AbstractThe requirements for global security and international stability vary according to the perspective brought to bear on the subject. Indeed, the structural realist and neoliberal paradigms present markedly different views on the sources of war and prescriptions for peace. Structural realism focuses on system-level capability distributions, alliances, and dyadic power balances as factors associated with the onset of war. Neoliberalism emphasizes the importance of international institutions, democracy, and economic interdependence in maintaining global security. This study develops an integrated model of war and peace based on system-level factors drawn from both paradigms and utilizes a new database reflecting the level of major power policy coordination. The findings for the period of 1816–2007 indicate that interaction effects of these realist and neoliberal variables complement their relationships with global patterns of interstate conflict. The basic conclusion to be drawn is that both concentrated power and managerial cooperation at the apex of the international system are required to produce a more peaceful world.

Abstract The balance of conventional military capabilities is intrinsic to understanding patterns of war among nations. However, cumulative knowledge relating to the effects of nuclear weapons possession on conflict interaction is largely absent. Framework is provided for analyzing the results of quantitative empirical research on this question and to identify any extant strong and consistent patterns in the interactions of states that can be associated with the possession of nuclear weapons. Since 1945, a vast, sophisticated, and contradictory literature has developed on the implications of nuclear weaponry for patterns of international conflict and war. This theoretical and empirical work has principally focused on the conflict effects of these weapons for the interaction of nuclear-armed states, although a growing number of studies have explored the impact of a state’s possession of nuclear weapons on the behavior of nonnuclear opponents. Given the destructive capacity of these weapons and their questionable value for battlefield use, most of this work has concentrated on the requirements for successful deterrence. In categorizing the studies, some scholars note that “classical deterrence theory” derives from the Realist paradigm of international politics and subdivide this theory into two complementary strands: structural (or neorealist) deterrence theory and decision-theoretic deterrence theory. In contrast, other analysts choose to classify work on nuclear deterrence into three schools of thought: nuclear irrelevance; risk manipulation, escalation, and limited war; and the nuclear revolution. The essence of these divisions involves a debate about what the possession of nuclear weapons does for a state that controls them. Does the possession of these weapons affect the behavior of nuclear and nonnuclear opponents in disputes over contested values? Do the weapons impart political influence and hold military utility, or are they useless as tools for deterrence, compellence, or war?

This study considers the problem of suicide terrorism, government counterterror responses, and the mobilization of recruits in support of the contending parties. A model is developed that enables predictions as to what factors should be emphasized or de-emphasized by the forces protecting society. The article presents a linear mathematical analysis of the logical interrelationships involved in the confrontation and embeds the study within the framework of previous mathematical and empirical work on the subject. It is concluded that governments should avoid inflicting collateral damage on the general population in counterterrorist activities and should pursue policies (both in counterterrorist operations and otherwise) that contribute to the political quiescence of the populace.

The four essays in this forum consider the influence of J. David Singer's initial views and analyses dating from the 1960s and 1970s on topics that continue to hold great importance today. Three essays consider the implications of these early works and decisions on the subsequent study of war, as well as their continuing wisdom (or not) in light of subsequent research. The fourth essay examines Singer's policy prescriptions in light of subsequent decisions and choices. In some cases, the ideas continue to have resonance with contemporary conflict research and policy issues, but in other instances there are grounds for reevaluation and the adoption of new research and data collection strategies or policy perspectives.

The scholars most frequently credited with development of the quantitative empirical study of war include Frederick Adams Woods, Alexander Baltzly, Pitirim A. Sorokin, Quincy Wright, Lewis Fry Richardson, Karl Deutsch, and J. David Singer. Of this set, the contributions of David Singer to the scientiac study of international conbict will be judged as paramount. Although Woods and Baltzly (1915), Sorokin (1937), Wright (1942), and Richardson (1960) all compiled data on wars, Singer’s efforts with the Correlates of War (COW) Project stand alone. Over the last four decades, the vast majority of systematic scientiac analyses conducted on the subject of international conbict have employed some component of the expansive COW Project database. Today, our empirical knowledge of the factors associated with patterns of war and peace is attributable largely to the vision of David Singer.1 The Correlates of War Project had its genesis in 1963 with a grant from the Carnegie Corporation to the Center for Research on Conbict Resolution at the University of Michigan. A portion of this grant went to David Singer for the study of war. As did Sorokin, Wright, and Richardson, Singer and his associate Melvin Small culled historical materials for information on war—in this case the frequency, participants, duration, and battle deaths of all wars since 1816 (Singer and Small 1972; Small and Singer 1982). Additional data sets were generated dealing with militarized interstate disputes, alliance membership, diplomatic ties, geographic proximity, territorial changes, intergovernmental organizations, civil wars, and national material capabilities (inclusive of the military, economic, and demographic dimensions of power).2 Singer believed that with few exceptions most previous analyses on the causes of war were insufaciently systematic and rigorous. Even the work conducted by Sorokin (1937), Wright (1942), and Richardson

Journal Article The Construction and Cumulation of Knowledge in International Relations: Introduction Get access Daniel S. Geller, Daniel S. Geller Wayne State University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar John A. Vasquez John A. Vasquez Colgate University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar International Studies Review, Volume 6, Issue 4, December 2004, Pages 1–6, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1521-9488.2004.00446.x Published: 10 December 2004

Part I: The Construction of Knowledge.1. Knowledge, Foundations, Politics: Karena Shaw (University of Victoria).2. The House of IR: From Family Power Politics to the Poisies of Worldism: Anna M. Agathangelonu (University of Houston, Clear Lake) and L.H.M. Lin (New School University).Part II: The Cumulation of Knowledge.3. Escalation: Competing Perspectives and Empirical Evidence: Russell J. Leng (Middlebury College).4. Politically-Motivated Opposition to War: Jack S. Levy (Rutgers University) and William F. Mabe, Jr. (Rutgers University).5. Territoriality and War in International Crises: Theory and Findings, 1918-2001: Hemda Ben-Yehuda (Bar-Ilan University).6. Pacifism and Fightaholism in International Politics: A Structural History of National and Dyadic Conflict, 1816-1992: Zeev Maoz (Tel-Aviv University).Part III: Policy Application.7. The Consequences of an Indo-Pakistani Nuclear War: Robert T. Batcher (Office of Technology and Assessments, US Department of State).8. Integrating Theory and Policy: Global Implications of the War in Iraq: Jacek Kugler (Claremont Graduate University), Ronald L. Tammen (Portland State University), and Brian Efird (Claremont Graduate University)

Regions of War and Peace. By Douglas Lemke. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002. 235p. 25.00 paper.I highly recommend Douglas Lemke's book to all scholars and students who study international conflict and war. This study is an extension of work conducted by the author since the early 1990s, some of which was published in the major quantitatively oriented journals in the field of international politics. The book integrates and advances the theoretical arguments and empirical findings of those earlier studies and makes a notable contribution in the area of peace and conflict analysis. I believe that although it is of primary interest to scholars, it may prove useful in advanced undergraduate classes on international relations and in graduate-level courses on international conflict.

This article examines the implications of possession of nuclear weapons for war between India and Pakistan. Existing literature derived from us-Soviet interaction during the Cold War may have little relevance to conflicts between developing nations with small and vulnerable nuclear arsenals. Applying power cycle theory within a regional context, this study explores possible global ramifications of a South Asian nuclear arms race. Power cycle theory suggests that Indo-Pakistani military competition may accelerate shifts in the relative power trends throughout Asia, causing abrupt changes in future foreign policy expectations and security that could ultimately affect the nuclear programs of both Russia and the United States.

The relationship between dyadic power balances and the onset of war is a principal element in realist theories of international politics. The influence of the status quo orientation of the belligerents has also been specified in power transition theory as a factor which impacts on the patterns of conflict. However, despite this theoretical underpinning, the question of the probabilistic identity of war initiators constitutes a gap in the understanding of factors associated with international conflict. This study examines the identity of war initiators as it relates to both power balances and status quo orientation for a set of nation-dyads that have formed long-term rivalries. The results of the analysis indicate that for rival dyads: (1) status quo challengers rather than defenders are the most probable war initiators; (2) status quo challengers are equally likely to initiate wars whether they are superior or inferior in capabilities to their rivals; and (3) status quo defenders initiate wars almost solely under unstable military balances. This last pattern suggests that stable military balances of either preponderance or parity are generally interpreted by status quo defenders as supportive of deterrence, whereas unstable balances producing capability shifts or transitions are deemed dangerous enough to provoke preemptive military action. The distribution is such that it approximates a necessary condition for the initiation of war by the status quo defender in an enduring rivalry. All three of the above findings are consistent with A.F.K. Organski's original formulation of power transition theory.

The onset and seriousness of World War I (1914) is explained on the basis of empirical uniformities established by systematic quantitative analyses. Scientific explanations of individual events may be provided through inductive subsumption under probabilistic laws, as well as through deductive subsumption under universal laws. This inductive explanation demonstrates that the case of World War I is a specific instance of a set of patterns which have appeared in a much larger number of cases.

Wars follow from decisions. Therefore, any explanation of war must incorporate, explicitly or implicitly, a model of decisionmaking. Decisionmaking models are distinguished by their assumptions about rationality. The two alternative assumptions undergirding these models are, simply, the rational and nonrational. Nonrational models, whether focusing on psychological variables or organizational interests and routines, maintain that decisions are frequently distorted by systematic perceptual, cognitive, or bureaucratic biases. Although the definition of “rationality” is a subject of both philosophical and conceptual debate, minimal criteria for an instrumentally rational decision would include the logical requirements of consistency and coherence in goal-directed behavior. Indeed, Singer (1981:14–15, 1989a:14) notes that: