Philosophers of science often make reference — whether tacitly or explicitly — to the notion of a scientific community. Sometimes, such references are useful to make our object of analysis tractable in the philosophy of science. For others, tracking or understanding particular features of the development of science proves to be tied to notions of a scientific community either as a target of theoretical or social intervention. We argue that the structure of contemporary scientific research poses two unappreciated, or at least underappreciated, challenges to this concept of the “scientific community” in the philosophy of science. In particular, we will present two case studies from robotics research, broadly construed, which show that (1) the boundedness of the scientific community is threatened when private citizens can develop scientific and technological advances at minimal expense (democratization), and (2) the discreteness of scientific research programs is threatened by the complexly interrelated environment of contemporary scientific work (interconnectivity). Taken together, the extent of democratization and interconnectivity present a significant challenge for any practically oriented philosophy of science, one which we hope will be taken on directly by philosophers in the future.

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Concerns about a crisis of mass irreplicability across scientific fields ("the replication crisis") have stimulated a movement for open science, encouraging or even requiring researchers to publish their raw data and analysis code. Recently, a rule at the US Environmental Protection Agency (US EPA) would have imposed a strong open data requirement. The rule prompted significant public discussion about whether open science practices are appropriate for fields of environmental public health. The aims of this paper are to assess (1) whether the replication crisis extends to fields of environmental public health; and (2) in general whether open science requirements can address the replication crisis. There is little empirical evidence for or against mass irreplicability in environmental public health specifically. Without such evidence, strong claims about whether the replication crisis extends to environmental public health - or not - seem premature. By distinguishing three concepts - reproducibility, replicability, and robustness - it is clear that open data initiatives can promote reproducibility and robustness but do little to promote replicability. I conclude by reviewing some of the other benefits of open science, and offer some suggestions for funding streams to mitigate the costs of adoption of open science practices in environmental public health.

Philosophers of science often make reference - whether tacitly or explicitly - to the notion of a scientific community. Sometimes, such references are useful to make our object of analysis tractable in the philosophy of science. For others, tracking or understanding particular features of the development of science proves to be tied to notions of a scientific community either as a target of theoretical or social intervention. We argue that the structure of contemporary scientific research poses two unappreciated, or at least underappreciated, challenges to this concept of the "scientific community" in the philosophy of science. In particular, we will present two case studies from robotics research, broadly construed, which show that (1) the boundedness of the scientific community is threatened when private citizens can develop scientific and technological advances at minimal expense (democratization), and (2) the discreteness of scientific research programs is threatened by the complexly interrelated environment of contemporary scientific work (interconnectivity). Taken together, the extent of democratization and interconnectivity present a significant challenge for any practically oriented philosophy of science, one which we hope will be taken on directly by philosophers in the future.

tmfast is an R package for fitting topic models using a fast algorithm based on partial PCA and the varimax rotation. After providing mathematical background to the method, we present two examples, using a simulated corpus and aggregated works of a selection of authors from the long nineteenth century, and compare the quality of the fitted models to a standard topic modeling package.

Background: A number of papers by Young and collaborators have criticized epidemiological studies and meta-analyses of air pollution hazards using a graphical method that the authors call a P value plot, claiming to find zero effects, heterogeneity, and P hacking. However, the P value plot method has not been validated in a peer-reviewed publication. The aim of this study was to investigate the statistical and evidentiary properties of this method. Methods: A simulation was developed to create studies and meta-analyses with known real effects , integrating two quantifiable conceptions of evidence from the philosophy of science literature. The simulation and analysis is publicly available and automatically reproduced. Results: In this simulation, the plot did not provide evidence for heterogeneity or P hacking with respect to any condition. Under the right conditions, the plot can provide evidence of zero effects; but these conditions are not satisfied in any actual use by Young and collaborators. Conclusion: The P value plot does not provide evidence to support the skeptical claims about air pollution hazards made by Young and collaborators.

While philosophers of science generally agree that social, political, and ethical values can play legitimate roles in science, there is active debate over whether scientists should disclosure such values in their public communications. This debate depends, in part, on empirical claims about whether values disclosures might undermine public trust in science. In a previous study, Elliott et al. used an online experiment to test this empirical claim. The current paper reports a replication attempt of their experiment. Comparing results of the original study and our replication, we do not find evidence for a transparency penalty or “shared values” effect, but do find evidence that the content of scientific conclusions (whether or not a chemical is found to cause harm) might effect perceived trustworthiness and that scientists who value public health and disclose this value might be perceived as more trustworthy.

In recent years, the “science of science” has combined computational methods with novel data sources to understand the dynamics of research communities. Many of the questions investigated by science of science are also relevant to academic philosophy. To what extent can the discipline be divided into subfields with different methods and topics? How are prestige and credit distributed across the discipline? And how do these factors interact with other factors, such as gender, to shape job market outcomes? Using job market data for anglophone academic philosophy, this paper finds, first, evidence that is consistent with the analytic- continental divide but is also consistent with other, more complex ways of organizing academic philosophy into distinct intellectual traditions; second, a clear prestige hierarchy, dividing Ph.D. programs into two distinct prestige categories; and, third, evidence that gender, prestige, and country have notable effects on academic job market outcomes for recent philosophy Ph.Ds.

Since at least the mid-2000s, political commentators, environmental advocates, and scientists have raised concerns about an “anti-science” approach to environmental policymaking in conservative governments in the US and Canada. This paper explores and resolves a paradox surrounding at least some uses of the “anti-science” epithet. I examine two cases of such “anti-science” environmental policy, both of which involve appeals to epistemic values that are widely endorsed by both scientists and philosophers of science. It seems paradoxical to call an appeal to epistemic values “anti-science.” I develop an analysis that, I argue, can resolve this paradox. This analysis is a version of the “aims approach” to science and values, drawing on ideas from axiology and virtue ethics. I characterize the paradox in terms of conflicts or tensions between epistemic and pragmatic aims, and argue that there is a key asymmetry between them: epistemic aims are valuable, in part, because they are useful for pursuing pragmatic aims. Thus, when epistemic and pragmatic aims conflict, epistemic aims need to be reconceptualized in order to reconcile them to pragmatic aims. When this is done, in the “anti-science” cases, the epistemic values are scientific vices rather than virtues. Thus the “anti-science” epithet is apt.

AbstractOrganized Research Units (ORUs) are nondepartmental units utilized by U.S. research universities to support interdisciplinary research initiatives, among other goals. This study examined the impacts of ORUs at one large public research university, the University of California, Davis (UC Davis), using a large corpus of journal article metadata and abstracts for both faculty affiliated with UCD ORUs and a comparison set of other faculty. Using regression analysis, I find that ORUs appeared to increase the number of coauthors of affiliated faculty, but did not appear to directly affect publication or citation counts. Next, I frame interdisciplinarity in terms of a notion of discursive space, and use a topic model approach to situate researchers within this discursive space. The evidence generally indicates that ORUs promoted multidisciplinarity rather than interdisciplinarity. In the conclusion, drawing on work in philosophy of science on inter- and multidisciplinarity, I argue that multidisciplinarity is not necessarily inferior to interdisciplinarity.

Repeatedly over the last century, scientists have described a tension between two different views of their profession, one in which scientific research is a valuable end in itself and a second in which research is merely a means to other goals (such as power, status, or money). This chapter shows how a framework of “communal practices,” drawn from the virtue ethics of Alasdair MacIntyre, can help scholars understand this tension while also creating a more nuanced and accurate view of its source and characteristics. Doing so allows us to take scientists’ accounts of their professional goals seriously without accepting oversimplified binaries, and it suggests ways to navigate the tensions they describe by cultivating virtues.

Women made significant contributions to the philosophy of science, even though they make up a relatively small percentage of philosophers of science. This bibliometric study identifies author gender for most philosophy of science book chapters and journal articles between 1930 and 2010 (n = 38,923). We find that the percentage of women grew from less than 2% of authors before 1950 to at least 17% of authors today. In addition to identifying influential women researchers, research topics, and professional roles, this chapter surveys techniques used to improve inclusivity, and it identifies reasons why social diversity is valuable to the development of the field of philosophy of science.

Chlorpyrifos, an acetylcholinesterase inhibitor (ACI), is one of the most widely used insecticides in the world, and is generally recognized to be a moderate human neurotoxin. This paper reports a distributional environmental justice (dEJ) analysis of chlorpyrifos use in California’s Central Valley, examining the way distributions of environmental risks are associated with race, ethnicity, class, gender, and other systems of structural oppression. Spatial data on chlorpyrifos use were retrieved from California’s Department of Pesticide Registration public pesticide use records for 2011–2015. These data were combined with demographic data for the Central Valley from the American Community Survey (ACS). Spatial regression models were used to estimate effects of demographic covariates on local chlorpyrifos use. A novel bootstrap method was used to account for measurement error in the ACS estimates. This study finds consistent evidence that Hispanic population proportion is associated with increased local chlorpyrifos use. A 10-point increase in Hispanic proportion is associated with an estimated 1.05–1.4-fold increase in local chlorpyrifos use across Census tract models. By contrast, effects of agricultural employment and poverty on local chlorpyrifos use are ambiguous and inconsistent between Census tracts and Census-designated places.

The U.S. National Science Foundation (NSF), together with other federal agencies, launched the National Robotics Initiative (NRI) program in 2011. The aim of the NRI is to accelerate the development and use of collaborative robots (corobots), which work beside or cooperatively with people. To date, the NRI program has involved multiple directorates of the NSF (Computer and Information Science and ...

BACKGROUND:Over the last several decades, scientists and social groups have frequently raised concerns about politicization or political interference in regulatory science. Public actors (environmentalists and industry advocates, politically aligned public figures, scientists and political commentators, in the United States as well as in other countries) across major political-regulatory controversies have expressed concerns about the inappropriate politicization of science. Although we share concerns about the politicization of science, they are frequently framed in terms of an ideal of value-free science, according to which political and economic values have no legitimate role to play in science. For several decades, work in philosophy of science has identified serious conceptual and practical problems with the value-free ideal. OBJECTIVES:Our objectives are to discuss the literature regarding the conceptual and practical problems with the value-free ideal and offer a constructive alternative to the value-free ideal. DISCUSSION:We first discuss the prevalence of the value-free ideal in regulatory science, then argue that this ideal is self-undermining and has been exploited to delay protective regulation. To offer a constructive alternative, we analyze the relationship between the goals of regulatory science and the standards of good scientific activity. This analysis raises questions about the relationship between methodological and practical standards for good science, tensions among various important social goods, and tensions among various social interests. We argue that the aims of regulatory science help to legitimize value-laden choices regarding research methods and study designs. Finally, we discuss how public deliberation, adaptive management, and community-based participatory research can be used to improve the legitimacy of scientists as representatives of the general public on issues of environmental knowledge. CONCLUSIONS:Reflecting on the aims of regulatory science-such as protecting human health and the environment, informing democratic deliberation, and promoting the capacities of environmental justice and Indigenous communities-can clarify when values have legitimate roles in regulatory science. https://doi.org/10.1289/EHP3317.

The argument from inductive risk (AIR) is perhaps the most common argument against the value-free ideal of science. Brian MacGillivray rejects the AIR (at least as it would apply to risk assessment) and embraces the value-free ideal. We clarify the issues at stake and argue that MacGillivray's criticisms, although effective against some formulations of the AIR, fail to overcome the essential concerns that motivate the AIR. There are inevitable trade-offs in scientific enquiry that cannot be resolved with any formal methods or general rules. Choices must be made, and values will be involved. It is best to recognize this explicitly. Even so, there is more work to be done developing methods and institutional support for these choices.

In 2004, the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation launched a new program focused on incubating a new field, “Microbiology of the Built Environment” (MoBE). By the end of 2017, the program had supported the publication of hundreds of scholarly works, but it was unclear to what extent it had stimulated the development of a new research community. We identified 307 works funded by the MoBE program, as well as a comparison set of 698 authors who published in the same journals during the same period of time but were not part of the Sloan Foundation-funded collaboration. Our analysis of collaboration networks for both groups of authors suggests that the Sloan Foundation’s program resulted in a more consolidated community of researchers, specifically in terms of number of components, diameter, density, and transitivity of the coauthor networks. In addition to highlighting the success of this particular program, our method could be applied to other fields to examine the impact of funding programs and other large-scale initiatives on the formation of research communities.

There is widespread interest in evaluating the social impacts of research and other scholarly activities. Conventional metrics for social impacts focus on economics or wealth creation, such as patents or technology transfer. These kinds of metrics are less appropriate for many scholarly fields, and miss the specific social concerns or needs that researchers aim to address. In this paper, drawing on ideas from ethics and development economics, we develop a conceptual framework for characterizing the social goals of research. We first distinguish resources — such as wealth and intellectual credit — from the goals of scholarship, and further distinguish inward- and outward-facing goals. Outward-facing goals refer to the intended social impacts of research. Next we introduce the Capabilities Approach, a conceptual framework for human well-being developed by ethicists and economists over the last 40 years. This Approach focuses on basic human needs, rather than wealth, and we draw specifically on a list of central human capabilities developed by philosopher Martha Nussbaum. We propose that the items on this list provide a useful starting point for articulating the specific social aims of research. We argue that the Capabilities Approach can facilitate research communication and improve the recognition of public engagement in academic and funding institutions. Familiar bibliographic data and text mining methods can be used in a capabilities-inspired portfolio analysis, and modest changes to existing data collection systems — for tenure and promotion, or research funding applications — could support the development of even richer capabilities-inspired metrics and incentive systems.

Inmaculada de Melo-Martin and Kristen Intemann consider whether, from the perspective of the argument from inductive risk, ethical and political values might be logically, epistemically, pragmatically, or ethically necessary in the core of scientific reasoning. In each case, they argue that there are significant conceptual problems. In this comment, employing regulatory uses of high-throughput toxicology at the US Environmental Protection Agency as a case study, I respond to some of their claims about the notion of pragmatic necessity. I conclude that, while an inductive risk framework has some significant limitations, it is still conceptually and rhetorically valuable.