In this study, we explore how investors react to incidents of CEO sociopolitical activism. Drawing from the business case logic and political psychology literature, we theorize that the perceived relevance and ideology of CEO comments, as well as the institutional context in which they were made determine investor reactions. Our analysis of 379 CEO comments made between 2007-2020 indicates that investors react positively to CEOs' political comments and negatively to sociocultural ones. Specifically, political comments are received favorably by investors if they are conservative-leaning, and this is especially true when made by CEOs of firms with greater government dependence or those operating in highly regulated industries. Conversely, investors react negatively to social comments made by CEOs of highly regulated firms. Overall, this study addresses recent calls for research on the expanding role of executives by highlighting the complex reactions CEO sociopolitical activism engenders among capital market stakeholders.

ABSTRACTResearch Question/IssueCEO sociopolitical activism seems to be on the rise in response to prominent social movements around social justice (e.g., Black Lives Matter), gender equality (e.g., #MeToo movement), and climate change (e.g., People's Climate Movement), to name a few. Engaging in such activism could be risky for executives, given its potential to appease some stakeholders while alienating others. This begs the question: Why do some CEOs become sociopolitical activists while others remain on the “sidelines”? This study addresses this question by exploring the notion of the executive “bully pulpit” and how CEOs leverage their status and reputation to publicly engage in sociopolitical activism.Research Findings/InsightsDrawing from the status and reputation literature, we explore the effect of CEO power, CEO celebrity status, and firm reputation as predictors of CEO sociopolitical activism. In doing so, we focus on the “bully pulpit” explanation by arguing that powerful, high‐status CEOs and those who lead firms with good reputations are more likely to use their professional position and visibility to advocate for or against controversial sociopolitical issues. Our analysis of CEO sociopolitical activism data from 246 matched‐pair S&P 500 firms from 2007 to 2020 largely supports our arguments, though we find there is an important interaction between firm reputation and both CEO power and celebrity.Theoretical/Academic ImplicationsThis study extends current research insights by highlighting how power, status, and reputation at the CEO and firm levels create a formidable platform (a “bully pulpit”) from which executive sociopolitical activism is exercised. Given its nascent nature, scholars are just beginning to empirically explore the consequences of CEO sociopolitical activism. This study contributes to ongoing work in this area by providing empirical evidence on the nature and drivers of CEO sociopolitical activism.Practitioner/Policy ImplicationsFirms seeking to play a more proactive role in contemporary sociopolitical issues need to consider hiring high‐profile CEOs. Additionally, highly reputed firms are well‐positioned to support their CEOs' efforts in influencing societal debates on controversial issues.

Based on a sample of firms in the S&P 1500 index covering the years 1993 to 2016, we find that firms with Republican CEOs spend less on R&D compared to their Democratic counterparts. However, Republican CEOs ratchet up their R&D spending when a Republican is in the Oval Office. Furthermore, we find that R&D spending is negatively related to return on assets (ROA), which is indicative of the risky nature of R&D spending, but R&D is positively related to Tobin Q, a longer-term performance measure. As a consequence, when Republican CEOs manage under a Republican president, the effect of accelerated R&D spending is to send ROA lower, owing to the short-term negative effect of R&D spending. Additionally, due to overspending on R&D by Republican CEOs under a Republican president, the generally positive effect of R&D on Tobin Q is weakened. It seems social capital has its dark side as it can mislead CEOs to make opportunistic but unwise R&D spending decisions. Overall, Republican CEOs, relative to Democratic CEOs, have higher short-term performance (ROA), and lower long-term performance (Tobin Q) owing to reduced R&D spending. Our results have research, managerial, and policy implications.

This paper investigates how product market competition affects the performance of closely held small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in developing economies. In contrast to prior findings that focus on large publicly traded companies in developed economies, we find that market competition has a negative effect on firm performance. Our findings are robust to different measures of competition and firm performance and survive after addressing endogeneity issues. We provide evidence that the adverse effect of competition is channeled through increased corruption. Our findings further suggest that firms respond to competition by attempting to acquire more financial resources and government support, adopt quality improvement and cost reduction policies. The adverse effect of competition is especially strong for smaller firms.

We extend the research on the relationship between acquirers’ corporate social responsibility (CSR) and acquisition performance by focusing on both the acquirer and target. Utilizing a moderated mediation model, we argue that target quality mediates the relationship between acquirer CSR and acquisition performance and that this relationship is further moderated by target CSR. We propose that socially responsible firms can evaluate and close deals with high-quality targets by leveraging their superior stakeholder management capabilities and social evaluations. Contrary to expectations, we find a negative relationship between acquirer CSR and acquisition performance; and target quality does not appear to mediate the acquirer CSR-acquisition performance link. The findings supported our contention that target CSR positively moderates the relationship between acquirer CSR and acquisition outcomes. Thus, target firm CSR appears to be a key driver of acquisition performance.

Research on small ventures’ coopetition is scant. In this cross-sectional study, we examine both proactive and reactive motivations for coopetition and the critical role of partner trust among 527 small ventures from multiple industries. We find both types of motivations to be directly related mutual benefits and that there is no difference in strength between the two relationships. We find that trust in coopetition partners acts in interesting ways as a moderating factor. We illustrate how these findings add new insights into and enhance our understanding coopetition among small ventures.

Kaplan and Sorensen (2021) study how CEO candidates differ from candidates for other top management positions. We re-analyze their data by examining the candidates’ characteristics for each position separately. Our results which employed the necessary factor rotation, reveal 12 factors for CEO and CFO positions, and 13 factors for COO positions. Our results also show that the critical factors for the incumbents to get the job differ from those that help the outsiders to be chosen for the same position. Seemly, an old boy network still exists as female candidates and outsiders were at a disadvantage in the hiring process.

CEOs’ public communications have been shown to influence firm performance by shaping stakeholders’ valuations of the firm. Recently, there has been a growing trend of CEOs publicly “weighing in” on controversial political issues. This phenomenon, which we refer to as CEO political outspokenness, appears to be unusual as it contradicts societal expectations that CEOs refrain from being involved in political controversy and instead focus on managing their businesses. In this study, drawing insights from agency theory, we argue that CEO political outspokenness engenders an adverse reaction from investors and is negatively related to firm performance. Extending our arguments further, we propose that this negative relationship is moderated by the firm’s past reputation (“celebrity status”) and a history of consumer activism. Our analysis of data from S&P 500 firms provided mixed support for our arguments. Contrary to our prediction, CEO political outspokenness in fact engenders a positive investor reaction. However, CEO political outspokenness was negatively related to market-based performance. As predicted, firms of lesser repute seem to experience greater performance declines as a consequence of CEO political outspokenness compared to those firms with “celebrity status.” Further, our findings show that CEO political outspokenness is negatively related to market-based and positively related to accounting-based performance for firms with no prior consumer activism. Overall, the findings suggest that CEO political outspokenness as a phenomenon seems to elicit complex reactions from organizational stakeholders. Implications for research and practice are discussed.

We employ stakeholder theory and the theory of relative standing to investigate the impact of acquiring firms’ engagement in corporate social responsibility (CSR) on their acquisition outcomes. We argue that acquirers with higher CSR engagement will enjoy higher acquisition success. In addition, such acquirers are expected to retain more top executives in the target firm than acquirers with CSR engagement. Moreover, we anticipate top executive retention to have a mediating influence on the relationship between CSR and acquisition performance. We find that acquiring firms’ CSR is positively associated with target executive retention as well as acquisition performance. The mediating influence of target executive retention is also significant. Finally, the impact of CSR on retention and retention’s mediating influence are stronger when target executive ownership is higher.

Nowadays, many people have the experience of living in or traveling to multiple cultures. Against this backdrop, research on multicultural experience becomes an increasingly important topic in a variety of management research areas. In this symposium, we look at both the antecedents and the consequences of multicultural experience, study its implications across a variety of context ranging from foreign origin CEOs to repatriates, and at both individual and organizational levels. Presentations in this symposium also draw on a variety of theories – from cultural intelligence (Earley & Ang, 2003), implicit beliefs (Dweck, 2000), the psychological theory of inspiration (Thrash & Elliot, 2003; 2004), and Piaget’s cognitive and intellectual development framework (Inhelder & Piaget, 1958). Together, research from this symposium has direct implications to the international business, organizational behaviour, and managerial and organizational cognition research areas. Broad Foreign Experiences Predict Lie-Detection Accuracy Presenter: Jiyin Cao; Stony Brook U.-State U. of New York Presenter: William Maddux; U. of North Carolina, Chapel Hill CEOs of Foreign Origin, Strategic Novelty, and Firm Performance Presenter: Mark Kroll; U. of Texas Rio Grande Valley Presenter: Michael A. Abebe; U. of Texas Rio Grande Valley Presenter: Son Anh Le; Louisiana Tech U. Cultural Distance and Intercultural Exchange: Unpacking the Psychological Pathway of Inspiration Presenter: Xi Zou; Nanyang Business School Presenter: Dan Jun Wang; Columbia Business School Presenter: Tim Wildschut; U. of Southampton Presenter: Constantine Sedikides; U. of Southampton Presenter: Daniel M Cable; U. of North Carolina, Chapel Hill The Effect of a Growth Mindset on Cultural Intelligence Presenter: Elia Lam; Hong Kong U. of Science and Technology Presenter: Manchi Chao; Hong Kong U. of Science and Technology

Drawing on stakeholder theory and signaling theory and considering both seller and buyer’s perspectives, we examine the relationship between acquirers’ corporate social performance (CSP) and acquisition performance, we also explore the role of target quality as a mediator as well as the roles of entrepreneurial firm status, TMT ownership, and family-controlled firms as moderators of the CSP–acquisition performance relationship. We test our hypotheses using a sample of 354 acquisitions. Our results show that acquirers’ CSP is significantly related to targets’ quality, and those relationships are enhanced when targets’ TMTs have greater ownership but not when targets are entrepreneurial firms or family-controlled firms. We find that acquirers’ CSP enhances acquisition performance through the mediating effects of targets’ quality. Our paper contributes to research on acquisition performance, CSP, and target and acquirer selection.

Purpose The authors contend that immediately following the initial public offering (IPO), the new owners that replace the original ones are likely to request changes in two corporate governance mechanisms, board of directors and top management teams (TMTs). Following these alterations, the purpose of this paper is to propose that such changes will be detrimental for the performance of young entrepreneurial firms. Design/methodology/approach This study examines the post-IPO governance changes in young entrepreneurial firms. The sample consists of 185 companies that went public between 2001 and 2005. A hierarchical linear regression approach with the appropriate control variables is adopted to test the proposed hypotheses. Findings The results revealed that, following the changes in ownership structure post-IPO, changes are observed in one of the corporate governance mechanisms the authors considered, boards of directors, but not TMTs. Consistent with the general theme of this study, the authors also observed a negative impact of changes in boards of directors on subsequent firm performance; this was not the case with TMTs. Research limitations/implications Contrary to the fundamental contentions of agency theory, the results highlight the need for adopting a different approach for young entrepreneurial firms. Practical implications The findings highlight the importance of preserving the entrepreneurial efficacy of young entrepreneurial firms. Originality/value This paper challenges the fundamental contentions of agency theory in the case of young entrepreneurial firms. The results demonstrate that post-IPO shareholders’ interference with the governance mechanisms results in lower performance.

Despite the growing importance of CEOs’ international experience (IE), we have yet to gain sufficient insights into its conceptualization and effect on firm outcomes. Based on prior research and work experience models, we suggest a new framework for measuring IE, including three components: length of time, number of countries, and cultural distance, along with their interactions. Drawing upon social and cognitive learning theories, we explore the impact of CEOs’ IE on two outcomes: strategic change and firm performance. We argue that IE components affect the two outcomes by enhancing executives’ international knowledge and general competencies. While international knowledge may affect firm performance directly, general competencies may affect firm performance both directly and indirectly through strategic change. Using a sample of 387 new CEOs, we found that time abroad had a positive effect on strategic change and firm performance, while number of countries and cultural distance positively moderated these relationships. Additionally, we also found that these components affected firm performance both directly and mediated through strategic change. Our findings have important theoretical implications for the conceptualization and impact of CEOs’ IE and practical implications for executive development and promotion.

Given the enormous emphasis on corporate sustainability both among scholars and practitioners, organizations are actively pursuing various strategies and actions that signal their commitment to this issue. While a relatively fewer number of firms embrace sustainable growth comprehensively as part of their business models (i.e. deep-level commitment), most corporate actions do not seem to go beyond symbolic, narrowly-defined and disjointed actions (surface-level commitment) that are meant to provide a superficial signal to external stakeholders. We explore this curious contradiction, and conclude that this paradox for the most part reflects the materialistic, anthropocentric priorities of the larger socio-cultural and institutional environment, and by extension individual firm stakeholders, whose expectations the firm must ultimately satisfy. The lack of a meaningful commitment to genuine sustainable growth is in part exacerbated by the absence of comprehensive support from the firm’s key stakeholders and challenging institutional norms. Owing to these expectations, we argue very few firms have chosen, or will choose to pursue deep-level sustainable growth. We conclude with some thoughts as to how those firms that choose to pursue such a deep-level sustainable growth path might proceed.

We draw on resource‐based logic to argue that relatively stable TMTs and boards are beneficial for young IPO firms because of the need to maintain and develop valuable firm‐specific capabilities and psychological attachment of pre‐IPO TMTs. Using panel data from 272 young IPO firms, we find that pre‐IPO TMT member exits negatively affect young IPO firms’ survival and performance. This negative effect is greater when more post‐IPO outside directors are added. We also find that the above interaction is positively and negatively associated with survival and performance when TMT ownership declines substantially and when firms have a founder CEO, respectively.

Using resource-based logic as well as stewardship and agency theories, we address a paradox when governing young firms—how to design governance structures to encourage top managers to generate rents while minimizing the threat of rent appropriation. Some corporate governance mechanisms (CGMs) enhance empowerment and encourage managers to generate rents for the firm. But these CGMs may also allow managers to appropriate rents excessively. The solution appears to be combining CGMs that empower managers to generate rents with CGMs that either (a) motivate stewardship behavior or (b) reduce information asymmetry between management and other stakeholders. Our empirical analyses provide substantial support for our predictions.

Corporate social responsibility (CSR) and corporate social performance (CSP) have garnered research attention from both scholars and practitioners. CSP is end result of CSR activities (Barnett, 2007; Wood, 1991), which can be defined as actions that appear to further some social good, beyond interests of firm and that which is required by law (McWilliams and Siegel, 2001: 117). Numerous studies have examined different aspects of CSP, such as definition and measures (Carroll, 1979; Margolis and Walsh, 2003), relationship with financial performance (McWilliams and Siegel, 2000; Orlitzky, 2011; Saeidi et al., 2015; Waddock and Graves, 1997), and determinants of CSP (Berrone and Gomez-Mejia, 2009), of which determinants of CSP have received increasing attention (Grow et al, 2005; Orlitzky, 2011). Researchers have identified and examined various factors that influence CSP, such as executive compensation, firm-level strategies, institutional ownership, organizational design, and top managers' values (Berrone and Gomez-Mejia, 2009; Graves and Waddock, 1994; McWilliams and Siegel, 2000; Russo and Harrison, 2005). Among these determinants, scholars have called for more research on influence of top management on CSP (Thomas and Simerly, 1995; Waldman et al, 2006). Both theoretical arguments and empirical results regarding impact of top management on CSP have been inconclusive and even conflicting. Agency theory suggests top managers carty out CSR activities only if those activities gratify either pecuniar)' or non-pecuniary desires (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Stakeholder theory indicates that top managers tend to do the right thing with regard to CSR (Donaldson and Davis, 1991; Freeman, 1984). Institutional theory suggests that executives' orientation toward CSP is influenced by normative pressures, which are often diverse and sometimes conflicting (Galaskiewicz, 1997; McWilliams et al, 2006). In same vein, empirical studies have provided mixed results regarding effects of top managers on CSP (e.g., Barnea and Rubin, 2010; Kassinis and Vafeas, 2002; McKendall and Wagner, 1997). For instance, impact of CEO ownership on CSP is positive in a study conducted by Berrone and Gomez-Mejia (2009) but negative in a study by Harjoto and Jo (2011); impact of CEO duality on CSP is positive in study of Zhang (2012) but negative in a study by Prado-Lorenzo and Garcia-Sanchez (2010). The purpose of this study is to gain a better understanding of influence that top management has on CSP by aggregating results of extant empirical literature using meta-analysis. Drawing on insights from institutional theory, stakeholder theory, and agency theory, study provides an integrated view of how top management affects CSP. This study adopts a well-established position in literature that although pressure on firms to act in a socially responsible way is increasing, pressure on managers to maximize profits is generally dominant (Gladwin et al, 1995; Jensen, 2002; Johnson and Greening, 1999; Waldman et al., 2006). In other words, dominant institutional logic embraced by managers and investors is profit-maximization. Managers have either a dominant economic value set (i.e., belief that profit-maximization comes first) or a stakeholder value set (i.e., belief that balancing needs of different stakeholders and working for greater social good should be emphasized) (de Luque et al., 2008; Wood, 1994). Based on these insights, study posits that managers who do not embrace dominant logic of profit-maximization are more likely to pay genuine attention to CSP than those who do. The relationships between CSP and managerial demographic characteristics such as age, tenure, and experience, which are indicative of managerial stakeholder value sets, are also examined. Finally, to shed light on ambiguous relationship between executives' values and CSP, moderating effects of type of CSP (i. …