We investigate mechanisms of institutional stability under profound environmental change, using corporate control in Japan as a critical case. Building on the concept of dualization in the comparative institutions literature, we theorize how dualized power relations at the top of the firm sustain insider control. Using data on executive board members of all non-financial firms listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange from 1993 to 2016, we show that "lifetimers"-employees who spend their entire careers with a single company-continue to enjoy substantial advantages in CEO succession. They maintain their dominance by promoting fellow lifetimers and constraining the prospects of other candidates. At the same time, "external appointees"-organizational outsiders who join the firm directly as executive board members-also benefit from their institutional ties and boundary-spanning roles. Yet, unlike lifetimers, their relative advantages are fragile, as they lack durable intra-firm power bases and are more exposed to shifting external conditions and internal politics. Our findings suggest that resistance by organizational insiders, combined with the selective co-optation of outsiders, can help preserve institutional arrangements in a changing environment.

Pay-for-performance systems are a defining feature of contemporary workplaces, yet their implications for inequality remain unclear. This paper examines how collective performance pay-where rewards are tied to team-, department-, or firm-level outcomes-shapes gender wage inequality through relational processes of reward distribution. Using linked employer-employee data on 21,339 full-time white-collar employees across 660 South Korean firms between 2006 and 2012, we show that collective performance pay widens the gender wage gap within organizations, especially when collective performance rewards form a larger share of compensation. The gap-increasing effect is strongest under team-level performance pay, where claims-making and negotiation are most active, and under distributional rules that allow greater managerial discretion. These findings reveal that inequality arises from relational dynamics in reward distribution rather than evaluation bias alone. The study highlights how meritocratic and team-based pay systems can inadvertently deepen gender inequality, revealing the relational foundations of the meritocracy paradox.

This paper theorizes the interplay of public and organizational policies by investigating whether the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) shifted patterns of gender inequality within U.S. workplaces. Did this leave law increase women's representation in positions of authority (moving more women into management jobs)? We argue that the impact of public policies will vary by organizational context, hypothesizing different effects by organizations' points of departure-the corporate policies in place when public policy changes. Analyzing establishment-level panel data from approximately 800 U.S. private-sector establishments in 1990-1997, we found that women's representation in managerial positions increased in the years immediately after the FMLA. Importantly, women's representation in management increased the most in workplaces that provided more generous leave benefits even before the FMLA. The increase in managerial representation was most prominent for women of color. Consistent with relational inequality theory, these findings suggest that women may find it easier to make claims for leave and for career advancement when both legal and organizational policies lend legitimacy to their claims. More broadly, this study points to the need to explicitly evaluate how policy impacts vary by organizational norms and commitments.

Earnings segregation at work is an understudied topic in social science, despite the workplace being an everyday nexus for social mixing, cohesion, contact, claims making, and resource exchange. It is all the more urgent to study as workplaces, in the last decades, have undergone profound reorganizations that could affect the magnitude and evolution of earnings segregation. Analyzing linked employer-employee panel administrative databases, the authors estimate the evolving isolation of higher earners from other employees in 12 countries: Canada, Czechia, Denmark, France, Germany, Hungary, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, South Korea, and Sweden. They find in almost all countries a growing workplace isolation of top earners and dramatically declining exposure of top earners to bottom earners. The authors perform a first exploration of the main factors accounting for this trend: deindustrialization, workplace downsizing, restructuring (including layoffs, outsourcing, offshoring, and subcontracting), and digitalization contribute substantially to the increase in top earner segregation. These findings open up a future research agenda on the causes and consequences of top earner segregation.

The upswing in finance in recent decades has led to rising inequality, but do downswings in finance lead to a symmetric decline in inequality? We analyze the asymmetry of the effect of ups and downs in finance, and the effect of increased capital requirements and the bonus cap on national earnings inequality. We use administrative employer–employee-linked data from 1990 to 2019 for 12 countries and data from bank reports, from 2009 to 2017 in 13 European countries. We find a strong asymmetry in the effect of upswings and downswings in finance on earnings inequality, a weak, if any, mitigating effect of capital requirements on finance’s contribution to inequality, and a restructuring but no absolute effect of the bonus cap on financiers’ earnings. We suggest that while rising financiers’ wages increase inequality in upswings, they are resilient in downswings and thus downswings do not contribute to a symmetric decline in inequality.

Extant research on the gender pay gap suggests that men and women who do the same work for the same employer receive similar pay, so that processes sorting people into jobs are thought to account for the vast majority of the pay gap. Data that can identify women and men who do the same work for the same employer are rare, and research informing this crucial aspect of gender differences in pay is several decades old and from a limited number of countries. Here, using recent linked employer-employee data from 15 countries, we show that the processes sorting people into different jobs account for substantially less of the gender pay differences than was previously believed and that within-job pay differences remain consequential.

It is widely believed that meritocratic employment practices reduce gender inequality by limiting managers' reliance on nonmerit factors, such as biases. An emerging stream of research, however, questions the belief, arguing that meritocratic practices often fail to reduce inequality and may paradoxically increase it. Despite these opposing predictions, we still lack convincing empirical findings to adjudicate between them. Typically relying on data from a single organization or industry, most previous studies suffer from limited generalizability and cannot properly account for the large variation in the implementation of merit-based reward systems across organizations, let alone identify the origins of the variation. We attempt to overcome the limitations by constructing large-scale linked employer-employee data and by investigating the impact of merit-based systems on different components of compensation. Analyzing our panel data on 400 large Japanese companies and 400,000 employees of these companies over 12 years, we found evidence in support of the meritocracy paradox. The gender gap in bonus pay was greater, not smaller, in workplaces with a merit-based system compared to workplaces without it. But this paradoxical expansion of the gender gap was observed only in bonus pay but not in total compensation. We further found that a transition to merit-based systems has varying impacts on different employee groups; it widened the gender pay gap for young workers but reduced the gap for managers. Our research contributes to understanding gender inequality in times of shifting employment relations and the rise of meritocracy.

Workplaces have become more unstable in recent decades, but how such instability shapes categorical inequalities remains little understood. This study explores how the rise of employment precarity, re-conceptualized as an attribute of workplaces, affects gender inequality. We argue that gender inequality increases in volatile workplaces where employee tenure is short and turnover is common. In such workplaces, gender stereotyping and opportunity hoarding by men may become prevalent, because members have little incentive to acquire individualized information about each other and those who are not satisfied with unequal distribution of rewards simply leave rather than raising their voice. To test our argument, we analyze the effect of workplace volatility on the gender-wage gap, using employer–employee linked data from two separate national contexts: South Korea and the Netherlands. Leveraging on the different institutional contexts of the two countries, we also examine the moderating roles of unionization and public sector employment. Our theory and empirical findings contribute to our understanding of the workplace-level mechanisms of inequality, especially in the context of recent structural changes in the labor market.

Despite growing concerns that parental leave policies may reinforce the marginalization of mothers in the labor market and reproduce the gendered division of household labor, few studies examine how women themselves approach and use parental leave. Through 64 in-depth interviews with college-educated Korean mothers, we find that although women’s involvement in family responsibilities increases during leave, they do not reduce their work devotion but reinvent it throughout the leave-taking process. Embedded in the culture of overwork in Korean workplaces, women find it justifiable to use leave only when they are highly committed to work and adjust the length of leave to accommodate workplace demands. Upon returning to work, they try to compensate for their absence by working harder than before, thereby showing that they are more committed than their colleagues. Given this “compensatory” work devotion, women question their own entitlement in the workplace, and some quit when they cannot meet their goal of compensating by doing more than others. This study highlights how the workplace culture shapes women’s work devotion during and after leave.

BACKGROUND:Late age at marriage and rising rates of singlehood increasingly characterize East Asian societies. For Japan, these are major contributors to the very low birth rate.OBJECTIVE:We analyze two unique data sets: dating records covering a two-year period from one of Japan's largest marriage agencies and in-depth interviews with 30 highly-educated Japanese singles. The longitudinal nature of the quantitative data allows us to test hypotheses about how single men's and women's preferences for partners' characteristics adjust over time. The qualitative data provides a more fine-grained look at Japanese singles' partner preferences.METHODS:We employ fixed-effects regression models to analyze Japanese men's and women's preferences for the relative and absolute education, income, and age of potential marriage partners.RESULTS:Both the quantitative and qualitative data suggest that Japanese women continue to highly value men's income-earning capacity. Men, in contrast, value a partner with moderate income-earning potential. Women's and men's preferences for partner's education are somewhat weaker, and women broaden their educational preference over time.CONCLUSION:Japanese men's and women's preferences for a potential partner's characteristics are largely consistent with Becker's theory of gender-role specialization. But we also find evidence consistent with Oppenheimer's expectation that men are coming to value women's income-earning capacity more highly than in the past.CONTRIBUTION:We use a unique Japanese data set featuring dating records over a two-year period to examine the appropriateness of theories of marital sorting proposed by Becker and Oppenheimer. Our quantitative analysis is complemented by in-depth interviews with Japanese singles.

Improving gender and racial and ethnic representation among corporate leaders and boards of directors has become an important goal for firms, shareholders, and other stakeholders. Beginning in 2020, Illinois corporations have been required to file annual reports on the demographic composition of their boards of directors and report on their policies and practices for promoting diversity, equity, and inclusion among directors and executive leadership. This report summarizes the data found in the 2020 diversity and inclusion filings.

We measure the size and evolution of the wage premium for a job in finance. In thirteen developed countries, wages, especially high wages, increased at a sustained pace in this sector during the 1990s and 2000s, contributing strongly to the increase in the share of the national top 1% and hence to inequality. The explanation of this gap by differences in talent is not enough. In France, salaries remain 25 to 30% higher once the effect of the diploma is deducted. We offer an alternative explanation based on the ability of employees to move financial activity with them from one firm to another.

Shareholder power is often cited as contributing to the deterioration of employment relations. However, managerial power also shapes how shareholder pressures affect workers. In this article, we examine how managerial power contributed to the initial durability and eventual decline of white-collar benefits in the era of shareholder primacy. One traditional source of elite power is the network of overlapping board appointments which helped corporate leaders resist shareholder pressures that weaken employment relations and benefits. More recently, this network has begun to fracture and leaders are no longer able to draw on collective resources in resisting shareholders. We investigate how shifting bases of elite power affect white-collar benefits, focusing on employee stock ownership plans, work-life balance policies and profit-sharing plans. Using a panel of S&P 1500 firms from 1998 to 2011, we show that firms densely connected in the board interlock network were more likely to adopt white-collar benefits; but these benefits began to erode as the network fractured. We discuss the consequences of a disempowered corporate elite for employment stability.

Abstract:It is widely believed that meritocratic employment practices reduce gender inequality by limiting managers' reliance on nonmerit factors, such as biases. An emerging stream of research, however, questions the belief, arguing that meritocratic practices often fail to reduce inequality and may paradoxically increase it. Despite these opposing predictions, we still lack convincing empirical findings to adjudicate between them. Typically relying on data from a single organization or industry, most previous studies suffer from limited generalizability and cannot properly account for the large variation in the implementation of merit-based reward systems across organizations, let alone identify the origins of the variation. We attempt to overcome the limitations by constructing large-scale linked employer–employee data and by investigating the impact of merit-based systems on different components of compensation. Analyzing our panel data on 400 large Japanese companies and 400,000 employees of these companies over 12 years, we found evidence in support of the meritocracy paradox. The gender gap in bonus pay was greater, not smaller, in workplaces with a merit-based system compared to workplaces without it. But this paradoxical expansion of the gender gap was observed only in bonus pay but not in total compensation. We further found that a transition to merit-based systems has varying impacts on different employee groups; it widened the gender pay gap for young workers but reduced the gap for managers. Our research contributes to understanding gender inequality in times of shifting employment relations and the rise of meritocracy.

Occupations have long been held by sociologists, from the older status attainment tradition to the more recent micro-class tradition, to be at the center of stratification writ large. Occupations are specifically argued to be central to shaping wages. Indeed, this has been understood as the comparative advantage of sociology relative to economics in understanding wage setting. However, an undercurrent has for decades existed in sociology that suggests other contexts, mainly workplaces and jobs, may be as important if not more important stratification contexts. Until recently data with the capacity to simultaneously assess all three contexts has been virtually non-existent. In this paper we use administrative data from five countries (Denmark, Finland, Germany, Japan, and South Korea) to assess the relative contributions of occupations, establishments, and jobs to wages. Our core finding is that there is no universal link between occupations and wages, with occupations explaining between 30 and 56 % of wage variance across country-years. As well, in all countries except Finland establishments explain more of the variance in wages than do occupations. Jobs and establishment figure prominently in the social organization of wages, and must be included in theoretical models and whenever possible in empirical analyses of social stratification.