This research has two aims: on the one hand, it seeks to measure ethnolinguistic diversity in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) at a disaggregated level, with a granularity that corresponds to the second Congolese administrative scale; on the other hand, it explains this fragmentation based on recent empirical literature. We therefore present the first estimates of ethnic diversity at the subnational level and examine their origins in the DRC. First, the data clearly reveal a strong and nonhomogenized ethnolinguistic diversity across the national landscape, while also acknowledging the real presence of ethnic dominance and significant ethnic polarization in certain territories. Second, based on our data, our empirical evidence suggests that ethnolinguistic diversity in the DRC can be primarily explained by geoclimatic factors, followed by historical-institutional factors, mixed variables, and finally, modern variables.Related ArticlesIshiyama, J., and K. Fox. 2006. "What Affects the Strength of Partisan Identity in Sub-Saharan Africa?" Politics & Policy 34, no. 4: 748-773. . Koos, A. K. 2016. "Constitutional Definition of the Demos and Inter-Ethnic Relations." Politics & Policy 44, no. 4: 639-676. . Ondoua Beyene, B., T. Mamadou Asngar, B. E. Ongo Nkoa, C. B. Kamdem, and P. K. Fosso. 2025. "Cultural Diffusion and Democracy: What Lessons in Sub-Saharan Africa's Experience?" Politics & Policy 53, no. 1: e70012. .Related ArticlesIshiyama, J., and K. Fox. 2006. "What Affects the Strength of Partisan Identity in Sub-Saharan Africa?" Politics & Policy 34, no. 4: 748-773. . Koos, A. K. 2016. "Constitutional Definition of the Demos and Inter-Ethnic Relations." Politics & Policy 44, no. 4: 639-676. . Ondoua Beyene, B., T. Mamadou Asngar, B. E. Ongo Nkoa, C. B. Kamdem, and P. K. Fosso. 2025. "Cultural Diffusion and Democracy: What Lessons in Sub-Saharan Africa's Experience?" Politics & Policy 53, no. 1: e70012. .Related ArticlesIshiyama, J., and K. Fox. 2006. "What Affects the Strength of Partisan Identity in Sub-Saharan Africa?" Politics & Policy 34, no. 4: 748-773. . Koos, A. K. 2016. "Constitutional Definition of the Demos and Inter-Ethnic Relations." Politics & Policy 44, no. 4: 639-676. . Ondoua Beyene, B., T. Mamadou Asngar, B. E. Ongo Nkoa, C. B. Kamdem, and P. K. Fosso. 2025. "Cultural Diffusion and Democracy: What Lessons in Sub-Saharan Africa's Experience?" Politics & Policy 53, no. 1: e70012. . Esta investigaci & oacute;n tiene dos objetivos: por un lado, busca medir la diversidad etnoling & uuml;& iacute;stica en la Rep & uacute;blica Democr & aacute;tica del Congo (RDC) a nivel desagregado, con una granularidad equivalente a la segunda escala administrativa congole & ntilde;a; por otro, explica esta fragmentaci & oacute;n con base en la literatura emp & iacute;rica reciente. Por lo tanto, presentamos las primeras estimaciones de la diversidad & eacute;tnica a nivel subnacional y examinamos sus or & iacute;genes en la RDC. En primer lugar, los datos revelan claramente una diversidad etnoling & uuml;& iacute;stica fuerte y no homogeneizada en todo el panorama nacional, a la vez que reconocen la presencia real de dominancia & eacute;tnica y una significativa polarizaci & oacute;n & eacute;tnica en ciertos territorios. En segundo lugar, con base en nuestros datos, la evidencia emp & iacute;rica sugiere que la diversidad etnoling & uuml;& iacute;stica en la RDC puede explicarse principalmente por factores geoclim & aacute;ticos, seguidos de factores hist & oacute;rico-institucionales, variables mixtas y, finalmente, variables modernas. (sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic):(sic)(sic),(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(DRC)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic),(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic);(sic)(sic),(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic).(sic)(sic),(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic),(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic).(sic)(sic),(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic),(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic).(sic)(sic),(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic),(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic),(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic),(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic),(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic),(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic).

Civil conflict and institutional failure represent persistent barriers to economic development in resource-rich regions, yet the effectiveness of emergency governance interventions remains poorly understood. We examine the causal impact of the Democratic Republic of Congo's 2021 State of Siege, which transferred administrative authority from civilian to military officials in North Kivu and Ituri provinces to address escalating violence and governance failures. Exploiting the quasi-experimental variation in treatment assignment across eastern provinces, we employ Matrix Completion methods to construct counterfactual outcomes using granular incident-level data from the Kufatilia Artisanal and Small-scale Mining Tracker spanning 2019-2023. We find that the State of Siege failed to achieve significant improvements in any measured outcome. Child labor, corruption, environmental degradation, mining disputes, roadblocks, and violence persisted at levels consistent with pre-intervention trajectories despite substantial expansion of military authority and resources. These results underscore the limitations of security-centric approaches in fragile states and highlight the need for comprehensive institutional reforms that simultaneously address coercive capacity, fiscal infrastructure, and legal frameworks to break cycles of violence and resource predation.

This paper examines whether the gap between the educational attainment of the country's leader and the population affects the implementation of land reforms. We combine an unbalanced panel of the educational distance and the enactment of land reforms from 1900-2010 to test our hypothesis. The analysis confirms our intuition and shows a statistically significant negative effect of educational distance on the probability of the full implementation of reforms in a Multinomial Logistic regression. The sensitivity analysis confirms the robustness of our results after the inclusion of other control variables and using alternative estimation techniques such as Ordinary Least Squares, Ordered Probit, and Logit. To deal with potential endogeneity, we use instrumental variables that indicate the distinct colonial educational policies. The Two Stage Least Squares estimation results confirm our findings.

ABSTRACT: This paper examines the effect of the visits of U.S. Presidents and Secretaries of State to a country on bilateral trade flows between that country and the United States. The official visits dummy variables are derived from the historical archives of the U.S. Department of State, while bilateral trade with the United States as a percentage of total trade with the world is compiled from UNCOMTRADE. The fixed effects estimation shows that the visits of U.S. officials to the country do not have a statistically significant effect on the bilateral trade variable. However, the issue of endogeneity cannot be ignored. As much as trade flows may increase after the visits of American officials to the country, these officials may be tempted to visit their major trading partners as well. This is either to ensure the smooth flow of trade, to increase the volume and value of trade, or to contain any trade disputes. This highlights an issue of reverse causality. To address the issue of potential endogeneity, we use the Endogenous Treatment model. The estimation results provide evidence that the official visits of U.S. Presidents and U.S. Secretaries of State have a statistically significant positive effect on bilateral trade with the United States. This is robust even after the inclusion of other control variables identified by the literature as confounding factors for bilateral trade flows. When we examine the effect of different types of visits, the results show that bilateral meetings during the official visits of U.S. Presidents and U.S. Secretaries of State have a statistically significant positive effect. These results imply that the visits of U.S. officials are taken as an opportunity to conclude trade agreements, to contain trade disputes, and to discuss the elimination of trade barriers between the two countries. This enhances the level of bilateral trade between the country and the United States. The paper has multiple policy implications tat are discussed in detail.

This paper surveys the nascent literature on the causes and consequences of official diplomatic visits that are undertaken by country's leaders, heads of states, chiefs of the executive, foreign ministers, and international notable figures and prominent personnel. The paper discusses the need for such a literature survey, the nature and sources of data used in the pertinent studies, and the determinants and factors behind official diplomatic visits. The paper also covers the political, economic, social, and cultural consequences of official visits. The paper concludes with some recommendations for future research.

This article examines the impact of prehistoric geographic isolation on technology adoption in both the historical period and contemporary period. The regression results show that geographic isolation tends to have a persistent positive effect on technology adoption, therefore, providing empirical support for the theory that geographic isolation is beneficial for economic development by stimulating innovations and improving technology.

This paper examines the effect of official visits by U.S. Presidents and Secretaries of State on foreign direct investment inflows. The key difficulty in determining a causal effect is the issue of endogeneity. To address potential endogeneity, we use the Endogenous Treatment model (ETM). The estimation results provide evidence that the official visits of U.S. Presidents have a statistically significant positive effect on both foreign investment inflows from the U.S. and on total foreign direct investment inflows. This is robust even after the inclusion of other control variables identified by the literature as confounding factors for foreign direct investment. When we examine the effect of different types of visits, the results show that bilateral meetings during the official visits of U.S. Presidents have a statistically significant positive effect on both foreign investment inflows from the U.S. and total foreign direct investment. These results imply that the visits of U.S. Presidents offer a signal of the confidence of American administrations in the host country, which may in turn encourage American and non-American firms to invest in that country.

Abstract This paper examines the effect of the visits by U.S. officials to a country on foreign aid. To achieve our objective, we compile variables that indicate the official visits of U.S. Presidents and Secretaries of States from 1960-2019 from the historical archives of the U.S. State Department. We examine the effect of these variables on U.S. aid and total official development assistance flows to the country. To deal with potential endogeneity, we use the Endogenous Treatment Model. The estimation results show that the visits of U.S. officials have a statistically significant positive effect on U.S. aid only when the visit is part of a multilateral meeting, while the effect of the visits of U.S. Presidents have a statistically significant positive effect on total official development assistance only when the visit is in the form of a bilateral meeting. A potential interpretation is that U.S. aid is provided as part of a multilateral effort intended to induce other countries to provide assistance to the country as well. However, donors could take the flow of U.S. aid as a signal that the country will be able to secure aid from the U.S. and will be less in need of their assistance. On the other hand, a bilateral visit by an American President can signal to other donors the confidence the United States have in this country, the close ties it has with this country, or the stakes it has in preserving stable economic conditions in this country. This could induce the donors to aid the country by offering official development assistance. JEL Code: D72, F54, F35, H11, O19

This study examines the effect of U.S. Presidents and Secretaries of State visits to a country on institutional quality, particularly on economic freedom. Hence, the study develops a model that predicts the conditions under which official visits can enhance the quality of institutions. We compile variables on official visits from 1960 to 2019 from the archives of the U.S. State Department to test the predictions of our model. In addition, we use the endogenous treatment model estimation to deal with potential endogeneity. The estimation results show that the official visits have a statistically significant negative effect on economic freedom, particularly in non-democratic countries with less political freedom. The estimation results are robust with different types of visits and samples. The study presents multiple explanations for these results, including the possibility of the following: First, some American administrations adopt a pragmatic approach aimed at achieving strategic objectives while overlooking practices that do not enhance institutional quality. Second, these official visits may improve other aspects of institutional quality that are more observable to the international community than economic freedoms. Third, American policymakers care more about achieving short-term objectives from their visits that can be presented as accomplishments to their electorate rather than institutional reforms that will only yield benefits to the United States in the long run. Finally, economic freedoms are associated with political freedoms per the Hayek-Friedman hypothesis.

The purpose of this study has been to assess the relationship between intelligence or cognitive capital and wage in 118 countries using cross-sectional. Human capital is measured in terms of IQ and cognitive ability, while wage is appreciated in both minimum wages. The empirical evidence is based on OLS, IWLS and quantile regression. We establish a positive relationship between these two variables, which adorned stable.

We assess the correlations between tribalism and financial development in 60 countries using data averages from 2000 to 2010. The tribalism index is used to measure tribalism whereas financial development is measured from perspectives of financial intermediary and stock market developments. The long-term finance variable is stock market capitalisation while short-run variable is private and domestic credit. We find that tribalism is negatively correlated with financial development and the magnitude of negativity is higher for financial intermediary development relative to stock market development. The findings are particularly relevant to African and Middle Eastern countries where the scourge of tribalism is most pronounced. JEL: E62, H11, H20, G20, O43

This paper examines the effect of a visit by a country's leader to the U.S. on the ability to attract foreign loans. The difficulty is the issue of endogeneity. As the leader's visit may attract foreign loans, leaders may also be tempted to visit countries known to be major creditors. To deal with potential endogeneity, we introduce a novel instrumental variable for the number of leader's trips. The instrument is urban distance defined as the gap between the level of urban development in the country of the leader relative to that in the United States. We conduct a Two-Stage-Least-Squares estimation (2SLS) and the Limited Information Maximum Likelihood (LIML) estimation where the urban distance serves as a source of exogenous variation in leader's trips. The data for leader's trips is derived from the historical archives of the U.S. State Department. The estimation provides evidence of a statistically significant positive coefficient of leader's trips. This result implies that these trips by the leaders signal to the creditors their commitment to use the borrowed funds properly and to repay these funds in due time. Our results are robust even after the inclusion of other control variable, using alternative samples, and accounting for the potential of instrument weakness. Borrowers ought to consider the beneficial effect of a visit by their leaders to their creditors. These trips allow the leaders to present to foreign creditors the projects that need to be financed in their countries, to persuade them to extend a loan to their country with concessionary terms, to highlight the future benefits of the loan, and to reassure them of the ability of the borrower to repay the principal and interest in due time.

Following the Millennium Development Goals and the Dakar Framework for Action, many African countries instituted free primary education policies in 2000 to achieve universal primary education by 2015. However, the impact of free education policies remains understudied, particularly for late-adopters. This paper estimates the short-term effects of free primary education on enrollment in the Democratic Republic of Congo, where the policy was implemented as a trial in only two provinces in 2010. We exploit the spatial variations in adopting the policies using difference-in-differences with propensity score matching and show that free primary education policies significantly increase enrollment. We find large heterogeneity in the effects depending on the school management types. Catholic conventional school accounts for most of the enrollment due to the perceived quality, level of teacher knowledge, school infrastructure, and better service delivery.

This paper examines the effect of the presence of a military ruler on military expenditure using a panel of sub-Saharan Africa countries. The paper also explores whether the relationship reflects a capture effect, is an outcome of the confrontational climate of the cold war or is a self-preservation effort by military rulers. The panel data estimations show that the presence of a military ruler has a statistically significant negative effect on military spending as a percentage of GDP. The coefficients are also not significantly different before or after the end of the cold war era. This implies that the negative relationship is driven by an effort by military rulers to preempt the ability of their peers to overthrow them from power. We also attempt to deal with potential endogeneity and consider the possibility of persistence in military spending. The paper uses the Arellano and Bond (1991) estimation technique that shows a negative but insignificant effect of the presence of a military ruler on military expenditure, while military spending shows a high degree of persistence.

This paper examines whether the number of official visits to and from the U.S. allows the country to adopt a more democratic system of governance. To achieve its objective, the paper develops a model that derives the conditions under which a host invites a guest to persuade or pressure for democratic improvement, and the conditions under which the guest accepts an invitation to visit and decides to improve the quality of democratic governance after the visit. To test our hypothesis, we introduce novel variables that indicate the number of leader's trips to the U.S., and the number of visits of U.S. Presidents and Secretaries of State to the country, from 1960 to 2015. The estimation results show that the official visits have a statistically significant positive effect on democracy. These results are robust. The paper also uses 3SLS to deal with potential endogeneity. The estimation confirms our previous findings that the official visits have a statistically significant positive effect on democracy. Finally, we explore the channels of transmission and find that American administrations use bilateral trade flows and U.S. aid as an incentive for countries to democratize. This supports our model predictions.

This paper examines the effect of the number of visits by U.S. officials to a country, and the number of visits of the country’s leaders to the United States, on bilateral trade flows between the country and the United States. To achieve our objective, we compile novel variables that indicate the number of official visits from 1960-2015 from the historical archives of the U.S. State Department. To deal with potential endogeneity, we use instrumental variables panel data techniques such as dynamic GMM and systems GMM estimations. The estimation results show that the visits by U.S. Presidents and Secretaries of State do not have a statistically significant effect on bilateral trade flows, while the leader’s trips to the United States have a statistically significant positive effect. This indicates that the leader’s trips to the United States are taken as an opportunity to promote free bilateral trade flows between the country and the United States, while the visits of American officials focus on other issues.

This study explores the relationship between social media and democracy in a cross-section of over 125 countries around the world. We find the evidence of a strong, positive correlation between Facebook penetration (a proxy for social media) and democracy. We further show that the correlation between social media and democracy is stronger for low-income countries than high-income countries. Our lowest point estimates indicate that a one-standard deviation (about 18 percentage point) increase in Facebook penetration is associated with an improvement in the democracy index by about 8-point (on a scale of 0–100) for the world sample and over 11 points for the sample of low-income countries.

This paper examines the effect of the number of visits by U.S. Presidents and Secretaries of State to the country on civil conflict. To achieve our objective, we compile novel variables that indicate the number of official visits from 1960-2017 derived from the historical archives of the U.S. State Department. To deal with potential endogeneity, we introduce novel instrumental variables for the number of official visits variables, namely aviation safety and capital distance. The 2SLS estimations provide evidence that the visits by U.S. officials to the country have a statistically significant positive effect on the onset of conflict. This indicates that the visits by U.S. officials induce the insurgents to engage in armed conflict with the incumbent government that is perceived as a stooge of the United States.

Who Becomes Minister in the DRC is a newly created database that provides information on members of government. The purpose of this article is to present the database and to document some facts about the background of political leaders. The database covers the period 2000-2016. The profile of politicians in this database is as follows: born mainly in the DRC, a Congolese minister is a 50-year-old male and Swahili-speaking, with a bachelor's degree mainly in law or economics. Finally, some avenues likely to be explored for future research with this database are indicated.