NEVs industry in the “post-subsidy era” can effectively enhance the enthusiasm of automobile enterprises to develop NEVs and improve consumers’ willingness to purchase NEVs, but dynamic adjustments should be made according to the actual situation to avoid unnecessary cost burden. (2) The purchase cost of NEVs hurts consumers’ purchase willingness, and the higher purchase cost caused by the cancellation of subsidies will reduce consumers’ willingness to purchase NEVs in the “post-subsidy era”. (3) Consumers’ car purchase choice has a direct impact on the strategic choice direction of automobile enterprises. Therefore, cultivating consumers’ low-carbon awareness and enhancing their willingness to purchase NEVs can promote the enthusiasm of automobile enterprises to develop NEVs in the “post-subsidy era”.

The purpose of our study is to discuss the impact of consumers’ market distribution and consumers’ fairness concerns on the decisions of supply chain participants. Based on utility theory, we innovatively incorporate consumers’ fairness concerns as a significant factor into the game model and focus on the impact of the utility gap between products on consumers’ purchasing willingness. In this paper, we establish a two-echelon supply chain consisting of one traditional manufacturer, one low-carbon manufacturer, and one retailer, and comparatively analyze the equilibrium results under the initial state and consumers’ fairness concerns. The results show that the presence of consumers’ fairness concerns results in the higher wholesale price, higher retail price, and larger profit of low-carbon products yet leads to a decline in traditional products’ pricing and profit, and the impacts on the low-carbon manufacturer are more significant than on the traditional manufacturer. A reduction appears in the retailer’s profit since consumers’ fairness concerns decrease the retailer’s ability to differential pricing. Additionally, the impacts of consumers’ fairness concerns on the game equilibrium are also affected by consumers’ market distribution and low-carbon manufacturers’ technical efficiency, and the impacts are more pronounced in an environment where low-carbon manufacturers’ R&D investments are more efficient. Furthermore, in a market dominated by low-carbon preferred consumers, low-carbon manufacturers are always more profitable than traditional manufacturers, while in a market dominated by traditionally preferred consumers, low-carbon manufacturers are only able to achieve higher profits than traditional manufacturers when R&D is quite efficient and consumers’ fairness concerns are relatively strong.

Considering consumer channel preferences, our paper establishes a two‐echelon differential low‐carbon supply chain model and discusses the effects of member's cost‐sharing and fairness concerns on equilibrium results. From a static perspective, the results indicate that retailers' fairness concern behavior will lead to a decrease in pricing and participants' efforts while manufacturers cost‐sharing strategy will only enhance retailers' advertising efforts. From a dynamic perspective, products' greenness, long‐term benefits of manufacturers and retailers, and social welfare will gradually increase and eventually saturate over time. In most cases, manufacturer‐to‐retailer cost‐sharing is a win–win strategy that not only enhances the long‐term interests but also realizes the greening and upgrading of the supply chain.

针对互联网企业与新能源汽车企业技术协同创新的问题,本文以互联网企业和新能源汽车企业为研究对象,通过构建微分博弈模型,运用HJB方程分析了三种技术协同创新博弈情形下互联网企业和新能源汽车企业各自的最优研发努力程度、互联网企业对新能源汽车企业的最优技术协同创新补贴以及二者合作的最优合作模式.通过对三种博弈结论的比较分析发现:(1)Stackelberg主从模式下互联网企业和新能源汽车企业各自的研发努力程度、各自的研发收益以及研发总收益均优于Nash非合作模式,达到了Pareto均衡;(2)互联网企业与新能源汽车企业同时为新能源汽车的技术突破付出努力能够最大限度地提升双方研发合作的整体收益;(3)互联网企业对新能源汽车企业的补贴与收益分配系数负向相关;(4)新能源汽车企业的研发投入对整体收益提升的有效性大于互联网企业;(5)协同合作模式下互联网企业和新能源汽车企业各自的研发努力程度、各自的研发收益以及研发总收益是三种模式中最优的,达到了完美的Pareto均衡.最后,本文通过算例分析验证了理论推导结果的正确性并基于研究结论提出了相应的建议对策.

Carrying out low-carbon economic cooperation under the belt and road initiative (BRI) is an important measure to actively respond to climate change and maintain global ecological security. With the continuous development of national strength, the Chinese government should actively fulfill environmental responsibility in the BRI economic cooperation. Existing studies have pointed out that the Chinese government can promote low-carbon economic cooperation in BRI through outward foreign direct investment (OFDI), and emphasized the significance of the Chinese government's participation. However, they have not revealed the relationship between China's environmental responsibility and the construction of a green BRI. To fill this gap, this paper analyzes the strategic choices and relevant influencing factors of the Chinese government, governments of countries along the BRI, and Chinese OFDI enterprises in the BRI low-carbon economic cooperation. Through parameter assignment and simulation, this paper draws the following conclusions: (1) The Chinese government should decide whether to take the initiative to fulfill environmental responsibility according to the economic development level of countries along the BRI; (2) The Chinese government fulfilling environmental responsibility is positive and effective for the responsible investment of Chinese OFDI enterprises; (3) The Chinese government fulfilling environmental responsibility can enhance the initiative of countries along the BRI to positive governance, but this enhancement is not last. More importantly, the environmental responsibility of the Chinese government is not simply to provide subsidies to countries along the BRI. Various measures must be taken by the Chinese government to fulfill its environmental responsibility in the BRI economic cooperation.

The threat from multinational enterprises to local enterprises in developing countries is increasing with the in-depth development of global value chain cooperation. To increase the profit distribution of local enterprises in global value chain, it is necessary to analyze the cooperation strategy between local enterprises and multinational enterprises. In this paper, cooperative game theory is applied to form a better understanding of cooperation between local enterprises and multinational enterprises. The Shapley values under different cooperative models are analyzed. Based on the analysis, the paper provides some suggestions for local enterprises to enhance the profit distribution of cooperation with multinational enterprises.

政产学协同创新是促进新能源汽车发展的重要举措.我国将进入新能源汽车后补贴时代,这项举措无疑会对新能源汽车产业带来巨大的影响.本文在拟取消新能源汽车补贴的大背景下,运用三方演化博弈方法,建立了新能源汽车企业、高校、政府三方的协同创新博弈支付矩阵,通过Matlab的数值仿真,研究了相关参数对三方协同创新策略的影响.结果表明:三方参与协同创新意愿增长速度不同,且政府参与意愿会随着新能源汽车企业和高校参与意愿的增长而下降;新能源汽车企业参与协同创新的意愿趋近于稳定的速度始终快于高校;政府对新能源汽车企业和高校协同创新的激励成本的大小影响着政府的参与意愿;政府参与和不参与协同创新的可获得收益不能单独影响政府的参与意愿,参与和不参与可获得收益之间差额的大小决定政府的参与意愿.

New energy vehicle subsidy is an important way for our government to support new energy vehicle industry. In recent years, our government has formulated a policy of vigorously supporting the new energy automobile industry. With the increase of support, the number of new energy vehicles in China has increased year by year. In view of the information asymmetry between the government and the enterprise in the implementation of the new energy vehicle subsidies policy, this paper studies the problem of the reverse selection of the enterprise and the government in the subsidy process by using the signal game model, and analyzes the related influencing factors and the game equilibrium. The results show that the probability of “subsidy defraud” is greatly improved due to the asymmetry of information between enterprises and governments. Realize the optimal separation and equilibrium solution of high sales enterprises applying for high subsidies and the government giving high subsidies; low sales enterprises apply for low subsidies, and the government gives the optimal separation equilibrium solution of low subsidies. It is necessary to increase the camouflage cost of the enterprise’s “subsidy defraud” and to increase the punishment of the “subsidy defraud”. At the same time, according to the results of the study, the relevant suggestions and countermeasures of the government’s preventive “subsidy defraud” behavior are put forward. The above research is of great theoretical significance and practical value in promoting the development of new energy vehicles in the post-subsidy era.