In theorising the rapid expansion of urban agglomeration across the world, a significant body of work has examined the transformation of scale from the perspective of geographical size and the regulatory facets of devolved power. A further literature has examined what are seen as the relational dimensions in the transformation and constitution of space and the extent to which these are socially constructed. In this conceptualisation, scale is constituted and reconstituted by capitalist relations of production, social production, and consumption. The influence of capitalist relations on scale has most explicitly been illustrated by the impact of globalisation and the way it has served to weaken the regulatory powers of nation states and is simultaneously reordering the hierarchy of government power within them. Metropolitan governments have been exposed to global markets and to the influence of transnational corporations and, in a process of glocalisation, increasingly endeavour to create an entrepreneurial environment conducive to attract and retain foreign investment. Hitherto the interpenetration of the global and local has largely been studied in the context of urban agglomeration and scalar transformation in the global North. In an attempt to address this lacuna this article examines the manifestation of the process of glocalisation in metropolitan Cape Town in South Africa in the global South. It posits that the municipal government’s ambition to transform the city into a modern digitally based economy linked to global markets manifests many of the characteristics of glocalisation. Furthermore, it argues, far from promoting greater social inclusion in a highly unequal post-apartheid city, the economic model which has been adopted is exacerbating social inequality and poverty.

The status of teaching and research on public policy and governance in Africa, in many respects, remains a vestige of the colonial and post-colonial eras. This is reflected in the epistemologies that underpin the design of curricula and the pedagogies adopted. Accordingly, African scholars and others have advocated for policy formulation and governance that reflect African socio-cultural contexts more accurately. Whilst broadly attentive to the historical factors that shaped state formation and administrative practices in post-colonial Africa, this chapter examines how public policy and governance are taught and researched in African institutions. Doing so also reflects on the challenges confronting African academics in developing relevant curricula to their national contexts. Accordingly, it considers how scholars might retain the essence of key theoretical precepts whilst adapting them to local circumstances. It also argues for a stronger pan-African focus in developing teaching materials and conducting research that traverses linguistic and geographic boundaries.

The status of teaching and research on public administration in Africa countries, in many respects, remains a vestige of the colonial era and this is reflected in the epistemologies that underpin the design of the curricula and pedagogies adopted. They have been further shaped by the injunctions of neoliberalism and conditionalities of donor aid which promote normative northern models of public administration. Recognising this reality African scholars and others have, for some time, advocated for transformative models of policy formulation and governance which more accurately reflect African contexts. Commencing with an analysis of the historical factors that shaped state formation and administrative practices in post-colonial Africa, this article broadly examines how public policy and governance are taught and researched in African institutions. It also reflects on the challenges which confront African academics in developing curricula and in conducting research which is relevant to their national contexts. In so doing, it considers ways in which scholars might retain the essence of key theoretical precepts whilst adapting them to local contexts. It also argues for a stronger pan-African focus in the development of teaching materials and in conducting research which traverses linguistic and geographic boundaries.

Globally, policy environments have become increasingly more complex with the growth in the number of wicked problems, such as that posed by the COVID-19 pandemic. In their response to these problems, public administrations have, from necessity, become heavily reliant on their intergovernmental relations systems, as the challenges posed generally require multilevel responses. This paper analyzes the role of intergovernmental relations in shaping the responses of the BRICS countries when confronted with COVID-19. We develop an analytical framework to understand the dynamics of intergovernmental relations in these countries. Based on this we assess the capacity of the state and political systems to manage intergovernmental relations and ensure effective responses to the COVID-19 crisis. This framework is based on an analysis of three dimensions of the policy domain: the political and state system, formal and informal institutions, and the political alignment between them. Whilst state and political systems were found to be instrumental in formulating an immediate response to the crisis, informal institutions and political processes also played a prominent role in determining the extent to which strategies were implemented, particularly in countries that are more decentralized. Countries lacking the robust formal institutions needed to facilitate intergovernmental relations and to ensure swift policy responses, tend to deliver ineffective and inefficient results when confronted with wicked problems.

Public Administration and DevelopmentVolume 39, Issue 4-5 p. 167-173 EDITORIAL BRICS and international development assistance Towards divergence or convergence in development assistance amongst North and South donors? Christopher Tapscott, Christopher Tapscott University of Western Cape, Cape Town, South AfricaSearch for more papers by this authorYijia Jing, Yijia Jing Fudan University, Shanghai, ChinaSearch for more papers by this authorJosé A. Puppim de Oliveira, Corresponding Author José A. Puppim de Oliveira pad_editor@yahoo.com japo3@yahoo.com Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV EAESP and FGV EBAPE), BrazilSearch for more papers by this author Christopher Tapscott, Christopher Tapscott University of Western Cape, Cape Town, South AfricaSearch for more papers by this authorYijia Jing, Yijia Jing Fudan University, Shanghai, ChinaSearch for more papers by this authorJosé A. Puppim de Oliveira, Corresponding Author José A. Puppim de Oliveira pad_editor@yahoo.com japo3@yahoo.com Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV EAESP and FGV EBAPE), BrazilSearch for more papers by this author First published: 04 December 2019 https://doi.org/10.1002/pad.1871Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat Volume39, Issue4-5Special Issue: THE BRICS AND INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCEOctober‐December 2019Pages 167-173 RelatedInformation

Following the successes of what have been labelled the developmental states of East Asia, a number of emerging economies have aspired to emulate the state-led model that has been seen as central to their rapid economic growth. However, recognising that the East Asian model was, in a number of significant ways, sui generis, states now attempting to follow a developmental path have tended to adopt hybrid models which incorporate a more citizen focused and democratic approach than the often autocratic and top down approach followed by the so-named Asian Tigers. South Africa is one such state which has declared its intent to construct a developmental state as a means to overcoming the legacy of Apartheid rule and to improving the welfare of the majority of its citizens. However, for a variety of historical reasons, unlike the topdown model characteristic of developmental states elsewhere, the South African variant was, in the first instance, focused on the construction of what has been termed developmental local government. This paper looks at the attempts to establish a system of developmental local government in the Cape Town metropolitan area and, in particular, the endeavour to advance citizen participation through a process of integrated development planning. Taking as a case study the sub-council area of Delft, which is inhabited by the poorest segments of the municipal population, the paper finds that little progress is being made in promoting citizen participation or in significantly improving their livelihoods. This is due to the fact the notion of a developmental state has been so poorly articulated in national policy and that this aggravated by weak inter-governmental coordination. In this context the idea of developmental local government has failed to progress beyond political rhetoric and it has contributed little to the construction of a broader national developmental state.

IJPSM 31,4 regard to some emerging trends in local government service provision, and, in this way, the article aims to contribute to the ongoing theoretical debate on whether local is always better for the delivery of public services. Explanatory factors, strengths and limitations of local service deliveryOne of the overarching questions in this special issue is whether or not social services are best provided locally.This forms part of a long scholarly debate about the advantages and disadvantages of (de)centralization, elements of which are discussed below with a particular focus on their implications for effective service delivery.From a political science perspective, possible explanations for the factors leading to decentralization may be grouped into the three different approaches, as described by Mueller (2015, p. 16 et seq.), namely, a socio-cultural approach, a structural approach and a political approach.In the first of these, the socio-cultural approach, it is suggested that decentralization occurs more often when there is societal diversity, for example, cleavages based on language, religion or ethnicity.Furthermore, it is argued, federalism is more likely to occur when there is a political culture of subsidiarity.Under the structural approach, it is asserted that such factors as the area, distance between settlements, and population size explain levels of (de)centralization.The proposition in this instance is that there are more variations in citizens' preferences in larger areas and consequently, decentralization is capable of achieving a better balance between costs and benefits.In terms of the centerperiphery paradigm (Rokkan and Urwin, 1982), more decentralization occurs when peripheral localities display more resistance to the center, and this is more likely when there are remote and inaccessible regions with their own strong urban centers.Population size is also assumed to be a driving factor for more decentralization (Dahl and Tufte, 1973).The debate on the scale of local government and its implications for local democracy is still an ongoing one (Denters et al., 2014).Under the political approach, (de)centralization is seen to depend on political ideology, the political right is believed to prefer a decentralized system based on a system of elite bargaining.Many arguments have been raised for and against the provision of services at the local level, some of which have been highly contentious and contradictory (Kuhlmann and Wollmann, 2014).What is striking is these exchanges, is that advantages of increased efficiency and effectiveness have been claimed by both those in favor of centralization and those advocating for decentralization and that their positions have often changed over the course of time (De Vries, 2000).A prominent argument raised in favor of providing services locally has long been that of greater efficiency and effectiveness in the allocation of public services.It is also argued that the local population can influence decisions relating to the type, level, quality and mix of local services, as well as the price they are willing to pay for them, and that this ultimately leads to greater citizen satisfaction (Miller, 2002).However, this argument is disputed on the grounds that lower costs are often achieved by providing fewer or lower quality services at the local level, rather than achieving the same standards and goals at lower costs.Decentralized service provision is therefore said to be favorable for allocative efficiency, while centralization enhances cost-efficiency because it avoids duplication and "reinvention of the wheel" by many local governments (De Vries, 2000) and economies of scale can be achieved.Another central argument advanced in favor of decentralized structures is the democratic dimension, and the fact that it facilitates greater political participation by local populations (Sharpe, 1970).Local governments are closer to the people than a distant central government, and participation at the local level brings together a variety of stakeholders and enhances collaboration and social cohesion.Furthermore, it is stated, it fosters accountability, transparency and openness (Miller, 2002).However, the extent to which

The inclusion of citizen participation as a means to the equitable delivery of public services has distinguished South Africa's democratic development trajectory over the last 20 years. While equitable resource allocation remains high on the agenda of more recently democratised states, most of which have highly diverse and unequally resourced populations. Influencing the design of more inclusive participation is the notion of a universal citizenship that applies the concept of the equality of individuals to the needs, identities and sense of agency of citizens both between and within states. The liberal democratic theoretical conceptualisation of the individual centres on the notion of universal citizen, who is the recipient and embodiment of democracy through the rights bestowed through the democratic model. This conceptualisation has been criticised for its inability to deal with the imprecision of individual and collective political identities, especially as these evolve in newly democratic contexts. The construction of a single identity citizen living in communities imbued with homogenous characteristics is carried forward into the policy construction of participatory governance. This article explores and challenges the notion of the single identity citizen that belongs to one homogenous community that can be identified and drawn into formally constructed government spaces. The paper explores the construction of political and socio-economic identities and how notions of community are constructed by citizens, on the one hand, and government policies, on the other.

Since the advent of democracy in 1994, South Africa has undergone an extensive process of state reform aimed at overcoming the legacy of Apartheid and at building a more egalitarian social and political order. Whilst progress has been made in reforming the state infrastructure, the pursuit of an inconsistent economic growth path has meant that inequality and poverty remain serious challenges to the social order. The inability of oversight institutions to control powerful political interest groups, furthermore, has led to the growth of public sector corruption and to power struggles within the ruling alliance. From a BRICS perspective this suggests that the current governance challenges in South Africa need to be taken into account when factoring in its future role in the partnership.

自1994年实现民主化以来,南非经历了广泛的国家改革进程,力求清除种族隔离制度的历史残余,建立更平等的社会和政治秩序.虽然在国家基础设施建设方面有所突破,但对不连贯的经济增长道路的追求,意味着不平等与贫困仍然对南非的社会秩序构成严峻挑战.此外,监督机构无力控制强大的政治利益集团,导致公共部门腐败与执政联盟内部权力斗争状况的进一步恶化.从金砖国家合作的角度来看,评估南非未来在金砖国家伙伴关系中所能发挥的作用时,需要着重分析南非目前面临的治理挑战.

Much of the focus in the literature on participatory development has been on the demand side and on the extent to which citizens succeed in pressuring the state to deliver basic services. Less attention has been focused on the supply side of participatory development, namely on how state institutions give effect to development policies. Post-Apartheid South Africa is replete with policies and legislation supporting participatory processes and yet in practice this has seldom lived up to the ideals espoused. This article examines the delivery of public housing in poor communities in three municipalities in South Africa and argues that there is a mismatch between how the formulators of policy understand participation and how it is interpreted by beneficiary communities and local officials. It concludes that considerably more attention needs to be focused on why officials fail to translate national policies into action if participatory democracy is to attain any legitimacy in the population at large. Points for practitioners Effective citizen engagement in decision-making processes is the key factor in participatory development programmes. Enabling legislation and policy is essential to the process but it is not sufficient to ensure participation. The design of participatory programmes will thus need to take into account the capacity of communities to organize themselves and will need to factor in the means and time to develop their ability to engage effectively. Officials managing participatory development projects need to undergo formal training so that they understand that the manner in which beneficiaries participate is as important the actual activities in which they are involved.

La littérature sur le développement participatif s’intéresse en grande partie au côté « demande » et à la mesure dans laquelle les citoyens parviennent à pousser l’État à offrir les services de base. Les auteurs s’intéressent moins au côté « offre » du développement participatif, à savoir à la manière dont les institutions publiques mettent en œuvre les politiques de développement. L’Afrique du Sud d’après l’apartheid regorge de politiques et autres lois en faveur des processus participatifs. Dans la pratique, pourtant, ces mesures sont rarement à la hauteur des idéaux visés. Dans le présent article, nous examinons les programmes de logement social dans les communautés pauvres dans trois municipalités d’Afrique du Sud et soutenons qu’il existe un décalage entre la façon dont ceux qui formulent la politique interprètent la participation et la façon dont la question est interprétée par les communautés bénéficiaires et les représentants locaux. Nous en concluons qu’il faut s’intéresser bien plus aux raisons pour lesquelles les représentants ne parviennent pas à traduire les politiques nationales en actes si l’on veut que la démocratie participative obtienne une certaine légitimité parmi la population au sens large. Remarques à l’intention des praticiens La participation effective des citoyens dans les processus décisionnels est le facteur déterminant dans les programmes de développement participatifs. Une législation et une politique favorables sont des éléments essentiels dans ce cadre, mais qui ne suffisent pas à eux seuls pour garantir la participation. Les programmes participatifs doivent par conséquent prendre en considération la capacité des communautés à s’organiser et ils doivent prévoir les moyens et le temps nécessaire pour développer leur capacité à associer la population efficacement. Les agents à la tête des projets de développement participatifs doivent suivre une formation formelle pour bien comprendre que la manière dont les bénéficiaires participent est tout aussi importante que les activités proprement dites auxquelles ils sont associés.

The past decade has witnessed an upsurge of protest action across the length and breadth of South Africa, predominantly by communities dissatisfied with the pace and level of service delivery extended by their local authorities. This social mobilisation is reflective of the failure both of the channels established to ensure citizen-state interaction and, most evidently, the failure of the local state to meet the expectations of its constituents. However, whilst protest action has emerged as a new form of engagement with the state and an assertion by citizens of their basic right to social and economic services, it is less clear how effective this social mobilisation is in securing these rights. It is also unclear why some forms of collective action are more successful than others in extracting concessions from the state. This article examines mobilisation by two communities in the suburb of Langa in Cape Town (i.e. Joe Slovo informal settlement and backyard dwellers) in their struggles for access to free public housing. The article argues that whilst political opportunity structures and resource mobilisation, delineated in social movement literature, have influenced the outcome of social mobilisation by both communities, less studied social opportunity structures have played an equally decisive role in determining these outcomes.

Protest politics in South Africa has a long history and has been deployed differentially in different historical moments. Whereas protests formed an important vehicle during the fight against apartheid, their rebirth and propulsion to the centre of the struggles in the post-apartheid dispensation have come as a surprise to many. The majority of these protests, so-called 'service delivery protests', are reported as emanating from communities' dissatisfaction with municipal service delivery as well as problems relating to lack of communication between council and councillors on the one hand and citizens on the other. In this article, we interrogate data from five study sites located in Cape Town and Pietermaritzburg. While we found support for the importance of service delivery, our data contradicts many widely held assertions as regards what causes these protests. We were able to show, for example, that these so-called 'service delivery protests' may actually emanate from reasons that extend beyond service delivery. Since our data indicates that levels of participation in Cape Town are higher than in Pietermaritzburg on the one hand, illustrating perhaps the different provincial contexts, there is also variation between the relatively high participation rates of the 'black African' sites of Langa and Khayelitsha, on the one hand, and the lower rates of the 'coloured' site of Bonteheuwel, on the other, which we ascribe to the disengagement of the community in Cape Town, from both local and national politics.