Radio’s presence is more visible than that of any other mass medium in Oyo State. Having considered radio’s prominence as a political facilitator and scarcity of studies in the literature of English medium audience-participatory radio newspaper reviews, this study set out to examine the difference in electoral participation among participants and non-participants in radio newspaper reviews in Oyo State. McLuhan’s Technological Determinism was adopted as the theoretical framework; the data were gathered through a 19-item questionnaire. Through stratified random sampling, 308 respondents (154 participants and 154 non-participants) were selected. The data were first analysed through descriptive statistics in which responses of both sub-samples were compared in tabular forms. To ascertain the statistical significance of the results, Pearson Product Moment Correlation Coefficient was further employed. The results showed that participants were more active than non-participants in the following: contesting elections (12.9%; 11.7%), boycotting elections (12.4%; 12.3%), enlightening others on electoral processes (57.2%; 49.4%), encouraging participation in elections (69.5%; 59.7%) and encouraging recall of non-performing political office holders (16.8%; 16.2%), respectively. However, non-participants engaged more than participants in activities such as voting (63.6%; 61.7%), campaigning for political candidates (39.6%; 35.7%) and attending political campaigns (42.2%; 38.3%), respectively. The results of inferential statistics revealed no significant relationship between participation in radio newspaper reviews and involvement in electoral activities (r = 0.14). The study concluded, therefore, that promoting electoral participation would take more than participation in radio newspaper reviews.

Research Problem: Risk communication literature on the COVID-19 pandemic often describes government communication to persons at risk but seldom describes citizens’ communication about the government, which is equally important. Therefore, this study investigated Nigerians’ pro-government and anti-government communication behaviours during the pandemic, focusing on how they varied with gender, age, sector of work and political party preference. Methods: This study adopted a quantitative design, using the survey method. It used a convenience sampling technique to recruit 401 adult Nigerians, among whom 141 (35.2%) were females and 260 (64.8%) were males. The research instrument was an online questionnaire, and the data collected were analysed using Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) version 23. Results: The T-test analysis showed that the males and workers in the private sector spoke and argued more against the government COVID-19 lockdown policy than the females and workers in the public sector, respectively. Also, the adults spoke and argued more in favour of the lockdown policy and complied more with the regulations than the youths. Participants who did not prefer the political party in government spoke more against the policy and complied less with regulations than participants who preferred the government in power. Conclusion: The study concluded that variation existed in the communication behaviours of Nigerians and their compliance with lockdown regulations during the COVID-19 pandemic, based on gender, age, employment sector and political party preference Key Contribution to Knowledge: Nigerians’ demographic and political characteristics accounted for variation in their communication behaviours for and against the government during the COVID-19 pandemic. Recommendation: This study recommends that the variation in Nigerians’ demographic and political characteristics should be considered while designing and implementing government risk communication strategies in tackling pandemics in the future.

AbstractThis chapter examined the nature of public policy and role of policy analysis in the policy process. It examines a variety of research methods and their use in public policy engagements and analysis for evidence-informed policymaking. It explains qualitative methods, quantitative methods, multiple and mixed-method research. Other issues addressed include causal research in public policy, report writing and communication and related issues in public policy research.

Since 2016, Nigerians have experienced a stable fuel supply even if prices have continued to rise. This supply stability came to a sudden halt in January 2022, bringing back memories of long queues and harsh living conditions witnessed since 2007. To explore the implications of this change we revisit our study on demanding power and accountability in the Nigerian energy sector. The study conducted from 2019–21 as part of the Action for Empowerment and Accountability (A4EA) research programme found a significant lack of accountability in fuel subsidy management in Nigeria.

The Covid-19 pandemic created an atmosphere of global uncertainty that challenged established assumptions and ways of life. Amid the uncertainty, most people turned to mass and social media for updates, direction and, especially during lockdowns, companionship. An earlier study of the Kari-kasa community shows their total disdain for modernity including the mass media: radio, television and newspaper. The question then arises: was the Kari-kasa able to sustain this disdain during a pandemic that turned most people to the media? To what extent did the community uphold its aversion to modernity in the face of a crippling pandemic? Employing classical ethnographic field methods of focus group discussion (FGD), observation, in-depth and key informant interviews, this study established a reasonable level of Covid-19 awareness among the Kari-kasa members, some of whom seemed to be modifying their belief system to conform to social pressure. They largely declined Covid-19 safety rules believing it was not obligatory. The nature of their information-seeking behavior breeds information disorder and infodemic within their micro-community. The Kari-kasa appeared to be left behind in government efforts on Covid-19 containment communication interventions. It is therefore recommended that specific behavior change communication intervention be targeted at conservative marginal and hidden communities such as Kari-kasa just like it is for the Amish. Also, since Kari-kasa members exhibit ideological belief rather than behavioral belief explained in theory, behavior change interventions targeted at such groups should pay attention to this influential factor for the intervention to be compatible with their belief.

Why do some fuel protests in Nigeria lead to a response from government, but others are barely noticed? What are the politics behind government response and who are the winners and losers? Using a multi-method approach, this study focuses on the period between 2007 and 2017 to investigate the dynamics of fuel protest in Nigeria to ask how, and under which conditions, struggles over energy access in Nigeria produce accountability and empowerment. The findings suggest that accountability and empowerment outcomes of the struggles over fuel access in Nigeria are severely limited by the very conditions that define the state as fragile: weak institutions, elite capture, widespread corruption, and a citizenry that is protest-fatigued and disempowered. This could be true of other fragile and conflict-affected settings. Therefore, frameworks that open up the civic space for dialogues between the government and citizens may produce better outcomes than protests.

ABSTRACT Public protests, including women-led struggles, are increasingly gaining a foothold in many parts of the world in response to multiple crises and growing exclusion, in a context of fragility. In the global South, most public protests involve temporary, informal coalitions where people come together and participate in a one-off event. The fluid nature of political space makes sustaining protests elusive because of protest fatigue. Yet, the #BringBackOurGirls (#BBOG), a women-led movement, headed a long-term protest that focused on the rights of the girl child to education – a direct response to Boko Haram’s gendered terror tactics, in which girls were abducted, forced to abandon school, and get married. This article examines when and how movements crystallise into long-term programmes of action in fragile and conflict-affected societies where state–society relations are weak and government is considered to be unresponsive. We use the case of the #BBOG movement, one of Nigeria’s intense social media-driven and women-led action, to examine the mix of pressures it faced, its characteristics, and strategies in situations of fragility, conflict, and closed political spaces. We identify four key strategies that the #BBOG has deployed to keep members coming, garner international support and sympathy, keep pressure on the elite in a safe manner for the movement members, and ensure an independent funding regime for durability and impact. This article finds that #BBOG was able to navigate fragility and the closing civic space in Nigeria by challenging the failure of government to address insecurity in the country, transcending societal barriers including gender, religion, and political class, transnationalising their movement, self-funding, and using social media strategically.

Energy protests are becoming increasingly common and significant around the world. While in the global North concerns tend to centre around climate issues, in the global South the concerns are more often with affordable energy. Both types of protests, however, have one issue in common: the undemocratic nature of energy policymaking. This paper draws together findings from research conducted in three countries, Mozambique, Nigeria, and Pakistan to ask how and under which conditions do struggles over energy access in fragile and conflict affected settings empower the powerless to hold public authorities to account? In exploring this theme, the study examines what factors support protests developing into significant episodes of contention within fragile settings, and whether these energy struggles promote citizen empowerment and institutional accountability.

AbstractIn June 2019, Google announced plans to connect Africa to Europe through an undersea internet cable project named Equiano. As a techno-commercial platform, Google’s gesture warrants scrutiny and propels this essay’s analyses of the political connections of Internet spaces that also enable a visual turn in the scholarship of African history. Using the Google search engine and Facebook, Yékú and Ojebode stress the embeddedness of digital technologies in cultural meanings that include visual narratives that visibilize government’s ahistoricism. They conclude by foregrounding the digital labors of Nigerian digital subjects who deploy historical photographs on Facebook as expressions of performative nostalgia.

Abstract Studies of migration emphasize the role of an imagined better world or utopia in migration intention and decision. That imaginary world is a product not so much of experience but of images conveyed through different sources, especially social media. If utopic images prod migration, do dystopic images of death and suffering en route discourage it? Through a small-N life-world ethnography, this article explores how failed migrants process dystopic images that are connected with migration. Failed migrants, that is, those who attempted migrating but did not succeed, were asked to explore and discuss the viral photograph of Alan Kurdî’s lifeless body on the shores of the Mediterranean and that of migrants who starved to death in Sahara Desert. Though these dystopic images sobered failed migrants, they (the images) did not attenuate their migration desperation. In processing the images, failed migrants deployed three strategies: migrating from fear to faith, migrating from dystopic to utopic platforms and cropping off dystopia. These findings call to question the power of images to influence desperate individuals and lend credence to the tenets of the theory of selectivity. Therefore, efforts aimed at stemming illegal migration might have to do more than frightening intending migrants with dystopic images.

Deepening democracy through local elections is a major aim of decentralisation. But do elections always work to strengthen the relationship between local politicians and citizens, or can they set elected officials up for failure? This article examines security provisioning by local governments in Nigeria, understanding that some local governments are elected, while others are appointed by state governors. Our hypothesis was that elected local councils should be better rated than those that are appointed. By looking at local government areas that differ mainly in terms of whether their council is elected or appointed, we found that local elections are not enough singly to build strong connections between democratically elected local politicians and citizens. Democratic decentralisation in the context of limited financial resources, and limited autonomy vis-a-vis state governors and political bosses, can set elected governments up for failure to the extent that they are viewed as worse performers than their appointed counterparts.

AbstractThe explosive growth and widespread presence of mobile telephony in Nigeria has attracted comments and research focusing on its social, economic, technological and cultural implications. However, scant attention, mostly newspaper comments, has been given to the contributions of mobile telephony to the democratic process in Nigeria. Given the centrality of communication to democracy and the nascence of Nigerian democracy, filling this gap is a worthwhile task. Using a questionnaire administered onliterate phone users, and interviews with non-literate users, selected through a combination of purposive and convenience sampling techniques, we addressed the question: in what ways and to what extent has mobile telephony promoted critical democratic activities in Nigeria? There is widespread presence of mobile phone among respondents but limited use and limited impact. Only 49.7% of literate users used their phones for anything beyond sending and receiving calls and text messages; non-literate users had to depend on literate others for nearly everything pertaining to mobile phone use. Mobile phones were used in campaigns, provided information but not conviction about voting decisions: they did not make 70.8% of the respondents to vote or not to vote in certain ways. Mobile phones were found to be weak for post-election engagements and accountability as elected politicians were said to change their phonelines or bar incoming calls. We conclude that there is widespread application of the mobile phone to the democratic process in Nigeria but the impact of this application is only limited. Keywords  Mobile telephony, Nigerian democracy, impact of mobile telephony, Nigerian politics

Studies of collective memories have focused on large-scale armed struggles and natural disasters ignoring, to a large extent, collective memories of unarmed resistance and civil uprisings. In the process, little is known about the nature and deployment of collective memories of such uprisings. As an attempt to address this gap, the study focused on collective memories of the struggle for democracy in Nigeria, an unarmed uprising that resulted in the arrests, incarceration, torture and even death of many citizens and journalists. From textual analysis of sixteen speeches of President Obasanjo given over a period of eight years; analysis of essays written by, 200 college students on their memories of the struggle for democracy, and analysis of interviews with the militant journalists who were in the forefront of the struggle for democracy, the paper identified convergences and divergences in the official, journalists’ and emergent memories of the struggle for democracy. Whereas the three collective memories agreed that the struggle was a bitter and painful one, official memories differ from journalists’ and emergent memories on the heroes, victims and villains of the struggle. Official memories also differ from others on the use to which the memories of the struggle should be put: while the official position is that the memories of the struggle should be forgotten and efforts devoted to nation building, others insist that the past should be properly remembered with blames and praises given to whomever they are due. The paper highlighted the memory contest that ensued between government on the one hand, and journalists and young citizens 011 the other: The paper concluded that memories of unarmed resistance and civil uprising can be as much contentious, politicised and deployed as a weapon as those of armed large-scale conflicts. There was a strong suggestion that emergent memories of the struggle are being influenced by journalists’ memories.

As popular movements of citizens of countries in the Middle East and North African (MENA) region progressed, and in their aftermath, pundits in Nigeria and the Diaspora wondered if there would be a bandwagon effect in Africa’s largest democracy. Yet, despite offline and online mobilizations, a growing national insecurity and the “Occupy Nigeria Movement” that sprang up against fuel price hikes in Nigeria, protests and revolts in Nigeria remained short-lived and aimed at piecemeal policy reforms rather than becoming a revolution to unseat the current government. Relying on a human development factors chart, the authors suggest that Nigerians’ discontent appears to be motivated by yearnings for what citizens of some MENA countries already have and vice versa. As such, neither democracy nor autocracy—as systems of governance—has delivered the aspirations of African citizens. DOI: 10.4018/978-1-4666-4197-6.ch020