The 2016 US Presidential campaign saw an explosion in popularity for the term "fake news." This phenomenon raises interesting questions: Which news sources do people believe are fake, and what do people think "fake news" means? One possibility is that beliefs about the news reflect a bias to disbelieve information that conflicts with existing beliefs and desires. If so, then news sources people consider "fake" might differ according to political affiliation. To test this idea, we asked people to tell us what "fake news" means, and to rate several news sources for the extent to which each provides real news, fake news, and propaganda. We found that political affiliation influenced people's descriptions and their beliefs about which news sources are "fake." These results have implications for people's interpretations of news information and for the extent to which people can be misled by factually incorrect journalism.

People have access to more news from more sources than ever before. At the same time, they increasingly distrust traditional media and are exposed to more misinformation. To help people better distinguish real news from "fake news," we must first understand how they judge whether news is real or fake. One possibility is that people adopt a relatively effortful, analytic approach, judging news based on its content. However, another possibility-consistent with psychological research-is that people adopt a relatively effortless, heuristic approach, drawing on cues outside of news content. One such cue is where the news comes from: its source. Beliefs about news sources depend on people's political affiliation, with U.S. liberals tending to trust sources that conservatives distrust, and vice versa. Therefore, if people take this heuristic approach, then judgments of news from different sources should depend on political affiliation and lead to a confirmation bias of pre-existing beliefs. Similarly, political affiliation could affect the likelihood that people mistake real news for fake news. We tested these ideas in two sets of experiments. In the first set, we asked University of Louisiana at Lafayette undergraduates (Experiment 1a n = 376) and Mechanical Turk workers in the United States (Experiment 1a n = 205; Experiment 1b n = 201) to rate how "real" versus "fake" a series of unfamiliar news headlines were. We attributed each headline to one of several news sources of varying political slant. As predicted, we found that source information influenced people's ratings in line with their own political affiliation, although this influence was relatively weak. In the second set, we asked Mechanical Turk workers in the United States (Experiment 2a n = 300; Experiment 2b n = 303) and University of Louisiana at Lafayette undergraduates (Experiment 2b n = 182) to watch a highly publicized "fake news" video involving doctored footage of a journalist. We found that people's political affiliation influenced their beliefs about the event, but the doctored footage itself had only a trivial influence. Taken together, these results suggest that adults across a range of ages rely on information other than news content-such as how they feel about its source-when judging whether news is real or fake. Moreover, our findings help explain how people experiencing the same news content can arrive at vastly different conclusions. Finally, efforts aimed at educating the public in combatting fake news need to consider how political affiliation affects the psychological processes involved in forming beliefs about the news.

We examined the influence of scholastic achievement levels on conformity behavior in the modified Asch experiment without using confederates (Mori & Arai, 2010). Four hundred and sixteen Japanese junior high school students (12 - 14 years old) were classified into three groups based on their scholastic achievement: high, middle, and low. We then created 22 same-sex groups (half male, half female). Each group included one high or low achievement “minority” student and three “majority” students who were all high or all low achievement students. The results showed that low achievement students in the minority role tended to conform more frequently than high achievement minority students—especially when amongst a high achievement majority. In addition, low achievement females showed more frequent conformity than low achievement males.

Background: Suggestive techniques can distort eyewitness memory (Wells & Loftus, 2003, Eyewitness memory for people and events. In A. M. Goldstein (Ed.), Handbook of psychology: Forensic Psychology, Vol. 11 (pp. 149-160). Hoboken, NY: John Wiley & Sons Inc). Recently, we found that suggestion is unnecessary: Simply reversing the arrangement of questions put to eyewitnesses changed what they believed (Michael & Garry, 2016, Ordered questions bias eyewitnesses and jurors. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 23, 601-608. doi:10.3758/s13423-015-0933-1). But why? One explanation might be that early questions set an anchor that eyewitnesses then adjust away from insufficiently. Methods: We tracked how eyewitness beliefs changed over the course of questioning. We then investigated the influence of people's need to engage in and enjoy effortful cognition. This factor, "Need for Cognition," (NFC) affects the degree to which people adjust (Cacioppo, Petty, & Feng Kao, 1984, The efficient assessment of need for cognition. Journal of Personality Assessment, 48, 306-307. doi:10.1207/s15327752jpa4803_13; Epley & Gilovich, 2006, The anchoring-and-adjustment heuristic: Why the adjustments are insufficient. Psychological Science, 17, 311-318. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2006.01704.x). Results: In our first two experiments we found results consistent with an anchoring-and-adjustment account. But in Experiments 3 and 4 we found that NFC provided only partial support for that account. Conclusions: Taken together, these findings have implications for understanding how people form beliefs about the accuracy of their memory.

Scientific advances across a range of disciplines hinge on the ability to make inferences about unobservable theoretical entities on the basis of empirical data patterns. Accurate inferences rely on both discovering valid, replicable data patterns and accurately interpreting those patterns in terms of their implications for theoretical constructs. The replication crisis in science has led to widespread efforts to improve the reliability of research findings, but comparatively little attention has been devoted to the validity of inferences based on those findings. Using an example from cognitive psychology, we demonstrate a blinded-inference paradigm for assessing the quality of theoretical inferences from data. Our results reveal substantial variability in experts’ judgments on the very same data, hinting at a possible inference crisis.

A growing body of correlational research finds a relationship between self-efficacy—beliefs in one’s capabilities—and academic success. But few studies have investigated whether self-efficacy is causally related to academic success. We hypothesized that an experience of success would promote self-efficacy in junior high school students and would lead to academic improvements. To induce an experience of success, we secretly presented easy anagrams to target students (41 males and 43 females; 12–13 years old) who then outperformed their classmates (116 males and 115 females). We assessed students’ self-efficacy and academic achievement scores before and after the anagram tasks. We found that the success-induced students raised their self-efficacy, and this elevated self-efficacy persisted for as long as one year. Moreover, success-induced males eventually showed significant improvement in their academic achievement. These results provide a real-world experimental enactment of Bandura’s self-efficacy theory and have implications for the practices of educational practitioners.

Eyewitnesses play an important role in the justice system. But suggestive questioning can distort eyewitness memory and confidence, and those distorted beliefs influence jurors (Loftus, 2005; Penrod & Cutler, 1995). Recent research, however, hints that suggestion is not necessary. Simply changing the order of a set of trivia questions altered people's beliefs about their accuracy on those questions (Weinstein & Roediger, 2010, 2012). I wondered to what degree eyewitnesses' beliefs—and in turn the jurors who evaluate them—would be affected by this simple change to the order in which they answer questions. Across a number of experiments in Part 1 of my thesis, I show that the order of questions matters: Eyewitnesses reported higher accuracy and were more confident about their memory when questions seemed initially easy than when they seemed initially difficult. In addition, jurors' beliefs about eyewitnesses closely matched those of the eyewitnesses themselves. But why does the order of questions matter? How does this simple rearrangement produce these alarming effects? Across a number of experiments in Part 2 of my thesis, I explore the extent to which the data are consistent with an explanation where eyewitnesses rapidly form an impression of their performance that is resistant to change. Taken together, these findings have implications for eyewitness metacognition and for eyewitness questioning procedures.

Trying to remember something now typically improves your ability to remember it later. However, after watching a video of a simulated bank robbery, participants who verbally described the robber were 25% worse at identifying the robber in a lineup than were participants who instead listed U.S. states and capitals—this has been termed the “verbal overshadowing” effect (Schooler u0026 Engstler-Schooler, 1990). More recent studies suggested that this effect might be substantially smaller than first reported. Given uncertainty about the effect size, the influence of this finding in the memory literature, and its practical importance for police procedures, we conducted two collections of preregistered direct replications (RRR1 and RRR2) that differed only in the order of the description task and a filler task. In RRR1, when the description task immediately followed the robbery, participants who provided a description were 4% less likely to select the robber than were those in the control condition. In RRR2, when the description was delayed by 20 min, they were 16% less likely to select the robber. These findings reveal a robust verbal overshadowing effect that is strongly influenced by the relative timing of the tasks. The discussion considers further implications of these replications for our understanding of verbal overshadowing.

Trying to remember something now typically improves your ability to remember it later. However, after watching a video of a simulated bank robbery, participants who verbally described the robber were 25% worse at identifying the robber in a lineup than were participants who instead listed U.S. states and capitals-this has been termed the "verbal overshadowing" effect (Schooler & Engstler-Schooler, 1990). More recent studies suggested that this effect might be substantially smaller than first reported. Given uncertainty about the effect size, the influence of this finding in the memory literature, and its practical importance for police procedures, we conducted two collections of preregistered direct replications (RRR1 and RRR2) that differed only in the order of the description task and a filler task. In RRR1, when the description task immediately followed the robbery, participants who provided a description were 4% less likely to select the robber than were those in the control condition. In RRR2, when the description was delayed by 20 min, they were 16% less likely to select the robber. These findings reveal a robust verbal overshadowing effect that is strongly influenced by the relative timing of the tasks. The discussion considers further implications of these replications for our understanding of verbal overshadowing.

Do you have many regrets from last year? To answer that question, you might start searching your memory and accumulating evidence. But your answer might not depend on how many regrets you remember. Instead, it might depend on how easy it feels to remember them. People often think that they have a larger pool of experiences to sample from when remembering feels easy than when remembering feels difficult. Thus, the relative ease of remembering can give us a quick indication of how many experiences we have had. Do people also rely on this feeling when thinking about their regrets? Across 3 experiments, we asked people to remember easy or difficult numbers of regrets from the past year, and then to rate how much regret they had for that year. Contrary to our predictions and the literature, we found that people relied on both number and ease: after remembering a small but easy number of regretted experiences, they rated the past year as less full of regret than others who remembered a large but difficult number. This pattern of results remained even when we drew people’s attention to the ease or difficulty of remembering. These results add nuance to the published literature, and suggest that when we think about how many regrets we have, what matters most is quantity and missed opportunity.

The persuasive power of brain images has captivated scholars in many disciplines. Like others, we too were intrigued by the finding that a brain image makes accompanying information more credible (McCabe & Castel in Cognition 107:343-352, 2008). But when our attempts to build on this effect failed, we instead ran a series of systematic replications of the original study-comprising 10 experiments and nearly 2,000 subjects. When we combined the original data with ours in a meta-analysis, we arrived at a more precise estimate of the effect, determining that a brain image exerted little to no influence. The persistent meme of the influential brain image should be viewed with a critical eye.

Deliberate and nondeliberate suggestions can influence cognitions and behaviors in surprising ways. Sometimes suggestions are helpful and improve our cognitions and behaviors, but at other times they are harmful. Suggestions can create response expectancies: the myriad ways in which we anticipate responding automatically to various situations. In this article, we discuss some of the most recent and intriguing reported effects of suggestion on cognition and behavior-effects that should make us stop and wonder, but should also make us reflect on the possibility that other well-known findings are the result of suggestion and expectation. The boundaries and underlying mechanisms of the effects of suggestion are puzzles waiting to be solved.