Make America Healthy Again (MAHA) is a health-related campaign slogan proposed by Robert F. Kennedy Jr. and later incorporated into the political coalition of President Trump. While #MAHA quickly circulated beyond the campaign itself and became a prominent hashtag for public discussion, it remains unclear whether this public discourse reflected, reshaped, or diverged from the stated agenda of the MAHA campaign. This study presents a large-scale, cross-platform analysis of early #MAHA public discourse between September 2024 and January 2025, using the framework of Agenda-Melding Theory. Drawing on 41,819 #MAHA-related posts, this study combines structural topic modeling, interrupted time-series analysis, and AI-assisted data annotation to examine the thematic structure and temporal dynamics. The most prominent finding is the substantial disconnect between #MAHA public discourse and the stated MAHA agenda: 81.3

BACKGROUND:Alcohol is a modifiable risk factor for several types of cancer, though awareness of this link is often found to be low among the US population. The current study investigated beliefs about alcohol as a cancer risk factor among Spanish-preferring Americans, specifically for different types of alcoholic beverages (e.g., beer, liquor, and wine). METHODS:We analyzed data from a national survey of US adults who prefer speaking Spanish, comparing their awareness of alcohol's link to cancer with the general population and Hispanic respondents in the Health Information National Trends Survey (HINTS) 5 Cycle 4 dataset. RESULTS:Awareness among Spanish-speaking adults was lower (wine: 8.2%, beer: 18.3%, and liquor: 28.4%) than all HINTS respondents (wine: 20.3%, beer: 24.9%, and liquor: 31.2%) and specifically the Hispanic HINTS respondents (wine: 18.3%, beer: 22.4%, and liquor: 32.2%). Statistically significant differences were found for wine and beer compared with the general population and for wine compared with Hispanic respondents. Higher media literacy correlated with increased awareness, particularly for beer, whereas eHealth literacy showed an inverse relationship. Recent immigrants demonstrated greater awareness than long-term residents. Gender, insurance status, cancer history, and information-seeking behaviors predicted differential awareness. CONCLUSIONS:Awareness of the alcohol-cancer link among Spanish-preferring adults in the United States is below the national average, with factors such as media literacy, eHealth literacy, demographics, and length of US residency associated with this awareness. IMPACT:The study underscores the need for culturally adapted health communication strategies to improve knowledge of alcohol as a cancer risk factor among Spanish-preferring Americans.

Researchers have tested a variety of interventions to combat misinformation on social media (e.g., accuracy nudges, digital literacy tips, inoculation, debunking). These interventions work via different psychological mechanisms, but all share the goals of increasing recipients’ ability to distinguish between true and false information and/or increasing the veracity of news shared on social media. The current megastudy with 33,233 US-based participants tests nine prominent misinformation interventions in an identical setting using true, false, and misleading health and political news headlines. We find that a wide variety of interventions can improve discernment between true versus false or misleading information during accuracy and sharing judgments. Reducing misinformation belief and sharing is a goal that is accomplishable through multiple strategies targeting different psychological mechanisms.

BACKGROUND:Inaccurate cancer news can have adverse effects on patients and families. One potential way to minimize this is through media literacy training-ideally, training tailored specifically to the evaluation of health-related media coverage. PURPOSE:We test whether an abbreviated health-focused media literacy intervention improves accuracy discernment or sharing discernment for cancer news headlines and also examine how these outcomes compare to the effects of a generic media literacy intervention. METHODS:We employ a survey experiment conducted using a nationally representative sample of Americans (N = 1,200). Respondents were assigned to either a health-focused media literacy intervention, a previously tested generic media literacy intervention, or the control. They were also randomly assigned to rate either perceived accuracy of headlines or sharing intentions. Intervention effects on accurate and inaccurate headline ratings were tested using OLS regressions at the item-response level, with standard errors clustered on the respondent and with headline fixed effects. RESULTS:We find that the health-focused media literacy intervention increased skepticism of both inaccurate (a 5.6% decrease in endorsement, 95% CI [0.1%, 10.7%]) and accurate (a 7.6% decrease, 95% CI [2.4%, 12.8%]) news headlines, and accordingly did not improve discernment between the two. The health-focused media literacy intervention also did not significantly improve sharing discernment. Meanwhile, the generic media literacy intervention had little effect on perceived accuracy outcomes, but did significantly improve sharing discernment. CONCLUSIONS:These results suggest further intervention development and refinement are needed before scaling up similarly targeted health information literacy tools, particularly focusing on building trust in legitimate sources and accurate content.

Americans systematically underestimate the popularity of climate policy. Researchers have speculated that correcting second-order misperceptions, or beliefs about what others believe, could translate into even broader support as action comes to be seen as more politically feasible. Using a two-wave experiment ( N≈1,600), we examine the effects of communicating the degree of policy support among Democrats, Republicans, or all Americans (i.e., norms). Republican and American norms increase perceived policy support from the relevant group; exposure to the Republican norm also increases policy support, and this effect is concentrated mostly among fellow Republicans. However, this effect does not persist over time.

Objective To characterize inaccurate and accurate beliefs about cancer risk factors held among Spanish-preferring adults in the United States. Methods From a national probability panel, we surveyed 196 Hispanic adults who prefer completing questionnaires in Spanish. We also used data from a representative sample of 1200 adults in the US to compare belief acceptance. Results Many less accepted accurate beliefs about cancer risk factors related to topics like fruit/vegetable consumption, weight loss, and alcohol use. Several inaccurate beliefs were widely held, with some being more accepted in the Spanish-preferring sample than the general US adult sample. Higher levels of self-reported media literacy and information scanning associated with more acceptance of both accurate and inaccurate beliefs. Access to the internet at home associated with discernment between accurate and inaccurate beliefs about cancer risk factors. Conclusion Acceptance of accurate beliefs and rejection of inaccurate beliefs varied across potential cancer risk factors. Future Spanish-language public health messaging should address these belief inconsistencies when providing up-to-date cancer-related recommendations or correcting inaccurate information in the public communication environment. Innovation Our study provides comprehensive information about cancer beliefs among Spanish-preferring adults in the United States, which was not previously available, and find that media literacy is a concept likely to be important to consider when putting together intervention tools to combat misinformation.

Air pollution is among the world's greatest environmental health threats. Still, little strategic communication research has addressed it. We report two pre-registered experiments examining narrative and statistical message effects. Study 1 (N = 1,282, U.S.) showed little effect for either. Study 2 (N = 754, California), which accounted for potentially problematic design features of Study 1, found effects for both types across a range of attitudinal outcomes (emotional response, efficacy, risk). Narrative messaging also had a small effect on mitigation intention. Carefully designed messages may produce positive changes on this issue, but success depends on alignment between message construction, recommended behaviors, and audience relevance.

How do citizens understand political authority within multi-level systems? We use original survey data from six European Union member states to assess the roles of political identity and interest in shaping citizen attitudes towards political authority in the European Union. We find that citizens with a greater interest in politics are more likely to express views on the authority of the European Union. These individuals are less likely to be uninformed. Interest does not necessarily mean that individuals hold correct perceptions. A substantive number of voters are misinformed about the power of Brussels. We find that citizens with an exclusively national identity are more likely to hold misperceptions than those who think of themselves as both members of their nation and as Europeans.

Does consensus messaging about contested science issues influence perceptions of consensus and/or personal beliefs? This question remains open, particularly for topics other than climate change and samples outside the United States. In a Spanish national sample (N = 5087), we use preregistered survey experiments to examine differential efficacy of variations in consensus messaging for vaccines and genetically modified organisms. We find that no variation of consensus messaging influences vaccine beliefs. For genetically modified organisms, about which misperceptions are particularly prevalent in our sample, we find that scientific consensus messaging increases perception of consensus and personal belief that genetically modified organisms are safe, and decreases support for a ban. Increasing degree of consensus did not have consistent effects. Although individual differences (e.g. a conspiratorial worldview) predict these genetically modified organism beliefs, they do not undercut consensus message effects. While we observe relatively modest effect sizes, consensus messaging may be able to improve the accuracy of beliefs about some contentious topics.

Scholars warn that partisan divisions in the mass public threaten the health of American democracy. We conducted a megastudy ( n = 32,059 participants) testing 25 treatments designed by academics and practitioners to reduce Americans’ partisan animosity and antidemocratic attitudes. We find that many treatments reduced partisan animosity, most strongly by highlighting relatable sympathetic individuals with different political beliefs or by emphasizing common identities shared by rival partisans. We also identify several treatments that reduced support for undemocratic practices—most strongly by correcting misperceptions of rival partisans’ views or highlighting the threat of democratic collapse—which shows that antidemocratic attitudes are not intractable. Taken together, the study’s findings identify promising general strategies for reducing partisan division and improving democratic attitudes, shedding theoretical light on challenges facing American democracy.

In two online experiments (N = 2,735), we investigated whether forced exposure to high proportions of false news could have deleterious effects by sowing confusion and fueling distrust in news. In a between-subjects design where U.S. participants rated the accuracy of true and false news, we manipulated the proportions of false news headlines participants were exposed to (17%, 33%, 50%, 66%, and 83%). We found that exposure to higher proportions of false news decreased trust in the news but did not affect participants' perceived accuracy of news headlines. While higher proportions of false news had no effect on participants' overall ability to discern between true and false news, they made participants more overconfident in their discernment ability. Therefore, exposure to false news may have deleterious effects not by increasing belief in falsehoods, but by fueling overconfidence and eroding trust in the news. Although we are only able to shed light on one causal pathway, from news environment to attitudes, this can help us better understand the effects of external or supply-side changes in news quality.

Studies based on digital trace data show that older Americans visit and share dubious news sources far more often than younger cohorts, tendencies often attributed to lower levels of digital literacy. At the same time, survey experiments show that older Americans are no worse, if not better, at discerning between false and accurate news. If older Americans can identify misleading news content equally well, why are they still more likely to engage with it in observational settings? In this article, we combine survey measures and digital trace data for three nationally representative samples (N=9,944) to argue that the existing literature over-emphasizes the importance of factors like digital literacy relative to standard political variables such as political interest and partisanship, factors known to increase across the lifespan. Calcified partisanship in particular makes older Americans vulnerable to hyperpartisan news --- which is highly slanted but not verified as explicitly false. High rates of engagement with this category of content, which has been examined in survey studies of older citizens less regularly in the literature, may partially explain the high rates of engagement with dubious news domains in behavioral trace data. In all, our findings have important implications for how we understand --- and might intervene to reduce --- high engagement among this cohort with dubious news.

In a national sample of 5087 Spaniards, we examine the prevalence of 10 specific misperceptions over five separate science and health domains (climate change, 5G technology, genetically modified foods, vaccines, and homeopathy). We find that misperceptions about genetically modified foods and general health risks of 5G technology are particularly widespread. While we find that partisan affiliation is not strongly associated with any of the misperceptions aside from climate change, we find that two distinct dimensions of an anti-elite worldview-anti-expert and conspiratorial mindsets-are better overall predictors of having science and health misperceptions in the Spanish context. These findings help extend our understanding of polarization around science beyond the most common contexts (e.g. the United States) and support recent work suggesting anti-elite sentiments are among the most important predictors of factual misperceptions.

This review explores psychological barriers to the acceptance of expert guidance. Specifically, the constructs of epistemic overconfidence, institutional distrust, anti-expert sentiments, anti-establishment orientations, science populism, and conspiracist worldviews are jointly considered as orientations to expertise. I review the state of the literature on their origins, prevalence, and effects on misinformation endorsement and acceptance of corrections. Addressing these psychological barriers requires building trust in institutions, backed by transparent communication and the involvement of community-based, non-expert messengers. As the review synthesizes disparate research strands, it underscores the need for future studies to compare, validate, and consolidate different orientations to expertise, understand causal relationships, and explore generalizability to diverse contexts.

We analyse public perceptions and misperceptions of European integration in the context of the Brexit referendum in the UK. Erroneous information about the EU was salient in the public domain before the referendum, but the prevalence of EU related misperceptions among voters has not yet been examined much. We use a population based survey that was conducted before the referendum to measure misperceptions in two domains: the role of the EU for the British economy and EU related costs. Hypotheses to explain misperceptions are derived from the public opinion literature and political psychology. Most voters hold misperceptions and this includes Euroskeptics as well as individuals who support the EU. Yet, misperceptions vary in systematic ways. Individuals with more education are less ill informed. In line with motivated reasoning, citizens' perceptions are also biased by their predispositions: while many voters hold misperceptions, the magnitude of misperceptions that portray the EU negatively is greater among Euroskeptics.

Background In an ongoing public health crisis, the question of why some people are unwilling to take vaccines with particular attributes is an especially pertinent one, since low rates of vaccination mean that it will take longer for many nations to exit the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic. Methods In this article, we conduct a pre-registered conjoint experiment in Hungary (N = 2512), where respondents were asked about their attitudes towards hypothetical COVID-19 vaccines whose characteristics varied across a number of attributes. Results Results indicate that vaccine attributes matter for the likelihood of uptake when it comes to the prevalence of severe side effects, efficacy and country of origin. Moreover, we find that our pre-treatment measure of institutional trust moderates the effect of our treatment, as differences in vaccine attributes are larger for those with robust levels of institutional trust compared to those with weaker levels. Conclusion Our findings suggest that institutional trust matters when it comes to understanding the relationship between vaccine attributes and likelihood of uptake.

Older news users may be especially vulnerable to prior exposure effects, whereby news comes to be seen as more accurate over multiple viewings. I test this in re-analyses of three two-wave, nationally representative surveys in the United States (N = 8,730) in which respondents rated a series of mainstream, hyperpartisan, and false political headlines (139,082 observations). I find that prior exposure effects increase with age—being strongest for those in the oldest cohort (60+)—especially for false news. I discuss implications for the design of media literacy programs and policies regarding targeted political advertising aimed at this group.

AbstractPolitical elites sometimes seek to delegitimize election results using unsubstantiated claims of fraud. Most recently, Donald Trump sought to overturn his loss in the 2020 US presidential election by falsely alleging widespread fraud. Our study provides new evidence demonstrating the corrosive effect of fraud claims like these on trust in the election system. Using a nationwide survey experiment conducted after the 2018 midterm elections – a time when many prominent Republicans also made unsubstantiated fraud claims – we show that exposure to claims of voter fraud reduces confidence in electoral integrity, though not support for democracy itself. The effects are concentrated among Republicans and Trump approvers. Worryingly, corrective messages from mainstream sources do not measurably reduce the damage these accusations inflict. These results suggest that unsubstantiated voter-fraud claims undermine confidence in elections, particularly when the claims are politically congenial, and that their effects cannot easily be mitigated by fact-checking.

During the COVID-19 pandemic, many residents of high-income countries (HICs) were eligible for COVID-19 vaccine boosters, while many residents of lower-income countries (LICs) had not yet received a first dose. HICs made some efforts to contribute to COVID-19 vaccination efforts in LICs, but these efforts were limited in scale. A new literature discusses the normative importance of an international redistribution of vaccines. Our analysis contributes an empirical perspective on the willingness of citizens in a HIC to contribute to such efforts (which we term international vaccine solidarity). We analyse the levels and predictors of international vaccine solidarity. We surveyed a representative sample of German adults (n = 2019) who participated in a two-wave YouGov online survey (w1: Sep 13-21, 2021 and w2: Oct 4-13, 2021). International vaccine solidarity is measured by asking respondents preferences for sharing vaccine supplies internationally versus using that supply as boosters for the domestic population. We examine a set of pre-registered hypotheses. Almost half of the respondents in our sample (48%) prioritize giving doses to citizens in less developed countries. A third of respondents (33%) prefer to use available doses as boosters domestically, and a fifth of respondents (19%) did not report a preference. In line with our hypotheses, respondents higher in cosmopolitanism and empathy, and those who support domestic redistribution exhibit more support for international dose-sharing. Older respondents (who might be more at risk) do not consistently show less support for vaccine solidarity. These results help us to get a better understanding of the way citizens' form preferences about a mechanism that redistributes medical supplies internationally during a global crisis.