We examine whether the decline in the number of dividend payers is purely a U. S. phenomenon or is part of a global trend. Focusing on the United Kingdom, a capital market comparable in maturity and sophistication to that of the United States, we find that the number of U. K. firms paying dividends declines from 75.9% to 54.5%. After controlling for firm size and profitability, we find a declining propensity to pay dividends over the 1998-2002 subperiod. We conclude that a shift in catering incentives appears most likely explain these recent changes in U. K. payout policies.

AbstractWe test whether a bias exists in analyst recommendations for firms that file for bankruptcy during 1995–2001. We fail to find overoptimism in analyst recommendations, including those of affiliated analysts. Our multivariate analysis of the market reaction to changes in analyst recommendations indicates that prior affiliation exerts no impact on either returns or trading volume. We find that the market does not view recommendation upgrades by affiliated analysts as biased since there is no price reversal following these recommendation changes. Overall, our results suggest that recently passed legislation to reduce analysts' conflicts of interest might be an overreaction.

A sample of cash-only acquisitions of Nasdaq targets during 1973–1999 is examined. It is found that the mean (median) percentage premia declines from 74% (65%) during the 1970s to 47% (42%) in the 1990s. Consistent with recent research on the value reduction associated with diversification, it is observed that acquirers generally will not pay higher prices to acquire firms operating in different industries. It is found that over-invested firms pursue acquisitions more aggressively by paying higher premia while under-invested firms pay less, on average. Finally, the evidence suggests that agency rather than synergistic or hubris effects influence the level of merger premia.

The changing nature of initial public offering (IPO) underpricing is examined using a sample of 513 IPOs launched in the UK from 1993 to 2001. It is found that the mean UK underpricing is initially less than that in the USA, reverses itself in the mid-1990s, returns to a lower level during the bubble period, but exceeds US underpricing for the last years of the sample. A growing amount of money left-on-the-table by UK underwriters is also observed. The analysis of IPO characteristics shows the simultaneous presence of changing composition and incentive realignment effects in the UK IPO market. These effects are most evident during the technology/internet equity bubble, which spans the last two subperiods of this study. It is concluded that although the market frenzy of the technology/internet bubble was present in the UK IPO market, its influence appears more limited than that documented for the US.

We examine the number of external appointments held by corporate directors. Directors who serve larger firms and sit on larger boards are more likely to attract directorships. Consistent with Fama and Jensen (1983), we find that firm performance has a positive effect on the number of appointments held by a director. We find no evidence that multiple directors shirk their responsibilities to serve on board committees. We do not find that multiple directors are associated with a greater likelihood of securities fraud litigation. We conclude that the evidence does not support calls for limits on directorships held by an individual.

In this paper, we use intra-day data for all stocks listed on the ISSM and provide new and direct evidence consistent with the tax-loss selling hypothesis. We find that (a) there is abnormal selling pressure prior to the year-end for stocks that have experienced large capital losses in the current and prior years (b) investors delay realizing capital gain by postponing the sale of capital gain stocks until after the new year (c) there is a significant decrease in the average trade size for stocks with large capital losses before the year-end and for stocks with capital gains in the new year, which suggests that individuals, rather than institutional investors, are the major sellers around the year-end (d) the tax-loss selling hypothesis, and not firm size or share price, is the fundamental explanation for abnormal January returns. Further, small or low share priced firms with capital gains do not experience abnormal returns in January. However, conditional on capital losses, small or low share priced firms magnify the turn-of-the-year effect (e) On average, the increase in selling activity adversely affects market liquidity by increasing bid-ask spreads and reducing depths. (f) The tax-loss selling pressure not only causes the price to be at the bid at the year-end, it also temporarily depresses the equilibrium price indicating the short run demand curve is not perfectly elastic (g) the year-end buying activity suggests that large investors buy capital loss stocks prior to the year-end to take advantage of the temporarily depressed price and capital gain stocks after the new year to reinvest the proceeds of the tax-loss selling.

We examine Korean chaebols to determine the costs and benefits associated with the operation of a diversified business group. We find that chaebol-affiliated firms suffer a value loss relative to non-affiliated firms. We observe that this value loss holds even after controlling for the relatedness of the diversification present within the chaebol. To identify the causes of this value loss, we obtain evidence suggesting that chaebol firms: (1) pursue profit stability rather than profit maximization, (2) over-invest in low performing industries, and (3) cross-subsidize the weaker members of their group. We do find however that chaebol firms possess greater debt capacity and consequently enjoy lower tax burdens. Nevertheless, because chaebols suffer an overall loss in value, we conclude that the costs associated with chaebol membership exceed its benefits.

Using a vector autoregressive (VAR) approach, the dynamic interactions and causal relationships among volatility, open interest, trading volume and arbitrage opportunities in the S&P 500 index futures market is examined. It is found that increased volatility lowers pricing error. This implies that as market volatility increases, investors sell off their equity and futures positions with relatively larger drops in futures prices. Pricing error plays a critical role in linking implied volatility and the level of open interest. Open interest rises for a few days in response to a pricing error shock, but pricing error declines over the next day after an initial rise in response to an innovation in open interest. This suggests that the level of open interest is a good proxy for examining the capital flows into and out of the nearest S&P 500 index futures contract.

Contrary to the concerns of the Council of Institutional Investors and other shareholder activists, it is reported that the incidence of multiple board memberships appointments by corporate directors is low, with only 4% of the sample holding three or more seats. It is found that directors in regulated industries hold fewer board memberships than those in unregulated businesses. Firm size, board size, firm performance and corporate growth opportunities positively influence the number of directorships held by individual directors. It is further discovered that increased equity ownership of the firm by the board is associated with fewer external appointments by the board members. It is concluded that proposals to limit the number of directorships held by an individual may be ill-advised.

Through a comparison of serial and once bankrupt firms over the period 1970–1996, those factors that lead to a successful reorganization are examined. It is found that serial bankrupt firms generally fail to restructure their top management around the time of their initial reorganization while over 70% of the sample of once bankrupt firms replace their senior executives. Serial bankrupt firms increase their level of fixed payments, are less able to lower their debt coupon rate and issue more equity than their once-bankrupt matches. It is further found that firm growth, performance, liquidity and size are associated with a greater likelihood of a successful reorganization. Firm risk as measured by financial leverage increases the probability of a subsequent bankruptcy. These results are useful to both bankruptcy courts and corporate managers seeking to discriminate between feasible and unrealistic reorganization plans following bankruptcy.

Myers and Majluf (1984) argue that informational asymmetry between managers and investors can explain the negative stock returns around the announcement of new equity. Using analyst following and consensus as proxies for information asymmetry, we observe that announcement period returns are significantly more negative for firms followed by fewer analysts and whose forecasts exhibit less consensus. Our findings hold after controlling for firm size and growth opportunities. Finally, we find evidence suggesting that analyst activity also influences firms' long-term performance. We conclude that the information role of security analysts partially explains the negative stock returns surrounding the announcement of new equity.

Myers and Majluf (1984) argue that informational asymmetry between managers and investors can explain the negative stock returns around the announcement of new equity. Using analyst following and consensus as proxies for information asymmetry, we observe that announcement period returns are significantly more negative for firms followed by fewer analysts and whose forecasts exhibit less consensus. Our findings hold after controlling for firm size and growth opportunities. Finally, we find evidence suggesting that analyst activity also influences firms' long-term performance. We conclude that the information role of security analysts partially explains the negative stock returns surrounding the announcement of new equity.

This Article examines the quality of forecasts in bankruptcy disclosure statements. Required by the Bankruptcy Code, disclosure statements seek to provide creditors with adequate information to cast an informed vote on a chapter 11 plan of reorganization. In addition, disclosure statements are theoretically important devices to narrow some of the information asymmetries that a bankruptcy proceeding exacerbates. We find that chapter 11 debtors forecast postbankruptcy business earnings capability with significant error and that bankruptcy disclosure statements are systematically over-optimistic in their forecasts of postbankruptcy performance. Furthermore, we find negative relations between the forecast error and the size of the firm as well as the firm's capital intensity. We do not find significant relationships between forecast error and changes in corporate governance, at either the CEO or board level.

The relationships between risk and performance were tested employing within and between analyses at the level of strategic groups in three different industries. As hypothesized, systematic risk did not exhibit a consistent relationship with performance. By contrast, all of the total correlations, the between-group correlations, and the within-group correlations of total risk with performance were in the hypothesized negative direction. These findings suggest that when risk-averse managers reduce total risk, the firm's carnings performance is enhanced. The hypothesized differences between strategic groups in total risk were evident primarily in the computer and pharmaceutical industries. Performance also differed across strategic groups in these two industries, as well as among airlines. Contrary to expectations, systematic risk also differed across strategic groups in all three industries. These ANOVA results indicate that differences in strategic profiles between strategic groups engender differences in total risk, systematic risk, and performance.

ABSTRACTThis article surveys the influence of research journals on finance doctoral education. Influence is measured by citations from syllabi of finance seminars. A sample of 101 distinct syllabi submitted by 33 finance doctoral programs yields a list of 1,031 articles cited by at least two schools. These 1,031 articles generate 3,273 citations referencing 17 finance, economics, and accounting journals, where multiple citations from a single school are counted as a single citation. The most notable findings are the wide variety of seminar content across finance doctoral programs and the dominance of five finance journals in providing this diverse content.

Among the various stakeholders of a firm, senior managers are the most likely targets for private and public political pressures. Other stakeholder groups are less visible and may be perceived as less influential in corporate strategy formulation and implementation. In some situations, consequently, senior executives may adopt corporate strategies in response to political pressures even if these strategies may be costly to shareholders. In this study, a special case is examined: the effect of divestment of South African business units on firm value. Using data from 1984 through 1990, we examine the impact that announcements of divestments have upon the stock return behavior of publicly traded firms. Our results indicate that significant and negative excess returns accrue to shares of companies announcing divestments of South African operations. These results are supportive of the premise that noneconomic pressures may influence managerial strategies rather than value-enhancement goals. © 1997 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

This paper re-examines the reaction of stockholders and bondholders to announcements of filing of Chapter 11 with a sample of 274 NYSE/AMEX and NASDAQ firms that announce bankruptcy during the period 1979-1989. Although the market reaction of these securityholders is the subject of considerable recent research, the literature contains only limited empirical evidence on bankruptcies in the period following the enactment of the 1978 Bankruptcy Reform Act (BRA). We find that both sets of securityholders experience significant losses in the days immediately surrounding the announcements, as would be expected if investors recognize that attempts to avoid bankruptcy costs through cheaper workouts have apparently failed. However, these losses are smaller than those associated with bankruptcies occurring prior to the BRA. One interpretation of these findings is that bankruptcy costs are lower under the 1978 law. Furthermore, our larger sample permits us to compare stock price reactions to bankruptcy announcements by NYSE/AMEX firms with those by NASDAQ firms; NASDAQ firms experience significantly larger losses (the difference is -10.29% with a z-statistic of 17.46), consistent with the notion that smaller firms have relatively larger bankruptcy costs. Also, our analysis of recent bankruptcies reveals the same puzzle that earlier researchers report; despite the sharp rise in leverage and significant increases in variance of returns (and residual risk), betas decline significantly as the announcement of the filing approaches. Finally, we report that lower rated bonds suffer larger losses, since their claims are more likely to be affected before those of senior bondholders.