If we want to measure change, we shouldn’t change our measures. Yet measurement changes do happen. Some result from global circumstances such as mode switches necessitated by the COVID-19 pandemic. Others are related to changes in the presentation and prevalence of a topic. The number of people who identify with no religion, also known as religious “nones,” has grown rapidly in many countries (Hackett et al. 2015; Stolz et al. 2025). We recently published an extended discussion of many measurement issues that may exaggerate the growth of religious “nones” (Conrad and Hackett 2026). In this short note, we highlight three common changes in the measurement of religious “nones” and call for survey and census organizations that make these changes to concurrently study how they affect the apparent prevalence of the “no religion” population.

Academic and popular interest in nonreligion has risen in parallel with the growth of nonreligious populations. In many cases, questions used to measure religion have been modified to better capture nonreligious identities. Little attention has been given to how these changes in measures affect the narrative about the “rise of the nones.” While there is no doubt that religiously unaffiliated populations have grown in many countries during the 21st century, we argue that the degree of such growth has sometimes been exaggerated. When measurement changes are introduced, they can have a substantial effect. We review methodological issues that affect estimates of the size of religiously unaffiliated populations and their change over time.

Christianity in China grew rapidly in the decades following the end of the Cultural Revolution. Some scholars and journalists claim that Christianity in China is still expanding in the twenty-first century. In this study, the authors contrast evidence for such claims with the results from two decades of survey data. In 19 nationally representative surveys conducted since the early 2000s, the authors find no clear evidence that Christianity continues to grow as a share of China’s population. Surveys conducted in the past decade indicate that about 2 percent of Chinese adults identify as Christian. Contrary to claims that Christianity is rising in popularity among young Chinese, surveys consistently find that Christian identification is more common among seniors than among young adults. Despite their limitations, the authors argue that surveys provide crucial information about the recent trajectory of China’s Christian population.

Religiosity tends to decline across generations. However, religious decline is more pronounced in some countries and the diminishing aspects of religion vary by context. To explain such variation, we extend the general secular transition model, which proposes that countries undergo a similar process of secularization beginning at different points in time. We explain that secular transition happens in three steps: first, public ritual participation declines; second, the importance of religion to individuals declines; and third, people shed religious affiliation. We test this model using datasets from surveys in 111 countries (Pew Research Center), 58 countries (World Values Survey and European Values Study (WVS/EVS)), and a subset of 17 countries measured in at least five WVS/EVS waves. We show the model fits countries with Christian, Muslim, Hindu, and Buddhist pluralities. While Eastern post-Soviet countries deviate from this pattern, traditionally Muslim countries appear to follow its early stages. However, we recommend caution in interpreting longitudinal claims, due to limited data.

The broad challenges of measuring religion in China have been well documented, but the related difficulty of quantifying how China's religious landscape is changing has received less scholarly attention. This study is a comprehensive review of available sources that allow researchers to understand religious trends in China. We pay special attention to the strengths and limitations of the standard measure of religious (zongjiao (sic)(sic)) identity. This measure is the only religion-related question that has been consistently asked in surveys. However, it tends not to capture all Chinese people who are religious in a broad sense. Our analysis of 21 nationally representative surveys conducted since the early 2000s finds that despite its limitations, the zongjiao identity measure provides an important signal about religious changes in China in the twenty-first century.

Cross-national studies of age patterns among couples have tended to compare the ages at which men and women first marry, but few have analysed age differences between current spouses or cohabiting partners (i.e. partner age gaps). We address this gap in the literature by using recent census and survey data to analyse age differences between current partners in 130 countries. Worldwide, men are an average of 4.2 years older than their wives or cohabiting partners. However, age gaps vary by region, ranging from 8.6 years in sub-Saharan Africa to 2.2 years in North America. The religious group with the largest age gap is Muslims (6.6 years), while the smallest age gap is seen among Jews (2.2 years). Differences between Muslims and non-Muslims remain even after controlling for country-level gender inequality and per-capita GDP.Supplementary material is available for this article at: https://doi.org/10.1080/00324728.2022.2094452.

Abstract This paper presents new estimates of the U.S. Jewish population based on a 2019–2020 Pew Research Center survey, which used a stratified address-based sample of all Americans to screen more than 68,000 respondents and complete full interviews with more than 5,800 adults who are Jewish or have some kind of connection to Judaism. We estimate there are about 5.8 million adult Jews living in the United States, including 4.2 million who identify as Jewish by religion and 1.5 million who are Jews of no religion. In addition, 1.8 million children live with at least one adult Jew and are being raised Jewish in some way. Altogether, about 7.5 million people, or 2.4% of the total U.S. population, are Jewish. We present population estimates for additional detailed categories of Jewish adults and children in Jewish households that are not available in any other recent source.

This chapter describes which U.S. groups report meditating frequently. While there is little cross-national data available to analyze demographic characteristics associated with meditation, Pew Research Center’s nationally representative 2014 Religious Landscape Study (RLS) asked more than 35,000 U.S. adults, “How often do you meditate? Would you say at least once a week, once or twice a month, several times a year, seldom, or never?” Americans tend to say they meditate regularly (40 percent do so at least weekly) or rarely, if at all (45 percent seldom or never do). There’s not much middle ground—only 8 percent say they meditate once or twice a month and only 4 percent say they do so several times a year. The Americans most likely to report high frequency of meditation—Jehovah’s Witnesses, older Americans, Black Americans, poorer Americans, and political conservatives—diverge from stereotypes about frequent practitioners of meditation.

This graphic shows differences in the religious composition of people around the world by age group. Religious change caused by demographic processes is more than a hypothetical future possibility. The consequences of demographic differences can be seen today by comparing the religious composition of younger and older populations.

We present estimates of how Muslim populations in Europe increased between 2010 and 2016 and projections of how they will continue to grow under three migration scenarios. If all migration were to immediately and permanently stop – a “zero migration” scenario – the Muslim population of Europe still would be expected to rise from the current level of 4.9% to 7.4% by the year 2050 because Muslims are younger (by 13 years, on average) and have higher fertility (one child more per woman, on average) than other Europeans. A second, “medium” migration scenario assumes all refugee flows stopped as of mid-2016 but that recent levels of “regular” migration to Europe will continue. Under these conditions, Muslims could reach 11.2% of Europe’s population in 2050. Finally, a “high” migration scenario projects the record flow of refugees into Europe between 2014 and 2016 to continue indefinitely into the future with the same religious composition (i.e., mostly made up of Muslims) in addition to the typical annual flow of regular migrants. In this scenario, Muslims could make up 14% of Europe’s population by 2050. Refugee flows around 2015, however, were extremely high and already have begun to decline as the European Union and many of its member states have made refugee policy changes.

Past research, typically focused on Christians in Christian nations, has found that women tend to be more religious than men. This study uses original nationally-representative data (N=5,601) with strategic oversamples of minority groups to examine variation in how religion and gender intersect across ethnoreligious identities in Israel. We demonstrate that Israel diverges from the typical pattern of women appearing more religious than men. In fact, Israeli men are consistently more religious than Israeli women on commonly used measures and frequently more religious on a broader set of questions specific to Judaism and Israel. Subgroup analyses highlight the intersectional nature of gender and religion, showing that men’s greater religiosity in Israel is limited to Jews, and, more specifically, non-secular Jews. We suggest that gender gaps arise, at least in part, because religions are gendered institutions with gendered norms, expectations, and incentives, and that these norms, expectations, and incentives vary from religion to religion.

Some U.S. surveys measure many religious identities, including detailed Protestant affiliations. Researchers must decide how to aggregate these diverse identities. There are now a variety of options for aggregating religious groups into categories. Depending on the research question, it may be appropriate to use one of the existing options or to develop an aggregation strategy tailored to the project in question.

Journal for the Scientific Study of ReligionVolume 57, Issue 4 p. 854-857 Article Supporting Evidence: Why Social Scientists Should Sometimes Consider Data Other than the General Social Survey Conrad Hackett, Conrad Hackett orcid.org/0000-0002-1310-965X Pew Research Center, University of MarylandSearch for more papers by this authorGregory A. Smith, Gregory A. Smith orcid.org/0000-0001-6784-8901 Pew Research CenterSearch for more papers by this authorElizabeth Podrebarac Sciupac, Elizabeth Podrebarac Sciupac Pew Research CenterSearch for more papers by this authorClaire Gecewicz, Claire Gecewicz Pew Research CenterSearch for more papers by this author Conrad Hackett, Conrad Hackett orcid.org/0000-0002-1310-965X Pew Research Center, University of MarylandSearch for more papers by this authorGregory A. Smith, Gregory A. Smith orcid.org/0000-0001-6784-8901 Pew Research CenterSearch for more papers by this authorElizabeth Podrebarac Sciupac, Elizabeth Podrebarac Sciupac Pew Research CenterSearch for more papers by this authorClaire Gecewicz, Claire Gecewicz Pew Research CenterSearch for more papers by this author First published: 09 December 2018 https://doi.org/10.1111/jssr.12570 Acknowledgments: We would like to thank Alan Cooperman, Anna Schiller, and Aleksandra Sandstrom for their feedback. Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat Volume57, Issue4December 2018Pages 854-857 RelatedInformation

Is Islam related to lower education levels for women? A key challenge for prior empirical research is the lack of data on educational attainment by religion at the global level. In this study, we bring together census and survey data from 151 countries to provide the first comprehensive global examination of religious differences in educational attainment by gender and birth cohort. We find Muslim women are less educated than women in most other religious groups and lag further behind their male co-religionists. Muslim women's educational attainment is lowest in sub-Saharan Africa, where even among the youngest cohort (women 25-34 years old) two-thirds have no formal schooling. However, in other regions, Muslim women have generally been rapidly catching up to other groups and have narrowed gender gaps substantially in recent cohorts. Moreover, these gains have been widespread, with some of the biggest changes occurring in theMiddle East and in wealthier countries. Our findings offer insight into religion's possible role in women's educational attainment and provide important context to the debate over Islam and gender equality.

Among the world’s major religious groups, Muslims have the lowest median age and the highest fertility rates. Due to these demographic factors, Muslims are expected to increase in number faster than any other major group in the period between 2015 and 2060, growing at more than twice the pace of global population growth.

Faithful Measures is the first book about how to study religion in the 21st century using traditional surveys as well as new tools and methods. I ordered the book as soon as I learned about it and recommend everyone interested in this topic do the same. Since this is an edited volume, many readers may do as I did—skim key chapters and then put the book on a shelf as a reference to pull down should the right occasion arise. The invitation to write this review was my opportunity to give the volume the more careful read it deserves. Roger Finke, founder and director of the Association of Religion Data Archives (ARDA), edited this volume along with ARDA associate director Christopher Bader. Quantitative researchers already owe Finke and Bader a debt for their vision and hard work to coordinate the treasure trove that is the ARDA. This volume is a logical next step in their efforts to advance inquiry into the role of religion in contemporary society.

The question of how Protestantism (including evangelicalism) is measured in social science research is of keen importance to those seeking to understand religion in American life. In this article, we compare and contrast two of the leading techniques for classifying Protestants. One of these approaches (the RELTRAD approach) categorizes respondents as evangelical Protestants, mainline Protestants, or black Protestants mainly on the basis of their denominational affiliation. By contrast, the self-identification method utilizes information about a respondent's race and a yes/no question that asks respondents directly whether they consider themselves born-again or evangelical Christians to create similar categories. We show that there is considerable overlap, though not perfect correlation, between the two approaches. Both methods produce similar estimates of the size of Protestant subgroups, and they paint similar religious and demographic portraits of the evangelical, mainline, and black Protestant communities. As a result, we argue that the self-identification method can be an effective proxy for RELTRAD when RELTRAD is unavailable as a measurement option.

Objectives:The religious landscape of older adults around the world is changing profoundly. Yet until now, no study has chronicled these changes or compared expected aging patterns of religious groups. Differential aging among religious groups can have important economic and social consequences. This study estimates and projects the future religious composition by age at the global and regional levels.Method:This study presents estimates of age structures by religion for 2010 and projections until 2050. It is based on analyses of more than 2,500 censuses, registers, and surveys from 198 countries. Regional and global results are the aggregate of demographic projections carried out at the country level.Results:In 2010, Muslims were least likely to be aged 60 or older (7% of all Muslims), and Jews were most likely to be in this age group (20% of all Jews). By 2050, we project that Buddhists and the religiously unaffiliated will have the oldest populations (both will have 32% above the age of 60), whereas Muslims will remain the youngest religious group (with only 16% above the age of 60). Christians will, globally, age relatively slowly, from 14% to 21% above the age of 60 from 2010 to 2050.Discussion:The religious landscape among the world's seniors will change fundamentally in the coming years, due to the combination of rapid aging among the religiously unaffiliated and Buddhist populations and the persistence of relatively young age structures among Muslims and Christians, which are the dominant religions in Africa.