From 1944 the State Department attempted to improve its communications security by creating a Division of Cryptography and mechanising the encryption process. This article assesses the effectiveness of these reforms and shows that State's new cipher equipment had cryptographic vulnerabilities. Moreover, the department was unable to maintain physical security at the Moscow embassy and through espionage and technical surveillance the KGB broke the ciphers and read American communications. The paper concludes by analysing the impact of this security failure, including the claim that intercepted messages influenced Stalin's decision to approve the North Korean invasion of South Korea in 1950.

Intelligence has always been a part of war, but it has not always been a part of War Studies. This was partly because of the strictures of secrecy, but also because of a lack of interest in spying and espionage among historians of war and international security. Now, intelligence is a core element of the study of war, conflict, and security. The academic literature, once sparse, is now developing rapidly, and with it the boundaries of the subject. Intelligence studies, like War Studies, is now about so much more than great power conflict. This chapter traces the evolution of intelligence studies as a part of War Studies. It outlines the evolution of openness across the world, the drivers behind it, where this leaves the discipline today, and how it will develop over the near future. Intelligence will remain prominent in discussions of security and in popular culture, but also secretive. It also has the potential of becoming more intrusive, powerful, and influential. Therefore studying and assessing intelligence and security, and how it relates to society and the individual is crucial not only for the development of the topic but also for the health of democratic society.

How securely did Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev handle secret intelligence? Former Soviet officials have claimed that he carelessly revealed intelligence and certainly in conversations with American, Italian, and Iranian diplomats and ministers Khrushchev put at risk Soviet sources by boasting about intelligence successes and disclosing information that could only have come from intelligence. While Soviet officials appear to have overestimated the security impact of Khrushchev's revelations, he may have compromised a covert KGB mission in Iran and an important surveillance operation against the American embassy in Moscow.

This article examines the impact of the discovery by Britain and the United States in the late 1940s/early 1950s that cipher machines produced compromising emissions, a phenomenon which became known as Tempest. The British and Americans were forced to develop security measures to protect their encrypted communications but the Soviet Union was still able to exploit Tempest emissions from cipher machines in Western embassies in Moscow and read their diplomatic traffic. At the same time, Tempest became an important new way for the NSA and GCHQ to gather communications intelligence, particularly from developing world states and NATO allies.

This article examines how effectively Britain secured its diplomatic communications against hostile decryption during the early Cold War. It shows that between 1945 and 1970 the Foreign Office and the Commonwealth Relations Office introduced and operated four advanced cipher machines, Typex, Rockex, Noreen and Alvis, which produced very strong ciphers. However, Britain did suffer physical compromises of Rockex through Soviet espionage and an attack on the British embassy in Beijing. Rockex was also vulnerable to technical surveillance of its acoustic and Tempest emissions, and the Soviets exploited this to read the encrypted communications of the British embassy in Moscow.

This article assesses a claim by Khrushchev that warnings from the Soviet intelligence services enabled to him to deter a Turkish invasion of Syria in 1957. The article shows that the United States and Turkey did aim to overthrow the Syrian government, with the Turks massing an invasion force on Syria's border. Soviet intelligence detected this threat and was able to alert Khrushchev, who took diplomatic and military countermeasures. However, while the Soviet intelligence services did provide advance warning, Khrushchev overestimated the extent to which the United States was committed to a Turkish invasion.

This article shows that during the 1962 West New Guinea Crisis the Soviet Union played a much more active military role than previously assumed. Khrushchev secretly supplied Indonesia with Soviet manned submarines and bombers, and was prepared for these units to participate in an Indonesian attack against the Dutch. The Soviets also helped the Indonesians draw up operational plans. This deployment fits into a pattern of covert Soviet military interventions in the developing world between 1960 and 1962 and suggests that in some cases Khrushchev was prepared to use Soviet military units to support wars of national liberation in the developing world.

This article examines Soviet Bloc and Western bugging of their opponents' diplomatic premises in the early Cold War, from 1945 to the late 1960s. It explains the process of audio surveillance, identifies significant cases of bugging and describes the countermeasures taken by Western states. The paper concludes that the Soviet Union was able to gather a considerable amount of intelligence from bugging Western embassies in Moscow during the early Cold War. In particular, bugging enabled the Soviets to break the diplomatic ciphers of the United States, Britain and West Germany.

This article examines British signals intelligence on Egypt during the 1956 Suez Crisis, the 1958 Middle East Crisis and the Egyptian intervention in the Yemen. It explains the production of signals intelligence and reviews the evidence that GCHQ could read Egyptian and other Arab communications. It then identifies some of the intelligence provided by GCHQ and considers its influence on British policy.

This study examines the code words and euphemisms which protected Anglo-American communications intelligence (Comint) during the Cold War. It explains how the code word security system operated and identifies the main Comint code words and euphemisms in effect from 1946 to 1999. The article then uses these code words and euphemisms to interpret declassified American documents and reveal more information about Anglo-American Comint on the Congo, Bolivia, Indonesia, South Vietnam and China in the 1960s.

July 01 2010 Bradley R. Simpson, Economists with Guns: Authoritarian Development and U.S.-Indonesian Relations, 1960–1968 David Easter David Easter Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google Scholar Author and Article Information David Easter Online Issn: 1531-3298 Print Issn: 1520-3972 © 2010 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology2010 Journal of Cold War Studies (2010) 12 (3): 157–159. https://doi.org/10.1162/JCWS_r_00022 Cite Icon Cite Permissions Share Icon Share MailTo Twitter LinkedIn Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Data Peer Review Search Site Citation David Easter; Bradley R. Simpson, Economists with Guns: Authoritarian Development and U.S.-Indonesian Relations, 1960–1968. Journal of Cold War Studies 2010; 12 (3): 157–159. doi: https://doi.org/10.1162/JCWS_r_00022 Download citation file: Ris (Zotero) Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search Dropdown Menu toolbar search search input Search input auto suggest filter your search All ContentAll JournalsJournal of Cold War Studies Search Advanced Search This content is only available as a PDF. © 2010 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology2010 Article PDF first page preview Close Modal You do not currently have access to this content.

This study examines the role played by GCHQ during the 1960s. It looks at GCHQ's overseas Sigint collection network, its relationship with the NSA and the problems caused by decolonization, economic crisis and military withdrawal from East of Suez. The paper also discusses GCHQ's intelligence targets in the 1960s, its codebreaking successes and assesses how important Sigint was for British policy towards France, Egypt and Indonesia. It concludes that while Sigint gave Britain tactical benefits in dealing with France and Egypt it was only in the case of Indonesia that Sigint helped Britain to achieve its strategic goals.

This study examines the role played by the West in the destruction of the Indonesian communist party, the PKI, and the removal of the radical Indonesian president, Sukarno, in 1965–66. After the murder of six generals in October 1965 the Indonesian army massacred thousands of communists and seized power from Sukarno. The United States secretly helped the army in this period by providing intelligence, arms, medicines and radios and by giving assurances that Britain would not attack Indonesia while the army was suppressing the PKI. The US, Britain, Australia and Malaysia also used propaganda to encourage hostility in Indonesia towards the PKI. The article assesses the impact of Western covert intervention and concludes that Western propaganda may have encouraged the mass killings of the communists.

This study examines the importance of British intelligence and propaganda in the Confrontation with Indonesia. It shows that Britain had access to human and signals intelligence on Indonesia, which influenced British policy and strategy in several ways. In particular, signals intelligence gave London the confidence to launch 'Claret' cross border raids against Indonesia from 1965. The study also reveals that Britain mounted an aggressive propaganda campaign against Indonesia during the Confrontation and especially after an abortive coup attempt in 1965. British propaganda successfully encouraged the army to destroy the Indonesian communist party, remove President Sukarno from power and end the Confrontation.

(1999). British and Malaysian covert support for rebel movements in Indonesia during the ‘confrontation’, 1963–66. Intelligence and National Security: Vol. 14, The Clandestine Cold War in Asia, 1945–65: Western Intelligence, Propaganda and Special Operations, pp. 195-208.