research-article Share on Query Processing on Gaming Consoles Authors: Wei Cui Microsoft Research Asia, CN Microsoft Research Asia, CN 0009-0005-9362-3585View Profile , Qianxi Zhang Microsoft Research Asia, CN Microsoft Research Asia, CN 0000-0002-0646-5365View Profile , Spyros Blanas The Ohio State University, US The Ohio State University, US 0009-0004-2703-7177View Profile , Jesús Camacho-Rodríguez Microsoft, US Microsoft, US 0009-0008-9151-6024View Profile , Brandon Haynes Microsoft Gray Systems Lab, US Microsoft Gray Systems Lab, US 0000-0002-1501-9586View Profile , Yinan Li Microsoft Research, US Microsoft Research, US 0009-0004-5483-2862View Profile , Ravi Ramamurthy Microsoft, USA Microsoft, USA 0000-0002-3484-0038View Profile , Peng Cheng Microsoft Research, CN Microsoft Research, CN 0000-0003-4014-4757View Profile , Rathijit Sen Microsoft, US Microsoft, US 0000-0003-4736-2837View Profile , Matteo Interlandi Microsoft, US Microsoft, US 0000-0002-5756-8321View Profile Authors Info & Claims DaMoN '23: Proceedings of the 19th International Workshop on Data Management on New HardwareJune 2023Pages 86–88https://doi.org/10.1145/3592980.3595313Published:18 June 2023Publication History 0citation191DownloadsMetricsTotal Citations0Total Downloads191Last 12 Months191Last 6 weeks191 Get Citation AlertsNew Citation Alert added!This alert has been successfully added and will be sent to:You will be notified whenever a record that you have chosen has been cited.To manage your alert preferences, click on the button below.Manage my AlertsNew Citation Alert!Please log in to your account Save to BinderSave to BinderCreate a New BinderNameCancelCreateExport CitationPublisher SiteGet Access

FastVer is a protocol that uses a variety of memory-checking techniques to monitor the integrity of key-value stores with only a modest runtime cost. Arasu et al. formalize the high-level design of FastVer in the F* proof assistant and prove it correct. However, their formalization did not yield a provably correct implementation---FastVer is implemented in unverified C++ code. In this work, we present FastVer2, a low-level, concurrent implementation of FastVer in Steel, an F* DSL based on concurrent separation logic that produces C code, and prove it correct with respect to FastVer's high-level specification. Our proof is the first end-to-end system proven using Steel, and in doing so we contribute new ghost-state constructions for reasoning about monotonic state. Our proof also uncovered a few bugs in the implementation of FastVer. We evaluate FastVer2 by comparing it against FastVer. Although our verified monitor is slower in absolute terms than the unverified code, its performance also scales linearly with the number of cores, yielding a throughput of more that 10M op/sec. We identify several opportunities for performance improvement, and expect to address these in the future.

Inference attacks on property-preserving encrypted databases (e.g., CryptDB) have been previously studied. These demonstrate how in certain scenarios one can recover plain text from databases that provide columnar encryption by using auxiliary information such as column statistics. Newer generation of encrypted databases are now being built using secure enclave technology. In this paper, we first show how the current generation of encrypted databases are robust against these previously published attacks. However, we identify two broad patterns that we identify as query integrity attacks and data integrity attacks that can be used to construct attacks that are similar in scope for a variety of encrypted databases built using enclaves. We believe this paper initiates an important discussion about the need for integrity protection for future encrypted databases.

We present FastVer, a high-performance key-value store with strong data integrity guarantees. FastVer is built as an extension of FASTER, an open-source, high-performance key-value store. It offers the same key-value API as FASTER plus an additional verify() method that detects if an unauthorized attacker tampered with the database and checks whether results of all read operations are consistent with historical updates. FastVer is based on a novel approach that combines the advantages of Merkle trees and deferred memory verification. We show that this approach achieves one to two orders of magnitudes higher throughputs than traditional approaches based on either Merkle trees or memory verification. We have formally proven the correctness of our approach in a proof assistant, ensuring that verify() detects any inconsistencies, except if a collision can be found on a cryptographic hash.

This paper presents Always Encrypted, a recently released feature of Microsoft SQL Server that uses column granularity encryption to provide cryptographic data protection guarantees. Always Encrypted can be used to outsource database administration while keeping the data confidential from an administrator, including cloud operators. The first version of Always Encrypted was released in Azure SQL Database and as part of SQL Server 2016, and supported equality operations over deterministically encrypted columns. The second version, released as part of SQL Server 2019, uses an enclave running within a trusted execution environment to provide richer functionality that includes comparison and string pattern matching for an IND-CPA-secure (randomized) encryption scheme. We present the security, functionality, and design of Always Encrypted, and provide a performance evaluation using the TPC-C benchmark.

Deferred verification of the integrity of data operations over a set of data that is hosted at an untrusted module (UM) is controlled. The controlling includes generating a request for a data operation on the set of data. The request includes an authentication portion. The request is sent to the UM. A response to the request is received from the UM. The response includes cryptographic verification information attesting the integrity of the data operation with respect to prior data operations on the set of data. The response includes results from deferred verification at a trusted module (TM).

In this paper we present BlockchainDB , which leverages blockchains as a storage layer and introduces a database layer on top that extends blockchains by classical data management techniques (e.g., sharding) as well as a standardized query interface to facilitate the adoption of blockchains for data sharing use cases. We show that by introducing the additional database layer, we are able to improve the performance and scalability when using blockchains for data sharing and also massively decrease the complexity for organizations intending to use blockchains for data sharing.

In this demo we present BlockchainDB, which leverages blockchains as storage layer and introduces a database layer on top that extends blockchains by classical data management techniques (e.g., sharding). Further, BlockchainDB provides a standardized key/value-based query interface to facilitate the adoption of blockchains for data sharing use cases. With BlockchainDB we can thus not only improve the performance and scalability of blockchains for data sharing but also decrease the complexity for organizations intending to use blockchains for this use case.

In this paper we present BlockchainDB, which leverages blockchains as a storage layer and introduces a database layer on top that extends blockchains by classical data management techniques (e.g., sharding) as well as a standardized query interface to facilitate the adoption of blockchains for data sharing use cases. We show that by introducing the additional database layer, we are able to improve the performance and scalability when using blockchains for data sharing and also massively decrease the complexity for organizations intending to use blockchains for data sharing.

In this paper we introduce shared, verifiable database tables, a new abstraction for trusted data sharing in the cloud.

Encrypted databases have been studied for more than 10 years and are quickly emerging as a critical technology for the cloud. The current state of the art is to use property-preserving encrypting techniques (e.g., deterministic encryption) to protect the confidentiality of the data and support query processing at the same time. Unfortunately, these techniques have many limitations. Recently, trusted computing platforms (e.g., Intel SGX) have emerged as an alternative to implement encrypted databases. This paper demonstrates some vulnerabilities and the limitations of this technology, but it also shows how to make best use of it in order to improve on confidentiality, functionality, and performance.

Verifying the integrity of outsourced data is a classic, well-studied problem. However current techniques have fundamental performance and concurrency limitations for update-heavy workloads. In this paper, we investigate the potential advantages of deferred and batched verification rather than the per-operation verification used in prior work. We present Concerto , a comprehensive key-value store designed around this idea. Using Concerto, we argue that deferred verification preserves the utility of online verification and improves concurrency resulting in orders-of-magnitude performance improvement. On standard benchmarks, the performance of Concerto is within a factor of two when compared to state-of-the-art key-value stores without integrity.

Metering is an important component of cloud database services. We discuss potential problems in verifiability for existing DBaaS metering and initiate a discussion of how we can address this problem.

In encrypted databases, sensitive data is protected from an untrusted server by encrypting columns using partially homomorphic encryption schemes, and storing encryption keys in a trusted client. However, encrypting columns and protecting encryption keys does not ensure confidentiality - sensitive data can leak during query processing due to information flows through the trusted client. In this paper, we propose SecureSQL, an encrypted database that partitions query processing between an untrusted server and a trusted client while ensuring the absence of information flows. Our evaluation based on OLTP benchmarks suggests that SecureSQL can protect against explicit flows with low overheads (< 30%). However, protecting against implicit flows can be expensive because it precludes the use of key databases optimizations and introduces additional round trips between client and server.

Fine-grained authorization (FGA) is a critical feature of many database applications. The general approach to FGA both in research and practice is the following: FGA policies are enforced by rewriting queries as a function of the current user. This query rewriting suffices for supporting the functionality of FGA but essentially treats FGA as a second-class citizen — most of the DBMS is unaware of authorizations; all the authorization logic is encapsulated in a small component that performs query rewriting. In this paper, we argue that in order to engineer good performance, it is essential to treat FGA as a first-class citizen by making the core components of the DBMS authorization-aware. As concrete evidence, we propose a novel index structure that we call an authorization index and show how an optimizer can exploit it to generate plans that are significantly better than the plans obtained using the rewriting approach. We also discuss how the tightlycoupled integration of authorizations provides an interesting case for revisiting other query processing problems.

Cipherbase is a comprehensive database system that provides strong end-to-end data confidentiality through encryption. Cipherbase is based on a novel architecture that combines an industrial strength database engine (SQL Server) with lightweight processing over encrypted data that is performed in secure hardware. The overall architecture provides significant benefits over the state-of-the-art in terms of security, performance, and functionality. This paper presents a prototype of Cipherbase that uses FPGAs to provide secure processing and describes the system engineering details implemented to achieve competitive performance for transactional workloads. This includes hardware-software co-design issues (e.g. how to best offer parallelism), optimizations to hide the latency between the secure hardware and the main system, and techniques to cope with space inefficiencies. All these optimizations were carefully designed not to affect end-to-end data confidentiality. Our experiments with the TPC-C benchmark show that in the worst case when all data are strongly encrypted, Cipherbase achieves 40% of the throughput of plaintext SQL Server. In more realistic cases, if only critical data such as customer names are encrypted, the Cipherbase throughput is more than 90% of plaintext SQL Server.