The following debate was set up as a roundtable during the conference “Internationalizing German Communication Studies: Learning from the World” in Erfurt, Germany, in March 2024. It features three scholars originally from Russia, Indonesia and Egypt, who have been socialized both in their native and the German communication studies community and thus can refer to both “worlds” in terms of a critical analysis, but also regarding academic best practices for a deep internationalization in communication studies. The debate aims to share their (subjective) experiences and to gather ideas of what could be improved and what should be continued regarding a cosmopolitization of study programs, university structures, and research foci in German communication studies institutes.

The paper explores the phenomenon of anonymous news channels on Russian Telegram, which have become increasingly popular in recent years. Drawing on 25 self-confrontation interviews, we answer the following questions: Do users trust anonymous news? If not, why do they keep using this information source? How does a restrictive socio-political context influence users’ trust in alternative news sources? Our results show that, in Russia, the concept of trust is linked to the normative democratic understanding of journalistic functions. At the same time, many users believe that trust in media is not at all necessary and develop individual strategies to navigate a “chaos of narratives”. The paper discusses Telegram’s role in shaping trust or distrust in news.

Der Beitrag präsentiert und diskutiert die Ergebnisse einer umfassenden Befragung und mehrerer Dokumentenanalysen zu Personal-und Forschungsstrukturen sowie Lehrprogrammen in der deutschen Kommunikationswissenschaft im Hinblick auf deren „tiefe Internationalisierung“ bzw. kosmopolitische Ausrichtung. Darunter verstehen wir eine umfassende Anerkennung und Einbindung globaler Vielfalt in die Wissensproduktion und messen dies entlang der Inhalts-und Raumdimension des Forschungs-und Lehroutputs der Professuren und der mit ihnen verbundenen Stellenstrukturen. Die Befunde zeigen, dass die deutsche Kommunikationswissenschaft einen großen Nachholbedarf hat, was eine kosmopolitische Wissensproduktion angeht. Vor dem Hintergrund der Relevanz globaler Werte, globalen Wissens und Global Governance werden aber auch Potentiale aufgezeigt sowie hochschulpolitische Maßnahmen diskutiert, die eine inhaltliche Internationalisierung der deutschen Kommunikationswissenschaft vorantreiben können.

In this essay, I explore the nature of propaganda in a hybrid media environment through the example of Russian propaganda during the ongoing war in Ukraine. I start by briefly overviewing the Russian media system’s development, focusing on the roots of cynical attitude toward journalism in the society. After analyzing propaganda strategies, I suggest the propaganda on demand concept, which describes the manipulation of public opinion by targeting different social milieus with specifically tailored narratives. In Russia’s case, this approach is based on inconsistency and eclecticism. However, it seems well suited to the very logic of the digital realm, which helps the state deliver often-contradicting narratives to different target groups.

ABSTRACT The outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic has become a stress test for science journalism worldwide. In this paper, we explore the under-researched topic of the perceived role enactment of science journalists in non-democratic settings in the example of COVID-19 coverage in Russia. Drawing on 23 semi-structured interviews with Russian science journalists from pro-state and independent media outlets, we examine their perceived role enactment and politicization of reporting about the pandemic in Russia. We identify three major types of limitations of a political nature reported by journalists: (1) editorial guidelines; (2) accessibility and self-censorship of sources; (3) self-censorship. Manifestation of these three types of limitations differ depending on the political orientation of media outlets as well as on the aspect of the topic. Based on the findings, we discuss the influence of universal trends and contextual factors on science journalism covering the pandemic.

Six years after the so-called ‘refugee crisis’ in 2015, the European Union remains divided on questions of migration and asylum policy. The issue also remains high on the agendas of the USA and Russia, two other key destination countries with immigration from Latin America and the Post-Soviet space. This article presents results from a comparative study of news coverage in 17 countries, focusing on 10 EU member states in Western and Central Eastern Europe (CEE), the USA and Russia. The intensity of coverage was remarkably different, with Hungary’s and Germany’s media standing out while Russian media displayed relatively low levels of coverage. Individual migrants and refugees were most visible in the two outlets from the USA. Media in CEE countries tended towards a more critical approach than media in Western Europe. However, differences between most countries’ pairs of analyzed media outlets indicate a more pluralistic debate than frequently assumed.

Six years after the so-called 'refugee crisis' in 2015, the European Union remains divided on questions of migration and asylum policy. The issue also remains high on the agendas of the USA and Russia, two other key destination countries with immigration from Latin America and the Post-Soviet space. his article presents results from a comparative study of news coverage in 17 countries, focusing on 10 EU member states in Western and Central Eastern Europe (CEE), the USA and Russia. The intensity of coverage was remarkably different, with Hungary's and Germany's media standing out while Russian media displayed relatively low levels of coverage. Individual migrants and refugees were most visible in the two outlets from the USA. Media in CEE countries tended towards a more critical approach than media in Western Europe. However, differences between most countries' pairs of analyzed media outlets indicate a more pluralistic debate than frequently assumed.

Previous studies on “youtubification” of political communication (May, 2010) have largely focused on democratic contexts. This study aims at exploring the role of the global video-sharing platform in non-democratic political communication, using the example of the Russian presidential election of 2018. It draws on the qualitative content analysis of 169 political videos collected from the “Popular” section of Russian YouTube during the last 2 months of the presidential campaign. The results show that oppositional discourse dominated the most popular political videos of Russian YouTube and that pro-state actors tried to co-opt the platform, publishing videos made in amateur and semi-professional styles that imitated user-generated content. Drawing on the findings, I discuss the risks and benefits of YouTube publics for the Russian authoritarian regime and the role of social media platforms in consultative authoritarianism.

Little is known presently about how, why, and with what consequences audiences comment on their news in contemporary authoritarian regimes. In order to address this gap, this study leverages recent theorizing about the multiple public sphere under non-democratic rule. Accordingly, critically commenting publics are theorized as “input institutions” that not only create risks but also offer important benefits for autocrats. Grounded in this approach, the study develops a series of hypotheses about the extent of political criticism that should be visible beneath the news in three purposefully selected authoritarian contexts: Azerbaijan, Russia, and Turkmenistan. In order to test these hypotheses, commenting environments facilitated (or not) by 46 leading news organizations on seven platforms were considered (N=322). For each environment, coders established whether comments were published that were (1) critical of the autocrat himself, (2) critical only of lower-level policies or officials of the regime, or (3) entirely uncritical. As the findings show, the extent of readers’ criticism differed systematically between the three contexts, broadly following the patterns hypothesized. Moreover, in line with this study’s key assumptions, critically commenting publics were facilitated not only by opposition media but also by substantial numbers of state-controlled news organizations.

Today's communicative environment, including the rise of social media, makes journalists perform publicly as both professionals and private citizens. In these circumstances, practices of self-limitation and self-censorship may extend to online behaviour. In this article, we analyse what makes journalists in public affairs media limit themselves in expression, both in editorial production and in online posting. We ask whether their self-censoring is related to personal, editorial, or external factors; whether political threats triumph over personal self-branding and professional/commercial reasons and whether these factors work differently in editorial and online behaviour; and whether journalists behave differently on different social networks. To formulate the answers, we use the results of a survey of 95 journalists from 51 Russian regions and seven in-depth interviews. Our results show that, in an organisationally weak journalistic community that operates in a restrictive environment, understanding of self-censorship differs significantly from that in Western democracies. It includes both self-limiting under pressures and personal-level ethical decisions that substitute professional codes of conduct. Moreover, for online posting and editorial work, there are different dominant 'perceived censors'. Political threats remain the most significant of all external pressures both online and offline, but personal motives lead the decision-making in posting on social networks. Russia is characterised by platform-wide echo-chambering and high differentiation between users of Facebook and the Russia-basedVK.com(formerly Vkontakte). We observe this difference in journalists' descriptions of self-limitation on these networks.

Extant research on how innovations diffuse among news organizations over time has largely focussed on democratic contexts. By contrast, this is the first longitudinal study to investigate the spread of a participatory newsroom innovation under authoritarian rule. Adopting a multiple case study design, the article reconstructs the histories of comment sections on the opinion-leading online media in two authoritarian contexts, which varied maximally with regard to the outcome of the diffusion process. In Belarus, the diffusion process followed a classic S-shaped curve of adoption, whereas in Azerbaijan adoption rates remained low during the studied period. The study identified primarily three factors that obstructed the diffusion process in Azerbaijan: (1) the restrictive policy of the authoritarian leadership specifically towards audience participation on news websites (social system), (2) the low intensity of communicative exchange between local and foreign news organizations (communication channels), (3) the advent of the successor technology in 2010 (time).

Over the past decades, internet governance has developed in a tug-of-war between the democratic, transnational nature of the web, and attempts by national governments to put cyberspace under control. Recently, the idea of digital sovereignty has started to increasingly gain more supporters among nation states. This article is a case study on the Russian concept of a “sovereign internet.” In 2019, the so-called law on sustainable internet marked a new milestone in the development of RuNet. Drawing on document analysis and expert interviews, I reconstruct Russia’s strategic narrative on internet sovereignty and its evolution over time. I identify the main factors that have shaped the Russian concept of sovereignty, including domestic politics, the economy, international relations, and the historical trajectory of the Russian segment of the internet. The article places the Russian case in a global context and discusses the importance of strategic narratives of digital sovereignty for the future of internet governance.

Today, aggressive verbal behavior is generally perceived as a threat to integrity and democratic quality of public discussions, including those online. However, we argue that, in more restrictive political regimes, communicative aggression may play constructive roles in both discussion dynamics and empowerment of political groups. This might be especially true for restrictive political and legal environments like Russia, where obscene speech is prohibited by law in registered media and the political environment does not give much space for voicing discontent. Taking Russian YouTube as an example, we explore the roles of two under-researched types of communicative aggression—obscene speech and politically motivated hate speech—within the publics of video commenters. For that, we use the case of the Moscow protests of 2019 against non-admission of independent and oppositional candidates to run for the Moscow city parliament. The sample of over 77,000 comments for 13 videos of more than 100,000 views has undergone pre-processing and vocabulary-based detection of aggression. To assess the impact of hate speech upon the dynamics of the discussions, we have used Granger tests and assessment of discussion histograms; we have also assessed the selected groups of posts in an exploratory manner. Our findings demonstrate that communicative aggression helps to express immediate support and solidarity. It also contextualizes the criticism towards both the authorities and regime challengers, as well as demarcates the counter-public.

The crisis in Ukraine was one of the dominant topics in international news coverage of 2014 and the following years. Representing a conflict along the lines of an East-Western confrontation unprecedented since the end of the Cold War, the news reporting in different European countries with different historical backgrounds is an essential research topic. This article presents findings of a content analysis examining coverage of the conflict in the first half of 2014 in newspapers from a diverse set of 13 countries: Albania, Czech Republic, Germany, Latvia, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Serbia, Switzerland and the United Kingdom, as well as Ukraine and Russia. Drawing on prior literature on news values, key events, and news cycles in foreign coverage, this study maps the evolution of the conflict in the course of four key events and identifies specific characteristics of the coverage in different newspapers. The results show that attention for the conflict varies considerably across the countries, which might be traced back to different degrees of geographical and cultural proximity, domestication, and economic exchange, as well as lack of editorial resources especially in Eastern Europe. Russia dominated the news agenda in all newspapers under study with a constant stream of conflict news. Contradicting prior literature, media sought to contextualise the events, and meta-coverage of the media’s role in the crisis emerged as a relevant topic in many countries with a developed media system.