The literature on judicial politics posits that powerful litigants, the "haves", tend to prevail in court. Nevertheless, the evidence regarding litigants' success remains inconclusive and is limited to a few advanced democracies and some in Latin America. This article tests the generalizability of extant arguments within the unexplored context of the Uruguayan Supreme Court of Justice (SCJ). Using an original database of the SCJ's decisions on the constitutionality of laws issued between 1989 and 2021, we explore the applicability of party capability theory and its extensions. The findings of this study indicate that the advantage held by those with greater resources is conditional on the issue at stake and is mostly limited to economic issues. These findings offer a nuanced understanding of party capability theory and extend its study to a previously unexplored case in the Global South.

Abstract The literature suggests that in highly polarized political contexts, supreme courts often experience politicization. However, this article contributes to the literature by examining the case of Uruguay, where political polarization is moderate but increasing. The study finds that in a context of moderate polarization, where the connection between political parties and the courts is weak, the negative effects of polarization on the court do not manifest. This weak connection is attributed to the rules governing the appointment and removal of judges, which are further supported by informal practices. Consequently, changes in polarization levels and political alternation have had little impact on the composition of the Uruguayan court, which is composed of career judges. While the court is not entirely detached from the political context, its composition and behavior do not mirror partisan divisions as seen in highly politicized judicial systems.

The literature suggests that in highly polarized political contexts, supreme courts often experience politicization. However, this article contributes to the literature by examining the case of Uruguay, where political polarization is moderate but increasing. The study finds that in a context of moderate polarization, where the connection between political parties and the courts is weak, the negative effects of polarization on the court do not manifest. This weak connection is attributed to the rules governing the appointment and removal of judges, which are further supported by informal practices. Consequently, changes in polarization levels and political alternation have had little impact on the composition of the Uruguayan court, which is composed of career judges. While the court is not entirely detached from the political context, its composition and behavior do not mirror partisan divisions as seen in highly politicized judicial systems.

In this research note we introduce an original database covering almost a century of legislative political parties (1925-2019) and reconstruct in the long term the evolution of the president's parliamentary support and coalition formation in Latin America. We identify some long-term perspectives that show that presidentialisms in the region have undergone transformations towards a greater fragmentation of the party system, with smaller presidential parties in Congress and the presence of legislative coalitions as a support base. The evidence highlights the importance of coalitional presidentialism in the third democratic wave and has implications for the literature on the factors that explain political stability in the region.

Uruguay stands out as an exceptional case for having a vibrant party system, stable democracy, and frequent use of direct democracy mechanisms (MDDs). Previous research has explained the use of MDDs as a means of opposing centre-right governments, but it has failed to explain the subsequent use of these mechanisms during the period of alternation between the major ideological blocs in government after 2005. We make an empirical contribution by describing the practice of direct democracy actions and explaining their fate through a qualitative comparative analysis that assesses how well the theoretical expectations proposed by Altman are borne out in the Uruguayan case in the latest period. We conclude that the politics of direct democracy change when ideological blocs alternate in government and that direct democracy initiatives fail due to the lack of lobbying power, high government approval rates, or non-concurrency of the vote with the presidential election in the context of a positive economic environment.

In the last 15 years, Uruguay has witnessed a process of judicialization of health care, carried out through litigation by hundreds of plaintiffs demanding access to high-cost medicines (HCMs) and challenging the constitutionality of laws regulating them. The case of Uruguay is interesting and informative because judicialization is occurring in a country with a comparatively robust health system and a traditionally deferential Supreme Court of Justice (SCJ). The study contributes to the literature on legal culture by examining a largely unexplored case, based on an analysis of the role played by the SCJ in reviewing the constitutionality of laws regulating access to HCMs. The systematic study of the Court's conceptions reveals the existence of three stages in terms of the (un)constitutionality of the challenged regulation and the nature of the arguments invoked. These shifts coincide with the frequent changes in the composition of the Court and suggest the coexistence of different legal cultures.

ABSTRACTThe use of veto points to block policy change has received significant attention in Latin America, but the different institutional venues have not been analyzed in a unified framework. Uruguay is exceptional in that political actors use both referendums and judicial review as effective ways to oppose public policies. While the activation of direct democracy mechanisms in Uruguay has been widely studied, the surge in the use of the judicial venue remains underexplored. This article argues that veto point use responds to the ideological content of policies adopted by different coalitions and the type of interest organization affected. It shows that policy opponents predominantly activate referendums when center-right coalitions rule and judicial review when center-left coalitions govern. It illustrates the causal argument by tracing the politics of court and referendum activation. This approach helps to bridge the gap between research on direct democracy and judicial politics, providing a unified framework.

This article examines the third year of the center-right coalition government, led by President Lacalle Pou in Uruguay. After two years where the pandemic and a referendum against the Urgent Consideration Law (LUC) dominated the agenda, this year saw a return to political normalcy. The government aimed to accelerate the adoption of strategic reforms in education and social security. Although the government coalition remained relatively solid and managed to approve the primary bills sent to Parliament, it experienced some difficulties agreeing on other crucial issues. However, in the second half of the year, the government appeared to lose control of the public agenda due to the emergence of political scandals. Also President Lacalle Pou's approval ratings began to decline, marking the end of the extended honeymoon period, although in comparative terms his popularity remains high.

El artículo analiza el tercer año de gestión del gobierno de coalición de centro-derecha liderado por el presidente Lacalle Pou en Uruguay. Tras dos años en los que la pandemia y el referéndum contra la Ley de Consideración Urgente (LUC) dominaron la agenda, este año se produjo una vuelta a la normalidad política. El gobierno buscó acelerar la adopción de reformas estratégicas en educación y seguridad social. La coalición de gobierno se mantuvo relativamente sólida y aprobó los principales proyectos enviados al Parlamento, aunque tuvo dificultades para acordar sobre otros asuntos relevantes. En el segundo semestre del año, el gobierno pareció perder el manejo de la agenda pública a raíz de la aparición de dos escándalos políticos. La aprobación del presidente Lacalle Pou comenzó a disminuir, lo cual supuso el fin de la luna de miel extendida, aunque en términos comparados su popularidad se mantiene en niveles elevados.

El estudio del vinculo entre justicia y politica en la region latinoamericana es una subdisciplina que ya cuenta con varias decadas de trabajo y conocimiento acumulado y que forma parte de la literatura de comparative judicial politics. Este numero tematico de la Revista Uruguaya de Ciencia Politica ofrece un conjunto de articulos de calidad, que abordan una diversidad de asuntos y lineas de investigacion dentro del fructifero campo de la judicial politics en America Latina. Los estudios parten de enfoques teoricos y metodologicos diversos, y abarcan tanto casos de poderes judiciales nacionales (Argentina, Brasil, Costa Rica y Uruguay) como analisis comparados de la experiencia en el ambito de la regional.

Does the executive's institutional hegemony represent a risk to the survival of democracy? By hegemony, we refer to the president's ability to control other institutions, particularly the legislature and judiciary. To answer this question, we develop two indices of presidential hegemony and analyze the duration of democratic regimes in 18 Latin American countries between 1925 and 2016. The results show that executive hegemony is a major driver of democratic instability. This finding is robust to non-linear effects and to potential endogeneity in the relationship between presidential power and democratic backsliding. Our findings challenge traditional concerns about executive-legislative deadlock, and have significant implications for the nascent literature on democratic backsliding, which highlights executive aggrandizement as a risk factor.

espanol?Que papel tiene el Poder Judicial y, en particular, la Suprema Corte de Justicia (SCJ) en el sistema politico uruguayo? El articulo analiza el rol de la SCJ como actor politico, a partir del estudio de su poder formal y de su ejercicio efectivo en el control de la constitucionalidad de las leyes. La investigacion muestra que la SCJ tiene un diseno institucional que le confiere una autonomia formal media, pero una autoridad baja. Si bien la SCJ es formalmente poco poderosa, y no ha habido cambios en su diseno institucional, en los ultimos anos se ha vuelto mas activa, ya sea por el aumento de la demanda proveniente de la sociedad como por las respuestas de la Corte, cuyas sentencias desafian, en mayor medida que antes, las decisiones de los poderes electos. Estos elementos son indicativos de un aumento del poder efectivo de la SCJ en el sistema politico. Desde esta perspectiva, el articulo contribuye al estudio del vinculo entre justicia y politica en Uruguay, cuestion inexplorada desde la ciencia politica nacional EnglishWhat is the role of the Uruguayan Supreme Court of Justice (SCJ) in the political system? The article analyzes the role of the SCJ as a political actor, studying its formal power and its effective exercise in the control of the constitutionality of laws. The research shows that SCJ design grants medium levels of autonomy, but a limited scope of authority. Although the SCJ is formally not very powerful, and there have been no changes in its institutional design, in recent years it has become more active, either because of the increase in the demand coming from society or because of the responses of the Court, whose sentences challenge, to a greater extent than before, the decisions of the elected powers. These elements are indicative of an increase in the effective power of the SCJ in the political system. From this perspective, the article contributes to the study of judicial politics in Uruguay, an issue unexplored in the Uruguayan political science

What is the role of the Uruguayan Supreme Court of Justice (SCJ) in the political system? The article analyzes the role of the SCJ as a political actor, studying its formal power and its effective exercise in the control of the constitutionality of laws. The research shows that SCJ’s design grants medium levels of autonomy, but a limited scope of authority. Although the SCJ is formally not very powerful, and there have been no changes in its institutional design, in recent years it has become more active, either because of the increase in the demand coming from society or because of the responses of the Court, whose sentences challenge, to a greater extent than before, the decisions of the elected powers. These elements are indicative of an increase in the effective power of the SCJ in the political system. From this perspective, the article contributes to the study of judicial politics in Uruguay, an issue unexplored in the Uruguayan political science.

RESUMEN La pregunta central de este artículo es: ¿sobre qué condiciones los partidos de oposición latinoamericanos son leales o desleales para la democracia? Buscando dar respuesta a esta cuestión, se espera contribuir a la construcción de una teoría de la lealtad democrática de la oposición partidaria para América Latina, pos dictadura militar (1978-2000). Para eso, es propuesta una definición operacional de la lealtad de la oposición partidaria y se presenta la distribución por país. Después, es formulado un modelo teórico simple sobre su variación, cuya hipótesis central es que la lealtad democrática de la oposición partidaria depende en gran medida del grado de inclusión/exclusión a la que se enfrenta. Se afirma que los diseños institucionales más inclusivos son acompañados por oposiciones partidarias leales, mientras que los sistemas más excluyentes derivan en oposiciones más desleales. La exclusión institucional es operacionalizada en tres dimensiones: el sistema electoral legislativo, los poderes presidenciales y la dispersión del poder institucional. Finalmente, se testean las hipótesis específicas por medio de la estimación de modelos estadísticos. El análisis estadístico muestra que dos de las tres hipótesis tienen un poder explicativo importante, sin embargo, se puede afirmar que, institucionalmente, sistemas más excluyentes están asociados a oposiciones desleales. Esto tiene importantes implicaciones en términos del diseño institucional y de régimen democrático.

The main question of this article is: under what conditions are the Latin American opposition parties loyal or disloyal to democracy? Aiming to answer this question, we hope to contribute to the construction of a theory of the democratic loyalty of the opposition parties in Latin America after the military dictatorships (1978-2010). To achieve this goal, we propose an operational definition of the loyalty of the opposition parties, sorted out by countries. Next, we formulated a simple theoretical model of its variation, whose central hypothesis is that the democratic loyalty of the opposition parties depends to a large extent on the degree of institutional inclusion/exclusion it faces. It is argued that the more inclusive institutional designs are accompanied by loyal partisan oppositions, while the more exclusive systems result in more disloyal oppositions. Institutional exclusion is operationalized in three dimensions: the legislative electoral system, the presidential powers and the dispersion of institutional power. Finally, specific hypotheses are tested through the estimation of statistical models. Statistical analysis shows that two out of the three main hypotheses have important explanatory powers, so it can be said that, from the institutional point of view, systems that are more exclusive can be associated with unfair oppositions. This fact has important implications in terms of institutional design and democratic regime.

En las últimas décadas, la Suprema Corte de Justicia (SCJ) de Uruguay ha estado en el centro de la escena política a partir del au­mento de sentencias que declararon inconsti­tucionales un conjunto leyes importantes. Para comenzar a comprender el papel de este actor en el sistema político uruguayo, el artículo analiza los alcances del poder formal de la SCJ, así como sus instituciones informales y la re­lación entre ambos. Los principales resultados indican que la SCJ tiene un diseño institucional que le confiere una autonomía media, pero una autoridad baja para intervenir de forma decisiva sobre disputas políticas significativas. Dicha configuración es muy estable en com­paración con las experiencias de los países de la región. Además, las instituciones informales que guían la designación de los miembros de la Corte refuerzan los niveles de autonomía, pero el entendimiento que los jueces tradicional­mente han tenido sobre su papel en el sistema político potencia sus limitaciones en el plano de la autoridad. No obstante, se identifican algunos indicios de cambios en la concepción del rol profesional de los jueces, que podrían estar ambientando un mayor protagonismo de la Corte en el escenario político.

In recent decades, the Uruguayan Supreme Court of Justice (scJ) has been at the center of the political scene and has increased the number of rulings declaring some important laws unconstitutional. As a first step to understand the role of this actor in the Uruguayan political system, the article analyzes the set's formal power, its informal institutions and the relationship between them. The main results indicate that scJ design has medium levels of autonomy, but a limited scope of authority to intervene decisively in politically significant disputes. This configuration is stable in comparison with the experiences of the countries of the region. As for informal institutions, the practice that guides the appointment of the Court justices reinforces the levels of autonomy, but the judges' conception about their role in the political system enhances their limitations in terms of authority. However, some signs of changes in the conception of the professional role of the judges are identified, which could be leading to an increase of the Court's authority in the political system.

El presente trabajo analiza los factores asociados a la victoria de Tabaré Vázquez en la elección de Uruguay 2014. Para ello propone un modelo probit basado en variables explicativas de mediano y corto plazo: la evaluación de la gestión del gobierno saliente presidido por Mujica y la popularidad (simpatía y antipatía) de los candidatos presidenciales Vázquez y Lacalle Pou. Asimismo se analizan los resultados del modelo a la luz de un modelo analítico similar aplicado para el estudio de la victoria de Mujica en 2009. De la comparación surge que existen importantes semejanzas entre ambas elecciones. En un contexto de fuerte estabilidad del sistema de partidos uruguayo y de baja volatilidad, este estudio sugiere que los factores de mediano y corto plazo son relevantes al momento de explicar los resultados electorales, donde el diseño de la oferta electoral y la selección de los candidatos se tornan en un aspecto central.

A partir de los datos del Estudio Mundial de Valores del ano 2006 este trabajo analiza los cambios que los valores de genero han tenido en la opinion publica uruguaya. El trabajo busca explicar que factores operan en la conformacion de valores mas igualitarios de genero. Se encuentra que las mujeres, y en especial las pertenecientes a los estratos mas educados son mas criticas ante los estereotipos de genero y muestran valores mas igualitarios. Dada la composicion actual de la elite politica uruguaya esto tiene implicancias para el logro de una participacion equilibrada de hombres y mujeres en la esfera publica.