Previous research has examined people's attitudes toward science and scientists, highlighting how religious identities, beliefs, or behavior shapes these attitudes. However, survey design choices have been previously shown to influence individuals' attitudes toward religion and science. We investigated the extent to which question ordering (i.e. presenting questions about science before questions about religion or the paranormal) in a large-scale survey would influence respondents' attitudes toward science and religion. Utilizing an experimental design, we found that responding to science questions first led to (1) more interest in science, (2) more confidence in the scientific community, (3) increased agreement that science is a way of knowing truth, (4) more confidence in responding to science knowledge items, (5) more agreement to scientific statements, and (6) more trust in scientists. We discuss the implications of question ordering when analyzing attitudes toward science and religion within the same surveys and future directions for research.

Past research indicates that individuals who were formerly religious (religious dones) and individuals who were never religious (religious nones) differ on important psychological and behavioral characteristics. Other research demonstrates that religious and nonreligious individuals experience social identity threat; however, this research has only been conducted in the United States. Thus, we examined social identity threat among currently religious, formerly religious, and never religious individuals across three cultural contexts: religious Western (United States), secular Western (the Netherlands), and Eastern (Hong Kong). Two studies (N = 4,697) drawn from three countries (Hong Kong, the Netherlands, and United States) examined the degree to which formerly religious individuals (i.e., religious dones) conceal their identity, relative to currently religious and never religious individuals. In Study 1 (N = 3,071), we found that religious dones report less public-private identity overlap-that is, greater identity concealment-in a religious culture (i.e., United States). In Study 2 (N = 1,626), we replicated these results and extended the findings to belongingness. In addition, belongingness mediated the association between religious identity and identity concealment among U.S. participants. These results suggest social costs of religious deidentification in religious settings: religious dones feel less belonging and consequently conceal their identity.

In many Western societies, religious people (particularly Christians) are underrepresented in STEM fields, relative to their numbers in the general population. We review existing literature that supports two broad types of explanations for religious underrepresentation in STEM, focusing primarily on Christians in the US. First, Christianity and science may actually conflict or be perceived by Christians to conflict with one another, which reduces Christians' engagement in STEM fields. Second, science and scientists may be portrayed, and Christians stereotyped, in ways that lead Christians to believe they would not belong in STEM. We argue that it is critical to further investigate these explanations, as doing so will shed light on how to broaden participation and engagement in science among a sizeable chunk of the population. We conclude our review by discussing promising directions for future research and implications for non-Christian religions, as well as in contexts outside the West.

Previous research has demonstrated that conservative individuals (relative to liberal individuals) were less likely to adhere to COVID-19 guidelines (e.g., social distancing). We argue that because adherence to COVID-19 guidelines was largely characterized as "politically correct" behavior, individuals opposed to political correctness (PC) norms would follow COVID-19 guidelines less, controlling for political conservatism and other relevant demographic variables. In two correlational studies and one preregistered experiment, we tested whether opposition to political correctness (OPC) predicts less adherence to COVID-19 guidelines. Study 1 showed that OPC correlates negatively with mask-wearing and social distancing, controlling for conservatism, gender, age, and religious identity. Study 2 replicated and extended these effects, demonstrating that seeing mask-wearing as a common good (i.e., as a beneficial COVID-19 mitigation strategy) mediated the relationship between OPC and mask-wearing, social distancing, handwashing, and vaccination intentions. Study 3 experimentally manipulated feelings toward PC. Inconsistent with our preregistered hypothesis but consistent with previous research, participants induced to have positive feelings toward PC adhered to COVID-19 guidelines the most and had the most positive feelings toward wearing masks. We discuss how moralization of health guidelines can predict individuals' likelihood of adhering to these guidelines. We also discuss how best to persuade individuals who see adherence to health guidelines as "politically correct," as well as future research directions to address this concern.

Building on previous research demonstrating that demographic growth of racial minorities increases realistic threat and prejudice among majority group members, we examined whether demographic increases of groups associated with symbolic threat (lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender [LGBT] and nonreligious groups) increased realistic threat, symbolic threat, and/or prejudice. In a single-paper meta-analysis across four studies, participants who read that LGBT groups were becoming more prevalent in the United States exhibited heightened perceptions of realistic threat and (especially) symbolic threat from these groups, which in turn predicted anti-LGBT prejudice. Two similar studies examining the growth of nonreligious groups demonstrated weaker effects. Implications for America's growing diversity and future directions for studying these effects are discussed.

Research has examined how Jews, Muslims, atheists, and agnostics react to feelings of social identity threat (i.e., the perception that one's group is devalued or stigmatized). However, no research so far has compared reactions between religious minorities (RMs; Jews and Muslims) and nonreligious individuals (NRs; atheists and agnostics) in general. Concealment of identity appears to be lower among RMs than among NRs, although this possibility has not been directly tested. A pilot study was conducted to assess differences in identity concealment between RMs and NRs under social identity threat. Nonreligious individuals were more likely than Jews and Muslims to conceal their religious identity to avoid social identity threat. Furthermore, concealment was related to having less group identity (lower identity centrality). The main study replicated this effect with a larger sample. Implications for managing social identity threat among these groups and directions for future research are discussed.

Nonreligious individuals stereotype Christians as unscientific and see Christianity and science as conflicting. The present studies examined how perceptions of incompatibility between Christianity and science influence nonreligious individuals’ stereotypes of Christians in science in the US context. We measured (Study 1) and manipulated (Study 2) participants’ beliefs about the compatibility or incompatibility of Christianity and science. In Study 1 ( N = 365), nonreligious participants ( n = 214), more so than Christian participants ( n = 151), perceived Christianity and science as incompatible, which in turn predicted perceptions of Christians as less intelligent and less scientifically able. In Study 2 ( N = 799; 520 Christians, 279 nonreligious), manipulating perceived Christianity-science compatibility reduced negative perceptions of Christians’ scientific ability and general intellect among nonreligious participants. Implications for mitigating negative stereotypes of Christians in science, increasing Christians’ representation in scientific fields, and improving relations between Christians and nonreligious groups are discussed.

The present research introduces the possibility that Whiteness can threaten majority group members' sense of uniqueness and reduce their support for multiculturalism, an ideology that emphasizes recognition of distinctive cultural identities and is seen as primarily relevant to racial/ethnic minorities. Across three studies, being induced to self-identify as "White" (vs. "European American") led majority group members high, but not low, in need for uniqueness (measured in Study 1, manipulated in Studies 2 and 3) to express less positivity toward multiculturalism. Further, the effect of uniqueness motives on reduced support for multiculturalism among participants self-identifying as "White" was mediated by reduced personal feelings of diversity (Study 3). Implications for optimal distinctiveness theory and the functions of White identity are discussed.

Negative attitudes toward the nonreligious persist in America. This may compel some nonreligious individuals to conceal their identity to manage feelings of social identity threat. In one correlational study and one experiment, we found evidence of social identity threat and concealment behavior among nonreligious Americans. Our first study showed that Southern nonreligious individuals reported higher levels of stigma consciousness and self-reported concealment of nonreligious identity, which in turn predicted lower likelihood of self-identifying as “atheist” in public settings than in private settings. Our second study successfully manipulated feelings of social identity threat by showing that atheists who read an article about negative stereotypes of their group subsequently exhibited higher concealment scores than did atheists who read one of two control articles. Implications for how nonreligious individuals negotiate social identity threat and future directions for nonreligion research are discussed.

With its origin in the writings of Alexis de Tocqueville and Karl Marx, relative deprivation has been investigated by researchers in psychology, sociology, anthropology, criminology, and political science. Relative deprivation is a judgment of oneself or one’s ingroup as being disadvantaged compared to another person or group, which leads to feelings of anger, frustration, resentment, and/or entitlement. Individuals can feel relatively deprived when comparing themselves to other ingroup members or relevant outgroup members, or when comparing their ingroup as a whole to a relevant outgroup. Individuals can also make temporal comparisons—comparing their current status with their own past or future status or comparing their ingroup’s current status with the past or future status of the ingroup. If these comparisons lead to an appraisal of disadvantage and to affective reactions such as angry resentment, a variety of interpersonal or intergroup outcomes can ensue, including individual psychological states (e.g., lower self-esteem), individual behavior (e.g., increased engagement in risky behaviors such as gambling), intergroup attitudes (e.g., more prejudice toward the outgroup), and collective action (e.g., higher likelihood of protesting). Relative deprivation can be influenced by several factors. People from individualistic cultures have been shown to exhibit more relative deprivation from collectivistic cultures. Temporality also has affected feelings of relative deprivation; these feelings are dependent upon type of temporal comparison (past vs. future) and number of temporal comparisons. Moreover, temporal comparisons have been treated as both an influencer of relative deprivation as well as a source of relative deprivation; future research should address these competing notions. Additional influencing factors include system-justifying beliefs (potentially limiting comparisons and subsequent feelings of relative deprivation) and feelings of empowerment (leading to more deprivation). Future directions pertaining to relative deprivation should focus on comparing feelings of relative deprivation over a period of time (i.e., longitudinally) and experimentally manipulating the construct to flesh out how relative deprivation works. Another recommendation for future research involves creating and validating measures of relative deprivation at both the individual and group level. Finally, a newer line of research examines relative gratification (where cognitive comparisons of being better-off than others leads to prejudice against outgroups). Future research should determine when and how relative gratification occurs and what the differences between the feelings and outcomes of relative gratification and relative deprivation may be.

Abstract The definition of group cohesion has been debated since the formal introduction of the concept in social psychology. Group cohesion has undergone a variety of conceptualizations over the years stemming from several theoretical perspectives. Many models of group cohesion have been introduced; however, research with these models is largely confined to the field (e.g., psychology) or subfield (e.g., sports psychology) in which it originated. Initially, unidimensional models of group cohesion were popular, with proponents of these models arguing that cohesion would have the same consequences regardless of its operationalization. However, later research found that group cohesion may be multidimensional in nature. Several two-dimensional models have been proposed, the most popular of which distinguishes between group members working together to attain common goals (task cohesion) and group members interacting with one another on a more personal level (social cohesion). Another multidimensional model of group cohesion builds on the social-task cohesion distinction but further divides social and task cohesion into Group Integration and Individual Attractiveness to Group sub-components, thus creating a four-factor model. Group cohesion has been applied to a variety of group contexts, including sports teams, military squads, and work groups. The amount of cohesion in each group is dependent upon the properties of the group being investigated. Groups that have naturally formed (i.e., “real” groups) have higher rates of group cohesion than groups created for the purpose of a study (i.e., “artificial” groups). Other factors that affect group cohesion include type of group (e.g., interdependent vs. co-acting) and level of analysis (i.e., individual or group). Research on group cohesion has focused on the consequences of group cohesion in lieu of what causes group cohesion in the first place. Furthermore, although much research has detailed the relationship between cohesion and performance, many other positive consequences of group cohesion have not been assessed in depth. Finally, group cohesion is also associated with potential negative consequences, such as groupthink.