Many philosophers believe that intentions are relevant to the justification of harm-they believe that intentional harms, or harms that result from intentionally affecting or using another person, are harder to justify than harms that are merely foreseen. How does this idea work in cases in which we are uncertain about what will happen-for example, about who will be harmed, in what way they will be harmed, or how much they will be harmed? All potential harms count against an action in evidence-relative justification, but which potential harms should count as intended, and which as merely foreseen? Must all potential harms be one or the other? In investigating these questions, I try to show two things. First, it is plausible that not one intention, but rather several distinct intentions, matter to the justification of harm. This only becomes clear under uncertainty. Second, several of the things that matter are best understood as scalar, and so no account of the moral relevance of intentions can escape appealing to some version of the controversial notion of 'closeness.' Even if closeness can be avoided under conditions of certainty, it reappears once we consider more realistic uncertainty cases.

How is the validity of our consent, and others’ moral permission to act on our consent affected by coercion? Everyone agrees that in cases of two-party coercion—when X coerces Y to do something with or for X—the consent of the coerced is invalid, and the coercer is not permitted to act upon the consent they receive. But coercers and the recipients of consent are not always identical. Sometimes a victim, Y, agrees to do something to, with, or for Z because they are being coerced by X. Recently, several philosophers have argued that consent under third-party coercion can be fully valid. We argue that this view has troubling implications. We develop a novel view of consent in third-party coercion cases, which we call the partial validity account. The core idea is that, under severe coercion, Y’s consent is at most partially valid—it reduces the strength of, but does not completely dissolve, Z’s consent-sensitive duties. We argue that the partial validity account gets the right results in important cases and explains the moral factors at play better than alternative accounts.

Who gets to parent whom? Anca Gheaus claims that each child should be parented by the "best available parent" and that parental interests should play no role in assigning parental authority. I investigate this view. I find that it does not clearly rule out parental interests and is underspecified. Various further specifications do not seem to be about giving children the best available parent, but rather concern familiar distributive principles that attempt to balance competing interests. At the level of policy, I find the view less radical than it may first appear.

Some of Derek Parfit’s most significant work concerns the non-identity problem. Briefly put, this is the problem of how, morally speaking, we should understand cases in which we can act in one way, and produce persons with sub-optimal lives, or act in another way, and produce different persons with better lives. Discussions of the non-identity problem tend to assume that it is a single problem, raising a single set of moral issues. This chapter seeks to complicate this picture. It introduces ‘Impure Non-Identity Cases’. These are cases in which a policy, or group of acts, is a non-identity case, and so nobody is harmed, or made worse off, by the policy, or group of acts, but some (and maybe even all) of the individual acts within the policy or group are not non-identity cases, and are harmful. The chapter investigates the moral implications of such cases, and the problems and questions they raise, aside from those raised by ‘Pure Non-Identity Cases’.

Transferred malice, or transferred intent, is the criminal doctrine that states that if D tries to kill A, and accidentally kills B, the intent to kill transfers from A to B, and so D is guilty of murdering B. This is widely viewed as a useful legal fiction. One of the finest essays on this topic was written by our honorand, Douglas N. Husak. Husak views both the potential usefulness of, and his preferred alternative to, transferred malice through the lens of sentencing – how much hard treatment the offender will receive. In this essay, I take a step back and ask in what ways transferred malice might be useful. I find its potential usefulness is not restricted to sentencing, but thinking about other ways in which it might be useful actually brings other potential drawbacks into focus – in particular, I argue, transferred malice mislabels the crimes the offender committed, and does so in a way that erases one of the victims from the moral description of the crime.

The individualist nature of much contemporary just war theory means that we often discuss cases with single attackers. But even if war is best understood in this individualist way, in war combatants often have to make decisions about how to distribute harms among a plurality of aggressors: they must decide whom and how many to harm, and how much to harm them. In this paper, I look at simultaneous multiple aggressor cases in which more than one distribution of harm among aggressors is available. I show how such cases pose deep questions concerning the nature, role, and scope of the necessity principle, and its relationship to both liability and narrow proportionality. I argue that a hitherto unrecognised measure – ‘narrow proportionality shortfall’ – and its distribution is relevant in choosing how to distribute harms across aggressors. I then extend this analysis to show how this may help us with a puzzle concerning sequential attacks.

In this article I argue that revisionists in just war theory must further revise their proportionality principles. I show that on the revisionist view it is possible for a war to be proportionate, even though all the acts of war are disproportionate, and it is possible for a war to be disproportionate, even though all the acts of war are proportionate. I then argue that consideration of these cases shows the revisionist view, as it stands, to be unsatisfactory, and I explore some ways in which revisionists might further revise their understanding of proportionality.

Abstract Often institutions or individuals are faced with decisions where not all claims can be satisfied. Sometimes, these claims will be of differing strength. In such cases, it must be decided whether or not weaker claims can be aggregated in order to collectively defeat stronger claims. Many are attracted to a view, which this chapter calls Limited Aggregation, where this is sometimes acceptable and sometimes not. A new version of this view, Local Relevance, has recently emerged. This chapter seeks to explore and evaluate this view. In order to do so, the chapter offers a more precise interpretation of this basic approach, calling it ‘Sequential Claims-Matching’. The chapter shows how Sequential Claims-Matching avoids problems that dog other Limited Aggregation views but suffers from difficulties and ambiguities of its own. In particular, the chapter shows that it is hard to accommodate some core Limited Aggregation intuitions around tie-break cases within the Local Relevance view.

In this chapter we introduce the nascent literature on Moral Uncertainty Theory and explore its application to the criminal law. Moral Uncertainty Theory seeks to address the question of what we ought to do when we are uncertain about what to do because we are torn between rival moral theories. For instance, we may have some credence in one theory that tells us to do A but also in another that tells us to do B. We examine how we might decide whether or not to criminalize some conduct when we are unsure as to whether or not the conduct is morally permitted and whether or not it is permissible to criminalize the conduct. We also look at how we might make sentencing decisions under moral uncertainty. We argue that Moral Uncertainty Theory can be an illuminating way to address these questions but find that doing so is a lot more complicated than applying Moral Uncertainty Theory to individual conduct.

Philosophers writing about proportionality in self-defense and war will often assume that defensive agents have full knowledge about the threat that they face and the defensive options available to them. But no actual defensive agents possess this kind of knowledge. How, then, should we make proportionality decisions under uncertainty? The natural answer is that we should move from comparing the harm we will do with the good we will achieve to comparing expected harm with expected good. I argue that this simple calculation is flawed, and I begin to develop a more sophisticated account of "subjective proportionality."

R.A. Duff’s The Realm of the Criminal Law advances the literature on criminalization by providing the most thorough exploration and defence yet provided of the intuitively attractive idea that criminalization is properly limited to public wrongs only. I outline here six concerns I have with the view, as presented in this book, and suggest where the account needs further elaboration, defence, or rethinking.

Introduction Is childhood good? Who benefits from childhood, and how? Are there goods that children experience or bring into existence which would not exist if we were to somehow eradicate childhood? Are children’s lives to be judged by the same or different standards from adults’? In this chapter I want to investigate these questions, but before I do, I wish to first separate off some questions about the value of childhood from some questions about the value of new or additional people.

Constrained instrumentalist theories of punishment – those that seek to justify punishment by its good effects, but limit its scope – are an attractive alternative to pure retributivism or utilitarianism. One way in which we may be able to limit the scope of instrumental punishment is by justifying punishment through the concept of duty. This strategy is most clearly pursued in Victor Tadros’ influential ‘Duty View’ of punishment. In this paper, I show that the Duty View as it stands cannot find any moral distinction between the permissible punishment of the guilty and the permissible punishment of the innocent in extreme circumstances, therefore undermining one the key pillars of its intuitive appeal. I canvass several ways to respond to this problem, arguing that a rights (or claims) forfeiture theory which employs the distinction between rights forfeiture and rights infringement (or claims forfeiture and infringement) is the best solution.

In this essay, we explore an issue of moral uncertainty: what we are permitted to do when we are unsure about which moral principles are correct. We develop a novel approach to this issue that incorporates important insights from previous work on moral uncertainty, while avoiding some of the difficulties that beset existing alternative approaches. Our approach is based on evaluating and choosing between option sets rather than particular conduct options. We show how our approach is particularly well-suited to address this issue of moral uncertainty with respect to agents that have credence in moral theories that are not fully consequentialist.

Children are expensive to raise. Ensuring that they are raised in such a way that they are able to lead a minimally decent life costs time and money, and lots of both. Who is responsible for bearing the costs of the things that children are undoubtedly owed? This is a question that has received comparatively little scrutiny from political philosophers, despite children being such a drain on public and private finances alike. To the extent that there is a debate, two main views can be identified. The Parents Pay view says that parents, responsible for the existence of the costs, must foot the bill. The Society Pays view says that a next generation is a benefit to all, and so to allow parents to foot the bill alone is the worst kind of free-riding. In this article, I introduce a third potentially liable party currently missing from the debate: children themselves. On my backward-looking view, we are entitled to ask people to contribute to the raising of children on the basis that they have benefited from being raised themselves.

Some philosophers believe that we can, in theory, justifiably pre-punish people – that is, punish them for a crime before they have committed that crime. In particular, it has been claimed that retributivists ought (in principle) to accept pre-punishment. The question of whether pre-punishment can be justified has sparked an interesting and growing philosophical debate. In this paper I look at a slightly different question: whether retributivists who accept that pre-punishment can be justified should prefer (ordinary) post-punishment or pre-punishment, or see them (in principle) as on a par. The answer is complex: asking this question brings to light unrecognised distinctions within both retributivism and pre-punishment, giving us four different answers to the question, depending on what kind of retributivism and what kind of pre-punishment are combined. Surprisingly, given that it is usually presented as a second best, to be pursued only when post-punishment is unavailable, some combinations will find pre-punishment preferable.

Retributivism is often explicitly or implicitly assumed to be compatible with the harm principle, since the harm principle (in some guises) concerns the content of the criminal law, while retributivism concerns the punishment of those that break the law. In this essay I show that retributivism should not be endorsed alongside any version of the harm principle. In fact, retributivists should reject all attempts to see the criminal law only through (other) person-affecting concepts or "grievance" morality, since they should endorse the criminalization of conduct that is either purely self-harming or good for somebody and bad for nobody (i.e., Pareto improvements).

Exploring the principles and values that should guide and limit the state's use of preventive techniques that involve coercion against the individual, this volume arises from a three-year study of Preventive Justice. The chapters examine whether and when preventive measures are justified, whether within or outside the criminal law, and whether they signal a larger change in the architecture of security. Preventive measures include controversial crime control approaches such as pre-inchoate offences, pre-trial detention, restraining orders, and prevention detention of the dangerous. There are g ... More