Restricted stock awards carry upside and downside risks for CEOs. We follow a socio-cognitive perspective by suggesting that awards of restricted stock are viewed as potential gains or potential losses depending on each CEO's dominant regulatory focus. Regulatory focus, therefore, helps determine how a CEO responds to restricted stock awards. We also propose that the moderating effect of regulatory focus strengthens as firm complexity increases and as CEO tenure lengthens, because complexity and tenure both increase CEOs' reliance on heuristic information processing. Specifically, complexity restricts a CEO's cognitive capacity for thoughtful deliberation during decision making, and tenure affects a CEO's motivation to search for and process information thoroughly. We find general support for the hypotheses and discuss the implications of our findings for future research and practice.

Much scholarly discussion on managerial stock-based compensation and risk taking has involved the two key properties of performance pay: risk sharing and incentive benefits. Focusing on either the undesirable risk bearing property or the incentive benefits that stock-based compensation provides, scholars have offered different prediction regarding the effect of performance pay on executive risk taking. We investigate how CEO regulatory focus sheds light on CEO interpretation of their shareholdings and in turn CEO risk taking behavior. In analyses of data compiled from the public companies listed in Taiwan, we found general support for the hypotheses.

INTRODUCTION * Question 1--How are PepsiCo, Coca-Cola, Monsanto, and McDonald's interrelated? * Question 2--How is IKEA interrelated with its rivals or stakeholders? * Question 3--How are Microsoft, Intel, IBM, Netscape, America Online, and Hewlett Packard interrelated? The answer to the first question is that these organizations primarily have opportunistic, competitive interfirm exchanges and it is via such exchanges that they are interrelated. Our response to the second question is that IKEA tends to have cooperative, nonconfrontational interactions with its stakeholders and rivals and this is how IKEA is interrelated with them. The answer we provide to the third question is that the enterprises mentioned have cooperative and competitive interfirm exchanges and it is through these exchanges that such firms are interrelated. A fundamental difference, however, may be discerned between the first group of firms and the latter two groups of firms. In the first group, the viabilities of PepsiCo, Coca-Cola, Monsanto, and McDonald's tend to be independent of each other as each firm develops on its own. In the other two groups, the viability of IKEA and its rivals/stakeholders, and on the other hand, the viability of Microsoft, Intel, IBM, Netscape, America Online, and Hewlett-Packard may be interdependent. In this paper, we recognize interrelatedness as a recurring pattern of interfirm behavior which can be characterized as predominantly competitive, cooperative, or both competitive and cooperative. Our concern is with firms which are interrelated but remain autonomous. Included in our analysis are groups of firms which contain competing enterprises as well as their stakeholder organizations. The reason we include such organization as competitors, strategic allies, suppliers and buyers in our work is that the roles played by some firms as the interact with each other may not always be clear-cut at any given point in time, For instance, on any given day, one organization may find another to be simultaneously a rival, a partner, a supplier, and/or a customer (Hamel & Prahalad, 1994). Additionally, some enterprises are increasingly involving stakeholder organizations in quality training, product design and other previously private internal processes, making interfirm boundaries ambiguous. Consequently, the inclusion of competing organizations and their stakeholder organizations in our examination of interrelated firms makes sense since interorganizational roles and boundaries in some situations have become somewhat obscured. We realize that it is difficult to characterize interactions among organizations as either strictly competitive or cooperative. That is because both cooperation and competition may occur among organizations. For instance, firms which may collaborate on specific projects tend to compete when the time comes for them to divide the pie. On the other hand, rival firms may cooperate (e.g., competing firms, such as General Motors and Toyota, cooperate on the production of small cars). Although both rivalry and collaboration may occur within a group of interacting firms, a competitive predisposition will ordinarily dominate cooperative tendencies in some groups of interrelated enterprises. Alternatively, a cooperative orientation may dominate competitive behavior in other group of firms. Yet within other groups of interrelated organizations, collaborative as well as rivalrous forces may approach balance. We recognize that rivalry may be more intense among competing organizations relative to interfirm exchanges which involve firms and their suppliers, customers, or strategic allies. However, in a group of firms predisposed to competitive behavior, we contend that adversarial forces will be more intense among rivals and their stakeholder organizations. In a group of firms with cooperative tendencies, collaborative forces will be comparatively more pronounced and, in a competitive and cooperative group, these forces may approximate parity. …

'Say on pay' - that is empowering shareholders to vote on the remuneration arrangements of their firm's senior executives - has become an international policy response to the perceived explosion in rewards for top management. In this study, we examine the operation of say in pay in the UK, the country which pioneered its adoption, using the population of non-investment trust companies in the FTSE 350 over the period 2003-12. We find that executive remuneration and dissent on the remuneration committee report are positively correlated. However, the magnitude of this effect is small. We find that dissent plays a role in moderating future executive compensation levels, although this effect is restricted to levels of dissent above 10%, and primarily acting upon the higher quantiles of rewards.

music from before 1600, creates endless problems for the musicologist. Unlike paintings, there are no x-rays to reveal earlier layers of composition, or paint pigments to analyze via mass spectrometry. The tools for analyzing stylistic features remain unrefined, compared to the elegant assessments of brush strokes, perspective, color, and narrative typical of art history. For fifteenth-century Latin music, musicologists rely on large-scale markers including genre, mensuration, text distribution, and cantus firmus treatment to determine the origins of anonymous works. This is true for English music, which retained distinctive characteristics even as it circulated anonymously across Europe, often with the ascription “Anglicanus” or “de Anglia.” During the same period, virtually no music from the Continent was copied in England itself. These circumstances inform Peter Wright’s impressive edition of individual Gloria and Credo movements for the series Early English Church Music. The volume is divided in four parts: complete settings of the Gloria and Credo, followed by fragmentary settings of the Gloria and Credo. Only five of the nineteen complete works have composer attributions, to which Wright provisionally adds two more. Three of the twenty-nine incomplete settings survive with attributions. The edition prefaces each work with an editorial commentary that includes easy-to-read critical notes, plainsong cantus firmi, and an individual discussion of text setting. In keeping with the current editorial policy of the series, the music is rendered in diplomatic notation, but transcribed in score, to the extent of displaying coloration and conflicting mensurations among voices, of which there are many. Each part has measure markers to denote the length of one breve. Because mensural notation is contextual in orientation, the length of individual notes and the coordination among voices are shown by their relative spacing on the page. Conceptually, this editorial method offers a strong visual representation of the separate, yet interdependent voices that sound in performance. The parameters of the edition—the determination of which settings are English— are based on the work of a small cadre of scholars, notably Brian Trowell (“Music under the Later Plantagenets” [Ph.D. diss., University of Cambridge, 1960]), Charles Hamm (“A Catalogue of Anonymous English Music in Fifteenth-Century Conti nental Manuscripts,” Musica Disciplina 22 [1968]: 47–76), Gareth R. K. Curtis (“Stylistic Layers in the English Mass Repertory, c. 1400–1450,” Proceedings of the Royal Musical Association 109 [1982–83]: 23–38), and Andrew Wathey (Gareth R. K. Curtis and Andrew Wathey, “FifteenthCentury English Liturgical Music: A List of the Surviving Repertory,” Royal Musical Association Research Chronicle 27 [1994]: 1–69). It is disappointing that the introduction sidesteps a discussion of thirteen exMUSIC REVIEWS

Despite leader-member exchange (LMX) theory’s initial premise of a three group status (low-, middle- and high-quality), scholars have continued their quest to theorize and empirically define the LMX developmental process with the two extreme ends. The authors review empirical studies that have isolated the middle-quality group and highlight outcomes and measurement opportunities of this group. The results of the review suggest continuing to portray LMX as a dichotomy masks the reality of the complexity of today’s LMX relationships and hinder comprehension of the LMX developmental process. The authors offer potential future research directions for LMX research inclusive of the middle-quality group.

Incremental innovation plays an important role in competitive conduct in high‐tech industries. This paper explores the impact of new model introduction by employing a nested logit specification to investigate the determination of market shares across and within submarkets for a panel of 336 digital cameras. Our results confirm the existence of pronounced life cycle effects and the existence of statistically significant market stealing and cannibalization effects, particularly associated with the introduction of a technologically superior entrant into the model's market segment. The paper reveals significant differences in market outcomes, in both elasticity and response to entry, across submarkets.

It is commonly believed that retaining target company executives is an important determinant of post-acquisition success. We review existing research, paying particular attention to the different micro-, group-, meso-, and macro-level factors that motivate acquisitions. We conclude that the link between turnover and post-acquisition performance is more complex than implied by existing studies. Retaining executives may lead to higher performance in some acquisitions, as existing studies suggest. However, there are good theoretical arguments for the opposite view; namely, replacing executives may be an equally important source of value creation in other acquisitions. We develop a framework that provides guidelines for understanding when and under what conditions retaining or replacing target executives may contribute to acquisition success. A research agenda that considers acquisition context and the short-, intermediate-, and long-term performance consequences of leadership instability in acquired firms is suggested as a means of moving this research domain forward. The decision to retain or replace target executives is largely a matter of context. Existing studies have not yet captured this complexity.

The purpose of this paper is to determine if advertising in the motor carrier industry has increased since the passage of the Motor Carrier Act of 1980. A census of sixty-five common carriers was conducted through the use of a mail survey. Simple, but meaningful, dependent and independent variables were established to test several hypotheses.

ABSTRACTWe elaborate on the determinants and performance prospects of liquid assets (cash and short-term investments) of smaller firms that are based abroad. We propose that smaller firms, for different reasons, may hold more liquid assets. Our contention also is that liquid asset holdings of cross-listed (noncross-listed) smaller enterprises may be directly (inversely) associated with firm performance. Moreover, the gap in performance may be greater between cross-listed versus noncross-listed enterprises of emerging countries compared to the gap in performance of cross-listed versus noncross-listed enterprises of developed nations.INTRODUCTIONScholars have recognized that executives ordinarily have information about their enterprise that external investors do not have (Sanders and Carpenter, 2003; Kang and Kim, 2010; Reuer, Tong, and Wu, 2013). This problem of information asymmetry, when one actor to an exchange has information that the other does not (Spence, 1973, 1974), may be particularly acute in the case of smaller businesses that are based abroad. If those firms are only listed on overseas exchanges, they are perceived to have greater information asymmetry. That is because, relative to U.S. exchanges, overseas exchanges have inferior investor guardian mechanisms due to lower levels of shareholder protection, poorer accounting disclosure requirements, and less transparent stock market trading conditions (Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz, 2004, 2006; Aggarwal, Erel, Stulz, and Williamson, 2009). Such shortcomings limit greater scrutiny by expert analysts, outside investors, and government authorities. Given these shortcomings, agency conflicts may become more intense (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Since managers have firm-specific information pertinent to the enterprise which may not be known to market participants, the efficiency of utilization of corporate assets may be questioned. Specifically, due to agency conflicts, it may be questioned whether firm assets will be used to enhance the interests of executives rather than owners (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Wright, Kroll, and Elenkov, 2002).In the presence of information asymmetry, market participants search for signals that may provide insight into the condition of the enterprise. In turn, managers of smaller businesses that are based abroad may provide signals to market participants to shed further light on the firm and its performance prospects. A signal is an attribute that a party has private, unverifiable information (Riley, 1989). To be effective, signals must be observable and costly or difficult to imitate (Spence, 1973, 1974). Because of the agency concern that executives of smaller overseas firms may utilize corporate assets for personal benefits at a cost to shareholders, executives of some firms may reliably subject themselves to increased investor guardianship by reducing information asymmetry through a key signal. They could cross-list their firms' common stocks on the U.S. exchanges, thereby lowering information asymmetry and conveying reduced agency conflicts. Cross-listing their shares on the U.S. exchanges helps to reduce the information asymmetry dilemma since these exchanges have higher levels of shareholder protection, more stringent accounting disclosure requirements, and more transparent stock market trading (Doidge, et al., 2004, 2006; Aggarwal, et al., 2009).As noted, firm assets may be used inappropriately. That is, they may be utilized for the private benefits of managers at the expense of firm performance and owners' welfare. However, enterprise assets may alternatively be used productively, promoting firm performance and shareholder wealth. In this study, we are concerned with the liquid asset holdings (cash and short-term investments) of smaller firms that are based overseas and their performance implications. Specifically, we are concerned with liquid asset holdings of those enterprises that have signaled enhanced shareholder guardianship versus those which have not. …

INTRODUCTIONDutta and Thornhill (2013) have theoretically questioned why some smaller firms survive while others do not. Scholars of small business and entrepreneurship have addressed this question from various theoretical perspectives. Castrogiovanni and Justis (2002) claim small business success may be better understood by resorting to theories relevant to strategic and contextual factors. Weinzimmer, Michel, and Franczak (2013) have attributed the understanding of business survival to theories of strategic orientation. Goldsby and Nelson (2012) argue that viability of small businesses may be comprehended via theories on firm design advantages.In our view, theories related to firm governance may also advance our understanding of why some smaller firms may become viable, while others may not. The topic of firm governance has received a great deal of attention not only because of its theoretical importance, but also because of its enormous practical importance (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997: 737). Firm governance may be defined as the power to manage or deploy enterprise resources and to resolve the conflicts of interests that may arise among the related participants. Scholars from a variety of disciplines have devoted their efforts to the study of this topic. In order to further our understanding of firm governance and its implications for enterprise viability, researchers have resorted to a number of related theories. Each of the various theories has shed light on some aspects of firm governance, but neglected other prominent aspects of governance. As suggested by Weick (1979), a good theory enlightens us with some dimensions of reality, but no theory can inform us with all dimensions of reality. Consequently, a multitheoretic elaboration may leverage the contributions of divergent theories and offset what each theory has not addressed.Our goal is not to cover all the theories related to firm governance, but to focus on agency, stewardship, resource dependence, and cognitive theories. Since the most dominant approach to the study of governance has utilized agency theory, we discuss this theory in relation to the other theories. Initially, we focus on agency and stewardship theories because they are in contrast to each other and may serve as substitutes with respect to small firm governance. Subsequently, we relate resource dependence and cognitive theories to agency theory because they enrich each other and may serve as complements regarding small firm governance. As will be evident, our elaborations, which are based on research evidence, may have appeal to those interested in small firm viability.THEORIES REVISITEDJuxtaposition of Agency and Stewardship TheoriesFirm governance has been substantially influenced by agency theory. The question posed by this theory is whether the power to manage the enterprise is used to benefit the principal, or the owner of enterprise resources, versus the agent, or the manager of enterprise resources (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Grounded in financial economics, the concern of agency theorists is with the conflicts of interests between owners and managers of firm resources. In this vein, the separation of ownership and management of enterprise resources is expected to lead to conflicts because the wishes of the owners are assumed to be distorted by the managers in ways that benefit the managers, but at a cost to the owners (Fama & Jensen, 1983). If managers are allowed to be wasteful with firm resources and not maximize the wealth of the owners, then presumably enterprise viability suffers. The emphasis of agency theory researchers is on the protection of the interests of the principal since the interests of the agent are protected by market forces (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). That is, if the agent is abused by the principal, such as being paid less than market wages, he or she could seek employment with another principal who pays market wages. …

Much of the research on managerial risk taking is grounded in one of the two leading theoretical perspectives: agency theory and prospect theory. While both perspectives agree that stock-based incentives influence managerial risk-taking behavior, they offer different predictions regarding the relationship. We investigate whether managerial perceived control helps reconcile the inconsistency. In analyses of data compiled from the public companies listed in CompuStat's Executive Compensation Database, we found general support for the hypotheses.

ABSTRACT In this paper, by resorting to concepts of identity orientations and forms of social exchange, we elaborate on possibility that some enterprise members may especially value one currency of psychological contract, while others may value multiple currencies. Moreover, independence or interdependence of currencies is addressed with ramifications for breach of psychological agreement. INTRODUCTION The separation of ownership and control has been recognized from different perspectives as a potential major organizational problem (Berle & Means, 1932; McLean Parks & Schmedemann, 1994; Rousseau & Shperling, 2003; Veblen, 1923). From an economic perspective, it has been argued that alignment of owners' and agents' interests via nexus of formal contracts requires attempts in resolution of conflicts between interests of principals and their agents (Berle & Means, 1932; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The problem of separation of owners' and agents' interests refers to agents promoting their personal interests at expense of principals whose interests are best served when their wealth is maximized through efforts of agents. For principals, therefore, benefits are primarily relevant in economic terms. The agents, however, not only prefer enhancements of their wealth, but also enhancements of their non-economic utilities at expense of principals. Note that agents' wealth may be enhanced with their employment rewards. Their non-economic benefits may encompass the physical appointments of office, attractiveness of secretarial staff, level of employee discipline, kind and amount of charitable contributions . . . etc. (Jensen & Meckling, 1976: 486). Effort reduction on job may also increase non-financial utilities of agents at expense of principals. Both economic and non-economic benefits of agents are conceived to be driven by self-interest, and self-interest is anticipated to be promoted deceitfully. Hence according to economic scholars, in absence of inducements or monitoring/intervention, managers or employees will deliberately and guilefully violate terms of their formal employment contract (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). From an organizational behavior perspective, it has alternatively been contended what economists interpret as agents' propensity to enhance their economic and non-economic benefits at expense of principals may actually occur because of limited information, misunderstanding, or miscommunication (Morrison & Robinson, 1997; Rousseau & Shperling, 2003). Consequently, problems that evolve from separation of ownership and control can be traced to gaps in what employers expect and what employees perceive they should contribute. Rather than deliberately violating terms of their employment agreements, organization behavior scholars propose executives and workers will honor their employment agreements, as they understand them. Accordingly, enhancing communication and mutual understanding among shareholders, managers, and employees may resolve problem of separation of ownership and control of corporate assets. Therefore, mutual benefits may be expected as mutual understanding is achieved among these stakeholders (Pierce, Rubenfeld, & Morgan, 1991; Rosen, Klein, & Young, 1986; Rousseau, 1995). What is recognized in behavioral view is that individuals at outset may seek jobs with organizations for an economic reason. Although economic exchange may initially characterize relationship between employee and enterprise, behaviors of employees within enterprise are motivated by more than an economic agenda. Hence, a person's decision to offer contributions to firm cannot be explained by economics alone. Whereas economic perspective emphasizes formal contract and expectation that agents will seek selfish interests beyond provisions of formal contract, organization behavior theorists clearly emphasize informal contract. …

Upper echelons theory states that prominent organizational members affect corporate outcomes, and firms are reflections of key decision-makers' mental constructs and propensities (Geletkanycz and Black, 2001; Hambrick and Mason, 1984). Demographic factors serve as proxies for mental constructs driving human propensities and firm outcomes. The impact of incentives, largely ignored in upper echelons theory, is addressed in agency theory (Hambrick and Jackson, 2000; Ryan and Wiggins, 2004). Top executives may choose firm strategies for personal benefits at a cost to shareholder wealth. Governance mechanisms limiting such abuse include managerial incentives and director incentives to monitor actively (Byrd and Hickman, 1992; Chang, 2003). Both agency and upper echelons perspectives are informative regarding the influences of directors and executives, each with a different focus. The upper echelons view is that decision-makers affect outcomes and they matter both for good and for ill. Executives make decisions and engage in behaviors that affect the health, wealth, and welfare of others--but they do so as flawed human beings (Hambrick, 2007: 341). Whereas upper echelons theory is silent on the issue of incentives, agency theorists argue that ownership incentives help align CEO and shareholder interests (Chang, 2003; Kroll et al., 1997; Wright et al., 2002b), motivate directors to monitor (Hambrick and Jackson, 2000; Ryan and Wiggins, 2004), and offer advice (Demb and Neubauer, 1992; Lorsch and MacIver, 1989). These key players influence acquisition quality, which has significant shareholder consequences (Andradade et al., 2001; Wright et al., 2002b). Theory and Hypotheses This study examines the interaction of experiences and incentives of two powerful corporate players: blockholder-directors and owner-CEOs. Pitcher and Smith (2001) recommend studying the impact of the dispositions and propensities of powerful individuals on corporate behavior and outcomes. Hambrick argues that if it is worthy to comprehend why enterprises behave or perform the way they do, we must consider the dispositions of their most powerful actors ... (2007: 334). Blocldaolder-directors are prominent because of their monitoring or advising roles as outsiders, as well as their control of five percent or more of a firm's outstanding equity stakes. Owner-CEOs are likewise influential because of their position of authority and significant shareholdings. The premise is that investment in incentives to manage or monitor and counsel can be efficient. CEO ownership captures investments in managerial incentives. Blockholder-director ownership captures investments in director monitoring and counsel. To address director or managerial propensity the present focus is on CEO and director experience. Experience gained in professional activities and via connections with others such as business-related networks (e.g., Collins and Clark, 2003; Geletkanycz and Hambrick, 1997), or external involvement such as international involvement (e.g., Kor, 2003; Reuber and Fischer, 1997; Sambharya, 1996), is an important indicator of mental constructs driving director or executive propensity. Good and bad experiences, however, differ in their consequences. The present proposition is that executives and directors who have served with value-creating enterprises are endowed with good experiences, whereas those who have served with value-destroying firms have gained bad experiences. Experiences gained through prior acquisitions or experiences related to a target firm's industry can affect acquisitions. Good versus bad prior experiences may be consequential as to whether directors or CEOs matter positively or negatively. This conjecture modifies the proposal of Hambrick (2007), but is compatible with his notion that key organizational players matter for good or for ill. Whereas previous good experiences with desirable results may be resorted to repeatedly, prior bad experiences with unfavorable consequences may also be repeated. …

We draw on organizational learning theory as well as resource-based view and examine managerial ability-strategic choice associations (i.e., choice of exploitative and/or explorative strategies). We also analyze the effects on outcomes of adopting exploitative and/or explorative strategies. The results indicate that more able top management teams (TMTs) simultaneously adopt exploitative and explorative strategies, whereas less able TMTs adopt either the exploita-tive or the explorative strategy. Moreover, firms with more able TMTs, adopting both strategies, tend to structure a better alignment with the environment and have lower vulnerability than en-terprises with less able TMTs adopting only one strategy.

(1985). International Impact: Business Education Importation and Economic Development. The Journal of Business Education: Vol. 60, No. 8, pp. 336-341.