This article examines the adequacy of EU copyright law in addressing the unauthorized dissemination of live sporting events, with particular focus on the audiovisual exploitation of football. It advances two principal arguments. First, despite the absence of copyright protection for sporting events as such, EU intellectual property law provides a comprehensive framework for the protection of their audiovisual exploitation. Secondly, recent developments in enforcement practices, while enhancing effectiveness, give rise to significant risks, notably in relation to proportionality and the increasing privatization of enforcement. The analysis begins by clarifying the scope of protection under EU law. While sporting events as such do not qualify as “works”, the activities carried in their audiovisual exploitation allow undertakings in the sector to enjoy erga omnes protection. The article then examines key enforcement mechanisms, focusing on dynamic blocking injunctions and the liability regime under Article 17 of the CDSM Directive. Both are shown to be adapted to the technological environment of online piracy and capable of achieving a meaningful degree of effectiveness. However, the implementation of these mechanisms raises concerns regarding overblocking, the burden placed on intermediaries, and the extension of obligations to new categories of service providers, such as Content Delivery Networks (CDNs) and Virtual Private Networks (VPNs). These developments call into question whether a fair balance between competing fundamental rights is consistently maintained. Finally, the article highlights the growing trend towards the privatization of enforcement. While partly driven by the practical demands of combating online piracy, this development raises concerns where it results in insufficient transparency, limited accountability, and inadequate safeguards for fundamental rights. Effectiveness in enforcement cannot justify a lowering of these standards. The article therefore concludes that, although the current framework is capable of reducing infringement, its continued evolution must be critically assessed to ensure that the protection of intellectual property does not come at the expense of proportionality, legal certainty, and fundamental rights.

The reference in Like Company v Google (Case C-250/25) is seen as a potential landmark case, giving the EU’s highest court the opportunity to define the scope and conditions of permitted artificial intelligence (AI) training and develop an infringement test for AI outputs. The European Copyright Society (ECS) urges the Court of Justice (sitting as a Grand Chamber) to exercise caution. While the reference stems from a plausible complaint by a press publisher against the provider of an AI powered chatbot reproducing and communicating its editorial content, the implications of this problematic reference could be far-reaching. Specifically, the reference conflates questions relating to the training phase (Questions 2 and 3) with the legal characterisation of the use of press publications by an LLM-based chatbot (Question 4 but also Question 1, referring to the right of communication to the public and the right of reproduction under Directive 2001/29/EC, hereinafter the InfoSoc Directive). If the reference is found admissible, it is suggested that the Court of Justice should address jointly Questions 4 and 1, which relate to the legal characterisation of the use of press publications in the display. Here it is important to correctly understand next-token prediction in large language models, augmented retrieval technology (where the use of data does not generally form part of the learning process) as well as “online use”, defining the scope of the press publishers’ right under Art. 15 of the CDSMD. In the opinion of the ECS, the ambiguous characterisation of a fast-moving technology may result in the failure to realise the societal benefits of AI as a potential general-purpose technology. There are risks that a rash decision will push Europe towards a licensing economy in which AI systems are offered as a service by (non-European) multinationals, without solving issues of equity such as creator consent and distribution of revenues.

The advent of digital technologies and connected patterns of production and consumption has progressively displaced ownership in favour of access as the predominant mode of enjoyment of works of authorship and other information goods. This transition from acquiring physical copies to subscribing to digital services has become prevalent across various sectors and has even enabled new commercial, cultural and scientific practices. However, it also marks a major shift in the theory and function of copyright: it transforms a right primarily concerned with regulating certain exploitations and circulations of works into one capable of controlling individual acts of access and use. EU copyright law increasingly reflects this shift through conditions of lawfulness. These appear across the acquis in different forms: the “lawful acquirer” in the Software Directive, the “lawful user” in the Database Directive, “lawful use” and “lawful source” in the Information Society Directive and CJEU case law, and “lawful access” in the Text and Data Mining (TDM) provisions of the Copyright in the Digital Single Market Directive (CDSMD). These expressions are not merely terminological variants. They perform a boundary-setting function by determining when exceptions and limitations may be relied upon, and therefore when certain acts may take place without right holders’ authorization. The principal risk, surfaced in decisions such as ACI Adam or VOB, is that lawful access, lawful use or lawful source might be equated with right holders’ authorization. An interpretation of this kind would undermine the nature and function of exceptions and limitations. Since an exception presupposes that authorization is not required, making authorization the sole condition of lawfulness would create circularity and deprive exceptions of practical effect. At the same time, lawfulness cannot be understood as an unlimited permission to access or use protected works. It must operate within identifiable legal boundaries, including effective technological protection measures, valid and enforceable contractual restrictions where not overridden by mandatory law, and other legally binding limits. Its application must also be guided by contextual principles, including the meaning of content “freely available online”, the knowledge and role of the user, the purpose and commercial or non-commercial character of the activity, the applicable fundamental rights framework, and the three-step test.

This paper examines the complex relationship between generative artificial intelligence (AI) and European copyright law, with a particular focus on the recently adopted EU AI Act and its potential extraterritorial effect. The paper begins by mapping key copyright challenges across the AI lifecycle, from the use of copyrighted training data to the status of AI-generated outputs. The paper then provides a detailed examination of the AI Act’s copyright-related provisions, including obligations for general-purpose AI (GPAI) providers, the interaction with the text-and-data mining (TDM) exceptions in the CDSM Directive, and the legal uncertainties surrounding copyright opt-outs. A core focus of the paper is examining the potential extraterritorial reach of the AI Act, exploring whether and how EU copyright compliance obligations may extend to AI model training conducted outside the EU. The paper concludes by highlighting unresolved tensions between copyright’s territoriality principle and conflict of laws rules, on the one hand, and the global nature of AI development, on the other, stressing the need for legal clarity and a balanced approach that ensures both innovation and fair remuneration for creators.

This paper provides a critical analysis of the Artificial Intelligence (AI) Act's implications for the European Union (EU) copyright acquis, aiming to clarify the complex relationship between AI regulation and copyright law while identifying areas of legal ambiguity and gaps that may influence future policymaking. The discussion begins with an overview of fundamental copyright concerns related to generative AI, focusing on issues that arise during the input, model, and output stages, and how these concerns intersect with the text and data mining (TDM) exceptions under the Copyright in the Digital Single Market Directive (CDSMD). The paper then explores the AI Act's structure and key definitions relevant to copyright law. The core analysis addresses the AI Act's impact on copyright, including the role of TDM in AI model training, the copyright obligations imposed by the Act, requirements for respecting copyright law-particularly TDM opt-outs-and the extraterritorial implications of these provisions. It also examines transparency obligations, compliance mechanisms, and the enforcement framework. The paper further critiques the current regime's inadequacies, particularly concerning the fair remuneration of creators, and evaluates potential improvements such as collective licensing and bargaining. It also assesses legislative reform proposals, such as statutory licensing and AI output levies, and concludes with reflections on future directions for integrating AI governance with copyright protection.

During the legislative process, the EU Artificial Intelligence (AI) Act was amended to include provisions related to general-purpose AI (GPAI) models. These broadly relate to transparency towards downstream users and relevant regulators, in addition to obligations connected to intellectual property. In this paper, we provide detailed analysis of these new provisions in the context of current technological applications and emerging trajectories, connecting them to computing literature and practice, and the broader context of connected and adjacent legal regimes, in particular copyright and relevant emerging case law. We find that there are a significant number of inclarities, tensions and contradictions both within the text, between the text and other legal regimes, and between the text and guideline documents, such as the Code of Practice on General-Purpose AI and recent guidelines by the European Commission. We identify a range of issues with the scoping of the provisions which may undermine its policy goals and create loopholes for regulatory avoidance, such as those relating to non-commercial models, open-source models, and model finetuning along the value chain. We find that the Code of Practice contains significant omissions and misstatements, some of which may present a compliance risk for an entity choosing to rely on the Code. We do not consider the provisions on GPAI models which present a systemic risk, which are dealt with elsewhere in the volume which this work will form a part of.

This Opinion describes and summarises the results of the interdisciplinary research carried out by the authors during the course of a three-year project on intermediaries’ practices regarding copyright content moderation. This research includes the mapping of the EU legal framework and intermediaries’ practices regarding copyright content moderation, the evaluation and measuring of the impact of moderation practices and technologies on access and diversity, and a set of policy recommendations. Our recommendations touch on the following topics: the definition of “online content-sharing service provider”; the recognition and operationalisation of user rights; the complementary nature of complaint and redress safeguards; the scope of permissible preventive filtering; the clarification of the relationship between Art. 17 of the new Copyright Directive and the Digital Services Act; monetisation and restrictive content moderation actions; recommender systems and copyright content moderation; transparency and data access for researchers; trade secret protection and transparency of content moderation systems; the relationship between the copyright acquis , the Digital Services Act and the upcoming Artificial Intelligence Act; and human competences in copyright content moderation.

The Berne Convention underscores the national treatment of foreign authors, allowing countries of the Union to protect designs through various means. Article 2(7) of the Convention (Berne) introduces a material reciprocity test, limiting copyright protection for works of applied art not protected in their country of origin. The Kwantum case (C-227/23), involving a dispute over a work of design or applied art, questions the application of the reciprocity test in the light of harmonised copyright law and the decision by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in RAAP (C-265/19). The Dutch Supreme Court seeks clarity on whether EU law mandates a copyright limitation through reciprocity, especially for non-EU right holders. In EU law, the Design Directive and Design Regulation govern the relationship between copyright and design protection for works of applied art. Both instruments stress the possibility of the cumulation of rights, allowing registered designs to qualify for copyright protection. Judicial harmonisation, notably in Cofemel (C-683/17) and Brompton Bicycle (C-833/18), extended the originality requirements to all works – including works of applied art – and thus limited EU Member States’ autonomy. The proposed Design Directive and Design Regulation maintain the cumulation principle, aligning with CJEU case-law on originality. In this Opinion, the European Copyright Society (ECS) does not make any pronouncement on the desirability of cumulation. On the topic of material reciprocity, the CJEU ruled in RAAP that Art. 8(2) of the Rental and Lending Directive (RLD) prohibited a Member State from excluding non-EEA performers from equitable remuneration for communication to the public of their recordings. The Court clarified that limitations to this right could be introduced only by the EU legislature and had to comply with Art. 52(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (CFREU). Any limitation had to be clearly defined by law. The Court emphasised that any exclusion of non-EEA right holders from remuneration must be explicit, as the right fell within the fundamental right to intellectual property of Art. 17(2) CFREU. Additionally, the Court stated that Art. 8(2) RLD should not be interpreted as granting a remuneration right solely to the phonogram producer and excluding the performer who contributed to the phonogram. The ECS criticised the potential wider implications of RAAP, proposing an alternative interpretation of the remuneration right under Art. 4(2) of the WIPO Performance and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT), suggesting that it should apply only to performers towards whom a direct and unreserved obligation existed on the basis of the WPPT. The ECS also criticised the Court’s reliance on the CFREU, particularly insofar as the Court viewed harmonised rights as abstract rather than individual, thus creating uncertainty about limitations. The Court’s conclusion that only the EU legislature could limit the right for nationals of non-EU states raises concerns about the application of material reciprocity by Member States in the past, and the retroactive effects of the interpretation remain unclear, contributing to legal uncertainty. In RAAP, the CJEU interpreted the WPPT, emphasising compliance with TRIPS and the Berne Convention’s core provisions in EU law. The Court stressed that material reciprocity had to be explicit in statutory law, with only the EU legislature defining limitations under harmonised rules such as Art. 8(2) RLD. However, EU design legislation grants Member States autonomy despite harmonised concepts established in cases like Cofemel and Brompton Bicycle. Unlike in RAAP, the CJEU may have more flexibility in interpreting EU copyright law for applied art in the Kwantum case. Precedents like Cofemel and Brompton Bicycle allow the Court to interpret material reciprocity under Art. 2(7) Berne without legislative intervention. Two alternatives for the Court are to interpret Art. 2(7) as mandating material reciprocity, preventing internal market issues, or to declare Member States’ application compatible with EU law, whether they apply material reciprocity or offer unreserved national treatment to works of applied art on the basis of Art. 19 Berne. Comparing RAAP and Kwantum, material reciprocity differs under Art. 4(2) WPPT and Art. 2(7) Berne. RAAP dealt with a conditional exception, while Art. 2(7) Berne is a mandatory rule, implying that countries of the Union must deny copyright protection to works protected solely as designs and models in their country of origin. While countries can choose to set aside material reciprocity under Art. 19 Berne, if the CJEU views Art. 2(7) Berne as limiting copyright as an intellectual property right under Art. 17(2) CFREU, the requirements in Art. 52(1) CFREU are already fulfilled without legislative intervention. Applying these considerations to the Kwantum case, it is noted that Dutch law provides no more protection than Art. 2(7) Berne. Given Art. 2(7)’s precedence over domestic law in the Dutch legal order, Dutch courts must apply the material reciprocity clause unless EU law dictates otherwise. In our view, the CJEU could either recognise material reciprocity as a requirement of EU law or declare Member State rules that mirror Berne’s reciprocity clause to be compatible with EU law. In conclusion, Kwantum reflects the uncertainty stemming from RAAP. The ECS advocates for a nuanced approach to the international application of EU copyright and related rights, giving due consideration to the regulations of international conventions as part of the EU legal order. In the case of copyright protection of works of applied art, the CJEU could, as a first step, either apply the reciprocity rule set out in Art. 2(7) Berne directly, or leave it to the Member States to decide on material reciprocity or national treatment, in accordance with the principles of the Berne Convention. As a second step, the EU legislature would be well advised to address the questions raised by RAAP and Kwantum at a more fundamental level through legislative intervention.

The exhilaration and enthusiasm which followed the passing of the Digital Services Act (DSA) is long over. No matter one’s perspective on the DSA, it seems clear that the party is over and the work begins. One of the perhaps oddest provisions of the DSA is Article 21. It calls for the creation of private quasi-courts that are supposed to adjudicate content moderation disputes. User Rights, based in Berlin, is one of the first organisations to assume this role.

This chapter offers a reflection on the topic of content moderation and bias mitigation measures in copyright law. It explores the possible links between conditional data access regimes and content moderation performed through data-intensive technologies such as fingerprinting and machine learning algorithms. In recent years, various pressing questions surrounding automated decision-making and their legal implications materialised. In European Union (EU) law, answers were provided through different regulatory interventions often based on specific legal categories, rights, and foundations contributing to the increasing complexity of interacting frameworks. Within this broader background, the chapter discusses whether current EU copyright rules may have the effect of favouring what we call the propagation of bias present in input data to the output algorithmic tools employed for content moderation. The chapter shows that a reduced availability and transparency of training data often leads to negative effects on access, verification and replication of results. These are ideal conditions for the development of bias and other types of systematic errors to the detriment of users' rights. The chapter discusses a number of options that could be employed to mitigate this undesirable effect and contextually preserve the many fundamental rights at stake.

The exhilaration and enthusiasm which followed the passing of the Digital Services Act (DSA) is long over. No matter one’s perspective on the DSA, it seems clear that the party is over and the work begins. One of the perhaps oddest provisions of the DSA is Article 21. It calls for the creation of private quasi-courts that are supposed to adjudicate content moderation disputes. User Rights, based in Berlin, is one of the first organisations to assume this role.

On 17 February 2024, the Digital Services Act (DSA) became fully applicable in Europe. The DSA's new approach fundamentally reshapes the regulation and liability of platforms in Europe, and promises to have a significant impact in other jurisdictions, like the US, where there are persistent calls for legislative interventions to reign in the power of Big Tech. This symposium brings together a group of renowned European and American scholars to carry an academic transatlantic dialogue on the potential benefits and risks of the EU’s new approach.

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