Collective action problems emerge when individual incentives and group interests are misaligned, as in the case of climate change. Individuals involved in these problems are generally considered to have two options: contribute toward public solutions such as global warming mitigation or free ride. However, many collective action problems today involve a third option of investing in a "private solution" such as local adaptation. The availability of this third option can lead to a private solution trap whereby private solutions are adopted, collectively optimal public solutions are not provided, and existing inequalities are exacerbated. We investigated the private solution trap with a collective action game featuring private and public solutions, wealth inequality determined by luck or merit, and participants from 34 countries. We found that the joint existence of private solutions and wealth inequality had a consistent effect across countries: Participants given a higher endowment adopted private solutions almost twice as often as those given a lower endowment, regardless of whether it was determined by luck or merit, and contributed proportionally less toward public solutions. Wealth inequality increased in every country and those given lower endowments were often left unprotected as public solutions were not provided. Across countries, cultural values of hierarchy and harmony were associated with preferences for private and public solutions, respectively. We also identified two universal pathways toward public solution provision: early contributions and conditional cooperation. Our findings highlight the ubiquity of the private solution trap, its cultural underpinnings, and its potential consequences for global collective action problems.

The money-burning game (MBG) is widely used to study anti-social or destructive behavior. We extend the design of the MBG to separate three motives that could lead subjects to burn their partner's money - spite, reciprocity, and inequality aversion. We detect that reciprocity is the dominant reason: Most of our subjects would only burn their partner's money if they believed that their partner would burn theirs. This finding has important implications for the interpretation of the behavior of the game.

To identify the neurocognitive mechanisms underpinning the social difficulties that characterize autism, we performed functional magnetic resonance imaging on pairs of autistic and non-autistic adults simultaneously whilst they interacted with one another on the iterated Ultimatum Game (iUG)-an interactive task that emulates the reciprocal characteristic of naturalistic interpersonal exchanges. Two age-matched sets of male-male dyads were investigated: 16 comprised an autistic Responder and a non-autistic Proposer, and 19 comprised non-autistic pairs of Responder and Proposer. Players' round-by-round behavior on the iUG was modeled as reciprocal choices, and dynamic functional connectivity (dFC) was measured to identify the neural mechanisms underpinning reciprocal behaviors. Behavioral expressions of reciprocity were significantly reduced in autistic compared with non-autistic Responders, yet no such differences were observed between the non-autistic Proposers in either set of dyads. Furthermore, we identified latent dFC states with temporal properties associated with reciprocity. Autistic interactants spent less time in brain states characterized by dynamic inter-network integration and segregation among the Default Mode Network and cognitive control networks, suggesting that their reduced expressions of social-emotional reciprocity reflect less efficient reconfigurations among brain networks supporting flexible cognition and behavior. These findings advance our mechanistic understanding of the social difficulties characterizing autism.

An economic experiment shows that a commercial domain or the presence of advertisements are not universally detrimental to the assessed credibility of web-based health information, unlike contextually relevant ads, which decrease credibility.

The literature on experimental tax and regulatory compliance has highlighted significant advantages associated with competitive audit selection mechanisms (ASMs) predicated on differences in estimated undeclared incomes among taxpayers. This paper explores the potential negative consequences of competitive ASMs in situations where authorities lack an unbiased indicator of these differences. Through a laboratory experiment, we demonstrate that asymmetric information between taxpayers and tax authorities can diminish compliance and exacerbate inequality within competitive ASMs. Our findings underscore the need for caution concerning the perceived benefits of competitive ASMs and emphasize the importance of allocating resources to mitigate income heterogeneity among groups subject to competitive audit selection.

Collective action problems emerge when individual incentives and group interests are misaligned, as in the case of climate change. Individuals involved in collective action problems are often considered to have two options: contribute towards a public solution or free-ride. But they might also choose a third option of investing in a private solution such as local climate change adaptation. Here we introduce a collective action game featuring wealth inequality caused by luck or merit and both public and private solutions with participants from 34 countries. We show that the joint existence of wealth inequality and private solutions has a consistent effect across countries: participants endowed with higher income choose the private solution almost twice as often as those endowed with lower income; and this finding cannot be explained by different sources of wealth (luck vs. merit) or by cultural or economic factors. We also show that preferences for private solutions undermine support for public solutions, resulting in wealth inequality increasing in every country. In contrast, we identify two universal pathways to successful public solution provision: early contributions to public solutions and conditional cooperation. Our findings highlight the ubiquity of the ‘private solution problem’ and its potential consequences for global collective action problems.

Leaders who decide the allocation of resources are often chosen through contests. Due to imperfect monitoring, they often decide to allocate resources to themselves at the expense of others. This paper investigates how being selected in a contest affects such allocation through two channels: entitlement and self-selection effects. In our experiment, two players compete for the right to allocate resources between themself and a third, uninvolved player. We identify the entitlement effects by comparing the choices of participants who participated in the contest with those who were chosen randomly. Self-selection effect is identified by comparing the choices of winners and losers between treatments via a difference-in-difference approach. We find a significant effect of entitlement; people participating in the contest transfer fewer resources to the third player compared to those who did not participate. Further, we find no evidence that the people with specific distributional preferences self-select into the leaders’ role. Our findings suggest that the primary reason leaders allocate resources to themselves is their involvement in the contest rather than being a result of self-selection.

This article examines whether Housing First for homeless families reduces homelessness and use of emergency health services and improves security of tenure and caregivers' mental health. We present the quantitative data from a mixed-methods design. Homeless families with at least one child under 18, residing in Brno, Czechia were recruited for an open-label pragmatic randomized controlled trial. Families were stratified by number of children and randomized by lottery. Fifty treatment families received intensive case management, housing in municipal flats, and a risk-fund. One hundred control families received services as usual. Structured interviews were conducted at baseline, and six and twelve months after move-in. For statistical analysis, we used a non-parametric Fisher's exact test for binary variables, a Mann-Whitney U test for categorical and continuous variables, and a parametric negative binomial model for count variables. Treatment families had less homelessness (0, 2 months vs. 11 months) in the year after move-in, were twice as likely to have secure tenure, and showed lower psychological distress. The treatment cut annual emergency room visits in half, ambulance use by three fourths, and hospitalizations by two thirds. This intervention led to greater improvements in health outcomes than previous interventions involving families experiencing homelessness.

the ‘Housing First’ Assemblage: An example of ‘Rapid Re-Housing for Homeless Families with Children’ in the City of Brno Abstract: Using the example of a Rapid Re-Housing project, this article aims to open up a more general social-scientific debate within the context of critical discussions about ending homelessness in the Czech Republic. It at the same time seeks to refine the usage of the ‘urban assemblages’ concept in sociological and anthropological research. A Rapid Re-Housing project was piloted in Brno in 2016–2018. Its objective was to house 50 families in need of housing in municipal apartments and to provide social support in the form of intensive case management. The project included a randomised controlled trial and a qualitative evaluation. This research showed that the effects of the intervention were positive for the vast majority of indicators monitored, with some of the intervention families experiencing significant changes in their financial situation. Discussing the effects of the Brno ‘housing first assemblage’ we respond to to the reservations that have been voiced about the practice of Housing First programmes. We base our responses here on empirical data and the concept of ‘relations of exteriority’ and show that even projects based on solving ‘only one component’ can initiate broader socio-material transforma-tions of contemporary societies.

Theoretical models of local social capital predict that communities may find themselves in one of two equilibria: one with a high level of local social capital and low migration or one with a low level of local social capital and high migration. There is empirical literature suggesting that immigrants who join communities high in social capital are more likely to invest in local social capital and that the whole community will then end up in the equilibrium with high local social capital and low migration. However, this literature suffers from the selection of immigrants, which makes the identification challenging. In order to test the causal influence of the initial level of local social capital, we take the setup used in the theoretical models into the laboratory. We treat some communities by increasing the initial level of social capital without affecting the equilibrium outcomes. We find that while most communities end up in one of the two equilibria predicted by the theoretical models, the treated communities are more likely to converge to the equilibrium with a high level of local social capital and low migration.

Using the example of a Rapid Re-Housing project, this article aims to open up a more general social-scientific debate within the context of criti-cal discussions about ending homelessness in the Czech Republic. It at the same time seeks to refine the usage of the 'urban assemblages' concept in sociological and anthropological research. A Rapid Re-Housing project was piloted in Brno in 2016-2018. Its objective was to house 50 families in need of housing in municipal apartments and to provide social support in the form of intensive case management. The project included a randomised controlled trial and a qualitative evaluation. This research showed that the effects of the intervention were positive for the vast majority of indicators monitored, with some of the intervention families experiencing significant changes in their fi-nancial situation. Discussing the effects of the Brno 'housing first assemblage' we respond to to the reservations that have been voiced about the practice of Housing First programmes. We base our responses here on empirical data and the concept of 'relations of exteriority' and show that even projects based on solving 'only one component' can initiate broader socio-material transforma-tions of contemporary societies.

Governments and organizations often implement policies designed to help people in case of an undesirable event. Such policies can make the society better off, but they may also create moral hazard. We use a laboratory experiment to examine two questions. First, can discretionary decisions to provide assistance overcome the problem of moral hazard and lead to higher efficiency? Second, if so, will people prefer this discretionary procedure to the strict liability policy in which no assistance is provided? We find that the assistance is more ecient than the strict liability procedure. However, people still prefer the strict liability regime rather than assistance provision. We conduct additional treatments that show that this eect is not driven by the presence of the human discretion, nor by risk, loss or inequality aversion. This suggests that when moral hazard is a concern people have procedural preferences in favor of the strict liability regime.

Norms for cooperation are essential for groups to function effectively, yet there are often strong incentives for group members to behave selfishly. Direct and indirect reciprocity can help to discourage such uncooperative behaviour by punishing defectors and rewarding cooperators, but require explicit means for punishment and tally-keeping. What, then, encourages an individual to cooperate with their group when others cannot track the behaviour of others? We adapted the Bargaining Game to examine the emergence and maintenance of cooperation among 20 groups of six anonymous players (N = 120) who interacted amongst themselves over recursive bargaining exchanges. By estimating the expected utility that drives players' demands in these interactions, we demonstrate that their behaviour on each exchange reflects the demands placed upon them previously. Thus, we highlight the role of generalised reciprocity in such situations; that is, when an individual passes on to another member of their group the behaviour they have received previously. Furthermore, we identify four distinct behavioural types that differ in their expressions of generalised reciprocity: Some players converge quickly on cooperative demands regardless of the behaviour they received from their co-players, and are therefore characterised by low expressions of reciprocity. In contrast, individuals with strong reciprocal tendencies decrease their demands over successive interactions in response to the behaviour of their group. By simulating groups with different compositions of these player types, we reveal the strong influence of individual differences in reciprocal tendencies on the emergence of cooperative group dynamics.

Around the world, people engage in practices that involve self-inflicted pain and apparently wasted resources. Researchers theorized that these practices help stabilize within-group cooperation by assorting individuals committed to collective action. While this proposition was previously studied using existing religious practices, we provide a controlled framework for an experimental investigation of various predictions derived from this theory. We recruited 372 university students in the Czech Republic who were randomly assigned into either a high-cost or low-cost condition and then chose to play a public goods game (PGG) either in a group that wastes money to signal commitment to high contributions in the game or to play in the group without such signals. We predicted that cooperators would assort in the high-cost revealed group and that, despite these costs, they would contribute more to the common pool and earn larger individual rewards over five iterations of PGG compared with the concealed group and participants in the low-cost condition. The results showed that the assortment of cooperators was more effective in the high-cost condition and translated into larger contributions of the remaining endowment to the common pool, but participants in the low-cost revealed group earned the most. We conclude that costly signals can serve as an imperfect assorting mechanism, but the size of the costs needs to be carefully balanced with potential benefits to be profitable.

Periodic rotation of staff in public administration may lead to lower corruption, as it disrupts long-term relationships between public officials and potential bribers. This paper proposes an experimental design that tests the anti-corruption effect of staff rotation in situations where public officials have committed to reciprocating bribes. We find that staff rotation does not influence the proportion of firms offering bribes but does reduce the share of bribe acceptance and inefficient decisions owing to bribery. The outcome of the staff-rotation treatment, in which firms offered bribes even though they were rarely accepted by officials, is consistent with the game having a quantal response equilibrium.

We investigate whether the value of time (VOT) depends on when the corresponding preferences are measured: in advance, just before, or after the time period for which the time preferences are being evaluated. We find that the VOT is highest when elicited just before the time period. This is an indication of the VOT being affected by time-inconsistent, and more specifically, present-biased preferences. We argue that this result may explain why time valuations based on stated preference (SP) data are typically found to be lower than those based on revealed preference (RP) data: most RP surveys evaluate the preferences of respondents close to the time period for which the preferences are being measured, whereas the time instances for which preferences are evaluated in SP surveys tend to be more abstract, or referencing past or future time periods.

In a controlled lab experiment, we investigate hypothetical biases in the value of time by comparing stated preference (SP) and revealed preference (RP) values attached to unexpected waiting times. The SP and RP choice sets are identical in terms of design with the only difference being that the RP choices have real consequences in terms of unexpected waiting times and monetary incentives. We find a substantial hypothetical bias with the average SP value of time being only 70% of the corresponding RP value. The bias is mainly driven by participants who have scheduling constraints during the time of the unexpected wait. Scheduling constraints are taken into account to a much lesser extent in the SP setting than in the RP setting, presumably because only in the latter, the consequences of ignoring them are costly. We find evidence that this effect is stronger for persons with relatively low cognitive ability.

The experimental literature has found a positive relationship between patience and performance in cognitive tests that are not incentivized by money. It has also been shown that unincentivized cognitive tests capture not only cognitive ability (CA), but also intrinsic motivation related to the test takers' personality traits. In order to determine whether the relationship between patience and test scores is driven by intrinsic motivation or CA, we run an experiment in which subjects take either incentivized or unincentivized cognitive tests. We find that while incentivized test scores positively correlate with patience, the unincentivized scores are not related to the time preferences of our subjects. The observed correlation between patience and cognitive test scores therefore seems to be driven by CA rather than by intrinsic motivation related to personality traits.

A large body of evidence supports a negative association between risk aversion of workers and the level of risk they face in their occupations. This relationship could be explained by the self-selection of workers into jobs according to their risk preferences or by the effect on risk attitudes of occupations in which people face or witness dangerous situations. We use incentivized experiments to measure risk preferences among three different groups: experienced firefighters, novice firefighters, and students. We find that experienced firefighters are less riskaverse than novice firefighters, and these in turn are less risk-averse than students. The effects remain significant even after controlling for other relevant differences between these groups. Our findings suggest that the observed relationship between risk aversion and high-risk occupations is not only a result of self-selection but also of people’s preferences being shaped by their work lives.

It has been shown in the experimental tax compliance literature that endogenous audit selection mechanism (ASM) increases tax compliance. However, this literature assumes that the tax authority has an unbiased observation of the actual taxpayers' income and consequently the taxpayers with the largest difference between the observed and reported income are most likely to be selected for audit. In reality, the tax authority might not have unbiased information about the actual incomes as these might be observed only for taxpayers who have been selected for audit. In this case, the ASM can be based only on reported incomes. The aim of the paper is to design an endogenous ASM that uses only the reported incomes and experimentally compare the tax compliance under the endogenous and random ASMs. We develop a theoretical model where taxpayers have heterogeneous income and the ASM is based only on the reported income. We show that in the symmetric Bayes-Nash equilibrium the proposed endogenous ASM entails a higher reported income than the random ASM. We test predictions of the model in an economic experiment. Each experimental session consists of 30 rounds. In each round, subjects may be selected for audit with a certain audit probability. In the random ASM, the probability of audit is exogenous and the same for all taxpayers.