Este estudo examina o papel da propriedade institucional comum (PIC) na redução do comportamento de tunneling dos acionistas controladores em empresas chinesas listadas em bolsa. Utilizando um modelo de regressão múltipla, a influência da PIC no tunneling é examinada empiricamente. Os resultados mostram que a PIC restringe o tunneling, e o impacto se intensifica com o aumento da PIC e um índice de participação acionária mais alto. Esse efeito é mais acentuado em empresas com ambientes de informações deficientes, baixa supervisão externa, propriedade não estatal e um alto grau de separação entre propriedade e controle. Descobrimos que os investidores institucionais comuns aliviam o tunneling usando a vantagem da informação e participando do ativismo dos acionistas. Esses resultados oferecem novas evidências sobre o efeito dos investidores institucionais comuns no comportamento dos acionistas controladores.

Purpose Extensive macro- and micro-economics research has been conducted on China's tax reform, which replaced business tax with value-added tax (VAT). However, existing studies have not clarified the reform's impact on firm-level investment decisions. Hence, this study explored the effect of replacing business tax with VAT on firms' investment efficiency. Design/methodology/approach The study used 2010–2018 data from China's A-share listed companies and a difference-in-differences (DID) model to explore the effect of the reform on firm-level investment decisions. Findings The authors found that China's tax reform has improved investment efficiency in underinvested firms, increased liquidity and decreased the level of reliance on external financing. The tax reform had a greater effect on investment efficiency in firms with lower liquidity and higher external financing reliance. Its effect was also more significant among non-state-owned and small companies. Originality/value This study fills the aforementioned research gap by exploring the effects of China's tax reform, thus providing a theoretical reference and a basis for policymaking.

This study examines the role of common institutional ownership (CIO) in reducing the tunneling behavior of controlling shareholders in Chinese listed companies. We empirically examined the influence of CIO on tunneling using a multiple regression model. The results show that CIO restrains tunneling, and the impact intensifies with an increase in CIO and a higher shareholding ratio. This effect is more pronounced in firms with poor information environments, low external supervision, non-state ownership, and a high degree of separation between ownership and control. We find that common institutional investors alleviate tunneling by using information advantage and engaging in shareholder activism. These results offer new evidence of the effect of common institutional investors on controlling shareholders' behavior.

Common institutional ownership has become a significant form of shareholding in the capital market. Using panel data on 2395 listed companies in China from 2007 to 2020, we examine the investment efficiency of this ownership practice on microcorporate investment behavior. The estimates indicate that common institutional ownership has a significant positive relationship with corporate investment efficiency by reducing overinvestment. Further institutional heterogeneity analysis reveals that enterprises have independent and long-term investment horizon of common institutional investors, and the positive effect of common institutional ownership on enterprises’ investment efficiency is stronger. The empirical results are validated by a series of robustness tests. This study provides empirical support for the performance of common institutional ownership participating in corporate governance and optimizing investment decisions.

资本市场开放是现代经济体系和成熟金融市场的基本特征,也是资本市场实现高质量发展的重要环节,对于加强上市公司规范治理和宏观经济的稳定具有重要作用.本文利用上市公司2010年至2016年数据,实证检验了资本市场开放对大股东掏空行为的影响.研究发现,资本市场开放有效抑制了大股东掏空,并且对掏空动机较强、掏空约束较弱公司的抑制作用更为显著.研究发现,在股权集中度低、两权分离度大,以及股权制衡度低、市场关注度较低的公司中,资本市场开放对大股东掏空的抑制作用显著;对国有公司和位于市场化程度较低省份的公司,抑制作用更强.本文的研究发现和结论丰富了宏观经济的微观基础和资本市场开放对公司治理影响的研究,同时为完善公司治理和提升公司内外部有效监督带来启示.