Slovenian courts have recently been dealing with a large number of cases dealing with prohibited crossings of the border or territory of a country (Article 308 of the Slovenian Criminal Code). An aggravated form of this offence is committed when irregular migrants are exposed to life and health dangers during transport. This is a case of a concrete endangerment offence, whereas the case law has grappled with the question of what level of danger these offences require. The analysis reveals several shortcomings in the previous theoretical definitions of concrete endangerment. In this article, the author attempts to rethink concrete endangerment, reflecting on the role of probability in judicial decision-making. Different ways of assessing the probability of an event are presented. The findings indicate that quantitative standards of probability are largely irrelevant for judicial decision-making, so courts will have to work with qualitative (descriptive) standards, which must be sufficiently clear and must not set the threshold of concrete danger too high.

The author elaborates on recent developments in the debates surrounding the justification of punishment, particular attention to how the traditional division between absolute and relative theories has been transcended. Special attention is paid to the integration of expressive theories into European theorising about punishment. While these concepts are not entirely new - having been previously discussed under different labels - the recent attempts integrate victims' interests into the debate may be viewed as a genuine innovation. Another question is whether these developments could have broader implications for the understanding and practice of criminal law. While shifts theoretical emphasis regarding punishment do not significantly impact the day-to-day operations of the judiciary penitentiary systems, these changes may have the potential to influence the criminal justice system over the long term.

A crucial challenge for retributive theories of punishment is the question of why it is justified to inflict suffering on guilty offenders. One of the more recent attempts to address this question refers to retributive emotions evoked by wrongful acts. Some argue that these emotions alone can justify state punishment., and the author refers to this position as the "emotional turn" in theories of punishment. This article explores the phenomenon of retributive emotions, their functionality (utility), moral appropriateness, and the ways in which these emotions are embedded in various theories of punishment. It seems that most attempts to justify state punishment with these emotions contain a strong consequentialist element - a referral to the beneficial consequences that expressing and satisfying retributive emotions will bring in the future (e.g., preventing vigilantism, deterring crime, caring for the interests of crime victims). Retributive emotions, as an argument for justifying punishment, have thus transcended the boundaries of retributivism and found their place within expressive and utilitarian theories of punishment as well. While it is useful to explore and understand these emotions, the author argues that they alone are not sufficient to justify the institution of state punishment.

Criminal punishment typically entails censure and various forms of deprivation and inconvenience (hard treatment). The latter raises many questions. What functions does the hard treatment of offenders perform? Is it perhaps a mere conventional symbol of expressing society's indignation because of a committed crime? Is its use necessary, or could it be replaced by "something better"? As long as hard treatment remains an integral part of the social response to crime, the question of the criteria of its distribution (sentencing criteria) is of crucial importance. The article deals with the question of whether proportionality in the assessment of punishment also requires taking into account the offenders' individual sensitivities to deprivations of punishment. While this issue is more or less resolved in the case of monetary fines, it turns out to be very controversial in the case of prison sentences. After reviewing and evaluating various standpoints, the author argues that the courts should pay (limited) attention to individual sensitivities.

The traditional dichotomy of "absolute" and "relative" theories of punishment may currently be considered obsolete. There is increasing discussion on expressive theories as the third pillar of the theories of punishment. These theories do not search for aims of punishment either in retribution or crime prevention, but rather see punishment as a means of communication or symbolic expression. Expressive theories of punishment appear in different variations, and the author critically evaluates some of these variations, whereas he finds the most intriguing those which consider punishment to be a symbolic means of communication with victims of crime. This variation of expressive theories closes an important gap in the discourse on the aims of punishment. At the same time, it opens several controversial questions, including: which expectations of victims of crime are legitimate and to what extent should the criminal justice system try to meet these expectations?

A drastic increase in the number of patients due to a sudden outbreak and rapid spread of infectious disease can overwhelm health care systems. A shortage of medical staff and equipment may force physicians to face tragic choices, in which some patients receive lifesaving treatments or priority treatment, and some do not. The (medical) ethics seeks answers to this dilemma. Another question is should any "wrong" decisions give rise to criminal responsibility? In the first part of our paper, we examine recommendations published by the Slovenian and foreign ethics councils and professional medical associations. The recommendations differ, in particular, in terms of decision-making criteria in life-against-life situations. In the second part, we discuss the potential legal consequences for breaching or disregarding those recommendations. When describing the process of triaging, we present our view on the classical ethical problem that the pandemic has once-again brought to the forefront: should we distinguish between situations in which patients have already been placed on mechanical ventilation and situations where two or more patients require mechanical ventilation, but only one ventilator is available? We agree that ex ante collisions of duties cannot be treated in the same way as ex post collisions of duties, but for different reasons than the authors usually suggest.

Introduction .........................................................................................................210 Dening and Conceptualizing SCP ..................................................................211 e Historical Context: A Brief Sketch of the Key Post-War Developments in SCP .........................................................................................214 e Social Root Causes of Crime and SCP ......................................................216 Measures of SCP ..................................................................................................218 Problems and Evaluation ................................................................................... 222 Summary ............................................................................................................. 223 Glossary of Key Terms ....................................................................................... 224 Discussion Questions ........................................................................................ 225 Suggested Reading ............................................................................................. 225 Recommended Web Links ................................................................................ 226 References ............................................................................................................ 226Social crime prevention (SCP) can be linked to the social control theory of crime (Hirschi 1969), which asserts that the strength and durability of an individual's bonds or commitments to society serve to diminish his or her propensity for deviant behavior. Unlike the more traditional example of situational crime prevention (Clarke 1996; Jeery 1971; Newman 1972; also see Chapter 14 in this volume), SCP is based on an assumption that real changes regarding diminishing deviancy and crime rates can be achieved mainly through solving social problems, such as social inequality, a low educational level, structural unemployment, poor employment opportunities, discrimination, poverty, and social exclusion (Meško 2002). Attempting to achieve its goals, SCP is concerned with measures aimed at tackling the root causes of crime and the predisposition of individuals to oend (Crawford and Traynor 2012; Graham and Bennet 1995). SCP programs and initiatives focus on individuals, groups and communities, and (potential) victims of crime (Meško 2002). Such programs minimize the risk for individuals, be they (potential) oenders or victims of crime, and contribute to the reinforcement of resilient communities. Usually, adherents of SCP criticize other preventive approaches and programs for wrongly addressing the root causes of crime while dealing only with its symptoms (see Box 8.1).

The relationship between criminal policy and criminal law doctrine ("criminal dogmatics") is considered to be controversial. There are opinions that advocate for strict division of both disciplines, as well as beliefs that criminal law doctrine should be tailored according to the goals of criminal policy (functionalism). The main hypothesis of this paper is that strict division between both disciplines is essentially impossible, which the author demonstrates through case-by-case analysis how supposedly value-free doctrinal discourse often hides assumptions of criminal policy. Since hiding or "dogmatising" policy assumptions causes several problems (it often appears unconvincing, it may lead to socially unacceptable solutions and it does not aid the legal safety, for example), the author advocates for open dialogue on issues of criminal policy at the stage of attributing criminal responsibility, not only when it comes to sentencing. In conclusion, he addresses limits and traps of criminal policy reasoning within criminal law decision-making.

The author analyses the idea of positive general prevention, which has become a leading theory of punishment in several legal systems, most notably the ones within Germanic legal circles. Positive general prevention is used as an umbrella term covering a variety of different effects of punishment (consolidation of confidence in the legal order, the moral-educational effect, and satisfying the public), which should, in the long run prevent crime. The main hypothesis of this paper is that the effectiveness of positive general prevention is relatively scarce, and this hypothesis is being verified in conjunction with the theory on preventive effects of ignorance and by reviewing relevant empirical research. In the conclusion, it is argued that positive general prevention is indisputably effective at the "all or nothing" level (with the complete elimination of sanctioning there would certainly be more crime), while preventive effects of making legal punishments harsher, are very limited. A specific problem of positive general prevention is that it can quickly become universal and a relatively cheap rhetorical device in the struggle for new incriminations, raising penalties and more severe penal policies, or for the apology of criminal law, as it is.

Nowadays it is widely accepted, at least in principle, that the essence of a prison sentence shall be in the deprivation of freedom, while limitations of other rights and freedoms are inadmissible, unless they are inherently linked to this loss of freedom. Which limitations are inherently linked to the loss of freedom, is a matter of interpretation; in the past few decades, this question has been extensively elaborated by the European Court of Human Rights (the Court). This study attempts a comprehensive analysis of its practice, with the main emphasis on Article 3 (prohibition of torture) and Article 13 (the right to an effective legal means) of the European Convention on Human Rights (1950/1994). Slovenia has recently been found guilty for violations of these two articles; the core problem of the prison system in Slovenia is prison overcrowding and insufficiency of legal means available to prisoners (the legislation provides several legal means, none of them, however, have turned out to be efficient enough in practice). By analysing the Court's jurisprudence, the authors critically assess imprisonment standards that have been set by the Court, while at the same time propose measures to improve the position of prisoners in Slovenia.

The transfer of the enforcement of sentences between states raises many penological, legal, political and financial questions. The traditional system of transfer based on tripartite consent (consent of the state of the judgement, the state of enforcement and state of the convict) is undergoing change: instead, a system allowing transfer against the will of the convict is being introduced, which requires states to enforce the sentence imposed on their citizens by foreign courts, in some cases even without verifying dual criminality. At the EU level, these changes are being justified by the provision of the optimum opportunities for social rehabilitation (resocialisation) of the convict; however, much more mundane reasons lie behind this justification: countries with a high percentage of foreigners in their prison populations would like to be partly relieved of this burden, quickly and without administrative complications, if possible. In numerous cases, the transfer of convicts to serve sentences in their country of origin is in the prisoners' interests, but not invariably (e.g. worse living conditions in the prisons of the country to which they have been transferred, longer waits for probation). Therefore, shifts in the field of transfer can be seen, at least from one perspective, as sacrificing the convicts' position on the altar of the rhetoric of mutual recognition of judicial decisions and the provision of optimum opportunities for the resocialisation of convicts.

In Slovenia (as well as throughout Europe), conditional release (parole) is becoming an increasingly important means of obtaining early release from prison. The authors consider the Slovenian legal regime for conditional release from the perspective of European prison law and policy. They argue that the Slovenian parole system, which has remained practically unchanged since the 1950s, needs certain improvements, especially regarding procedural safeguards in the decision-making process. Deciding whether to grant parole remains, for the time being, an administrative procedure without real possibilities for the prisoner to appeal when parole is refused. As there is hardly any decision of greater importance to imprisoned persons than that which determines the date of their release, the authors argue that the safeguards to the procedure by which prisoners "get out" should in principle be taken as seriously as those which govern the manner in which they "get in." Good practices derived from comparative law are also discussed and taken into consideration in the authors' proposals for possible improvements to the Slovenian parole system de lege ferenda.

Članek obravnava pomoč kot obliko udeležbe v kazenskem pravu. Uvodoma so obravnavane časovne meje pomoči, ki jih je po avtorjevem mnenju treba opredeliti ozko in jih ne širiti prek formalnega dokončanja dejanja. Nadalje je obravnavana razmejitev s sostorilstvom, kar je eno bolj težavnih vprašanj. Avtor opozarja, da je pomoč lahko nujni pogoj za izvršitev dejanja, ni pa treba, da je. V tej zvezi kritično obravnava nekatere sodne odločbe, ki tipična ravnanja pomoči razglasijo za sostorilstvo, ker naj bi pomenila nujni pogoj za izvršitev dejanja. V sklepnem delu je obravnavano vprašanje kaznovanja pomagača, pri čemer se avtor zavzame za obligatorno omilitev kazni pomagaču.

It is generally known that individuals cannot realize their goals by themselves in many areas of human activity but achieve them by associating with other people. This is also true for the area of crime, in which a large proportion of criminal offences are committed on the basis of collaboration of several people. In conceptual terms, criminal law distinguishes various forms of participation in criminal offence and also attributes different effects to different forms. Traditionally, instigation is one of the forms of collaboration in a criminal offence (participation). This form can be defined as intentionally influencing someone to commit an act which has the characteristics of a criminal offence and is unlawful. This short and concise definition of instigation nevertheless raises numerous further questions with various implications and it depends on their assessment whether an individual will be held responsible as an abettor in a specific case. Answers to these questions derive from the principles of criminal law and criminal policy. In addition to those issues of instigation in which there is a nexus of criminal law and criminal policy aspects, there is also a whole range of questions in which criminal policy considerations prevail. In particular, here belong issues of the framework of punishment for instigation and the culpability of unsuccessful abetting. These two questions are treated in the concluding part of the paper.

The author deals with theories of the aim of punishment, starting from the currently accepted presumption that any of the traditional theories cannot alone convincingly justify the content and limits of punishment. "Mixed theories are therefore unavoidable, although the question of the proportions of different aims of punishment within these theories remains controversial. The author advocates so-called mixed crime prevention theories, which attempt to connect different aspects of special prevention (oriented to rehabilitation) and general prevention, but reject any form of retribution as a goal of punishment. Rejection of retribution as the aim of punishment does not mean rejection of the principle of guilt - because this has the role of foundation and the upper limit of punishment within mixed crime prevention theories. The author also draws attention to some dark sides of these theories, but concludes that they are for the time being the best possibility with regard to the available alternatives.

Abstract A. Einleitende Bemerkungen Das slowenische Strafgesetzbuch (StGB) wurde im September 1994 vom Parlament verabschiedet und trat am 1. Januar 1995 in Kraft. Im Jahr 1999 erfuhr es relativ unwesentliche Änderungen und Ergänzungen, jüngste Änderungen fanden im Jahr 2004 statt. Sie traten am 5. Mai 2004 in Kraft und betreffen hauptsächlich den besonderen Teil des StGB. Es handelt sich vor allem um die Verschärfung und Erweiterung der typischen Straftatbestände für die organisierte Kriminalität, die Korruption, den Terrorismus und den Menschenhandel im weiteren Sinn und die Neugestaltung einiger Sexualstraftatbestände, vor allem bezüglich der Prostitution und sexueller Angriffe auf Minderjährige. Einige dieser Neuerungen, insbesondere auf dem Gebiet der völkerrechtlichen Verbrechen, werden als Annäherung Sloweniens an den so genannten europäischen Strafrechtsraum verstanden (und in der Literatur bereits überwiegend als übereilt kritisiert) und verdienen damit am Ende dieser Darstellung besondere Aufmerksamkeit.