This article introduces a bundle of active learning activities for an introductory undergraduate course in research methods. In particular, the activities aim to help students develop core knowledge and skills that provide a foundation for reading and conducting quantitative and qualitative research. Active learning is a pedagogical practice with well-established benefits such as better student attitudes and improved content comprehension and application. I build on this conventional wisdom by applying a student-centred evaluation method, demonstrating that students perceive active learning as an effective complement to traditional lecturing and assignments for learning core methodological topics in political science.

Urban universities with a predominantly commuting student population face distinct challenges in fostering social connections. Commuting students spend less time on campus and have fewer opportunities for organized and spontaneous social interactions with other students. The campus experience for commuter students tends to center around the classroom. Social connection is vital to various outcomes, such as persistence and well-being, and thus instructors need to find ways to promote different forms of interaction. This study uses focus groups and a survey instrument to examine student perceptions of the social benefits of collaborative active learning activities in a first-year introductory political science course. The data indicate that students positively assess their experiences with collaborative learning, highlighting its benefits on social connection and well-being.

The pattern of intergovernmental relations (IGR) on immigrant integration in Canada runs counter to core arguments in the extant literature. In particular, Canada's federal structures have not produced multilateral, institutionalized, and conflictual IGR; IGR in Canada has been predominantly bilateral and only moderately institutionalized. Moreover, IGR has been conflictual at times, while collaborative at others. Several factors explain this unexpected pattern. In an attempt to ward off separatism, the central government devolved authority over immigrant selection and settlement programmes to Quebec, creating a deep asymmetry between Quebec and the Anglophone provinces (and territories) in these areas. Interprovincial competition drove other provinces to seek powers over immigration and integration. The central government - driven by fiscal pressures and a philosophical commitment to symmetry - struck bilateral agreements with Anglophone provinces to fund and devolve settlement programming and some control over the selection of economic immigrants.

Canada has been celebrated in popular and academic work for its relative immunity to nativist populism. No competitive nativist party has recently emerged in federal politics that challenges the mainstream consensus around mass immigration, unlike virtually every other postindustrial democracy. This paper argues that existing explanations for this "exceptionalism" are lacking. In particular, they fail to appreciate the importance of Quebec nationalism in contributing to this outcome. Quebec nationalism fractured the stronger anti-immigration sentiment found in rural and smaller urban areas in both Quebec and Anglophone Canada and thereby prevented right-wing parties from mobilising that sentiment in a way that could feasibly win elections. This forced such parties to moderate their message and court "ethnic voters" in suburban ridings around Toronto and Vancouver. We illustrate this argument using novel data which permit a comparison of the Canadian experience with nativist politics in Australia and New Zealand.

Interculturalism provides the core framework for immigration-related policies in Catalonia, while remaining deeply intertwined with Catalan nationalism. We first identify ‘intercultural nationalism’ as the core doctrine through which Catalan nationalist discourse has been articulated in relation to immigration. We trace interculturalism's origins to nationalism in Quebec and argue that, in Catalonia also, regional immigration policies have been constructed in opposition to those of the central state, while attempting to involve immigrants closely in subnational belonging and social cohesion. Second, we investigate whether interculturalism is durable during economic and political crises, arguing that intercultural policies did not change following the economic recession of the 2010s. This harmonises with broader interpretations that de-emphasise the role of economic factors in ethnic conflicts. In conclusion we note how the continuing resilience of interculturalism in Catalan policies on immigration contrasts sharply with the rise of xenophobia elsewhere.

How do sub-state nationalists respond to the growing presence of cultural diversity in their homelands' resulting from migration? Sub-state nationalists in Europe, in nations without states' such as Catalonia and Scotland, have been challenging the traditional nation-state model for many decades. While the arguments in favour of autonomy or independence levelled by these movements have become more complex, sub-state nationalist movements remain grounded by their perceived national community that is distinct from the majority nation. Migration to the homeland' of a sub-state nation, then, presents a conundrum for sub-state elites that we label the legitimation paradox': too much internal diversity may undermine the claim to cultural distinctiveness. We engage with three common intervening variables thought to influence how sub-state nationalists confront the legitimation paradox': civic/ethnic nationalism, degree of political autonomy, and party competition. Our overarching argument is that none of these factors have a unidirectional or determinate effect on the sub-state nationalism-immigration nexus, which is why the nuanced case studies that comprise this Special Issue are worthwhile endeavours.

This article examines the discursive and political response to immigrant-generated diversity by Partido Nacionalista Vasco (PNV) in the Basque Country of Spain. A much-ballyhooed fact about PNV is that its founder, Sabino Arana, articulated a racist nationalist doctrine in the late nineteenth century. Alarm bells were raised in the early 2000s when the Basque Country became a destination for foreign immigrants arriving in Spain from Latin America and North Africa: do foreign immigrants pose a threat to Basque national identity? The PNV's answer to this question has been a clear no'. Rather than distance itself from its past, however, party elites legitimate the inclusive and compassionate attitude towards foreign immigrants through selective discovery of the Basque national narrative. While sceptics of ideational variables are quick to suggest that nationalist elites manipulate the past to serve current purposes, this article suggests that such an interpretation does not do justice to the subtle ways in which symbols, myths, and images of the past have shaped the worldviews of PNV elites in the realm of immigration.

Why have immigrant integration policies in the Basque Country and Flanders been framed according to multicultural principles? This paper offers an addendum to rationalist and institutionalist approaches, arguing that we cannot make sense of multicultural policies in these two cases without considering the interplay between historical narratives that undergird the nation and elite decision-making. Narratives of cultural oppression have been essential for nationalist mobilization in the Basque Country and Flanders. In turn, the choice of multiculturalism over assimilation by sub-state elites made sense because it fits with their understanding of the nation as an oppressed group.

For better or worse, Canada is considered the exemplar multicultural society. Toronto, Montreal, and Vancouver are among the world’s most diverse cities, and the Canadian government appears content that the typical immigrant profile is, and will continue to be, non-European. Furthermore, unlike centre-right parties across Europe that have declared that multiculturalism is dead (e.g., Daily Mail 2011), the governing Conservative Party of Canada has been busy crafting a strategy aimed at courting the votes of “new Canadians,” which has paid dividends for the party in recent federal elections; at the same time, the Conservative Party has introduced “subtle restrictiveness” into Canada’s citizenship and refugee policy to appease its traditional conservative base (Marwah, Triadafilopoulos, and White 2013, 96). Does this mean that all is, indeed, well with multiculturalism in Canada? The majority of the contributors to the works under review would disagree. A controversy that has continually plagued scholarly analysis of multiculturalism is that the meaning

AbstractThis article endeavours to explain why English Canadians and Quebeckers differ in their opinions about private healthcare options. Data indicates that respondents in the nine predominantly English-speaking provinces are more likely to oppose private hospitals than Quebeckers. No one province or region in “English Canada” drives these results: aversion to private hospitals is consistent across the nine provinces. Research on welfare states slots Canada into the “liberal” category, which is indicative of a preference for market solutions to welfare problems, which makes this finding perplexing. The argument presented here is that universal healthcare has become bound up with the national identity of English Canada, resulting in a general aversion to private healthcare initiatives outside of Quebec.

On October 20, 2011, the paramilitary Basque separatist group Euskadi ta Askatasuna (ETA; Basque Homeland and Freedom) declared a 'definitive cessation to armed activity' and called for 'open dialogue' with the Spanish government. The right-leaning Partido Popular (PP, Popular Party), which assumed control of the Spanish executive the following month, has unequivocally rejected ETA's request for negotiations. It contends that discussions with ETA have been unproductive in the past because the group is not interested in genuine peace, only in using the lull in security operations to regroup for more violence.

This article builds on recent attempts to explain why sub-state nationalist parties in West Europe and North America pursue varying discourses and policies in response to immigrant-generated diversity. It analyses the dynamics of immigrant integration in two comparable cases of sub-state nationalism: Catalonia and the Basque Country. In contrast to the hypothesis that sub-state nationalism and immigration are inherently antagonistic, nationalist parties in both cases have experimented with multiculturalism to make diversity a new marker of national identity. The recent assimilationist turn in Catalonia, however, demonstrates that regional electoral competition can sometimes complicate matters of identity.

Multiculturalism and the Welfare State: Recognition and Redistribution in Contemporary Democracies, Keith Banting and Will Kymlicka, eds., New York: Oxford University Press, 2006, pp. 405. - Volume 46 Issue 3

Why in some cases do we observe an increase in ethnic violence following a democratic transition, while in others violence dissipates? We argue that a crucial intervening variable that is often ignored in ethnic conflict studies is the nature and number of organizations that purport to represent an ethnic group. Following Brubaker (2004), we question the notion that ethnic groups are unitary actors with homogenous preferences. In most cases, loyalties among politically relevant minority ethnic groups are divided between moderate and extremist organizations. Democratization and concurrent institutional changes can significantly alter the previous configuration of organizations, which affects the level of competition between organizations for group support. Through an analysis of six cases, we demonstrate that, on average, competition is associated with higher levels of ethnic violence while cooperative or dominant organizations have tended to reduce violence in the aftermath of democratization.

Basque nationalism is singled out in the literature as a case of minority nationalism that faces an ongoing struggle between those in support of a liberal-inclusive definition of the nation and those favouring an exclusive-racialist one. Nevertheless, Basque nationalist parties have been welcoming of immigration and have legislated to create a regional citizenship based on residence rather than ethnicity. This article argues that, at least in part, the positive' response of Basque nationalists to the immigration wave that began in the early 2000s is an attempt to strengthen national solidarity by contrasting Basque values of openness and tolerance against the restrictive nature of the reforms to the immigration law in Spain that were initiated in 2000. This argument challenges the notion that sub-state nationalists are hostile to immigration because of the threat diversity poses to the nationalist project.

Democratization has been heralded as both a “curse” and “cure” for ethnic conflict. Using a comparative analysis of ethnic conflicts in Senegal and Nicaragua, this article makes the case that the breadth of accommodation provided by a central government following democratization is a key variable that can provide a deeper understanding of why conflict sometimes worsens and sometimes ameliorates. By adopting a framework that conceptualizes the range of accommodation provided to territorial minority ethnic groups in advanced capitalist democracies as falling into three general categories, “loyalty,” “voice,” and “recognition,” the article illustrates that using a combination of these three strategies helped Nicaragua quell violent ethnic conflict. On the other hand, the conflict in Senegal continued because the newly democratic government refrained from using strategies to provide “voice” and “recognition” for the Diola minority.

Post-Franco Spanish governance represents a rare case of a stable multinational federation in comparative and historical perspective.1 In contrast to other multinational federations that arose from dictatorial rule, such as the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, Spain has not compromised its geographical integrity, and its federal institutions are still operating after more than two decades. Moreover, the first attempt to decentralize Spain in response to nationalist mobilization failed miserably, and led to civil war and fascism.2 This makes Spain’s peaceful and stable transition to a multinational federal democracy that much more remarkable. The question, then, is what accounts for the stability of Spain’s post-1978 federation?