We argue that the main Mendicant Orders of the Late Middle Ages—Dominican and Franciscan—were instrumental in shaping key cultural and institutional traits of impersonal exchange by updating both moral codes and religious practice. As one of the three pillars of impersonal exchange—alongside state capacity and merchant institutions—religiously infused moral cognition provides the focus of our analysis. In line with their specializations, we document opposing effects of the two Orders on individualism, impersonal prosociality, and impartial enforcement: positive from exposure to the Dominicans and negative from exposure to the Franciscans. These effects stem from deep moral changes tied to the emotions of guilt, shame, and compassion, with knowledge and education accounting for historical persistence. We assess these differences across multiple datasets, analytical levels, and historical contexts—always focusing on the differential effects of the two Orders. Our findings invite a reassessment of the Church’s role in cultural and institutional development and underscore the divergent effects of its branches and doctrines.

The chapter analyzes the main tradeoffs in the organization of public registries, comparing five forms of organization: (1) the bureaucracies or 'discretionary expense centers' used to provide privately valuable services in the welfare state; (2) the internal markets introduced to reform them, and the hybrid solutions that the liberal state has used since the nineteenth century to provide such privately valuable services, including (3) revenue centers based on user fees; (4) franchised systems in which professional civil servants are paid from the profit of an office; and (5) the contemporary variant in which the Government contracts out the provision of the whole service to a private firm. This comparison suggests that market forces may play a better role in organizing public registries when they are limited to a few variables, which makes stronger incentives possible while at the same time reducing the need for extensive planning and supervisory staff.

We study a land-titling reform implemented as a randomized control trial to isolate its effects on litigation. The reform consisted of demarcating land parcels, registering existing customary rights, and granting additional legal protection to right holders. Ten years after implementation, the reform doubled the likelihood of households experiencing land-related litigation, but disputes did not escalate into more frequent violent episodes. We suggest that this increase in litigation reflects the complementarity of land titling by registration and by judicial procedures aimed at further clarifying property rights, as the reform registered titles to all parcels but left many titles subject to adverse claims. This raised the demand for complementary litigation aimed at perfecting titles for low-value parcels that, under the customary system, were optimal to keep unclarified. Consistent with this explanation, we find that the increase in litigation took place among households that plausibly own land of lower value.

este documento describe en primer lugar los problemas que confrontan los operadores economicos, las soluciones que utilizan y como las instituciones juridicas ayudan a resolverlos. Sobre esta base y con el auxilio de esos casos reales, propone una discusion sobre con que eficacia desempenan esa tarea las instituciones economicas espanolas. El analisis teorico se desarrolla en cuatro etapas: tras analizar el papel del derecho de propiedad (apartado 1) y la contratacion privada (2), los dos siguientes apartados se centran en el papel que desempenan las instituciones legislativas (3) y judiciales (4). La segunda parte desarrolla doce casos de discusion relativos a cada una de las areas anteriores.

Tras unos años de crecimiento complaciente, España se ha visto sorprendida por la crisis. Con un desempleo crónico y un déficit público descontrolado, la economía no se recupera y el PIB por habitante empieza a alejarse de los referentes europeos. Peor aún: estamos siendo incapaces de adoptar reformas imprescin-dibles. Los observadores más optimistas consideran que la recu-peración tardará en llegar; la mayoría, incluso la pone en duda o cuestiona que, sin reformas, pueda ser significativa. Lógico que el país se haya sumido en el desánimo y que empecemos a caer en el descrédito. Se teme un estancamiento duradero, que pu-diera incluso acabar en un círculo vicioso de «argentinización». Las raíces de esta parálisis son más profundas de lo que pare-ce. Desde antiguo, hemos reaccionado tarde y mal a las crisis. Por suerte, hoy tenemos más razones para ser optimistas de las que había en el pasado. Contamos con las personas adecuadas, por lo que salir de la crisis sólo requiere eliminar frenos al creci-miento. Las reformas necesarias guardan así relación con la liber-tad y la competencia, pero su auténtico denominador común es la responsabilidad. Nuestra democracia sólo será adulta cuan-do hayamos asumido que los derechos comportan deberes, y que la libertad requiere responsabilidad. Hemos de aplicar este principio a todos los ámbitos de nuestra sociedad, incluidas las empresas, los sindicatos, las instituciones educativas, los servi-cios y administraciones públicas, los partidos políticos, y, más fundamentalmente, los individuos. Al surgir la presente crisis, medio país cayó en la tentación de pensar que venía de fuera, que sufríamos los efectos pasajeros de una recesión internacional. Al hacerlo, reincidíamos en un error que ha sido causa tradicional de nuestro atraso económico: ser incapaces de reaccionar con rapidez cuando la bonanza exterior se desmorona. Al menos desde la década de 1950, nuestra historia económica ha seguido las mismas pautas: reaccionamos tarde a las crisis, y la respuesta siempre consiste en liberalizar los mercados, lo que proporciona tasas de crecimiento rápidas y elevadas, superiores a las de nuestros vecinos europeos. Sin embargo, estas liberali-zaciones quedan incompletas o se interrumpen, como si una vez pasada la urgencia el país se sumiera en la complacencia. A las reformas que acompañaron la estabilización de 1958 les sucedió la esclerosis de los planes de desarrollo, lo mismo que a las priva-tizaciones de la segunda mitad de los 1990 les siguió la parálisis reformista que sufrimos desde el año 2000. La reacción a la crisis actual está siguiendo la misma pauta, tratando los síntomas sin atacar las causas. Hasta ahora, sólo ha consistido en aumentar el gasto público. Y ello pese a que llevá-bamos ya años gastando en torno a un diez por cien más de lo que producíamos. Era lógico. Con tipos de interés negativos, era de esperar que los ciudadanos nos endeudáramos. E individual-mente hemos reaccionado con sensatez a la crisis, reduciendo el endeudamiento privado. Nuestros Gobiernos, en cambio, no han sido tan juiciosos: ni antes de la crisis, porque apenas ahorraron ni aprovecharon la coyuntura favorable para introducir reformas que aumentaran la productividad; ni después, porque el actual Gobierno se ha limitado a sustituir deuda privada por deuda pública, posponiendo así un ajuste que tarde o temprano es inevitable.

La prolongacion de la crisis sanitaria esta generando problemas financieros crecientes a muchas empresas y negocios que podrian hacer necesaria su reestructuracion e incluso amenazar su continuidad. En el presente trabajo se pasa revista a la situacion existente, partiendo de algunos estudios recientes que aproximan los efectos del Covid sobre las cuentas de las empresas espanolas. Seguidamente, se repasan las razones por las que la intervencion publica podria reducir los costes de bienestar que la pandemia origina a traves de su impacto sobre las empresas y autonomos, asi como las principales herramientas de politica disponibles, el uso que se ha hecho de ellas en Espana y otros paises y algunas de sus limitaciones.

En comparacion con los ciudadanos de paises europeos de similar tamano, los espanoles mostramos unas marcadas preferencias estatistas y contrarias a la competencia, que, como se ha argumentado en otros trabajos del mismo autor, favorecen una concepcion finalista de las leyes, asi como una tendencia a imponer sobre las relaciones contractuales privadas tanto un exceso de reglas imperativas como unas funciones redistributivas que seria preferible desarrollar en el ambito del derecho publico.

AbstractRecurrent difficulties are delaying what for the time being are still modest applications of blockchain. This paper identifies what value this new technology adds to the contractual and property processes, exploring its potential and analyzing the main difficulties it is facing. Paying particular attention to the distinction between contract (personal or in personam) rights and property (real or in rem) rights, it first examines the difficulties for trading contract rights through blockchain-based applications, mainly those to complete contracts ex ante without relying on third-party enforcers. Second, it explores the difficulties faced by blockchain to enable trade in property rights.

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En este trabajo se discute la importancia de la seguridad juridica para el buen desempeno economico y se analiza la situacion espanola en este ambito.

The chapter analyzes the basis of the market economy in classical Rome, from the perspective of personal vs impersonal exchange and focusing on the role of the state in providing market-enabling institutions. It starts by reviewing the central conflict in all exchanges between those holding and those acquiring property rights, and how solving it requires reducing information asymmetry without endangering the security of property. Relying on a model of the social choice of institutions, the chapter identifies the demand and supply factors driving the institutional choices made by the Romans, and examines the economic circumstances that influenced these factors in the classical period of Roman law. Comparing the predictions of the model with the main solutions used by Roman law in the areas of property, business exchange, and the enforcement of personal obligations allows the chapter to propose alternative interpretations for some salient institutions that have been subject to controversy in the literature, and to conclude with an overall positive assessment of the market-enabling role of the Roman state.

Experience is a major source of knowledge. Could institutions be improved by eliciting the additional knowledge held by experienced individuals? I show here that in several areas of the law experienced individuals are more critical of institutional quality than inexperienced individuals. Moreover, performance indexes built with experienced subsamples substantially alter country rankings. Assuming no unmeasured confounders, more knowledge arguably leads experienced individuals to revise the more benign view held by the general population, composed mostly of inexperienced individuals. Moreover, experience is a stronger driver than alternative sources of knowledge, including education, which might therefore be reinforcing milder and, arguably, incorrect assessments of institutional quality. After observing how this 'experience effect' varies systematically across countries, I conclude by proposing that evaluations of institutional quality pay greater attention to experienced individuals and cautioning against basing inferences on assessments made by the general population.

We review a recent literature on cultural differences acros s euro member states. We point out that this literature fails to address cultural d ifferences between Protestants and Catholics, which are likely a major underlying rea son for cross-country differences. We argue that confessional culture explains w hy Catholic countries tend to have weaker institutions but are more open to economic and political integration. EU policies after the economic crisis looked clumsy and fail ed to address all concerns, but were viable, caused only a manageable amount of se ri u backlash and tied in well with Europe’s cultural diversity, also providi ng scope for learning and adaption.

We review a recent literature on cultural differences across euro member states. We point out that this literature fails to address cultural differences between Protestants and Catholics, which are likely a major underlying reason for cross-country differences. We argue that confessional culture explains why Catholic countries tend to have weaker institutions but are more open to economic and political integration. EU policies after the economic crisis looked clumsy and failed to address all concerns, but were viable, caused only a manageable amount of serious backlash and tied in well with Europe’s cultural diversity, also providing scope for learning and adaption.

We analyze the “sequential exchange” problem in which traders have incomplete information on earlier contracts. We show that under sequential exchange, it is in general not possible to simultaneously implement two key features of markets – specialization between asset ownership and control, and impersonal trade. In particular, we show that in contrast with the conventional wisdom in economics, strong property rights—enforceable against subsequent buyers—may be detrimental to impersonal trade. Finally, we provide conditions under which a mechanism that overcomes the tradeoff between specialization and impersonal trade exists, and we characterize such mechanism. Our results provide an efficiency rationale for how property rights are enforced in business, company and real estate transactions, and for the ubiquitousness of “formalization” institutions that the literature has narrowly seen as entry barriers.

The paper identifies what value blockchain adds to the contractual and property processes, exploring its potential and analyzing the main difficulties it is facing. It argues that, contrary to naive conceptions that proclaim the end of intermediaries and state involvement, blockchain applications will rely on a variety of interface, completion and enforcement specialists, including standard public interventions, especially for property transactions. Without these interventions, blockchain applications will at most enable trade in in personam claims—instead of in rem rights—, therefore facilitating personal instead of truly impersonal—that is, asset-based—transactions.

This paper analyzes social choice with respect to the demarcation of land boundaries, distinguishing between physical and legal demarcation. In contrast with the influential “land administration” literature and the World Bank’s policy guidelines, the analysis supports voluntary—instead of mandatory—demarcation as well as non-integrated services for land administration. Consistent with these theoretical arguments, the paper empirically verifies that demarcation conflicts play a lesser role in title-, land- and property-related litigation, which seems to increase in all these areas after physical demarcation is made mandatory. Relying on World Bank data, it also observes that linking and merging cadastres and land registries does not correlate with lower transaction costs.