Peace and Conflict Studies was shaped by a canon that revolved around the prevention of mass atrocities through uncovering the drivers and mechanisms of destruction, aggression, and discrimination, and by tracing the potential of civil society actors to scandalize and resist such actions around the globe. The quest for relevance and impact in the discipline was addressed through targeted research communication and political engagement in or vis-à-vis political institutions, generating evidence in close cooperation with NGOs and fact-finding efforts by multilateral institutions, particularly under the umbrella of the UN. But in a break with the substantial canon and the standard procedures of the discipline, Peace and Conflict researchers have recently been asked to be “neutral” when confronted with the intentional killing of tens of thousands of civilians, and criticized as “activist” or too political when they worked according to canonized principles. As I argue in this forum contribution, the label “activist” has an exceptionalizing, policing, and ultimately paralyzing function. It operates as a derogatory gesture used to police the boundaries of relevance and impact in Peace and Conflict Studies. Rather than marking a substantive deviation from established academic standards, accusations of “politicization” function to disqualify research that follows ordinary disciplinary procedures yet produces analytically and politically uncomfortable conclusions or addresses decision-makers outside the mainstream.

Abstract This introduction frames the Special Forum on land in international politics. We reconstruct the land question and show its relevance and pervasiveness in neighboring disciplines, asking why land has played such a small role in International Relations (IR). We argue that to understand current empirical trends in international politics, from territorial wars to political economy, from social movements to environmental crises, we need a serious engagement with land: an understanding of international politics “from the ground up.” The introduction thus positions land—the earth we walk on, eat from, care for, and fight about—as a central site and subject matter of international politics. Understanding processes that start and move through land requires thinking of land in multiple dimensions: as territory, as property, and as culture. Building on the findings in this Special Forum, we flesh out these three dimensions of land in international politics. Furthermore, we outline three takeaways for further theory development in IR: In addition to analyzing land as a problem of governance or territorial control, we point to it as constitutive of international politics more broadly, highlighting the natural/material side of land that makes it somewhat unruly. Building on this, we engage with the debate on environmental determinism and encourage scholars to rethink our relationship to nature without stepping into the traps of regressive (“blood and soil”) narratives. Finally, we highlight the importance of rural places for the study of international politics, particularly regarding the big challenges of the 21st century.

I examine the use of the term "resistance" in the wake of Hamas's 7 October 2023 attack on Israel. Drawing on International Relations (IR) scholarship and its conceptual canon, I first observe that resistance is often underdetermined; it is taken for granted rather than defined or problematised. Secondly, however, I carve out the conceptual characteristics that summarise customised usage. Based on this survey of the canon, resistance is commonly understood to be an organised and principled, performative contestation of a superior power that can (but does not have to) involve violence, yet always implies a power imbalance in the situation it describes (in favour of that which is resisted). Based on the canon of IR, there is no reason not to describe the behaviour of Hamas on October 7 as resistance, without thereby justifying or theorising the specific means applied during its attacks. But what does it mean for scholars when a concept aligned with established usage provokes public outrage in a specific case? Should we focus on challenging the public, or rethink our own conceptual choices? Based on the debate over "explaining as explaining away" in the sociology of knowledge, I suggest that the given situation is not that exceptional. Scholars dealing with political subjects must consider how their concepts are perceived, anticipate their effects where possible, and publicly reflect on normativity and positionality when giving directions to their use. I make suggestions for normatively couching contested concepts in the discursive and normative opportunity structure.

Abstract How do international organizations (IOs) “see” land? Building on evidence in Critical Agrarian Studies, this article investigates this question with a focus on how global governance contributes to the global land rush. Drawing on Li’s heuristic of “making land investible,” we identify four strategies in IO reports that render land legible as a policy object and facilitate its commodification. We show that IOs play a strategic role in the global land rush by selecting economistic ways of seeing land. Yet, to varying degrees, they are less selective, seeing land in plural ways. This applies more to IOs whose mandate deviates from market interests (UNEP) than those whose goal is entrenched in commodification (WTO). Importantly, though, the logic of seeing land as an economic resource runs through the entire sample. IOs are rendering land investible across the bord; only some do it almost exclusively, thus seeing selectively (overlooking other meanings of land) while others seem more open, or less selective, thus being able to see other meanings of land, such as heritage, ecological and cultural services. Based on Poulantzas, we show how a focus on material interests underlying governance institutions can offer explanations of their “strategic selectivity” in seeing land. This helps understand why some IOs are strongly selective about what they see in land, while others have more discretion at how they make land legible. The resulting contradictions in their ways of seeing land can serve a strategic function in establishing the permissive structure that sustains the land rush.

Emancipatory activism is often channelled into institutions. While this can be interpreted as a success, it may also demobilize activism. The growing literature on the co-optation of emancipatory struggles and the technocratic exercise of power in transnational politics explains these dynamics with the depoliticizing character of institutions: struggles are depoliticized through institutionalization. Participation in institutional politics is therefore a dangerous undertaking for activists. But why do activists, who are aware of these depoliticizing effects and their corresponding trade-offs, still decide to participate? Bringing recent studies of technocracy in transnational politics into conversation with political theory of activism, we argue that activists in struggles such as social inequality, environmentalism and transformative justice are aware of institutional depoliticization and consciously navigate dangerous arenas in their activism. Based on aspirational politics, they combine incremental and radical visions for change. Such participation is best described with a “perspective of investment”. We conceptualize activists vis-à-vis the institutions they enter, and classify reasons why they do so. We show for the arenas of economic development and transitional justice that through aspiration even technocratic institutions that stabilize (neo)imperial orders can provide spaces of solidarity, resistance, and visions for a new international order.

Social movements see participation formats of international organizations (IOs) with suspicion. They increasingly retreat from cooperation to contest IOs from the outside, because they fear co-optation without real policy impact. However, the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) was an exception to this trend because its opening up was seen as long-term dialogue facilitating discussions about the nature of food production, and because it created credible institutional mechanisms that were trusted by activists to give influence to farmers and peasant movements. Therefore, the food sovereignty movement participated within the FAO framework in a remarkably institutionalized way throughout the 2010s. But in 2019, when the United Nations (UN) announced to hold a food systems summit (United Nations Food Systems Summit (UNFSS)), this changed dramatically. The food sovereignty movement, many non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and eventually scientists, decided to boycott the summit, instead organizing an alternative Peoples' Summit, and withdrawing from long-held institutional roles in the FAO. How can this be explained? This article traces the process from the announcement of the UNFSS to its implementation, stressing how institutional trust was damaged by several decisions in the process that undermined the good faith of activists. As we show in detail, the circumvention of established institutional mechanisms, and the feeling of betrayal on the side of the movement, was decisive for losing institutional trust. Importantly, a mixture of substantive and institutional changes in the context of UNFSS not only undermined the movement's trust into the integrity and ability of the summit organizers, but thereby also provoked movement efforts to delegitimize UN food governance at large.

After decades of outsourcing mining activities, Global North governments have begun to domesticate production sites. This strategy aligns with decarbonization goals but also contributes to the emergence of new environmental conflicts and protest movements. The analysis of these movements provides an important insight into the changing shape of transnational rule in the context of resource extraction for the European Green Deal. Building on the approach to reconstruct rule from resistance, we reconstruct the anti-mining resistance movement against a lithium mine in Serbia. Tracing their tactics and addressees, we identify three main conflict actors that the movement is opposed to (the transnational mining company Rio Tinto, the Serbian government, and the European Union (EU)). By addressing these institutions, the protesters do not only constitute a multifaceted conflict constellation around the Jadar project, but they also submit an argument about who can and who is allowed to dictate to others how they ought to behave. While all involved parties play their part, the EU appears more as a structural force during the conflict, preconfiguring the possible conduct of others. Particularly, the accession process places contradictory expectations on Serbia, both enabling and restricting the agency of the government and domestic protest movements. Yet, transnational companies are likely profiting from this constellation in the long run, because the inbuilt contradiction between a commitment to green policies and a pressure to open markets to foreign investments in the context of the accession process is conducive to that end.

Zusammenfassung Warum schließen sich so viele Bauern den Protesten an? Im Folgenden wollen wir uns der Beantwortung dieser Frage mit einem theoretischen Modell nähern. Hierfür schlagen wir eine politische Landkarte der deutschen Landwirtschaft vor, die sich zwischen vier Paradigmen aufspannt: Produktivismus, Multifunktionalismus, Nationaler Protektionismus und Marktliberalismus. Anschließend ordnen wir jenen Paradigmen spezifische Interessen zu und zeigen, wie diese sich zueinander (nicht) in Beziehung setzen lassen. Diese Interessen clustern wir anhand von fünf Idealtypen aus der Forschung zu „farming styles“: Yield Optimiser, Traditionalists, Innovators, Support Optimiser und Idealists. Anschließend zeigen wir, welche dieser Interessen von welchen bäuerlichen Gruppen repräsentiert werden und welche von den aktuellen Protesten wahrscheinlich angesprochen werden. Darauf aufbauend diskutieren wir die Gründe, warum sich ein wesentlicher Teil der deutschen Bäuer:innen von Gruppen mobilisieren lässt, die ihren Interessen widersprechen, von anderen aber nicht. Dafür führen wir die Machtverteilung, das Gelegenheitsfenster und eine Affektschranke als zentrale analytische Konzepte ein. Mit dieser Erklärung bringen wir Ansätze kritischer Agrarforschung und politischer Ökologie mit jenen der Protest- und Bewegungsforschung zusammen und theoretisieren somit die ideologische Ausrichtung und Mobilisierungskraft der Landwirtschaftsproteste, die sich nur über ein Zusammendenken von ökonomischen Faktoren, ausdifferenzierten Interessens- und Einstellungsprofilen, Machtungleichheiten und affektiven Dynamiken verstehen lassen.

During the last decades, the politicisation of agriculture has been observed when peasant movements claimed rights to land and food sovereignty. But where did this politicisation come from? I distinguish two types of politicising agriculture: ‘from above’ and ‘from below’. While the latter has received much attention, particularly drawing on La Via Campesina, the former has so far received less spotlight. This is problematic because it relegates ‘politicisation’ to social movements and by that normalises the politicisation of agriculture, which has made their resistance necessary in the first place. I historically situate the transnational smallholder movements that have been politicising issues around food production since the 1980s, particularly in South-east Asia. They have been doing so because, in the decades preceding their activism, Western governments and international organisations politicised the issue to fight communism with the expansion of industrialised agriculture, which they exported in the ‘Green Revolution’. I trace this politicisation ‘from above’ (drawing on the US intervention in Indonesia) and the delayed political responses of peasant movements in Indonesia and beyond.

Large-scale land acquisitions harm small-scale farmers in rural Eastern Germany, increasingly prompting political attention and denunciation of the phenomenon as 'land grabbing'. However, counter-framings are not necessarily progressive and may inadvertently fuel right-wing populist narratives, complicating the fight against neo-liberal restructuring of the countryside. This article explores progressive agrarian collectives' alternative framings in Eastern Germany, examining their interpretations of 'land grabbing'. Amid growing authoritarian populist sentiments in rural areas, a comparative analysis of Arbeitsgemeinschaft Bauerliche Landwirtschaft and Bundnis Junge Landwirtschaft shows different approaches to framing the problem and highlights the importance of holistic, inclusive narratives in countering these challenges.

A growing number of left-wing scholars criticize practices of transnational solidarity. Pointing to the cooptation of “globalism” by neoliberal capitalism, these scholars utilize this critique to advance leftwing nationalism. In this article, I reconstruct symptomatic texts of this genre and identify the critique of (liberal) cosmopolitanism as the common denominator in their calls for nationalizing the Left. As a consequence of their opposition to cosmopolitanism, these authors reject freedom of movement or global justice activism. In order to examine whether the project of transnational solidarity is affected by this critique, I reconstruct its justifications in Critical Theory and postcolonial-feminist theory. Hauke Brunkhorst and Chandra Mohanty exemplarily theorize transnational solidarity in different ways, but each based on a substantial critique of liberal cosmopolitanism. By that, I show that a principled return to nationalism derived from a critique of cosmopolitanism is informed by coincidental evidence that rejects practices of transnational solidarity because of their alleged embeddedness in cosmopolitan reason. Drawing on La Via Campesina, I illustrate principles of a transnational solidarity project that is not justified with liberal cosmopolitan ideas. Their experiences challenge the nationalist/statist critique while not falling back into naïve and/or neoliberal cosmopolitanism.

At the peak of its resistance in 2000, a transnational protest movement against extractive industries managed to pressure World Bank Group President James Wolfensohn to agree to a review of all activities in this sector. Based on interviews with most participants, this chapter reconstructs that review process. Led by the independent ‘eminent person’ Emil Salim, many advocacy groups decided to join and debated with other stakeholders, governments, companies and World Bank Group staff. The resultant review took up many of the critics’ complaints and made progressive recommendations to the World Bank Group. These recommendations were strongly contested inside the institution. The official Management Response took up some of the recommendations but watered-down central recommendations. Surprisingly, the powerful social movement did not react with protest to this weak institutional reaction, despite being very disappointed by the result. During this review, several processes of fragmentation, in accordance with the mechanisms of complex rule, can be found and illustrated, explaining this lack of critical response.

In the transnational realm, it feels awkward to speak of rule because traditionally, IR was built on the distinction of domestic rule and international anarchy. Yet, many global governance theories have acknowledged that various kinds of hierarchy exist beyond the nation state. In liberal approaches, these are frequently justified with the epistemic authority, the ‘knowing better’ of international institutions, which are legitimated by their expertise rather than governing through coercion. This chapter critically discusses these approaches and builds on alternative conceptions of authority, rule, and domination in order to shift the perspective from compliance to resistance. In such a view, rule would hence become visible where resistance takes place. Rule and resistance are understood as a dynamic constellation. Through the latter, we know that the former exists, and can consecutively analyse both through their interaction.

This chapter traces the history of interaction between the Word Bank Group and its critics from the mid-1980s until 2001. Advocacy against the World Bank Group gained in size and depth quickly. Coalescing with what became the Global Justice Movement after 1988, the strength of this movement was its diversity, ranging from hardcore autonomous street-action groups to reform-minded NGOs. The chapter shows how the World Bank Group reacted to this movement, beginning to take seriously the moderate critics and inviting them in from the mid-1990s onwards. Moderates, in turn, started to defend their newly won privileges by distancing themselves from the radicals. Furthermore, ruptures between activists from the Global North and the Global South are traced with the example of the anti-debt campaigns, leading to a fundamentally altered field of critique after the millennium.

This book analyses the fragmentation of a social movement and the rise of a new form of transnational rule. Its question is derived from a transnational activist meeting. The activists have been organizing against capitalist development practices – embodied by the World Bank Group – for over three decades, but nowadays they feel powerless vis a vis the institution. Although they are convinced that development projects are as devastating as ever, they can only dream of the levels of mobilization they brought to the streets during the 1990s. Perplexed by this decline, they ask themselves: ‘The movement is so fragmented. How has that happened?’ The book examines activists’ struggles to sustain their momentum and shows how the opening-up of world economic institutions contributed to complex rule in global governance, creating access for some while weakening their critique and fragmenting the overall social movement. Bridging International Relations and social movement studies, it observes international organizations and social movements in their interaction, demonstrating how social movements are divided and ruled in the absence of a ruler. Zooming into the Extractive Industries Review and the Civil Society Policy Forum, the book reconstructs how this happens through five mechanisms (economization, incorporation, legitimation, professionalization, and regulation) which both constitute complex rule in global governance and keep the social movement in fragmentation.

International Relations (IR) has long been criticized for taking a particular (Western) experience as basis for formulating theories with claim to universal validity. In response, recent discussions have therefore centered on making IR 'truly global', that is, more inclusive and less parochial in its language and substance. But the concept of the global underpinning this discussion is both illusive and strongly contested. It requires problematization. But how? In this Forum, scholars discuss this question with a forward-looking agenda. Building on recent critical engagements with the question of the global as a concept in general and Global IR specifically, the authors ask how the global should be problematized in order to achieve a (more) progressive agenda for IR. They draw on different regional and disciplinary perspectives to both further the agenda of a less exclusive and racist discipline without falling into the trap of shallow inclusivity, and to discuss ways of problematizing the global without falling back into nativism or nationalism.

This chapter introduces an understanding of rule derived from the experiences of the its critics. Based on Boltanski, it theorizes that rule always has the effect of fragmenting critique. In comparison to ‘simple rule’ which works through oppression in order to crush critique, complex rule is more difficult to detect and grants more room for opposition. Critique is legitimate within complex rule, as long as it is expressed in a specific form. This abstract hypothesis is then developed for the historical constellation of open global governance. In dialogue with a number of critical theories, three dimensions of complex rule in global governance are suggested: an ideological dimension; a discursive dimension, and an organizational dimension.