Kleinman & Kaplan (2016) decry how family courts are being misled by biased or undertrained evaluators, who commonly discount or dismiss allegations of domestic violence and child abuse, while lending undue credence to unscientific notions concerning parental alienation. They also argue that family courts often relax evidentiary rules, including qualification and cross-examination of expert witnesses, and that judges commonly abdicate their responsibilities to experts, leading to poor and unjust decisions. Further, they claim that custody evaluators fail to take seriously the psychological consequences to children of abuse or domestic violence. The authors also minimize the frequency of false claims of domestic violence or child abuse, especially by children, who, they claim, "tell it like it is." This comment on their article questions the theoretical and empirical bases for such claims. There is ample reason to believe that: a) child custody evaluators consider domestic violence and abuse very important and relevant; b) the "relaxation" of the rules of evidence in family court cases is far from the norm; c) judges are charged with an active gatekeeping role with respect to expert testimony, often with the assistance of cross-examination and rebuttal experts; d) false or unfounded allegations of abuse or domestic violence are common in family court disputes; and e) there is no scientific consensus or substantive evidence showing the parental alienation is an unscientific myth. It is argued that the proper role of custody evaluators is to follow where the evidence leads, while remaining mindful of the limits of their expertise.

Confirmatory bias is an unavoidable source of error in human judgment, which is rooted in the adaptive design of the brain for recognizing meaningful patterns. In forensic psychology, the complete elimination of confirmatory bias is worth aspiring to, but even its substantial reduction is fraught with challenges. In this brief article, I present a vignette from an actual jury trial to illustrate how a seemingly small instance of confirmatory bias led to a major blunder in expert testimony. Also, I consider how it might have been prevented.

In deciding which instrument to use in making a prediction or classification, forensic psychologists strive to use the most accurate test possible for their purpose. But accuracy in prediction or classification can be measured in many different ways. Choosing the right approach to measuring accuracy requires a basic understanding of various test accuracy statistics including, most fundamentally, sensitivity, specificity, positive predictive power, and negative predictive power. These statistics and their purposes are reviewed, along with related concepts such as base rates, cut scores, and the application of Bayes' theorem to the use of tests in particular circumstances. The advantages of using ROC (receiver operating characteristics) curves and AUC (area under the curve) statistics in choosing tests are also briefly reviewed.

Gurley et al. ( Psychological Injury and Law 7:9–17, 2014 ) express reservations about the admissibility of testimony based on the Rorschach Performance Assessment System (R-PAS) in court. They question whether there is sufficient evidentiary foundation in the underlying psychometrics and adequate general acceptance among psychologists for R-PAS-based testimony to meet either the Daubert or Frye criteria for admissibility and also raise doubts about how well it meets the criteria for the use of forensic tests proposed by Heilbrun ( Law and Human Behavior 16:257–272, 1992 ). This invited comment addresses their concerns about the admissibility of R-PAS-based testimony and corrects some erroneous statements about the psychometrics of R-PAS and the pertinent empirical literature. Gurley et al. characterize R-PAS as being in competition with the established Comprehensive System (CS; Exner 2003 ), though we clarify that it is actually an evolutionary development from the CS and designed to be a replacement for it. We also point out how their conclusion that R-PAS-based forensic testimony may be hazardous or premature is based on an insufficient familiarity with the R-PAS scientific and professional literature, a misinterpretation of the Frye and Daubert evidentiary standards, and a mischaracterization of several of Heilbrun’s ( Law and Human Behavior 16:257–272, 1992 ) criteria for the use of tests in forensic testimony.

Although the Rorschach is widely used in child custody evaluations, its contributions are often underestimated. As an evidence-supported, performance-based method, it adds incremental validity to self-report findings. It yields insights about perceptual and coping styles, reality testing and logical thinking, emotional regulation and sensitivity, and relational schemas. Some evaluators hesitate to use the Rorschach due to concerns about reliability and validity, admissibility, and courtroom presentation. R-PAS, a relatively new Rorschach system, shows particular promise in addressing such concerns. It selects and organizes variables according to their degree of empirical support and clinical meaningfulness, uses internationally relevant, nonpathologizing reference data, uses contemporary psychometric statistical methods, and presents results in a format that is easy for a court to understand.

The Clinical Case Applications section (CCA) has been a popular component of the Journal of Personality Assessment (JPA) throughout the past decade. We have seen an increasing number of high-quality submissions, and the articles published in the section have been followed with interest by the readership. When the CCA was launched, a case study section aimed at practicing psychologists was unique among scientific journals with high methodological standards. More recently, however, other prominent scientific psychology journals have added sections devoted to case study methodology: Psychotherapy, the Journal of Clinical Child and Adolescent Psychology, and the Journal of Pediatric Psychology are a few examples. Clearly, well-conceptualized and well-written case studies continue to hold a place in contemporary psychology, despite some continuing controversy about their utility and standing in psychological science (Borckardt et al., 2008; Dattilio, Edwards, & Fishman, 2010). The CCA as presently constituted is particularly well suited to the journal published by the Society for Personality Assessment (SPA), whose members include a substantial number of practicing clinicians and applied assessment psychologists, as well as researchers. Thus, the scope of the section remains largely unchanged from previous statements and calls for submissions (Meyer, Nichols, & Handler, 2005; Nichols & Handler, 2003). However, we offer in this statement some potential topics and areas of personality assessment that are underrepresented or have yet to appear in the section that we think might be of interest to the readership of JPA and to the personality assessment community at large. We also encourage authors to submit more “hybrid” articles that combine case studies with scientific research methods to inform the everyday activities of assessment practitioners. To that end, we also describe an array of single-case experimental and quasi-experimental research designs and methodologies to strengthen the conclusions drawn from case studies and case series. Finally, we discuss the editorial and review process of the CCA, which differs somewhat from traditional journal review procedures. We hope this updated statement provides prospective authors with guidance in preparing and submitting clinical case study manuscripts to the CCA, with or without formal research components.

Robert McGrath and colleagues (McGrath, Mitchell, Kim,& Hough, 2010) squarely took aim at a sacred cow inpersonality assessment when they published a highly pro-vocative meta-analysis in Psychological Bulletin that castdoubt on the “validity” of validity scales. Using strict selec-tion criteria, which dramatically winnowed down the num-ber of possibly relevant studies from over 4,000 to 40, theyfound surprisingly scant evidence supporting the utility ofresponse bias indicators. They concluded that despite closeto a century of research devoted to response bias, “the caseremains open whether bias indicators are of sufficient utilityto justify their use in applied settings to detect misrepresen-tation” (p. 466). In this and a subsequent article (McGrath,Kim, & Hough, 2011), they issued a challenge for newresearch that places response bias indicators on a more solidfooting.Alarming as these findings may have sounded to psy-chologists who routinely rely on validity scales in their dailyforensic practice, no one called for an immediate moratori-um on their use in the courtroom. Rohling et al. (2011)promptly published a critical response focusing on allegedinadequacies in the methodology of McGrath et al. (2010)and the soundness of their data analysis, particularly withrespect to neuropsychological assessment. They argued thatMcGrath et al. had overlooked at least five studies showingthat response bias indicators moderated predictive validityand had made inappropriately sweeping conclusions bytreating positive and negative response bias indicators asthough evidence concerning the former was relevant to thelatter. It is also important to note that the final sample ofMcGrath et al. (2010) included only one forensic case (i.e.,Edens & Ruiz, 2006)

The Rorschach Performance Assessment System (R-PAS; Meyer et al. 2011) is a new system for administering, scoring, and interpreting the Rorschach Inkblot Test that is designed to make the best possible use of currently available scientific and clinical evidence. Many features of R-PAS are well-suited to forensic evaluation generally and to psychological evaluations in psychological injury cases in particular. Among them, R-PAS: (a) offers an alternative to self-report methods that adds incremental validity, (b) provides a useful check against exaggerated or minimized symptom presentation, (d) generates evidence concerning implicit traits and behavioral tendencies, (e) offers techniques for adjusting for abnormal response sets, (f) uses internationally applicable reference data that do not exaggerate or minimize pathology, (g) organizes results according to the strength of the evidence, and (h) presents results on which are interpretations are based in a manner easy for the intelligent layperson to grasp. Despite its recent formal introduction to the professional assessment community, R-PAS takes advantage of decades of research in peer-reviewed publications (including the insights of Rorschach critics) and builds on established validity and general acceptance for most of its procedures and features. The article describes the standards and criteria applying to expert psychological testimony in U.S. federal and state courts and applies them to Rorschach-based testimony in general and R-PAS-based testimony specifically. It is argued that when the system is properly used and applied and when such testimony is appropriately formulated, it should be found admissible in both state and federal courtrooms

The idea of producing a Special Issue on attachment developed gradually as it became increasingly evident that this sometimes rather arcane area of study in the field of developmental psychology ha...

Erard on Kim et al. 564 Kim et al. reply 564 LoSchiavo & Shatz on Arnett 565 Webster et al. on Arnett 566 Stroebe & Nijstad on Arnett 569 Haeffel et al. on Arnett 570 Arnett replies 571 Boatright-Horowitz & Soeung on Teaching Antiracism 574

ABSTRACT In reply to T. Tippins (2007, this issue), we take issue with his claim that recognition of the biasing impact of custody evaluators' countertransference opens the door to “evidentially legitimate” fishing expeditions through evaluators' private lives on cross-examination. We clarify the distinction between self-examination for counter-transference bias as a heuristic for improving the sensitivity and objectivity of expert testimony and its use as substantive evidence. We argue that countertransference bias is a highly personal, emotionally charged kind of bias, unlike the cognitive biases more frequently discussed in the child custody literature. We conclude that recognition of the insidious emotional influences that threaten our objectivity in working with families in high conflict divorce is an important ethical responsibility.

The authors' reply to Martindale and Gould's critique of Pickar's article (2007a, this issue), "Countertransference Bias in the Child Custody Evaluator."Martindale and Gould's objections to considering an evaluator's countertransference reactions as a potential source of bias are addressed by focusing on these four areas: (1) Whether it is useful to introduce the term "countertransference bias" to identify a potential source of distortion in custody evaluations; (2) How the empirical literature on countertransference in the context of psychotherapy might apply to the child custody evaluation process; (3) Clarification of areas of agreement and disagreement with Martindale and Gould, and (4) The importance of evaluator attempts at "debiasing." We conclude that gaining awareness of countertransference reactions can only enhance the evaluator's ability to provide the most objective custody evaluation possible. (C) 2007 by The Haworth Press, Inc. All rights reserved.

Erickson, Lilienfeld, and Vitacco's (2007/this issue) review of the suitability and limitations of psychological tests invites legal and mental health professionals to rely on it as an objective guide for selecting, using, and admitting psychological tests in family court matters. Unfortunately, their discussion is marred by a pronounced bias in favor of multiscale, objective personality inventories and against performance-based or projective instruments. This bias is evident not only in their unbalanced emphasis on the strengths of the former and weaknesses of the latter, but also in their use of selective citations and loaded language in launching what amounts to a polemical argument in support of tests that they favor. Their discussion of the Rorschach inkblot test is particularly misleading. This article refutes their unwarranted criticisms of the theoretical underpinnings of the Rorschach test, its research base, its norms, its interscorer reliability, the validity of its scores, and its admissibility in the courtroom. The value of multimethod assessments that include the use of direct clinical observation of performance under standardized conditions in custody evaluations is highlighted.

Personality assessment can indirectly help custody evaluators answer important questions about parental competence and the fit between parents' psychological resources and children's needs. It is preferable to use testing to check hypotheses derived from the case information rather than the reverse. The Rorschach makes it possible to assess implicit motives, coping capacities, and need states, thus complementing and supplementing self-attributed personal characteristics from the MMPI-2 and other self-report data. It also offers idiographic information for individualizing assessments. Concerns about admissibility and charges that the Rorschach "overpathologizes" litigants are addressed, and suggestions are offered for making optimal use of the Rorschach in child custody work. (C) 2005 by The Haworth Press, Inc. All rights reserved.

The Rorschach Comprehensive System has been considered by W. M. Grove and R. C. Barden (1999) as inadmissible for expert psychological testimony according to the guidelines from theDaubert (1993), Joiner (1997), andKumho (1999) decisions. This article refutes W. M. Grove and R. C. Barden’s conclusions, arguing that the Rorschach Comprehensive System is (a) testable, (b) valid and reliable, (c) extensively peer reviewed, (d) associated with a reasonable error rate, (e) standardized, (f) accepted by a relevant and substantial scientific community, and (g) appropriate for a wide range of forensic issues. In drawing their negative conclusions, W. M. Grove and R. C. Barden overlooked or minimized a substantial body of empirical data supporting the reliability and validity of the Rorschach Comprehensive System and misinterpreted the language and intent of the Supreme Court decisions.

In reply to Grove et al. (2002), the authors attempt to limit their focus on the question of admissibility of the Rorschach Comprehensive System for expert testimony under the guidelines of the U.S. Supreme Court Daubert/Kumho/Joiner decisions. The article refutes the argument that a "raging controversy" exists as evidence that the Rorschach is not accepted in the field of psychology. The authors again argue that Grove et al. have misconstrued the intent of Daubert/Kumho and misidentify nonclinician academics as the appropriate evaluators of the admissibility of the Rorschach. The authors add to their previous argument (2002) that the Rorschach has sufficient reliability, validity, and error rates to be admissible under Daubert and conclude by countering the Grove et al. argument that the Journal of Personality Assessment is not an adequate forum for peer review of the Rorschach.

(1980). The PCP Psychosis: Prolonged Intoxication or Drug-Precipitated Functional Illness? Journal of Psychedelic Drugs: Vol. 12, PCP: Problems and Prevention. Selected Proceedings of the National PCP Conference 1979+K2, pp. 235-251.

This study was designed as an extension of previous research in which pronunciation of a foreign language was experimentally manipulated using alcohol or hypnosis, to confirm a relationship between permeability of language ego boundaries and pronunciation. The present study used Benzodiazepine (Valium) to manipulate pronunciation in Thai. Seventy‐five subjects were assigned to one of four treatment conditions: Placebo, 2 mg., 5 mg., or 10 mg., and subsequently tested on the Standard Thai Procedure (STP) and the Digit Symbol Test. Results seem to suggest that Benzodiazepine (Valium) facilitates the empathic sensitivity of the subjects to the tester rather than to the voice on the tape. The combined findings of the Valium and alcohol studies are interpreted as supporting the theoretical connection between language ego boundaries and ego boundaries in general and illustrate the extraordinary sensitivity of the test to fluctuations in the state of the subject's ego.