There is an urgent need for scalable mental health interventions, particularly for workers in under-resourced settings who experience high stress and limited access to mental health resources. One promising approach is empowering workers’ emotion regulation skills. This study evaluates a brief, cost-effective, and scalable intervention that teaches reappraisal—an emotion regulation strategy that alters how individuals interpret challenging situations. Despite its potential, the long-term effectiveness of reappraisal in workplace contexts remains uncertain. We tested this intervention among early education workers in a non-profit organization serving low-income families—one of the most underpaid and stressful professions in the U.S. Study 1 (n = 1,967), a pre-registered field survey, found positive correlations between reappraisal use, emotional well-being, and job performance. Study 2, a pre-registered longitudinal field experiment (n = 4,054), found lasting improvements in some emotional well-being and workplace outcomes from the reappraisal intervention (vs. active control) six months later, including reduced stress, a greater sense of control over stressors, more frequent action-taking to solve problems, increased self-reported job performance, and stronger intentions to stay in the current organization. Furthermore, reappraisal engagement during the intervention significantly mediated these effects. These studies advance understanding of emotion regulation’s effectiveness, durability, and mechanisms in real-world settings, providing a scalable solution to improve well-being in high-stress professions. This research also provides a template for tailoring emotion regulation interventions to novel contexts and extending their benefits to diverse populations.

There is an urgent need for scalable mental health interventions, particularly for workers in under-resourced settings who experience high stress and limited access to mental health resources. One promising approach is enhancing workers’ emotion regulation skills. Although previous literature suggests promise, the long-term effectiveness of this approach is unknown. The present study evaluated a scalable intervention that taught reappraisal—an emotion regulation strategy that alters how individuals interpret challenging situations. We tested this intervention nationwide among low- and middle-income workers (e.g., drivers, teachers, food service workers) in early education, one of the most stressful and under-resourced sectors in the United States. Study 1 (n = 1,967), a pre-registered field survey, found positive correlations among reappraisal use, emotional well-being, and job performance. Study 2, a pre-registered longitudinal field experiment (n = 4,054), found lasting improvements in some emotional well-being and workplace outcomes (e.g., job performance, quit intentions, and impatient decision-making) from the reappraisal intervention (vs. active control) six months later. These studies provide the first evidence of reappraisal’s durable effects over time in the workplace, establishing it as a scalable and enduring strategy for improving worker well-being and performance across diverse occupational settings.

We review major theories of emotion and decision making, concentrating on developments within the disciplines of psychology, economics, and decision science. These theories naturally cluster into two sets of theories – one set that views emotional valence (i.e., positivity versus negativity) as the primary factor for predicting decision outcomes and a second set of theories that views valence as one of multiple factors for making predictions. Often known as “emotion-specific models,” theories in this latter set propose, for example, that emotions of the same valence can have opposing (rather than similar) effects on certain decisions. After describing strengths and weaknesses of each set, we proceed to review the Emotion-Imbued Choice model (EIC) -- a unified, meta-level model of emotion and decision making. We close by noting the accelerating pace of important developments in understanding emotion and decision making as well as by noting promising future directions.

Meta-analyses have concluded that positive emotions do not reduce appetitive risk behaviors (risky behaviors that fulfill appetitive or craving states, such as smoking and excessive alcohol use). We propose that this conclusion is premature. Drawing on the Appraisal Tendency Framework and related theories of emotion and decision-making, we hypothesized that gratitude (a positive emotion) can decrease cigarette smoking, a leading cause of premature death globally. A series of multimethod studies provided evidence supporting our hypothesis (collective N = 34,222). Using nationally representative US samples and an international sample drawn from 87 countries, Studies 1 and 2 revealed that gratitude was inversely associated with likelihood of smoking, even after accounting for numerous covariates. Other positive emotions (e.g., compassion) lacked such consistent associations, as expected. Study 3, and its replication, provided further support for emotion specificity: Experimental induction of gratitude, unlike compassion or sadness, reduced cigarette craving compared to a neutral state. Study 4, and its replication, showed that inducing gratitude causally increased smoking cessation behavior, as evidenced by enrollment in a web-based cessation intervention. Self-reported gratitude mediated the effects in both experimental studies. Finally, Study 5 found that current antismoking messaging campaigns by the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention primarily evoked sadness and compassion, but seldom gratitude. Together, our studies advance understanding of positive emotion effects on appetitive risk behaviors; they also offer practical implications for the design of public health campaigns.

Patients with obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD) present as risk-averse and avoidant of feared stimuli, yet the literature examining risk aversion in OCD is conflicting. One possible explanation is that patients may exhibit aversion only on ambiguous tasks where the likelihood of possible outcomes is unknown. To test this idea, the current study assigned 30 patients with OCD versus 30 non-psychiatric controls (NPC) to conditions of known versus unknown risk (i.e., probabilities) on the Beads Task. Importantly, the task involved real financial stakes. We also examined self-reported intolerance of uncertainty (IU) as a mechanism. Results revealed a significant risk information x group interaction for certainty about the decision. Specifically, while NPCs felt significantly less certain on the unknown risk (versus known risk) task, the OCD group felt uncertain regardless of risk information. Results also revealed a significant main effect of group for distress after deciding, such that the OCD group was more distressed across all task versions compared to NPCs. Elevated trait IU was associated with higher task-related distress. Results indicate that even when patients with OCD are given information about likelihoods, they still feel uncertain and experience distress. Findings have clinical implications for addressing risk aversion and ambiguity/uncertainty in treatment.

Though past research suggests that individuals grapple with negative emotions when dealing with their own and others’ bad (dishonest) behaviors, this symposium explores a different proposition, one where actors feel good for bad deeds in ways that explain why actors and their dishonest collaborators might find extensive support in organizational context. Across a series of studies, the papers in our symposium show that individuals feel pride and gratitude for dishonesty, explaining their motivation to engage in and support dishonesty. Additionally, we find that they are able to reconcile such feelings if they embrace the paradox of feeling bad and good at the same time. Together this research explores the emotional antecedents, consequences, and moderators of positive reactions to dishonesty, providing a more nuanced view as to why dishonesty persists in many organizational contexts. Proud to be Guilty - Emotional Implications of Egoistic vs. Altruistic Dishonesty Author: Shaked Shuster; Ben Gurion U. of the Negev Author: Tal Eyal; Ben Gurion U. of the Negev Author: Shahar Ayal; Reichman U. (IDC) Author: Simone Moran; Ben Gurion U. of the Negev I am Dishonest and I Know it! Paradox Mindset and Self-Concept Author: Eriselda Danaj; IESE Business School Partners in Crime: Gratitude Increases Corrupt Collaboration Author: Ke Wang; Harvard Kennedy School Author: Molly Moore; Harvard Kennedy School Author: Jennifer Lerner; Harvard Kennedy School Being Good and Doing Bad: How Occupational Stereotypes Influence Gratitude for Prosocial Dishonesty Author: S Wiley Wakeman; Stockholm School of Economics Author: Megan Chan; Stockholm School of Economics Author: Nora Hansson Bittar; Stockholm School of Economics Author: Ning Xu; Stockholm School of Economics

The COVID-19 pandemic (and its aftermath) highlights a critical need to communicate health information effectively to the global public. Given that subtle differences in information framing can have meaningful effects on behavior, behavioral science research highlights a pressing question: Is it more effective to frame COVID-19 health messages in terms of potential losses (e.g., “If you do not practice these steps, you can endanger yourself and others”) or potential gains (e.g., “If you practice these steps, you can protect yourself and others”)? Collecting data in 48 languages from 15,929 participants in 84 countries, we experimentally tested the effects of message framing on COVID-19-related judgments, intentions, and feelings. Loss- (vs. gain-) framed messages increased self-reported anxiety among participants cross-nationally with little-to-no impact on policy attitudes, behavioral intentions, or information seeking relevant to pandemic risks. These results were consistent across 84 countries, three variations of the message framing wording, and 560 data processing and analytic choices. Thus, results provide an empirical answer to a global communication question and highlight the emotional toll of loss-framed messages. Critically, this work demonstrates the importance of considering unintended affective consequences when evaluating nudge-style interventions.

Research over the past decades has demonstrated the explanatory power of emotions, feelings, motivations, moods, and other affective processes when trying to understand and predict how we think and behave. In this consensus article, we ask: has the increasingly recognized impact of affective phenomena ushered in a new era, the era of affectivism?

Escalation of commitment-the tendency to remain committed to a course of action, often despite negative prospects-is common. Why does it persist? Across three preregistered experiments (N = 3,888), we tested the hypothesis that escalating commitment signals trustworthiness. Experiments 1-2, respectively, revealed that decision makers who escalated commitment were perceived as more trustworthy and entrusted with 29% more money by third-party observers. Experiment 3 revealed that decision makers who escalated commitment subsequently made more trustworthy choices, returning 15% more money than those who de-escalated. Decision makers were equally likely to escalate commitment in public versus in private, possibly because they previously internalized how others would evaluate them. Complementing research examining cognitive factors driving escalation of commitment, the present work reveals that accounting for the reputational causes and consequences of decisions to escalate enhances understanding of why escalation is so common and suggests how organizations might reduce it. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

The COVID-19 pandemic has increased negative emotions and decreased positive emotions globally. Left unchecked, these emotional changes might have a wide array of adverse impacts. To reduce negative emotions and increase positive emotions, we tested the effectiveness of reappraisal, an emotion-regulation strategy that modifies how one thinks about a situation. Participants from 87 countries and regions (n = 21,644) were randomly assigned to one of two brief reappraisal interventions (reconstrual or repurposing) or one of two control conditions (active or passive). Results revealed that both reappraisal interventions (vesus both control conditions) consistently reduced negative emotions and increased positive emotions across different measures. Reconstrual and repurposing interventions had similar effects. Importantly, planned exploratory analyses indicated that reappraisal interventions did not reduce intentions to practice preventive health behaviours. The findings demonstrate the viability of creating scalable, low-cost interventions for use around the world. The stage 1 protocol for this Registered Report was accepted in principle on 12 May 2020. The protocol, as accepted by the journal, can be found at https://doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.c.4878591.v1 This Registered Report presents evidence from 87 countries and regions showing that brief emotion-regulation interventions consistently reduced negative emotions and increased positive emotions during the COVID-19 pandemic.

Objective: Appetitive risk behaviors (ARB), including tobacco use, alcohol consumption, consumption of calorie dense/nutrient-poor foods, and sexual risk behavior contribute substantially to morbidity and mortality. Affective states that arise from a wide array of unrelated circumstances (i.e., incidental affect) may carry over to influence ARB. A meta-analysis is needed to systematically examine causal evidence for the role of incidental affect (including specific emotions) in influencing ARB. Method: Integrating effect sizes from 91 published and unpublished experimental studies that include both an incidental-affect induction and neutral-control condition (k = 271 effect sizes: k = 183 negative affect, k = 78 positive affect), this meta-analysis examines how negative and positive affective states influenced ARB and related health cognitions (e.g., intentions, evaluations, craving, perceived control). Results: Negative affective states reliably increased ARB, in analyses where all negative affective states were analyzed (d = .29) and in stratified analyses of just negative mood (d = .30) and stress (d = .48). These effects were stronger among study populations coded as clinically at risk. Positive affective states generally did not influence ARB or related health cognitions, except in the presence of a craving cue. Design issues of extant literature largely precluded conclusions about the effects of specific positive and negative affective states. Conclusion: Taken together, findings suggest the importance of strategies to attenuate negative affect incidental to ARB to facilitate healthier behavioral patterns, especially among clinically at-risk individuals.

Do negative feelings in general trigger addictive behavior, or do specific emotions play a stronger role? Testing these alternative accounts of emotion and decision making, we drew on the Appraisal Tendency Framework to predict that sadness, specifically, rather than negative mood, generally, would 1) increase craving, impatience, and actual addictive substance use and 2) do so through mechanisms selectively heightened by sadness. Using a nationally representative, longitudinal survey, study 1 (n = 10,685) revealed that sadness, but not other negative emotions (i.e., fear, anger, shame), reliably predicted current smoking as well as relapsing 20 years later. Study 2 (n = 425) used an experimental design, and found further support for emotion specificity: Sadness, but not disgust, increased self-reported craving relative to a neutral state. Studies 3 and 4 (n = 918) introduced choice behavior as outcome variables, revealing that sadness causally increased impatience for cigarette puffs. Moreover, study 4 revealed that the effect of sadness on impatience was more fully explained by concomitant appraisals of self-focus, which are specific to sadness, than by concomitant appraisals of negative valence, which are general to all negative emotions. Importantly, study 4 also examined the topography of actual smoking behavior, finding that experimentally induced sadness (as compared to neutral emotion) causally increased the volume and duration of cigarette puffs inhaled. Together, the present studies provide support for a more nuanced model regarding the effects of emotion on tobacco use, in particular, as well as on addictive behavior, in general.

Abstract Context Being diagnosed with cancer often forces patients and families to make difficult medical decisions. How patients think they and others will feel in the future, termed affective predictions, may influence these decisions. These affective predictions are often biased, which may contribute to suboptimal care outcomes by influencing decisions related to palliative care and advance care planning. Objectives This study aimed to translate perspectives from the decision sciences to inform future research about when and how affective predictions may influence decisions about palliative care and advance care planning. Methods A systematic search of two databases to evaluate the extent to which affective predictions have been examined in the palliative care and advance care planning context yielded 35 relevant articles. Over half utilized qualitative methodologies ( n  = 21). Most studies were conducted in the U.S. ( n  = 12), Canada ( n  = 7), or European countries ( n  = 10). Study contexts included end of life ( n  = 10), early treatment decisions ( n  = 10), pain and symptom management ( n  = 7), and patient-provider communication ( n  = 6). The affective processes of patients ( n  = 20), caregivers ( n  = 16), and/or providers ( n  = 12) were examined. Results Three features of the palliative care and advance care planning context may contribute to biased affective predictions: 1) early treatment decisions are made under heightened emotional states and with insufficient information; 2) palliative care decisions influence life domains beyond physical health; and 3) palliative care decisions involve multiple people. Conclusion Biases in affective predictions may serve as a barrier to optimal palliative care delivery. Predictions are complicated by intense emotions, inadequate prognostic information, involvement of many individuals, and canceru0027s effect on non–health life domains. Applying decision science frameworks may generate insights about affective predictions that can be harnessed to solve challenges associated with optimal delivery of palliative care.

I share my story knowing that I stand on the shoulders of giants. Many researchers of judgment and decision making ( JDM) have also worked in a dedicated way with government agencies on problems of human security, broadly defined. To name but a few, Baruch Fischhoff, Danny Kahneman, Elke Weber, Paul Slovic, Ellen Peters, Eric Johnson, Craig Fox, Barb Mellers, Phil Tetlock, Carey Morewedge, and undoubtedly others have all worked with federal government agencies on matters that affect human security. That said, it is an especially exciting time in the field of decision science (otherwise known as JDM). The general public is increasingly recognizing that, in order to thrive in such areas as medicine, finance, and national security, we need to make smart decisions—and that decision science, as a field, can help us do just that.1 Coincidentally, the day I began writing this, I had just finished a video call with the U.S. Chief of Naval Operations (CNO). The CNO is the most senior military (i.e., noncivilian) officer in the Navy; he serves as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and is a military adviser to the National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, the Secretary of Defense, and the U.S. President. Our call focused on ways I might increase my involvement advising Navy leadership. Many weeks later, as I write the final revision of this document, I have accepted a 1-year assignment within the Pentagon. Specifically, I serve as the Navy’s first Chief Decision Scientist and as Special Advisor to the Chief of Naval Operations. Through a useful law known as the Intergovernmental Personnel Act, organizations in the federal government can, among other possibilities, “buy out” a portion (or all) of a faculty member’s time for a specified time frame. In my case, I retain my position at Harvard but devote approximately half of my time to the Navy.2 My job description includes such objectives as increasing the use of evidence-based decision making within the Navy and increasing the use of experimentation (i.e., scientific method) to increase organizational learning and operational effectiveness. A smaller set of specific objectives in this position needs to remain undisclosed, at least for now. Readers may wonder how all this came about. Working at the Pentagon or in national security was not a specific goal I set for myself. Rather, at each stage of my career, I have merely been excited by opportunities to improve human judgment and decision making, especially decisions made for the common good. Moreover, I have gravitated toward decision domains characterized by small margins for error and high stakes, such as in health/medicine, finance, and especially national security—three areas in which I have concentrated my applied efforts. Corny though it may seem, I draw inspiration from John F. Kennedy’s inaugural address, which also happens to be the motto for the Harvard Kennedy School: “Ask not what your country can do for you—ask what you can do for your country.” I came by this conviction naturally, growing up in a patriotic, liberal-activist household. My parents believed deeply in—and experienced for themselves—the power of democracy to create equality of opportunity. The children of immigrants, they themselves grew up one generation away from living under oppressive regimes. About the time I learned to read, my parents put me to work leafletting for their candidates and causes. It seemed normal to me to carry a clipboard and petitions around my neighborhood, normal to help my parents set up for near-nightly committee meetings, and normal for me to serve as a U.S. congressional intern in Democratic Representative Barney Frank’s office while I was still in high school. 815822 PPSXXX10.1177/1745691618815822LernerDecision Science Meets National Security research-article2018

Context: Being diagnosed with cancer often forces patients and families to make difficult medical decisions. How patients think they and others will feel in the future, termed affective predictions, may influence these decisions. These affective predictions are often biased, which may contribute to suboptimal care outcomes by influencing decisions related to palliative care and advance care planning.Objectives: This paper aims to translate perspectives from the decision sciences to inform future research about when and how affective predictions may influence decisions about palliative care and advance care planning.Methods: A systematic search of two databases to evaluate the extent to which affective predictions have been examined in the palliative care and advance care planning context yielded 35 relevant articles. Over half utilized qualitative methodologies (n= 21). Most studies were conducted in the United States (n= 12), Canada (n= 7) or European countries (n= 10). Study contexts included: EOL (n= 10), early treatment decisions (n= 10), pain and symptom management (n= 7), and patientprovider communication (n= 6). The affective processes of patients (n= 20), caregivers (n= 16), and/or providers (n= 12) were examined.Results: Three features of the PC and ACP context may contribute to biased affective predictions: 1) early treatment decisions are made under heightened emotional states and with insufficient information; 2) palliative care decisions influence life domains beyond physical health; and 3) palliative care decisions involve multiple people. Conclusion: Biases in affective predictions may serve as a barrier to optimal palliative …

Sadness increases how much decision makers pay to acquire goods, even when decision makers are unaware of it. This effect is coined the "misery-is-not-miserly effect". The paper that first established this effect is the second most-cited article appearing in Psychological Science in 2004. In light of its impact, the present study sought to assess whether the misery-is-not-miserly effect would replicate (a) in a novel context and (b) even when another way of alleviating a sense of loss (i.e., compensatory consumption) was available. Results revealed that the effect replicated in the novel context and, despite a prediction otherwise, even when individuals had an opportunity to engage in compensatory consumption. Moreover, a meta-analysis of the original effect and that observed in the present study yielded a small-to-medium effect (Cohen's d = 0.43). As such, the present study lends evidentiary support to the misery-is-not-miserly effect and provides impetus for future research exploring the impact of sadness on consumer decision-making, specifically, and of emotion on decision processes, more generally.