The implicit association test (IAT) and concept of implicit bias have significantly influenced the scientific, institutional, and public discourse on racial prejudice. In spite of this, there has been little investigation of how ordinary people make sense of the IAT and the bias it claims to measure. This article examines the public understanding of this research through a discourse analysis of reactions to the IAT and implicit bias in the news media. It demonstrates the ways in which readers interpreted, related to, and negotiated the claims of IAT science in relation to socially shared and historically embedded concerns and identities. IAT science was discredited in accounts that evoked discourses about the marginality of academic preoccupations, and helped to position test-takers as targets of an oppressive political correctness and psychologists as liberally biased. Alternatively, the IAT was understood to have revealed widely and deeply held biases towards racialized others, eliciting accounts that took the form of psychomoral confessionals. Such admissions of bias helped to constitute moral identities for readers that were firmly positioned against racial bias. Our findings are discussed in terms of their implications for using the IAT in prejudice reduction interventions, and communicating to the public about implicit bias.

This qualitative study explored East and South Asian international students' (N = 12) experiences with racial microaggressions at one Canadian university. Data were collected through unstructured, individual interviews. Using a modified version of the consensual qualitative research method (Hill, Thompson, & Williams, 1997), we identified six racial microaggressions themes: (a) excluded and avoided, (b) ridiculed for accent, (c) rendered invisible, (d) disregarded international values and needs, (e) ascription of intelligence, and (f) environmental microaggressions (structural barriers on campus). In addition, we used the same approach to identify themes pertaining to the ways in which students coped with racial microaggressions: (a) engaging with own racial and cultural groups, (b) withdrawing from academic spheres, and (c) seeking comfort in the surrounding multicultural milieu. Microaggressions and coping themes differed based on country of origin and language proficiency. Implications for research and practice are discussed.

Income inequality undermines societies: The more inequality, the more health problems, social tensions, and the lower social mobility, trust, life expectancy. Given people's tendency to legitimate existing social arrangements, the stereotype content model (SCM) argues that ambivalence―perceiving many groups as either warm or competent, but not both―may help maintain socio-economic disparities. The association between stereotype ambivalence and income inequality in 37 cross-national samples from Europe, the Americas, Oceania, Asia, and Africa investigates how groups' overall warmth-competence, status-competence, and competition-warmth correlations vary across societies, and whether these variations associate with income inequality (Gini index). More unequal societies report more ambivalent stereotypes, whereas more equal ones dislike competitive groups and do not necessarily respect them as competent. Unequal societies may need ambivalence for system stability: Income inequality compensates groups with partially positive social images.

What is it like to be a person today? To think, feel, and act as an individual in a time of accelerated social, cultural, technological, and political change? This question is inspired by the double meaning of subjectivity as both the 'first-personness' of consciousness (being a subject of experience) and the conditioning of that consciousness within society (being subject to power, authority, or influence). The contributors to this volume explore the perils and promise of the self in today's world. Their shared aim is to describe where we stand and what is at stake as we move ahead in the twenty-first century. They do so by interrogating the historical moment as a predicament of the subject. Their shared focus is on subjectivity as a dialectic of self and other, or individual and society, and how the defining tensions of subjectivity are reflected in contemporary forms of individualism, identity, autonomy, social connection, and political consciousness.

Income inequality undermines societies: The more inequality, the more health problems, social tensions, and the lower social mobility, trust, life expectancy. Given people's tendency to legitimate existing social arrangements, the stereotype content model (SCM) argues that ambivalence-perceiving many groups as either warm or competent, but not both-may help maintain socio-economic disparities. The association between stereotype ambivalence and income inequality in 37 cross-national samples from Europe, the Americas, Oceania, Asia, and Africa investigates how groups' overall warmth-competence, status-competence, and competition-warmth correlations vary across societies, and whether these variations associate with income inequality (Gini index). More unequal societies report more ambivalent stereotypes, whereas more equal ones dislike competitive groups and do not necessarily respect them as competent. Unequal societies may need ambivalence for system stability: Income inequality compensates groups with partially positive social images.

Students encountering each other for the first time were asked to converse for 30 minutes either face-to-face or through online chat. Conversational quality was compared to examine the possibility that specific social differences in communicative style are reduced or erased in online chat. As expected, gender differences evident in face-to-face conversation were absent online. However, conversational differences between experienced and inexperienced online chat users were, on the whole, similar across conditions. More generally, online chat appeared to produce less sequential connectivity, greater self-focus, and less other-focus than did face-to-face conversation.

The adoption of a rigorous experimentalism in the discipline of psychology has imposed tight constraints on what can be asked in psychological research and what sorts of answers given. Over the course of psychology's history the interpretive agent has receded into the background to make way for a more concrete observation language and a mechanistic, functionalist description of mind and behavior. In this context of disciplinary loss and gain, how do psychology's fledgling practitioners—its graduate students—understand the significance of their own research efforts? In this paper, we present thematic and discursive analyses of interviews with a sample of psychology graduate students at a large, public, research university in North America. We explore the manner in which the imperatives of "objectivity," as applied to psychological research, serve paradoxically to enhance the validity of what students feel their research permits them to claim while reducing its personal and social significance. We look at how, in this compromise, students struggle to define their identities as scientists so as to allay doubts about the significance of their work. Their comments provide insight into how psychological knowledge is critically evaluated inside and outside the discipline, and how these two perspectives are dialectically related. URN: http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0114-fqs1102260

In its traditional guise, cross-cultural psychology is a science of comparative measurement. Its chief method is the regulated observation or recording of behaviour in different cultural milieux and its quantitative conversion into a common metric. This method allows for the estimation of differences across cultures on the strength or magnitude of the behaviour. We can therefore speak of one cultural group doing more of Y, or being more Y, than some other group, where Y is a conceptually and operationally defined behaviour taken to apply equally well to both groups. The culture-independence of the definition supports examination of how the magnitude of the behaviour may be determined or conditioned by some cultural variable X. According to this picture, culture (the independent variable) differs from place to place and the features by which it differs produce more or less of the universally defined behaviour (the dependent variable) under study. The hypothetical contingency of 'culture affecting behaviour' that underlies this approach is thereby maintained. In this paper, I use the problem of translation to cast doubt on this picture of cross-cultural research and the inferential strength of its comparative method. In opposition, I argue that we never measure the same behaviour across cultures if behaviour is understood as socially significant action. Rather, the specification of analogous actions across cultures is a highly uncertain approximation involving the inevitable projection of one's own conceptual scheme. I argue further that most social phenomena of interest to cross-cultural psychologists cannot be adequately defined in a manner that divorces them from the local linguistic conventions and normative frameworks through which they are realized as part of cultural life. For this reason, cross- cultural psychology cannot effectively model itself on the natural sciences. It is as much hermeneutics as psychometrics.

This study examined the relations of parental permissiveness, authoritativeness, authoritarianism, and nurturance with two dimensions of self-esteem - self-liking and self-competence. In a sample of 207 two-parent families, university students and both their parents provided independent reports on all the above variables. Covariance structure analysis was used to eliminate reporter-specific bias and unreliability in predicting student self-esteem from parenting behavior. The results revealed highly redundant positive associations of mothers' and fathers' authoritativeness and nurturance with both self-liking and self-competence. The pattern of these associations suggests that the significance of parental authoritativeness for the child's self-esteem is due mainly to the nurturance it provides. Contrary to expectation, mothers' and fathers' authoritarianism was also positively associated with self-liking. As discussed, however, this is likely to be an artifact of the specific measures and testing methods used.

Japanese tend to report lower self-esteem than do Westerners. What this behavioral difference indicates about the private sentiments of individuals in Japan and Western countries such as Canada has been earnestly debated in recent years. Consideration of self-esteem ratings as speech acts or performatives shifts the focus of cultural comparison away from the valence of assumed mental representations and onto the pragmatics of agreement with statements of personal value. This alternative framing highlights the importance of performative pressures and other normative considerations in guiding the speech acts whereby self-esteem is typically measured. To support our claim that the self-esteem ratings of Japanese and Canadians are shaped by contrasting performative pressures, we show that explicit instructions designed to offset these pressures predictably raise or lower reported self-esteem. Implications of the results for the meaning and measurement of self-esteem across cultures are discussed.

For nearly 60 years, researchers and practitioners have struggled toward agreement on the definition and measurement of self-esteem. Both consensus and precision have proven elusive, and debate about what we are or should be measuring with our instruments continues today. In this article, we offer a clarifying account of the nature of self-esteem as a key aspect of personal identity and examine its legitimacy as a hypothetical construct. The distinction between implicit and explicit self-esteem is discussed in this context, raising critical questions about the theoretical status of the former.

Can people comprehend assertions without believing them? Descartes (1644/1984) suggested that people can and should, whereas Spinoza (1677/1982) suggested that people should but cannot. Three experiments support the hypothesis that comprehension includes an initial belief in the information comprehended. Ss were exposed to false information about a criminal defendant (Experiments 1 and 2) or a college student (Experiment 3). Some Ss were exposed to this information while under load (Experiments 1 and 2) or time pressure (Experiment 3). Ss made judgments about the target (sentencing decisions or liking judgments). Both load and time pressure caused Ss to believe the false information and to use it in making consequential decisions about the target. In Spinozan terms, both manipulations prevented Ss from "unbelieving" the false information they automatically believed during comprehension.

We argue in this paper for distinguishing two dimensions of global self-esteem, self-competence and self-liking. Studies 1 and 2 identify a corresponding pair of factors in Rosenberg's (1965) Self-Esteem Scale. Studies 3 and 4 examine the predictive value of the two-dimensional approach to self-esteem as reflected in the unique associations of self-competence and self-liking with negative life events and word recognition.