Since the 1980s, disproportionate top earnings growth in large cities has fueled a resurgence in the spatial concentration of top earnings across countries in the global north. Research attributes this trend to national top earnings growth or globalization but has left unanswered how national and local top earnings growth coincide and why this phenomenon occurs in cities less central to the global economy. Here we show that earnings growth in finance since the 1980s has concentrated top earnings in the few cities where financial market jobs cluster. Using administrative linked employer-employee data for ten countries in the global north from 1989 to 2019, we show that this pattern extends beyond major global cities to smaller financial cities. Comparing financial cities with similar domestic cities shows that this contribution is not just a byproduct of scale or urban growth. We thus emphasize the role of urban sectoral specialization and the labor markets within these sectors in driving the spatial concentration of top earnings.

Earnings segregation at work is an understudied topic in social science, despite the workplace being an everyday nexus for social mixing, cohesion, contact, claims making, and resource exchange. It is all the more urgent to study as workplaces, in the last decades, have undergone profound reorganizations that could affect the magnitude and evolution of earnings segregation. Analyzing linked employer-employee panel administrative databases, the authors estimate the evolving isolation of higher earners from other employees in 12 countries: Canada, Czechia, Denmark, France, Germany, Hungary, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, South Korea, and Sweden. They find in almost all countries a growing workplace isolation of top earners and dramatically declining exposure of top earners to bottom earners. The authors perform a first exploration of the main factors accounting for this trend: deindustrialization, workplace downsizing, restructuring (including layoffs, outsourcing, offshoring, and subcontracting), and digitalization contribute substantially to the increase in top earner segregation. These findings open up a future research agenda on the causes and consequences of top earner segregation.

Powerful male actors are argued to secure workplace resources for themselves and other in-group members, contributing to workplace inequalities. We contend that, like gender, parenthood similarity in supervisor-supervisee dyads also provokes group processes, and that parenthood is superordinate to childlessness. Critically, we hypothesize how shared supervisor-supervisee parental status at its intersection with gender might intensify or offset (dis)advantage in access to workplace training. Hypotheses are tested with unique linked German employer-employee data and estimating gender-parental training differences using workplace fixed-effects regressions. Results show that while on average women train less than men and parents train more than childless workers, these effects can alter at the intersection with supervisors' group memberships. Dyad 'double jeopardy' is evident in that childless women face the greatest training disadvantages when reporting to childless female supervisors. Yet whether sharing one superordinate status offsets disadvantage of a subordinate group membership occurs only for shared parenthood. Childless men gain no advantage when reporting to a male supervisor, whereas sharing parenthood with immediate supervisors countervails disadvantage of being female for mother supervisees. We conclude that only by considering social relations at the intersection of supervisor-supervisees' multiple categorical memberships might we better understand the relational processes sustaining or reducing workplace inequalities.

The upswing in finance in recent decades has led to rising inequality, but do downswings in finance lead to a symmetric decline in inequality? We analyze the asymmetry of the effect of ups and downs in finance, and the effect of increased capital requirements and the bonus cap on national earnings inequality. We use administrative employer–employee-linked data from 1990 to 2019 for 12 countries and data from bank reports, from 2009 to 2017 in 13 European countries. We find a strong asymmetry in the effect of upswings and downswings in finance on earnings inequality, a weak, if any, mitigating effect of capital requirements on finance’s contribution to inequality, and a restructuring but no absolute effect of the bonus cap on financiers’ earnings. We suggest that while rising financiers’ wages increase inequality in upswings, they are resilient in downswings and thus downswings do not contribute to a symmetric decline in inequality.

Extant research on the gender pay gap suggests that men and women who do the same work for the same employer receive similar pay, so that processes sorting people into jobs are thought to account for the vast majority of the pay gap. Data that can identify women and men who do the same work for the same employer are rare, and research informing this crucial aspect of gender differences in pay is several decades old and from a limited number of countries. Here, using recent linked employer-employee data from 15 countries, we show that the processes sorting people into different jobs account for substantially less of the gender pay differences than was previously believed and that within-job pay differences remain consequential.

We investigate how the institutional context of the public and private sectors regulates the association of workplace diversity policies and relational status positions with first- and second-generation immigrants’ wages. Using unique linked employer–employee data combining administrative and survey information of 6,139 employees in 120 German workplaces, we estimate workplace fixed-effects regressions. Workplace processes are institutionally contingent: diversity policies such as mixed teams reduce inequalities in the public sector, and diversity policies such as language courses reinforce existing inequalities in the private sector. In public sector workplaces where natives hold higher relational positions, immigrants’ wages are lower. This group-related dynamic is not detectable in the private sector.

The impact of harmful social relations in the workplace, such as workplace bullying, has become abundantly clear to the social sciences. However, data limitations have prevented researchers from fully examining the organizational component of workplace bullying. Using a sample of linked-employer-employee data collected from the German working population, this paper shows how the interaction of organizational attributes and individual characteristics of workers (specifically, gender) is associated with how workplace bullying manifests itself. A series of diversity/equity and work-family policies are examined. Results show that some programs, but not all, are associated with workplace bullying. More frequent organizational use of mentoring programs for women is associated with higher levels of supervisory bullying, while more frequent use of work-family policies is associated with higher levels of supervisory bullying in cases where the employee and supervisor are different genders.

We measure the size and evolution of the wage premium for a job in finance. In thirteen developed countries, wages, especially high wages, increased at a sustained pace in this sector during the 1990s and 2000s, contributing strongly to the increase in the share of the national top 1% and hence to inequality. The explanation of this gap by differences in talent is not enough. In France, salaries remain 25 to 30% higher once the effect of the diploma is deducted. We offer an alternative explanation based on the ability of employees to move financial activity with them from one firm to another.

Germany has experienced sharply rising earnings inequalities, both between and within workplaces. Working from prior literature on rising employment dualization and the fissuring of workplaces into high and low wage employers, we explore a set of organizational explanations for rising between and within workplace inequality focusing on the role of employment dualization, skill segregation/complexity, and firm fissuring. We describe and model these hypothesized processes with administrative data on a large random sample panel of German workplaces. We find that rising inequalities are associated with polarization in industrial wage rates and the birth of new low wage workplaces, as well as increased establishment skill specialization and the growth of part-time jobs in workplace divisions of labor. We conclude with recommendations for future research that directly examines more proximate mechanisms and their relative importance in different institutional contexts.

Occupations have long been held by sociologists, from the older status attainment tradition to the more recent micro-class tradition, to be at the center of stratification writ large. Occupations are specifically argued to be central to shaping wages. Indeed, this has been understood as the comparative advantage of sociology relative to economics in understanding wage setting. However, an undercurrent has for decades existed in sociology that suggests other contexts, mainly workplaces and jobs, may be as important if not more important stratification contexts. Until recently data with the capacity to simultaneously assess all three contexts has been virtually non-existent. In this paper we use administrative data from five countries (Denmark, Finland, Germany, Japan, and South Korea) to assess the relative contributions of occupations, establishments, and jobs to wages. Our core finding is that there is no universal link between occupations and wages, with occupations explaining between 30 and 56 % of wage variance across country-years. As well, in all countries except Finland establishments explain more of the variance in wages than do occupations. Jobs and establishment figure prominently in the social organization of wages, and must be included in theoretical models and whenever possible in empirical analyses of social stratification.

It is well documented that earnings inequalities have risen in many high-income countries. Less clear are the linkages between rising income inequality and workplace dynamics, how within- and between-workplace inequality varies across countries, and to what extent these inequalities are moderated by national labor market institutions. In order to describe changes in the initial between- and within-firm market income distribution we analyze administrative records for 2,000,000,000+ job years nested within 50,000,000+ workplace years for 14 high-income countries in North America, Scandinavia, Continental and Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia. We find that countries vary a great deal in their levels and trends in earnings inequality but that the between-workplace share of wage inequality is growing in almost all countries examined and is in no country declining. We also find that earnings inequalities and the share of between-workplace inequalities are lower and grew less strongly in countries with stronger institutional employment protections and rose faster when these labor market protections weakened. Our findings suggest that firm-level restructuring and increasing wage inequalities between workplaces are more central contributors to rising income inequality than previously recognized.

Analyzing linked employer-employee panel administrative databases, we study the evolving isolation of higher earners from other employees in eleven countries: Canada, Czechia, Denmark, France, Germany, Hungary, Japan, Norway, Spain, South Korea, and Sweden. We find in almost all countries a growing workplace isolation of top earners and dramatically declining exposure of top earners to bottom earners. We compare these trends to segregation based on occupational class, education, age, gender, and nativity, finding that the rise in top earner isolation is much more dramatic and general across countries. We find that residential segregation is also growing, although more slowly than segregation at work, with top earners and bottom earners increasingly living in different distinct municipalities. While work and residential segregation are correlated, statistical modeling suggests that the primary causal effect is from work to residential segregation. These findings open up a future research program on the causes and consequences of top earner segregation.

Digitalized work has gained importance across industrialized countries. Simultaneously, research investigating the consequences of digitalized work for workplace relations among employees, supervisors, and coworkers, such as workplace bullying, is largely missing. This study is, to the best of our knowledge, the first to investigate how digitalized work influences supervisory and coworker bullying dependent on individual, job, and workplace characteristics. We use representative linked-employer-employee data from 3612 employees located in 100 large workplaces in Germany across all industrial sectors and apply random effects multilevel linear analyses. Individual involvement in digitalized work is related to less supervisory bullying for all employees, and for lower qualified employees to less coworker bullying. At the workplace level, when digitalization has advanced, supervisory bullying increases for highly qualified employees. Neither the individual nor the workplace effects of digitalization are explained by mediating factors such as job autonomy, routine or machine work, competency, or psychological or physical stress. Competence and job autonomy prevent the occurrence of bullying, while routine work, psychological stress, and physically demanding work are positively related to bullying. All effects are more pronounced for supervisory bullying than for coworker bullying. Individual involvement with digitalized work seems to change relational dynamics within workplaces and to protect employees from bullying. For highly qualified employees, this is probably related to the gathering of key competencies; for lower qualified employees, it might be linked to working with digital devices. In workplaces where digitalization has progressed, digitalized work may disrupt and change the established work processes and relations and increase the necessity for new coordination and, thus, the occurrence of conflicts.

Author(s): Tomaskovic-Devey, Donald; Rainey, Anthony; Avent-Holt, Dustin; Bandelj, Nina; Boza, Istvan; Cort, David; Godechot, Olivier; Hajdu, Gergely; Hallsten, Martin; Henriksen, Lasse Folke; Hermansen, Are Skeie; Hou, Feng; Jung, Jiwook; Kanjuo-Mrcela, Aleksandra; King, Joe; Kodama, Naomi; Kristal, Tali; Krizkova, Alena; Lippenyi, Zoltan; Maja Melzer, Silvia; Mun, Eunmi; Penner, Andrew; Petersen, Trond; Poje, Andreja; Safi, Mirna; Thaning, Max; Tufail, Zaibu

This study examines how firms' resources, training costs and training intensity influence immigrants' access to formal employer-provided training. Using unique linked employer–employee data for four immigration countries and linear probability models with random slopes, the study shows that immigrants' disadvantaged access to training is not explained by individual, job-related or firm characteristics. Immigrants employed in firms that have undergone a reduction in size are more likely to receive training. Moreover, immigrants who work in training intensive firms are also more likely to receive training. Paradoxically, the immigrant–native gap in training is also the highest in training intensive firms.

Objective: This paper investigates commuting and interregional migration from eastern to western Germany, and asks, first: Who chooses to migrate and who chooses to commute? Second: Does commuting serve as a stepping-stone or as a long-term alternative to migration? And third: What role does education and educational–occupational mismatch play in those choices? Methods: We use the Socio-Economic Panel data from 1992 to 2013 and multilevel multinomial logit models with random effects, as well as cross-classified multilevel logit with random effects. Results: People with higher education are more likely to migrate than to remain immobile or to commute, while people who have spent less time in education are more likely to commute than to remain immobile or to migrate. Educational–occupational mismatches reduce the likelihood of migration for both men and women, but they reduce the likelihood of commuting only for men. For women, educational–occupational mismatches increase the likelihood of commuting. Moreover, commuting serves as a stepping-stone to migration, rather than as a long-term alternative to it, especially for the highly educated. Contribution: We investigate the relationship between migration and commuting more directly than has been the case in previous research. Moreover, we advance previous research by showing how educational–occupational mismatch influences decisions as to whether to commute or to migrate. Our analysis shows how education, educational–occupational mismatch, and gender are interrelated and intertwined with each other, and how gender-specific mobility patterns follow from these interrelations.