This article provides a slightly different take on the issue of polarisation and academic freedom than the one proposed by Sari Hanafi. We contend that students and academics, especially within the humanities and social sciences, tend to exhibit increasing cultural and political homogeneity and growing intolerance towards those who have different views. This leaves the universities culturally and politically isolated at a time when they have come under increasing assault, whether political or economic. It also risks intellectual sclerosis – the replication of set formats. I plead for pluralism. In relation to Hanafi’s arguments, I am not convinced by the explanatory power of ‘symbolic liberalism’ nor of ‘neoliberalism’ whilst some of his accusations towards European intellectuals seem contradictory. Finally, I argue that state interference and cancel culture should not be conflated.

This article presents a sociological dialogue between six researchers who specialise in different sociological subfields. Each researcher explores the possible consequences of generative AI within their specific area of expertise. More concretely, the article develops insights around directions in social theory, the political economy of intellectual property, matters of identities and intimacies, evidence and evidentiary power, racial and reproductive inequalities, as well as work and social class. This is followed by a collective discussion on six interconnected themes across these areas: agency, authorship, identity, visibility, inequality, and hype. We also consider our role as cultural producers, understanding our reactions to generative AI as part of the empirical, theoretical, and methodological shifts this knowledge controversy engenders, as well as highlighting our duty as critical sociologists to keep the knowledge controversy about generative AI open.

This paper examines the impact of a shift in focus from political praxis to trauma work in the context of a failed democratisation movement. It investigates the various phenomena which emerge when intellectuals, under the traumatic impact of violence and atrocities, place trauma narration at the core of their interventions. Drawing on document analysis, participant observation and semi-structured interviews with twenty nine exiled Syrian intellectuals in Paris and Berlin who had participated in the revolutionary movement of 2011, the paper suggests that an inversion of the normative power structures pertaining to how intellectuals relate to their publics occurs when they adopt, under conditions of extreme violence and trauma, what we call a radically embedded positionality vis-à-vis ‘the people’. This results in the dismantling of previous figurations of the ‘militant intellectual’ along with praxis-focused notions of the ‘responsibility of intellectuals’, ultimately undermining their ideational influence upon domestic publics and weakening their political impact and critical role within a revolutionary movement.

This chapter builds further on 'existence theory,' an approach to sociological theorizing inspired by existentialist philosophy. In particular, it examines contemporary cultural developments through the lens of this theoretico-methodological perspective. The chapter consists of two parts. First, it outlines the main tenets of existence theory, with a particular focus on key concepts such as 'existential milestones,' 'existential ladder,' 'existential urgency,' and 'contradictory milestones.' Second, it points out the unique features of contemporary culture in relation to this theoretical framework, arguing that an erstwhile rigidity as to which milestones need to be achieved and by when is less applicable in many contemporary Western societies – at least for some sectors of those societies – than it was in the past. This 'existential problematization' manifests itself in a variety of ways, through 'existential individualization' (flexibility as to whether to accept or reject milestones), 'existential fluidity' (ability to articulate the milestones in a unique fashion), 'temporal flexibility' (flexibility as to timing of the achievement of the milestones), 'sequential flexibility' (flexibility as to the sequence by which milestones are achieved), and 'existential politicization' (greater symbolic significance and display). Finally, the chapter argues that existential problematization ties in with broader issues about different forms of social inequality such as race, class, and gender.

Abstract After situating Andreas Reckwitz’s The Society of Singularities within the broader context of the tradition of social theory, we discuss in detail the obvious strengths of this book, notably its impressive range and originality. Subsequently, we elaborate on two limitations of Reckwitz’s argument. Firstly, we argue that Reckwitz’s use of categories such as ‘singularity’ and ‘universality’ is too all-embracing, lacking the clarity and focus needed to sustain a productive line of inquiry. Secondly, and related to the previous point, we contend that Reckwitz’s claims about the recent trend towards increasing singularity are so broad that they are difficult to refute empirically. Further, we discuss briefly contemporary political developments to demonstrate why the core societal issues at stake cannot be explained through all-inclusive categories such as singularity. Finally, we maintain that existence theory can provide an alternative fruitful perspective on some of the phenomena discussed in this book.

In this essay, we provide a comprehensive reply to the critical commentaries by David Inglis, Thomas Kemple, William Outhwaite, Simon Susen, Bryan S. Turner, and Robin Wagner-Pacifici. Our reply is structured along three main pillars. Firstly, we clarify what we aim to achieve with existence theory. Drawing on neo-pragmatist philosophy, our aim is to present a new and useful perspective on a wide range of social phenomena; we do not attempt to tackle or resolve broad philosophical issues. Secondly, we demonstrate that we do not subscribe to an algorithmic notion of society which posits that people's trajectories have to fit a neat, linear pathway. Related, we do not wish to impose a normative model that endorses the existential milestones that are dominant in any particular society. Thirdly, building on various helpful pointers from our critics, we elaborate on various ways in which the theory could be enriched and further developed: for instance, by bringing in insights from the sociology of generations, critical theory, and sociological studies of the body.

After exploring the main tenets of existence theory and the affinities between this theory and other philosophical traditions, this introduction lists the central points of each contribution to this special issue. In what follows, we provide a brief synopsis of the critical commentaries by David Inglis, Simon Susen, Robin Wagner-Pacifici, Bryan S. Turner, William Outhwaite, and Thomas Kemple.

This article introduces ‘existence theory’ as a new approach to sociological theory and research. Existence theory starts from the assumption that people organise their lives around a limited set of existential milestones. Cultural expectations are such that without the accomplishment of those milestones, individuals may experience their lives as incomplete. Examples of milestones can include the attainment of formal education, a lasting partnership and the creation of a family, but in general the milestones which are important to individuals and their precise articulation will depend on a variety of cultural and structural factors. The achievement of existential milestones often depends on that of other existential milestones, thereby producing what we call an ‘existential ladder’. The article also elaborates on the significance of ‘existential urgency’ in that, due to a variety of factors (some biological, some cultural and structural), there are time limits on when certain existential milestones ought to be achieved by. In contemporary society, we note that individuals seem to have more choice about which milestones are important to them and when they can be achieved, although we emphasise that this flexibility is unevenly distributed. This then provides a steppingstone towards an elaboration of the power dynamics and inequalities underlying both the experience and the achievement of existential milestones. Finally, this paper shows how existence theory helps to reflect on a variety of social phenomena of contemporary significance: populism in politics, forced migration, and the coronavirus pandemic.

This article provides a sociological explanation for the global emergence of Slavoj Žižek as a public intellectual. It presents an integrative account encompassing both personal and institutional aspects. Drawing on positioning theory and performative frameworks, the article contributes to the sociology of intellectuals, as well as to the vast ‘Žižek-literature’ that focuses on his philosophical content or political activities. We analyse the distinctiveness of Žižek’s performances, arguing that Žižek acts as a ‘sacrificial intellectual’: he plays ‘the fool’ and relies on irony to undermine the traditional role of the authoritative intellectual. Within the context of the digital public sphere and declining intellectual authority, Žižek’s unique form of positioning has been particularly effective and has contributed to his celebrity status.

In this brief essay, Patrick Baert replies to Derek Robbins' review of his book The Existentialist Moment and of the co-authored book (with Simon Susen) The Sociology of Intellectuals. His main argument is that Robbins' review is not only longwinded, but also suprisingly muddled, lacking in analytical clarity and precision. The essay also points out two other problems with Robbin's confusing review. Firstly, Robbins wrongly accuses Baert of not paying attention to the content of ideas, whereas precisely the opposite is the case. Secondly, Robbins misunderstands the core presuppositions of positioning theory in that he erroneously associates the notion of positioning with conscious strategising. Baert is more sympathetic towards Robbins' argument about the need to distinguish between different fields, but he laments Robbins' inability to show how a more detailed attempt to draw this distinction would lead to a superior analysis of the specific historical context at the time.

Drawing on Austin’s speech act theory and on related theories of performativity and positioning, this article analyses the public confessions during the 1990s by three prominent state actors in Turkey about their direct involvement in state crimes against Kurds and left-wing political opponents. All three cases received significant media attention at the time. The aim of the article is not only to shed new light on those specific confessions by the perpetrators within the Turkish context, but also to develop further theoretical insights into the phenomenon of public confessions as such. Whilst confessions of this kind are often welcomed and portrayed as truth-statements that are cathartic and enable society to move forward, this analysis demonstrates that the reality is often more complex as the confessions in question tend to go hand in hand with a disavowal of individual responsibility by the perpetrators involved.

As of late, the sociology of intellectuals has made important inroads into its object of study. Much of this has been achieved by problematising the modes of engagement intellectuals undertake and multiplying the types of actor that can be considered to have intellectual authority, going beyond the traditional mould of the ‘authoritative’ public intellectual. However, relatively few have theorised how intellectuals associate themselves in groups: how collectives, whether in the form of institutions or not, negotiate their public interventions and position themselves as a group in the public debate. This article delves into this issue, with an emphasis on how ‘intellectual collectives’ reach a common identity and decide who can intervene ‘on their behalf’ – what we call prosopopoeia. Informed by positioning theory, and based on two variables (presence of a single organisational basis and purported intellectual cohesiveness), this article contributes to current debates on the sociology of intellectuals by analysing how collectives of intellectuals intervene in the public debate, reach some form of coordination with their peers, police the boundaries of their collective identity, and, in the process, attain a common position across audiences.

This chapter develops the theoretical and methodological perspective to study aspects of the history of philosophy and provides a summary of its main tenets, especially in relation to the book The Existentialist Moment: The Rise of Sartre as a Public Intellectual. The Existentialist Moment confronts the widespread belief that the sociology and history of intellectuals should uncover the structural causes or motives underlying intellectual interventions and that their ability to reveal them is a key criterion for measuring their success. Influenced by speech-act theory, positioning theorists explore how words, rather than representing or mirroring the external world, accomplish things. Applied to the intellectual realm, this performative perspective studies precisely what intellectual interventions achieve. More concretely, the central idea is that intellectual interventions always involve positioning. It would be a mistake for sociologists and historians who are interested in the positioning of particular intellectuals to restrict themselves solely to the biography of these individuals or the textual analysis of their writings.

Starting with his own personal experiences as Rom HarréRom Harré’s PhD student in the late 1980s, Patrick Baert presents HarréHarré as a remarkably versatile and broad intellectual, who has been able to work and contribute significantly in a variety of fields. This chapter shows how Rom HarréRom Harré’s breadth has enabled him to innovate in various disciplines by relying on metaphors derived from analogies with other disciplines—a methodological strategy that is perfectly compatible with some of the main tenets of his realist philosophy. Baert argues that this strategy has been particularly fruitful in the social sciencesSocial sciences. Baert then shows the link between HarréHarré’s positioning theoryPositioning theory and his own use of the theory in the fields of intellectual historyIntellectual history and the sociology of intellectualsSociology of intellectuals.