ABSTRACT This article studies Malcolm Fraser's approach towards the United States between 1977 and 1980. The paper does so by examining how Fraser's Coalition government perceived and responded to the concept of trilateralism, which Jimmy Carter embraced at the early stages of his presidency. The Australian government was concerned about Carter's ties to the Trilateral Commission, which advocated closer cooperation among North America, Western Europe and Japan to address global political, economic and strategic challenges. Trilateralism ascribed a peripheral role to Australia within the western alliance, which threatened Canberra's access to its principal Cold War ally. This article, therefore, argues that Australia, as a middle power, embraced personal diplomacy in its efforts to influence the United States' foreign policy during a period of great flux in the Cold War. Specifically, Fraser employed personal diplomacy aimed at establishing a close rapport with Carter to safeguard Australia's continuous and uninhibited input into US decision‐making on matters that directly and indirectly impacted Australia's national objectives, interests, and considerations.

This article analyses Jimmy Carter's policy towards Turkey between 1977 and 1980. It argues that the US-Turkish relationship represents another example of Carter's pragmatism in foreign policy. Turkey remained a close US ally and NATO member throughout the Cold War. In the 1970s, the bilateral relationship confronted challenges, particularly following the 1974 Cyprus Crisis. Carter's 1976 election accentuated bilateral tensions due to his perceived pro-Greek and pro-Cypriot - and, by implication, anti-Turkish - stance on Greece-Cyprus-Turkey issues during the election campaign. Once in office, however, Carter prioritized a traditional interpretation of US national interest towards a close Cold War ally, emphasizing the security dimension of the relationship. The administration's policy required adjustments in terms of strategy to fit the ever-changing domestic Turkish politics and regional developments. President Carter and his top foreign policy advisors remained determined to repair and secure a crucial alliance with a strategic ally.

Historians of the First World War face the daunting task of offering a fresh and original perspective on this much‐researched subject. Andrekos Varnava successfully meets this challenge with his latest monograph and provides a new interpretation of the Great War and its impact. He focuses on a non‐settler part of the British Empire, Cyprus, and covers the period from the start of the war until its proclamation as a Crown Colony. In this book, he studies three key themes: the impact of the war on the British Empire, focusing on one of its smallest parts; the loyalties of the population, especially the often overlooked majority lower classes; and the disproportionate role of elites — whether these were the colonial administrators or the local leading elites — in shaping the future of Cyprus. In doing so, Varnava provides a compelling analysis of the political objectives, social structures and attitudes prevailing in British Cyprus.

Australian Journal of Politics & HistoryVolume 66, Issue 1 p. 172-173 Book Reviews British Cyprus and the Long Great War, 1914-1925: Empire, Loyalties and Democratic Deficit Athanasios Antonopoulos, Corresponding Author ath.antonopoulos@outlook.com Griffith UniversitySearch for more papers by this author Athanasios Antonopoulos, Corresponding Author ath.antonopoulos@outlook.com Griffith UniversitySearch for more papers by this author First published: 21 April 2020 https://doi.org/10.1111/ajph.12656Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onEmailFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditWechat No abstract is available for this article. Volume66, Issue1Special Issue: Labor in the Australian StatesMarch 2020Pages 172-173 RelatedInformation

This article focuses on the Cyprus talks between 1974 and 1976. It presents the beneficial role the former US secretary of state, Henry A. Kissinger, played in bringing the Greek and Turkish sides around the negotiating table and commit to the efforts for a mutually acceptable settlement following the 1974 Cyprus crisis. Kissinger acted as the honest broker between Ankara, Athens and Nicosia moderating each side's demands and communicating their respective positions when direct contacts were insufficient. All parties for different reasons welcomed his involvement and considered his presence a necessity necessary. Since the public in Greece and Cyprus remained hostile to him, the US secretary remained on the side-lines. Kissinger offered innovative solutions on controversial questions that prevented progress. Thanks to his contribution intense negotiations between the two Cypriot communities with the support of Greece and Turkey took place during the Ford administration. His intervention could not and did not suffice to overcome domestic conflicts and political considerations that prevailed over the efforts for a reconciliatory and mutually acceptable agreement. Nonetheless, he succeeded in paving the way for reducing tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean.