Does a better monitoring of officials' actions (transparency) lower the incidence of corruption? Using a common agency game with imperfect information, we show that the answer depends on the measure of corruption that one uses. More transparency lowers the prevalence of corruption but raises the average bribe as it motivates the corruptor to bid more aggressively for the agent's favor. We show that transparency affects the prevalence of corruption at the margin through a competitive effect and an efficiency effect.

We compute the differential and total rate of the semileptonic decay of polarized top quarks t→ℓν _ℓ + b jet + jet at next-to-leading order (NLO) in the QCD coupling with an off-shell intermediate W boson. We present several normalized distributions, in particular those that reflect the t -spin analyzing powers of the lepton, the b-jet and the W^+ boson at LO and NLO QCD.

Does a better monitoring (transparency) of officials lowers the incidence of corruption ? Using a common agency game with imperfect information, we show that the answer depends on the measure of corruption that one uses. More transparency lowers the prevalence of corruption but it may raise the average bribe as it motivates the corruptor to bid more aggressively for the agent’s favour. We show that transparency affects the prevalence of corruption at the margin through a competitive effect and an efficiency effect.

In this paper we discuss the production of a heavy scalar MSSM Higgs boson H and its subsequent decays into pairs of electroweak gauge bosons WW and ZZ . We perform a scan over the relevant MSSM parameters, using constraints from direct Higgs searches and several low-energy observables. We then compare the possible size of the pp → H → WW , ZZ cross sections with corresponding Standard Model cross sections. We also include the full MSSM vertex corrections to the H → WW , ZZ decay and combine them with the Higgs propagator corrections, paying special attention to the IR-divergent contributions. We find that the vertex corrections can be as large as −30 % in MSSM parameter space regions which are currently probed by Higgs searches at the LHC. Once the sensitivity of these searches reaches two percent of the SM signal strength the vertex corrections can be numerically as important as the leading order and Higgs self-energy corrections and have to be considered when setting limits on MSSM parameters.

We calculate the contributions to electroweak precision observables (EWPOs) due to a fourth generation of fermions with the most general (quark-) flavour structure (but assuming Dirac neutrinos and a trivial flavour structure in the lepton sector). The new-physics contributions to the EWPOs are calculated at one-loop order using automated tools (FeynArts/FormCalc). No further approximations are made in our calculation. We discuss the size of non-oblique contributions arising from Z–quark–anti-quark vertex corrections and the dependence of the EWPOs on all CKM mixing angles involving the fourth generation. We find that the electroweak precision observables are sensitive to two of the fourth-generation mixing angles and that the corresponding constraints on these angles are competitive with those obtained from flavour physics. For non-trivial 4×4 flavour structures, the non-oblique contributions lead to relative corrections of several permille and should be included in a global fit.

I model the participation of firms in a voluntary agreement as a costly certification process whereby a firm informs the Regulator of its pollution intensity. Without this knowledge, the Regulator imposes the same tax on all firms in a heterogeneous industry, unduly hurting the clean ones with the lowest intensity. Certification allows clean firms to get a tax rebate. It also entails an informational externality as the dispersion of types decreases within the pool of non-participating firms, following an unraveling process. Because participation is a firm’s private decision, there is such a thing as a bad voluntary agreement.

We analyse and compute, within a number of standard model (SM) extensions, the cross sections σ A→VV′ for the production of a heavy neutral pseudoscalar Higgs-boson/spin-zero resonance at the LHC and its subsequent decays into electroweak gauge bosons. For comparison we calculate also the corresponding cross sections for a heavy scalar. The SM extensions we consider include a type-II two-Higgs doublet model (2HDM), a 2HDM with four chiral fermion generations, the minimal supersymmetric extension of the SM (MSSM), and top-colour assisted technicolour models. Presently available phenomenological constraints on the parameters of these models are taken into account. We find that, with the exception of the MSSM, these models permit the LHC cross sections σ A→VV′ to be of observable size. That is, a pseudoscalar resonance may be observable, if it exists, at the LHC in its decays into electroweak gauge bosons, in particular in WW and γ γ final states.

We examine, in a number of Standard Model extensions, whether the decays $A \to WW/ZZ$ of a neutral pseudoscalar (Higgs) resonance can have branching ratios at the percent level and we determine the possible size of $B(A \to WW/ZZ)$ relative to the respective branching ratios of a scalar boson $H$. The branching ratios of the these decay modes and the total widths $\Gamma_A$, $\Gamma_H$ are computed in the minimal supersymmetric extension of the SM, in a type-II two-Higgs doublet extension (2HDM), in a 2HDM with 4 chiral fermion generations, in a 2HDM with additional heavy vector-like quarks, and in a top-color assisted technicolor model. We find that in the above non-supersymmetric models $B(A \to WW)$ can be about 2%, while $B(A \to ZZ) \lesssim 10^{-3}.$ The ratio $B(A \to WW)/B(H \to WW)$ can be of order 10% in large regions of the parameter space of the models.

New physics interactions can affect the strength and structure of the tbW vertex. We investigate the magnitudes and phases of “anomalous” contributions to this vertex in a two-Higgs doublet and the minimal supersymmetric extension of the standard model, and in a top-color assisted technicolor (TC2) model. While the magnitudes of the anomalous couplings remain below 1 percent in the first two models, TC2 interactions can reduce the left-chiral coupling f L by several percent.

We propose a version of Townsend’s [17] model of costly audits where the agents’ types are correlated. Audits are used because agents have a limited ability to bear risk so that the Full Surplus Extraction (FSE) scheme á la Crémer and McLean [5,6] and McAfee and Reny [13] are suboptimal. It is shown that Townsend’s result is a special case of our model when agent types are uncorrelated. The performed numerical simulation of the model using two agents and two types offers interesting insights into what we call the Townsend Ridge. Indeed, the optimal contract which specifies wages to be paid and the audit strategy are remarkably different from one side of the ridge to the next. The observed discontinuity at the ridge reflects a discreet change from a single to a dual audit policy.

I characterize a generalization of the negligence rule to assign compensating damages in an accident involving multiple tortfeasors. These tortfeasors have the opportunity to undertake spending in prevention and the rule is designed to provide them with the best incentives to do so. I study the case where liability is constraint in the sense that the optimal amount of effort (not constrained by liability) cannot be implemented. The optimal multi-player rule is to apply the negligence rule to the most liable player (the deep-pocket or the victim, defined as the player who is the most responsive to monetary incentives under the strict liability rule) and the strict liability rule to everybody else.

We construct a model of valuation to assess the financial fragility of a set of firms in a closed economy. A firm is identified with a possibly infinite random sequence of benefits. Firms with negative benefits in a given period are said to be in distress and need liquidity to refinance their projects. Those liquidities must be obtained from firms with positive benefits (which represent excess liquidities). Distressed projects are refinanced to the extend that their need for liquidity does not exceed their endogenous continuation value. This value is, in turn, affected by current and future refinancing possibilities. We provide a recursive proceduure to compute this value when there is an aggregate liquidity constraint. We compare the allocation under a centralized coalition of firms with that of a decentralized competitive liquidity market. We show that the competitive market is more fragile because it does not value the possibility that a currently distressed firm could become a provider of liquidity some period in the future. That is, the market value of a firm can diverge from its social value due to externalities involving the ability of that firm to refinance other distressed firms in the future.

We propose a valuation model for a bank which faces a bankruptcy risk. Banks are identified with a possibly infinite random sequence of net benefits. A bank is solvent as long as its benefits remain non-negative. To preserve distressed banks from destruction, banks will be pooled within a financial coalition. When possible, those with current positive balance sheet will refinance those in need of liquidity. Banks are refinanced to the extent that their current needs for liquidity do not exceed their expected endogenous continuation value. This value itself is affected by future refinancing possibilities. We provide a recursive formula to compute this value when there is an aggregate liquidity constraint.

(Sous la direction de Michel Poitevin) Impartition et sous-traitance apparaissent souvent comme des synonymes : pourtant, les deux termes recoupent des realites distinctes. La sous-traitance renvoie aux modalites - economiques ou legales - de toute forme de delegation. L'impartition designe une strategie d'entreprise et se distingue de la sous-traitance en ce qu'elle comporte une dimension manageriale essentielle : elle touche non seulement a la cession d'une activite de production comme telle, mais aussi a tout ce qui motive la decision de ceder a un fournisseur externe la responsabilite de produire un bien ou de fournir un service. En d'autres termes, l'impartition integre une reflexion sur l'opportunite de la sous-traitance. Une entreprise doit-elle se delester d'une part de sa production? Quel volume d'activites doit-elle ceder au sous-traitant? Comment peut-elle optimiser le choix de ses partenaires? Quels types de contrats doit-elle signer? Ces questions delimitent le domaine propre a l'impartition car, selon les reponses qu'il leur apportera, un gestionnaire sous-traitera ou non le produit ou le service dont il est responsable. Les textes presentes dans cet ouvrage abordent l'impartition dans une double perspective de gestion et d'economique et jettent un nouvel eclairage sur le phenomene en presentant les arguments theoriques sous-jacents a l'impartition et en illustrant ces arguments par des etudes de cas. Cette monographie est disponible aupres de Distribution de livres Univers 845, rue Marie-Victorin Saint-Nicholas, Qc, G0S 3L0 Telephone : (418) 831-7474 ou 1-800-859-7474 Telecopieur : (418) 831-4021 (Sous la direction de Michel Poitevin) Impartition et sous-traitance apparaissent souvent comme des synonymes : pourtant, les deux termes recoupent des realites distinctes. La sous-traitance renvoie aux modalites - economiques ou legales - de toute forme de delegation. L'impartition designe une strategie d'entreprise et se distingue de la sous-traitance en ce qu'elle comporte une dimension manageriale essentielle : elle touche non seulement a la cession d'une activite de production comme telle, mais aussi a tout ce qui motive la decision de ceder a un fournisseur externe la responsabilite de produire un bien ou de fournir un service. En d'autres termes, l'impartition integre une reflexion sur l'opportunite de la sous-traitance. Une entreprise doit-elle se delester d'une part de sa production? Quel volume d'activites doit-elle ceder au sous-traitant? Comment peut-elle optimiser le choix de ses partenaires? Quels types de contrats doit-elle signer? Ces questions delimitent le domaine propre a l'impartition car, selon les reponses qu'il leur apportera, un gestionnaire sous-traitera ou non le produit ou le service dont il est responsable. Les textes presentes dans cet ouvrage abordent l'impartition dans une double perspective de gestion et d'economique et jettent un nouvel eclairage sur le phenomene en presentant les arguments theoriques sous-jacents a l'impartition et en illustrant ces arguments par des etudes de cas. Cette monographie est disponible aupres de Distribution de livres Univers 845, rue Marie-Victorin Saint-Nicholas, Qc, G0S 3L0 Telephone : (418) 831-7474 ou 1-800-859-7474 Telecopieur : (418) 831-4021