This paper evaluates the impact of aging on the radiation sensitivity of 6T SRAM for two planar bulk technologies. This study is motivated by the growing impact of aging and radiation effects on the reliability of CMOS technology. A modelling methodology dedicated to this new phenomenon is proposed. This modelling uses the radiation modelling device MUSCA SEP3 and an electrical aging modelling. First, the impact of aging on SEE sensitivity is studied through a parametric modeling of the threshold voltages of the transistors composing the 6T SRAM. Then, an operative avionics environment is modelled in order to evaluate the consequences on reliability.

This paper investigates the impact of terrestrial radiation on soft error (SE) sensitivity along the very large-scale integration (VLSI) roadmap of bulk, FDSOI and finFET nano-scale technologies using the MUSCA SEP3 tool. The terrestrial radiation considered in this work includes neutron, proton, and muon particles and alpha-emitters. The results indicate that protons and muons must be taken into account for ground environments. However, significant differences were observed for bulk, FDSOI and FinFET technologies. The downscaling induces an increase in SEU susceptibility to radiation. An overall analysis indicates that the SER does not increase drastically with technological integration for the three technologies considered. Moreover, the results show that FDSOI and FinFET technologies provide resistance to the ionizing radiation effects due to narrow sensitivity volumes. At the ground altitudes, the total SER ranges from 103 and 104 FIT/Mbit for the planar bulk technology while it ranges from 102 and 103 FIT/Mbit for the FDSOI and FinFET technologies. The results of analyses show that for the avionic altitude, neutron and/or the proton environments induce the main contribution to the total SER, whereas muon and α-SER impacts are negligible. For the 45-nm technological node (all types), the neutron contribution is around 60–70% of the total SER. Concerning the ground altitude, α-SER is the main contribution down to the 28-nm node. Moreover, the results suggest muon-induced upset affects the soft error rate from 32-nm SRAM operated at a nominal supply voltage and has a significant impact for circuits fabricated in smaller process technologies (22-nm and 14-nm). In addition, the results show that the muon impact can be the main contribution at 22-nm and beyond. Future terrestrial error rate predictions will require characterizations of the linear energy transfer (LET) threshold with consideration of muon and/or proton environments.

□ Constant failure rate hypothesis used for all Safety studies is strongly put into question □ Methodologies to deal with non-constant failure rates are not handled in the regulation, which even recommend to “contact a specialist” □ Methods allowing to deal with non-constant failure rates (Weibull law, Monte Carlo simulation) are quite complex □ Finally, we have to answer these three questions : □ First, the question of the compliance to Safety requirements (which margin do we have ?); □ Second, the question of the position of the regulation relating to non-constant failure rates; □ Third, the question of the way to deal with non-constant failures from a mathematical and methodological point of view.

Particles originating from primary cosmic radiation, which hit the Earth's atmosphere give rise to a complex field of secondary particles. These particles include neutrons, protons, muons, pions, etc. Since the 1980s it has been known that terrestrial cosmic rays can penetrate the natural shielding of buildings, equipment and circuit package and induce soft errors in integrated circuits. Recently, research has shown that commercial static random access memories are now so small and sufficiently sensitive that single event upsets (SEUs) may be induced from the electronic stopping of a proton. With continued advancements in process size, this downward trend in sensitivity is expected to continue. Then, muon soft errors have been predicted for nano-electronics. This paper describes the effects in the specific cases such as neutron-, proton- and muon-induced SEU observed in complementary metal-oxide semiconductor. The results will allow investigating the technology node sensitivity along the scaling trend.

Since 2000, avionics is facing several challenges, mostly driven by technological leaps in the electronics industry and innovation requirements from aircraft manufacturers. First, technological improvements now generally flows from civilian to military applications, due to costs cuts in Defense. Second, technological changes in avionics are impacted by the explosion of the electronics consumer industry. Third, the increasing of avionics systems' complexity, which integrates more and more functions, has encouraged new players to enter the market. The aim of this article is to analyze how technological changes can affect the competitiveness of avionics firms. We refer to criticality levels as a determinant of the market competitiveness. Certification processes and costs could stop new comers to bring innovations from the consumer electronics industry and protects traditional players. This study will compare three avionics systems regarding their patent dynamics since 1980: flight controls, Integrated Modular avionics and Head-Up Displays. We assume that differences in the market competitiveness may appear due to their differences in their related criticality level and certification processes. Systems belonging to Design Assurance Level A or B required wide-range of capabilities and long-term experience. The opportunity for new comers to introduce a certified-version of their product could be constrained by certification requirements.

Avionics industry is facing changes since the 90's. The purpose of our work is to highlight these changes, and more specifically from a technological point of view. The analysis aims to demonstrate that firms in avionics are really closed in their development, following the same technological paths. Our approach relies on patent datas from the 80's up to 2008 for eight major avionics suppliers.

Safety-critical and dependable systems are an important part of our daily life. Every day we rely on the expertise of embedded systems engineers that have produced controllers for our aircraft, the braking control in our cars or the control systems used in our railway systems. Nowadays, Avionics community and other high reliability users of advanced microelectronic products face many challenges as technology scales into Deep Sub-Micron (DSM) feature sizes [1, 2]. In this paper we will go through the different concerns introduce by Semiconductor technology evolution and their impact for Avionics' equipment suppliers.

Avionics, the electronic component of equipment used in aeronautics, has since 2000 faced an innovation problem related to rapid technological change as well as an increase in embedded functions. These considerations impact the competitive environment, opening the door to new, more specialized firms. A study of the technological trajectories of key players in avionics through patent analysis reveals that these players have less influence on electronic innovations, which are mostly driven by consumer electronics. Moreover, we detect intensive and implicit knowledge flows between avionics players, consisting of internal practices and expertise expected in the aeronautics sector.

In this paper we introduce a fully non intrusive test method which is based on the Differential Electro-Magnetic Analysis (EMA). Our objective is to demonstrate the capability of this new method to detect a modification in a circuit, like a fault voluntary injected would be. This detection is carried out by comparing a reference trace, called Reference Signature, with a differential trace representing the observed electromagnetic activity, called Control Signature. The results show the efficiency of the proposed method. We will then introduce the possibility offered by EM measurement to be used to detect a degradation of physical parameters on Avionics equipments where no intrusion is allowed.

According to this method, measuring an electromagnetic spectrum emitted by the electronic component (6, 8, 10) during operation and comparing the electromagnetic spectrum measured in a predetermined template defining at least one safe operating area for detecting a possible malfunction or risk of malfunction of the electronic component.

In this paper we introduce a fully non intrusive test method which is based on the Differential Electro-Magnetic Analysis (EMA). Our objective is to demonstrate the capability of this new method to detect stuck-at-0 faults voluntary injected in a full-custom circuit. This detection is carried out by comparing a reference trace, called Reference Signature, with a differential trace representing the observed electromagnetic activity. The results show the efficiency of the proposed method. We will then introduce the possibility offered by EM measurement to be used to detect degradation of physical parameters on equipments where no intrusions are allowed.