Digital philosophy of science has split into a normative, model-driven first wave and a descriptive, text-driven second wave. This paper argues for a synthesis of these traditions. We propose a framework grounded in normative naturalism for evaluating scientific norms based on their role in solving local, context-specific problems. This framework is advanced through three complementary digital methods: tracking norm effectiveness, computational modeling research systems, and analyzing scientific discourse. To demonstrate our approach, we conduct a detailed analysis of how reviewers use the term “pseudoscience” in a large corpus of open peer review reports. This case study shows how combining quantitative methods with close reading can uncover the operative, and often implicit, norms that guide scientific communities. Our approach suggests that digital philosophy of science, by systematically examining scientific communication, can open new possibilities for empirically-informed normative guidance in practice.

This commentary critiques Mougenot and Matheson's proposal to integrate embodied cognition with mechanistic explanations in cognitive neuroscience. We suggest more promising directions for embodied cognitive neuroscience, focusing on neuroethological research and evolutionary studies of nervous systems. These approaches, compatible with wide mechanistic explanations, offer a robust path forward by examining central nervous system function within whole organisms in their environments.

Nawet jeżeli integrację poznania rozproszonego z mechanistycznymi koncepcjami wyjaśniania można uznać za ruch interesujący, a w przypadku powodzenia prowadzący do niebanalnego rozszerzenia kognitywistycznych badań nad poznaniem, to z perspektywy teoretyka poznania rozproszonego należy uznać ten ruch za ryzykowny. W poniższej pracy, w dyskusji z propozycją Witolda Wachowskiego (2022), postaram się przedstawić ryzyko, z jakim wiąże się wspomniana integracja i zaproponuję rozwiązanie alternatywne, polegające na połączeniu rozproszenia poznania z teorią sieci. Teoria ta, w mojej opinii, pozwala na bardziej owocne badanie wzorców rozproszenia poznania. ----------------------------------------- Zgłoszono: 26/09/2023. Zrecenzowano: 26/03/2024. Zaakceptowano do publikacji: 10/06/2024.

This paper discusses the resources for deconstruction offered by cognitive science, drawing inspiration from David Gunkel’s work on the topic (Deconstruction, MIT Press 2021). The gesture of deconstruction is seen as having a positive impact on the development of this interdisciplinary field by challenging misleading dichotomies and examining its underlying assumptions, such as the symmetry of integration. ------------------------- Received: 6/11/2022. Reviewed: 13/12/2022. Accepted: 20/12/2022.

We argue that Yarkoni’s proposed solutions to the generalizability crisis are half-measures because he does not recognize that the crisis arises from investigators’ underappreciation of the roles of theory in experimental research. Rather than embracing qualitative analysis, the research community should make an effort to develop better theories and work toward consistently incorporating theoretical results into experimental practice.

This paper is a loose commentary on Marcinów’s book (2017). The commentary is focused on the objects of psychopathological investigations and the role of psychology / psychiatry tension in the process of singling out, tracking, and describing them. As a consequence, there are limitations of collaborative and integrative efforts between psychologists and psychiatrists where questions of psychopathology are concerned.

The focus of this special issue of Theory & Psychology is on explanatory mechanisms in psychology, especially on problems of particular prominence for psychological science such as theoretical integration and unification. Proponents of the framework of mechanistic explanation claim, in short, that satisfactory explanations in psychology and related fields are causal. They stress the importance of explaining phenomena by describing mechanisms that are responsible for them, in particular by elucidating how the organization of component parts and operations in mechanisms gives rise to phenomena in certain conditions. We hope for cross-pollination between philosophical approaches to explanation and experimental psychology, which could offer methodological guidance, in particular where mechanism discovery and theoretical integration are at issue. Contributions in this issue pertain to theoretical integration and unification of psychology as well as the growing importance of causal mechanistic explanations in psychological science.

In this paper, we defend a novel, multidimensional account of representational unification, which we distinguish from integration. The dimensions of unity are simplicity, generality and scope, non-monstrosity, and systematization. In our account, unification is a graded property. The account is used to investigate the issue of how research traditions contribute to representational unification, focusing on embodied cognition in cognitive science. Embodied cognition contributes to unification even if it fails to offer a grand unification of cognitive science. The study of this failure shows that unification, contrary to what defenders of mechanistic explanation claim, is an important mechanistic virtue of research traditions.

In this article, I show the role that the philosopher of cognitive science can currently play in cognitive science research. I argue for the important, and not yet considered, role of the philosophy of cognitive science in cognitive science, that is, the importance of cooperation between philosophers of science with cognitive scientists in investigating the research methods and theoretical assumptions of cognitive science. At the beginning of the paper I point out, how the philosopher of science, here, the philosopher of cognitive science, can participate in interdisciplinary research. I am opting of the cooperation in investigating the so-called reflective problems. Then, I discuss four examples of issues important for the cognitive science, in which the competences possessed by the philosopher are useful. At the ending I point out wider landscape of possible cooperation of philosophers with cognitive scientists.

∗ This paper was prepared for the special issue of “Ruch Filozoficzny” dedicated to professor Żeglen. Professor was advisor of my Master Thesis (on phenomenal consciousness) and PHD Thesis (on embodied cognition). With gratitude for her support and trust in my – sometimes a little bit slow – work, I want to dedicate her this paper. While working on PHD Thesis I had an opportunity work with professor Żegleń and Tomasz Komendziński (and colleagues such as Jacek Podgórski and many others) on the first program in cognitive science studies in Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń. Together with Tomasz Komendziński we proposed that an important part of this studies should be lectures in “Philosophy in Cognitive Science”, and for two years, I had the great pleasure of conducting exercises for these lectures. Despite the fact that my approach to the relation between philosophy and cognitive science dramatically changed from that time, that period was extremely important for my thinking about issues which I describe in this article. 1 Contrary to the opinion expressed in most of the papers providing an introduction to cognitive science (Keith Frankish, William Ramsey, The Cambridge Handbook of Cognitive Science (Cambridge University Press, 2012); Jay Friedenberg, Gordon Silverman, Cognitive Science: An Introduction to the Study of Mind (Sage, 2011)), the interdisciplinary nature of the field is not obvious or self-evident (Jamie Cohen-Cole, “Instituting the Science of Mind: Intellectual Economies and Disciplinary Exchange at Harvard’s Center for Cognitive Studies”, The British Journal for the History of Science 40, no. 4 (2007): 567–597; Harvey J. Graff, Undisciplining Knowledge: Interdisciplinarity Ruch FilozoFiczny

The integration of embodied and computational approaches to cognition requires that non-neural body parts be described as parts of a computing system, which realizes cognitive processing. In this paper, based on research about morphological computations and the ecology of vision, I argue that nonneural body parts could be described as parts of a computational system, but they do not realize computation autonomously, only in connection with some kind of—even in the simplest form—central control system. Finally, I integrate the proposal defended in the paper with the contemporary mechanistic approach to wide computation.

The body is a highly complex, coordinated system engaged in coping with many environmental problems. It can be considered as some sort of opportunity or obstacle, with which internal processing must deal. Internal processing must take into account the possibilities and limitations of the particular body. In other words, even if the body is not involved in the realization of some cognitive explicit task, it is not a neutral factor of our understanding of why a system solves a task in one way or another. Therefore, when conducting research on embodiment and the body’s cognitive system we should not neglect internal, cognitive processing. I appeal to Goldman’s research on embodied cognition to sketch the broader framework for internal processing in embodied cognition. I believe that even if we don’t accept Goldman’s approach as the viable proposal for embodied cognition in general, it’s a quite natural starting point for our analysis. Goldman (2012; 2014, and with de Vignemont 2009) argue for the essential role of the bodily formats or bodily codes (respectively: B-formats and B-codes) in embodied cognition. B-codes are here described as the processing of regions or sub-regions of the central nervous system. They are primarily employed for body control or monitoring, and reused for cognitive tasks. Beyond doubt, this conception provides an excellent starting point for analyzing the internal (mostly neural) processing in cases of embodied cognition. At the end of this paper, I will argue that the embodiment of cognition needs a conceptual twist. Following Keijzer’s (2015) interest in the evolution of the nervous system, and the minimal forms of cognition, I argue that in investigating embodied cognition, we should investigate the role played by cognitive processing for specific kinds of organisms, meaning organisms with a body of a particular morphology (size, shape, kinds, and distribution of sensors and effectors). Doing that, I refer to some conceptual and empirical considerations. I will also try to show that research on embodied cognition is still not sufficiently anchored in evolutionary and comparative studies on cognition, nor on the nervous system and body morphology. Bigger reliance on these kinds of studies, will make it make possible to gain a deeper understanding of internal processing in embodied cognition.

Over a year ago, entirely by accident I came across a book by Jan Górski, Świadomość jaźni [Self-consciousness]. For a few years I had been interested in studies on self-consciousness and bodily awareness, including Polish research. Therefore, discovering this book, which deals with issues that are of interest to me, came as quite a great surprise. A quick browse through the book revealed that it is a fascinating work due not only to the topic and conclusions but also to the literature on which the author based his analysis. Intrigued, I decided to find out: Who is Jan Górski?

Aim: Article introduces xenomelia - a disorder of bodily experience that manifests itself in the feeling of disownership related to one of the limbs that a patient wants to remove. For a dozen of years, xenomelia has been investigated by psychiatrists and neurologists; yet, there is no agreement on its medical definition or diagnostic criteria. Recently, it has been proposed that apart from neuroanatomical factors that contribute to bodily awareness, social factors may determine xenomelia as well. In the paper, we investigate a social neuroscience view in developmental perspective. Perspective: We believe that the neurodevelopmental approach is the one that presents xenomelia in the most complex way. We propose to examine changes in bodily experiences related to social events that emerge during periods sensitive to development of multimodal neuronal representations of the body. We indicate that crucial changes occur in the adolescence, when social environment seems to have extremely powerful impact on self-consciousness and self-esteem. Conclusions: We demonstrate that xenomelia is a disorder of multifactorial aetiology. In order to explain it, we need to investigate social influence on the development of self-consciousness (and bodily consciousness). We highlight the periods that in our view are critical for the development of one's own body representations. We point to the neuronal representations related to self that undergo major changes during adolescence as we believe they have great impact on shaping bodily consciousness. We also believe that further investigations on neural body maps in infants may tell us more about the possible factors that affect xenomelia. (C) 2016 Institute of Psychiatry and Neurology. Published by Elsevier Sp. zo.o. All rights reserved.

Cognitive neuroscience aims to map mental processes onto brain function, which begs the question of what “mental processes” exist and how they relate to the tasks that are used to manipulate and measure them. This topic has been addressed informally in prior work, but we propose that cumulative progress in cognitive neuroscience requires a more systematic approach to representing the mental entities that are being mapped to brain function and the tasks used to manipulate and measure mental processes. We describe a new open collaborative project that aims to provide a knowledge base for cognitive neuroscience, called the Cognitive Atlas (accessible online at http://www.cognitiveatlas.org), and outline how this project has the potential to drive novel discoveries about both mind and brain.

Książka Przemysława Żywiczyńskiego i Sławomira Wacewicza zatytułowana „Ewolucja języka. W stronę hipotez gesturalnych” jest pierwszą polską monografią poświęconą tematyce ewolucyjnych badań nad językiem. W kolejnych rozdziałach swojej pracy autorzy prowadzą nas najpierw ku naukowym badaniom genezy języka, a następnie ku wybranym z koncepcji ewolucyjnych. Jestem przekonany, że książka ta może stanowić interesujące wprowadzenie do wspomnianej problematyki. Przyjrzyjmy się zatem jej zawartości.