Need for Cognition (NFC) describes one’s inclination towards and enjoyment of effortful cognitive activities and has been associated with favourable academic outcomes. Yet, recent evidence also points to beneficial outcomes regarding well-being. This review gives an overview of the literature on the role of NFC in well-being in healthy adults by combining random-effects meta-analyses and a qualitative integration of evidence. Studies investigating NFC and facets of well-being were acquired via database searches and a call for unpublished results. Higher NFC was found to be associated with lower neuroticism, anxiety, negative affect, burnout, public self-consciousness, and depression and with higher positive affect, private self-consciousness, and satisfaction (|𝜌| ~ .20 with 95% confidence intervals excluding zero for all examined outcomes). While tests for publication and selection bias in the meta-analyses were negative, heterogeneity was often observed. NFC was further associated with aspects of a more stable identity and higher social confidence, while associations with addictive behaviours and physical health were inconsistent. One mechanism driving these patterns seems to be a higher perceived control in individuals with higher NFC that increases active coping, but also reduces the effectiveness of health interventions by fostering a sense of overconfidence in own resources. Thus, this review provides a leverage point for future research on NFC and well-being to improve prevention and intervention.
Effortful tasks are generally experienced as costly, but the value of work varies greatly across individuals and populations. While most mental health conditions are characterized by amotivation and effort avoidance, individuals with anorexia nervosa (AN) persistently engage in effortful behaviors that most people find unrewarding (food restriction, excessive exercise). Current models of AN differentially attribute such extreme weight-control behavior to altered reward responding and exaggerated cognitive control. In a novel test of these theoretical accounts, we employed an established cognitive effort discounting paradigm in combination with fMRI in young acutely underweight female patients with AN (n = 48) and age-matched healthy controls (HC; n = 48). Contrary to the hypothesis that individuals with AN would experience cognitive effort (operationalized as N-back task performance) as less costly than HC participants, groups did not differ in the subjective value (SV) of discounted rewards or in SV-related activation of brain regions involved in reward valuation. Rather, all group differences in both behavior (superior N-back performance in AN and associated effort ratings) and fMRI activation (increased SV-related frontoparietal activation during decision-making in AN even for easier choices) were more indicative of increased control. These findings suggest that while effort discounting may be relatively intact in AN, effort investment is high both when performing demanding tasks and during effort-based decision-making; highlighting cognitive overcontrol as an important therapeutic target. Future research should establish whether exaggerated control during effort-based decision-making persists after weight-recovery and explore learning the value of effort in AN with tasks involving disorder-relevant effort demands and rewards.
While intelligence and motivational variables are well-established predictors of academic achievement, Need for Cognition (NFC), the stable intrinsic motivation to engage in and enjoy challenging intellectual activity, has not yet been considered comprehensively in this field, especially not longitudinally. By applying latent change score modeling, we examined the incremental value of NFC, considering well-established motivational constructs and prior achievement in the prediction of academic achievement across different subjects in a longitudinal approach across two time points in a sample of secondary school students (NT1 = 271, NT2 = 255). Correlations of NFC with grades were comparable to those of established predictors. NFC incrementally predicted academic achievement over and above prior achievement and ability self-concept. A mutual influence of NFC and academic achievement was found pointing to skill development as well as self-enhancement processes taking place in this interplay. Consequently, we propose to include NFC in models for the comprehensive explanation of academic achievement in school.
Prior research suggests that cognitive control, indicated by NoGo N2 amplitudes in Go/NoGo tasks, is associated with dispositional anxiety. This negative association tends to be reduced in anxiety-enhancing experimental conditions. However, anxiety-reducing conditions have not yet been investigated systematically. Thus, the present study compares the effect of a relaxation instruction with the conventional speed/accuracy instruction in a Go/NoGo task on the correlation of the NoGo N2 with two subconstructs of dispositional anxiety, namely anxious apprehension and anxious arousal. As the test of differences between correlations needs considerable statistical power, the present study was included into the multi-lab CoScience Project. The hypotheses, manipulation checks, and the main path of pre-processing and statistical analysis were preregistered. Complete data sets of 777 participants were available for data analysis. Preregistered general linear models revealed that the different instructions of the task (speed/accuracy vs. relaxation) had no effect on the association between dispositional anxiety and the NoGo N2 amplitude in general. This result was supported by Cooperative-Forking-Path analysis. In contrast, a preregistered latent growth model with categorical variables revealed that anxious arousal was a negative predictor of the NoGo N2 intercept and a positive predictor of the NoGo N2 slope. Non-preregistered growth models, allowing for correlations of anxious apprehension with anxious arousal, revealed that higher anxious apprehension scores were associated with more negative NoGo N2 amplitudes with increased relaxation. Results are discussed in the context of the compensatory error monitoring hypothesis and the revised Reinforcement Sensitivity Theory.
Frontal alpha asymmetry has been proposed as a ubiquitous marker of state and trait approach motivation, but recent meta-analyses found weak or nonexistent links with personality traits. It has been suggested that frontal asymmetry may show stronger individual differences in situations that elicit approach motivation (state-trait interaction). To investigate this with sufficient statistical power, we utilized data from the CoScience project (N = 740). Frontal asymmetry was measured during a resting period, a picture viewing task, and a guessing task, which were expected to trigger different levels of approach motivation. Results showed that frontal asymmetry was not reliably affected by task manipulations and did not relate to self-reported traits. Furthermore, Bayesian statistics and a cooperative forking path analysis were used to supplement the preregistered analyses. To conclude, this comprehensive analysis could not support the validity of frontal asymmetry as a marker of approach motivation, neither as a reliable state nor as a trait marker.
Cognitive motivation (COM) in conjunction with self-regulation (SR) was demonstrated to be positively linked to mental health in educational and clinical contexts. We introduce COM and SR in the occupational context and hypothesize these traits—based on their conceptual link to hardiness - to counteract health-risking stressors. Data from two large cross-sectional studies in Germany comprise a sample of 1,022 psychosomatic rehabilitation in-patients and a healthy sample of 298 employees of various occupations. Using bootstrapping in correlation analyses, we found in both samples COM and SR to be especially associated with an active, meaningful, and persistent coping style (0.31 ≤ r ≤ 0.57). Analyses via structural equation modeling found COM cross-sectionally predicting occupational coping via SR in both samples. We discuss COM and SR as personal resources with respect to Conservation of Resources Theory and provide ideas for promoting these variables in patients and employees.
Contrary to the law of less work, individuals with high levels of need for cognition and self-control tend to choose harder tasks more often. While both traits can be integrated into a core construct of dispositional cognitive effort investment, its relation to actual cognitive effort investment remains unclear. As individuals with high levels of cognitive effort investment are characterized by a high intrinsic motivation towards effortful cognition, they would be less likely to increase their effort based on expected payoff, but rather based on increasing demand. In the present study, we measured actual effort investment on multiple dimensions, i.e., subjective load, reaction time, accuracy, early and late frontal midline theta power, N2 and P3 amplitude, and pupil dilation. In a sample of N = 148 participants, we examined the relationship of dispositional cognitive effort investment and effort indices during a flanker and an n-back task with varying demand and payoff. Exploratorily, we examined this relationship for the two subdimensions cognitive motivation and effortful-self-control as well. In both tasks, effort indices were sensitive to demand and partly to payoff. The analyses revealed a main effect of cognitive effort investment for accuracy (n-back task), interaction effects with payoff for reaction time (n-back and flanker task) and P3 amplitude (n-back task) and demand for early frontal midline theta power (flanker task). Taken together, our results partly support the notion that individuals with high levels of cognitive effort investment exert effort more efficiently. Moreover, the notion that these individuals exert effort regardless of payoff is partly supported, too. This may further our understanding of the conditions under which person-situation interactions occur, i.e. the conditions under which situations determine effort investment in goal-directed behavior more than personality, and vice versa.
It is an open question in cognitive emotion regulation research how emotion regulation unfolds over time, and whether the brain regions involved in down-regulation are also recruited during up-regulation of emotions. As a replication and extension of our preceding study, we conducted an fMRI study in young healthy adults on the neural basis of up- and down-regulation of negative and neutral pictures during the immediate stimulation phase as well as after short- and long-term delays (N=47 for immediate and short-term delays, a subset of N=30 for long-term delays). For this, we employed three experimental conditions—down-regulation (distance), maintenance (permit), and up-regulation (intensify)—for negative and neutral pictures, and investigated the neural responses during the stimulation and post-stimulation phase as well as during re-exposure after 10 min and after 1 week. We observed the following main results: first, we found greater activation in emotion-generating regions such as the amygdala in the permit vs. distance and the intensify vs. distance comparisons, but not in the intensify vs. permit comparison. Second, we observed greater activation in emotion-regulating regions such as the right inferior parietal and right superior / middle frontal cortex in the distance vs. permit and the distance vs. intensify contrasts, but not the permit vs. intensify contrast. Third, we found that the activation difference between distance and intensify within the amygdala reversed after the regulation period. Fourth, previous emotion regulation did not influence the activation during re-exposure, neither after 10 min nor after 1 week. Taken together, the results provide a partial replication of persistent effects observed in our preceding study, indicate different neural systems for up- and down-regulation, and demonstrate that a broader perspective on emotion regulation can be achieved by simultaneously considering different goals, directions, and strategies of emotion regulation in a single experiment.
When individuals set goals, they consider the subjective value (SV) of the anticipated reward and the required effort, a trade-off that is of great interest to psychological research. One approach to quantify the SVs of levels of difficulty of a cognitive task is the Cognitive Effort Discounting Paradigm by Westbrook and colleagues (2013). However, it fails to acknowledge the highly individual nature of effort, as it assumes a unidirectional, inverse relationship between task load and SVs. Therefore, it cannot map differences in effort perception that arise from traits like Need for Cognition, since individuals who enjoy effortful cognitive activities likely do not prefer the easiest level. We replicated the analysis of Westbrook and colleagues with an adapted version, the Cognitive and Affective Discounting (CAD) Paradigm. It quantifies SVs without assuming that the easiest level is preferred, thereby enabling the assessment of SVs for tasks without objective order of task load. Results show that many of the 116 participants preferred a more or the most difficult level. Variance in SVs was best explained by a declining logistic contrast of the n -back levels and by the accuracy of responses, while reaction time as a predictor was highly volatile depending on the preprocessing pipeline. Participants with higher Need for Cognition scores perceived higher n -back levels as less effortful and found them less aversive. Effects of Need for Cognition on SVs in lower levels did not reach significance, as group differences only emerged in higher levels. The CAD Paradigm appears to be well suited for assessing and analysing task preferences independent of the supposed objective task difficulty. Protocol registration The stage 1 protocol for this Registered Report was accepted in principle on August 19, 2022. The protocol, as accepted by the journal, can be found at: https://doi.org/10.17605/OSF.IO/CPXTH .
Differences in moral sentiments are widespread. Increasingly, their biological correlates are investigated to elucidate potential sources of divergent moral attitudes and choices. Serotonin is one such potential modulator. We investigated the effects of a functional serotonergic polymorphism, 5-HTTLPR, which was previously linked to moral choices albeit with inconsistent findings. N = 157 healthy young adults completed a set of congruent and incongruent moral dilemmas. In addition to the traditional moral response score, this set allows by using a process dissociation (PD) approach an estimation a deontological and a utilitarian parameter. While there was no main effect of 5-HTTLPR on any of the three moral judgement parameters, there was an interaction effect between 5-HTTLPR and endocrine status on PD parameters, which was mainly due to the deontological but not the utilitarian parameter. In men and free cycling women, LL homozygotes showed reduced deontological tendencies compared to S allele carriers. Contrariwise, in women using oral contraceptives, LL homozygotes had increased deontology parameter scores. Furthermore, LL genotypes in general reported less difficulty in making harmful choices, which were in addition associated with less negative emotions. The findings suggest that 5-HTTLPR might be involved in modulating cognitive and emotional processes contributing to moral decisions.
Abstract Individuals have a repertoire of emotion regulation (ER) strategies at their disposal, which they can use more or less flexibly. In ER flexibility research, strategies that facilitate goal achievement are considered adaptive and therefore are subjectively valuable. Individuals are motivated to reduce their emotional arousal effectively and to avoid cognitive effort. Perceived costs of ER strategies in the form of effort, however, are highly subjective. Subjective values (SVs) should therefore represent a trade-off between effectiveness and subjectively required cognitive effort. However, SVs of ER strategies have not been determined so far. We present a new paradigm for quantifying individual SVs of ER strategies by offering monetary values for ER strategies in an iterative process. N = 120 participants first conducted an ER paradigm with the strategies distraction, distancing, and suppression. Afterwards, individual SVs were determined using the new CAD paradigm. SVs significantly predicted later choice for an ER strategy (χ2 (4, n = 119) = 115.40, p < 0.001, BF10 = 1.62 × 1021). Further, SVs were associated with Corrugator activity (t (5, 618.96) = 2.09, p = 0.037, f 2 = 0.001), subjective effort (t (5, 618.96) = − 13.98, p < 0.001, f 2 = 0.035), and self-reported utility (t (5, 618.96) = 29.49, p < 0.001, f 2 = 0.155). SVs were further associated with self-control (t (97.97) = 2.04, p = 0.044, f 2 = 0.002), but not with flexible ER. With our paradigm, we were able to determine subjective values. The trait character of the values will be discussed. Protocol registration The stage 1 protocol for this Registered Report was accepted in principle on July 19, 2022. The protocol, as accepted by the journal, can be found at: https://doi.org/10.17605/OSF.IO/FN9BT .
Evidence suggests that cognitive control and emotional control share partly the same cognitive processes. For example, downregulation of negative emotions requires inhibiting or limiting the expression of a prepotent appraisal of a situation in favor of selecting an alternative appraisal. Although inhibitory control seems to be a particularly relevant process in emotion regulation (ER), previous studies reported inconsistent findings on their relationship, likely because of the application of single task measures in relatively small samples. Therefore, this study implemented a battery of six commonly used inhibitory control tasks in a large sample of young healthy adults (N = 190) and investigated whether inhibitory control is associated with the downregulation of negative emotion. ER was measured via self-reported reappraisal and suppression use and via a laboratory ER task where participants had to distance themselves from emotions in response to negative and neutral pictures. The ER task was accompanied by concurrent physiological measurements of corrugator electromyography (EMG), skin conductance response (SCR), and heart period (HP). Frequentist and Bayesian analyses indicated that inhibitory control was neither associated with self-reported reappraisal and suppression use, nor with successful downregulation of negative emotion via distancing. Compared with HP and SCR, corrugator EMG was the only peripheral physiological measure that was indicative of regulatory success. The findings question the view that inhibitory control represents an underlying process in emotion regulation via distancing, at least at the behavioral level. Further studies should investigate the generalizability of these findings to other ER strategies, tactics, paradigms, and participant groups. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).
It is an open question in cognitive emotion regulation research how emotion regulation unfolds over time, and whether the brain regions involved in down-regulation are also recruited during up-regulation of emotions. As a replication and extension of our preceding study, we conducted an fMRI study in N=47 young healthy adults on the neural basis of up- and down-regulation of negative and neutral pictures during the immediate stimulation phase as well as after short- and long-term delays. For this, we employed three experimental conditions – down-regulation (distance), maintenance (permit), and up-regulation (intensify) – for negative and neutral stimuli, and investigated the neural responses during the stimulation and post-stimulation phase as well as during re-exposure after 10 min and after 1 week. We observed the following main results: first, greater activation in emotion-generating regions such as the amygdala in the permit vs. distance and the intensify vs. distance comparisons, but not in the intensify vs. permit comparison. Second, greater activation in emotion-regulating regions such as the right inferior parietal and right superior / middle frontal cortex activation in the distance vs. permit and the distance vs. intensify contrasts, but not the permit vs. intensify contrast. Third, the activation difference between distance and intensify within the amygdala reversed after the regulation period. Fourth, previous emotion regulation did not influence the activation during re-exposure, neither after 10 minutes nor after 1 week. Taken together, the results provide a partial replication of persistent effects observed in our preceding study, indicate different neural systems for up- and down-regulation, and demonstrate that a broader perspective on emotion regulation can be achieved by simultaneously considering different goals, directions, and strategies of emotion regulation in a single experiment.
Humans show metacontrol of decision making, that is they adapt their reliance on decision-making strategies toward situational differences such as differences in reward magnitude. Specifically, when higher rewards are at stake, individuals increase reliance on a more accurate but cognitively effortful strategy. We investigated whether the personality trait Need for Cognition (NFC) explains individual differences in metacontrol. Based on findings of cognitive effort expenditure in executive functions, we expected more metacontrol in individuals low in NFC. In two independent studies, metacontrol was assessed by means of a decision-making task that dissociates different reinforcement-learning strategies and in which reward magnitude was manipulated across trials. In contrast to our expectations, NFC did not account for individual differences in metacontrol of decision making. In fact, a Bayesian analysis provided moderate to strong evidence against a relationship between NFC and metacontrol. Beyond this, there was no consistent evidence for relationship between NFC and overall model-based decision making. These findings show that the effect of rewards on the engagement of effortful decision-making strategies is largely independent of the intrinsic motivation for engaging in cognitively effortful tasks and suggest a differential role of NFC for the regulation of cognitive effort in decision making and executive functions.
Despite a plethora of research, associations between individual differences in personality and electroencephalogram (EEG) parameters remain poorly understood due to concerns of low replicability and insufficiently powered data analyses due to relatively small effect sizes. The present article describes how a multi-laboratory team of EEG-personality researchers aims to alleviate this unsatisfactory status quo. In particular, the present article outlines the design and methodology of the project, provides a detailed overview of the resulting large-scale dataset that is available for use by future collaborators, and forms the basis for consistency and depth to the methodology of all resulting empirical articles. Through this article, we aim to inform researchers in the field of Personality Neuroscience of the freely available dataset. Furthermore, we assume that researchers will generally benefit from this detailed example of the implementation of cooperative forking paths analysis.
Burnout has become more prevalent, mainly in social jobs, but little is known about the personality traits that promote or protect against burnout. One of these traits is Need for Cognition (NFC), the stable intrinsic motivation to seek out and enjoy effortful cognitive activities. We analyzed data of N = 180 teachers to replicate results by Grass et al. (2018), who reported a mediation of NFC and the burnout subscale reduced personal efficacy by habitual reappraisal, but not by habitual suppression or self-control. With our data, self-control became a significant mediator when taking teaching experience into account, but neither reappraisal nor suppression did. We also investigated whether NFC and burnout were associated via different ratios of demands and resources, and included other variables in an exploratory approach. The results indicated that teachers with higher NFC and self-control have lower burnout because they experience their resources as fitting to the demands.