Why do some states comply with international agreements while others flout them? In this article, I introduce a previously unconsidered explanation: bureaucratic structure. I develop a rational choice model examining the impact of bureaucratic structure on compliance, suggesting that the existence of several distinct bureaucracies can mute compliance with an international agreement by insulating some bureaucrats from pressure to comply. I examine this theory through newly coded data on a 2001 OECD agreement designed to decrease the percentage of aid that is “tied” to donor‐state products and services—a practice that is popular among special interests but which decreases foreign aid's effectiveness. I find that non–development‐oriented bureaucracies, such as departments of interior, labor, and energy, were significantly less likely to comply with the agreement than traditional development bureaucracies. This aggregates to the state level as well, where states with many aid agencies were less compliant than states with a streamlined bureaucracy.

En 2018, la guerra comercial entre Estados Unidos y China hizo bajar el precio de muchos productos agr & iacute;colas estadounidenses. Si bien muchos agricultores respondieron plantando cultivos alternativos, otros continuaron plantando cultivos de bajo valor, lo que tuvo un alto coste sobre sus resultados y provoc & oacute; un gran n & uacute;mero de quiebras agr & iacute;colas. & iquest;Por qu & eacute; algunos agricultores hicieron caso omiso de sus propios intereses econ & oacute;micos y plantaron cultivos de bajo valor durante la guerra comercial? Argumentamos que las preferencias pol & iacute;ticas explican, en parte, el comportamiento de los agricultores. Emparejamos datos de cultivos georreferenciados con las listas de sanciones a nivel de producto por parte de China y calculamos los cambios que se produjeron a nivel de condado en la siembra de aquellos cultivos afectados por los aranceles. Argumentamos que aquellos condados con una mayor proporci & oacute;n de votantes de Trump en las elecciones de 2016 eran significativamente menos propensos a cambiar sus decisiones en materia de cultivos debido a la guerra comercial. Esto sugiere que el partidismo puede afectar a la econom & iacute;a en mayor medida de lo que se cre & iacute;a anteriormente. En 2018, la guerre commerciale entre la Chine et les & Eacute;tats-Unis a fait chuter les prix de nombreux produits agricoles am & eacute;ricains. Quand bon nombre d'agriculteurs ont par cons & eacute;quent opt & eacute; pour des cultures de substitution, d'autres ont poursuivi les cultures de faible valeur au d & eacute;triment de leur r & eacute;sultat net. C'est ainsi qu'un grand nombre d'agriculteurs ont fait faillite. Pourquoi certains producteurs ont-ils ignor & eacute; leurs int & eacute;r & ecirc;ts & eacute;conomiques et maintenu des cultures de faible valeur lors de la guerre commerciale ? Nous affirmons que les pr & eacute;f & eacute;rences politiques expliquent en partie le comportement des agriculteurs. Nous faisons correspondre des donn & eacute;es de culture g & eacute;or & eacute;f & eacute;renc & eacute;es aux listes de sanctions par produit de la Chine, puis calculons les changements au niveau national dans la plantation de cultures soumises & agrave; des droits de douane. Nous remarquons que les comt & eacute;s ayant fortement vot & eacute; pour Donald Trump lors des & eacute;lections de 2016 avaient bien moins de chances d'opter pour d'autres plantations & agrave; cause de la guerre commerciale. Aussi l'esprit de parti pourrait-il avoir des cons & eacute;quences bien plus larges sur l'& eacute;conomie que l'on ne le pensait.

Abstract Foreign aid is foreign policy, but it was not always treated as such by international relations (IR) scholars. A literature that once took a purely state-centric approach to research is increasingly finding that an actor-centric approach provides new insights on decisions by aid donors, recipients, and implementers. Approaches from the foreign policy analysis (FPA) literature are relevant to the study of foreign aid and development, and the potential for the two literatures to speak to one other is high. In this chapter, we point to areas of foreign aid and development research that have benefitted from the ideas of FPA. Aid scholars find richer interpretation and understanding of phenomena associated with aid and development when they are able to consider the actions of leaders, bureaucrats, and other individual decision-makers. We suggest further areas of overlap that could support for important advancements in both FPA and IR.

This paper introduces new data on the creation of subsidiary bodies (SBs) by members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) between 1972 and 2020. Delegation to SBs is one of the principal means through which the UNSC acts, and these bodies are designed to carry out crucial functions such as peacekeeping, implementing sanctions, and investigating crises. Yet, no research has systematically evaluated their creation, design, and use. Our dataset includes a typology of all proposed and created SBs as well as information about their purpose and design. After introducing the data, we empirically analyze the determinants of SB creation. Multivariate regression demonstrates that SBs are more likely to be created when the preferences of the permanent members are aligned. Moreover, stronger bodies are more likely to be created during periods of high preference alignment, while middle- and lower-strength bodies are less influenced by member alignment. These results provide unique evidence demonstrating how politics affects the choice of when and how the UNSC responds to global problems. Our data and analysis paint a picture of a more proactive UNSC than is commonly portrayed in the literature, and these data will enable scholars to further analyze UNSC action. Este art & iacute;culo presenta nuevos datos sobre la creaci & oacute;n de & Oacute;rganos Subsidiarios (OS) por parte de los miembros del Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas (CSNU) entre 1972 y 2020. La delegaci & oacute;n en los OS es uno de los principales medios a trav & eacute;s de los cuales act & uacute;a el CSNU. Estos & oacute;rganos est & aacute;n dise & ntilde;ados para llevar a cabo funciones cruciales como el mantenimiento de la paz, la aplicaci & oacute;n de sanciones y la investigaci & oacute;n en materia de crisis. Sin embargo, no existe ninguna investigaci & oacute;n que haya evaluado sistem & aacute;ticamente su creaci & oacute;n, dise & ntilde;o y uso. Nuestro conjunto de datos incluye una tipolog & iacute;a de todos los OS propuestos y creados, as & iacute; como informaci & oacute;n sobre su prop & oacute;sito y dise & ntilde;o. Despu & eacute;s de presentar estos datos, analizamos emp & iacute;ricamente los determinantes de la creaci & oacute;n de los OS. La regresi & oacute;n multivariable demuestra que es m & aacute;s probable que se creen OS cuando las preferencias de los miembros permanentes se encuentran alineadas. Adem & aacute;s, resulta m & aacute;s probable que se creen organismos m & aacute;s fuertes durante los per & iacute;odos de alineamiento de mayor preferencia, mientras que los organismos que tienen una fuerza media o baja se encuentran menos influenciados por el alineamiento de los miembros. Estos resultados proporcionan pruebas & uacute;nicas que demuestran c & oacute;mo la pol & iacute;tica afecta la elecci & oacute;n en materia de cu & aacute;ndo y c & oacute;mo responde el CSNU a los problemas globales. Nuestros datos y an & aacute;lisis ofrecen una imagen de un CSNU m & aacute;s proactivo de lo que com & uacute;nmente se describe en la literatura. Estos datos permitir & aacute;n a los acad & eacute;micos analizar m & aacute;s a fondo las acciones del CSNU. Cet article pr & eacute;sente de nouvelles donn & eacute;es sur la cr & eacute;ation d'organes subsidiaires (OS) par les membres du Conseil de s & eacute;curit & eacute; des Nations Unies (CSNU) entre 1972 et 2020. La d & eacute;l & eacute;gation & agrave; des OS constitue l'un des principaux moyens d'action du CSNU. Ces organes sont con & ccedil;us pour exercer des fonctions cruciales comme le maintien de la paix, la mise en oe uvre de sanctions et l'enqu & ecirc;te sur des crises. Pourtant, aucun travail de recherche ne propose d'& eacute;valuation syst & eacute;matique de leur cr & eacute;ation, conception et utilisation. Notre ensemble de donn & eacute;es comprend une typologie de toutes les propositions et cr & eacute;ations d'OS, ainsi que des informations quant & agrave; leur finalit & eacute; et leur conception. Une fois les donn & eacute;es pr & eacute;sent & eacute;es, nous analysons de fa & ccedil;on empirique les d & eacute;terminants de la cr & eacute;ation des OS. La r & eacute;gression multiple d & eacute;montre que la probabilit & eacute; de cr & eacute;ation d'OS augmente quand les membres permanents partagent les m & ecirc;mes pr & eacute;f & eacute;rences. De plus, des organes forts seront plus souvent cr & eacute;& eacute;s dans les p & eacute;riodes o & ugrave; les pr & eacute;f & eacute;rences convergent grandement, tandis que les organes de puissance faible & agrave; interm & eacute;diaire subissent moins l'influence de l'alignement des membres. Ces r & eacute;sultats mettent en & eacute;vidence de mani & egrave;re singuli & egrave;re l'influence de la politique sur le choix de la date et du mode de r & eacute;ponse aux probl & egrave;mes mondiaux par le CSNU. Nos donn & eacute;es et notre analyse d & eacute;peignent un CSNU plus proactif qu'il ne figure g & eacute;n & eacute;ralement dans la litt & eacute;rature ; ces donn & eacute;es permettront aux chercheurs d'analyser plus avant les mesures du CSNU.

How do international crises unfold? We conceptualize international relations as a strategic chess game between adversaries and develop a systematic way to measure pieces, moves, and gambits accurately and consistently over a hundred years of history. We introduce a new ontology and dataset of international events called ICBe based on a very high-quality corpus of narratives from the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) Project. We demonstrate that ICBe has higher coverage, recall, and precision than existing state of the art datasets and conduct two detailed case studies of the Cuban Missile Crisis (1962) and the Crimea-Donbas Crisis (2014). We further introduce two new event visualizations (event iconography and crisis maps), an automated benchmark for measuring event recall using natural language processing (synthetic narratives), and an ontology reconstruction task for objectively measuring event precision. We make the data, supplementary appendix, replication material, and visualizations of every historical episode available at a companion website crisisevents.org.

Foreign policy scholars often assume that leaders pursue a national interest. However, states often spread their foreign policy authority thinly across bureaucracies and programs with overlapping or conflicting interests. This is especially pronounced in foreign aid, which serves a clear foreign policy purpose but is often mired in bureaucracy. Why is foreign aid often so fragmented? Focusing on the United States, I explain foreign aid fragmentation as a byproduct of domestic politics. When moderate legislators are ideologically diffuse, leadership must persuade them to support a foreign aid agenda by offering pet projects. This increases aid's fragmentation. In contrast, when moderates are relatively homogeneous, leaders can gather support through more traditional compromise, decreasing the need for fragmented pet projects. I test this theory using a mixed-methods approach, employing a novel agency-level dataset of US foreign aid appropriations and a case study of a 1992 act delivering aid to the former Soviet Union.

Effective foreign policy necessitates a well-functioning bureaucracy. However, many states fragment foreign policy authority to bureaucratic actors with little interest or expertise in foreign affairs, such as labor, agricultural, and commerce ministries. This is especially common in foreign aid, where research suggests that fragmentation can be deleterious. Why do some states allow their foreign aid bureaucracy to become fragmented? I suggest that the fragmentation of the foreign aid bureaucracy results from domestic distributive politics. Leaders building electoral coalitions can fragment aid to many projects, programs, and bureaucracies to satisfy special interests. Using a novel coding of a bureaucracy-level foreign aid data set, I find that institutions incentivizing distributive politics increase aid fragmentation and that nontraditional aid bureaucracies are more open to distributive politics. I also qualitatively trace the theoretical mechanisms using a case of UK foreign aid. I find that special interests benefit from the existence and empowerment of nontraditional aid bureaucracies.

How do international crises unfold? We conceptualize of international relations as a strategic chess game between adversaries and develop a systematic way to measure pieces, moves, and gambits accurately and consistently over a hundred years of history. We introduce a new ontology and dataset of international events called ICBe based on a very high-quality corpus of narratives from the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) Project. We demonstrate that ICBe has higher coverage, recall, and precision than existing state of the art datasets and conduct two detailed case studies of the Cuban Missile Crisis (1962) and Crimea-Donbas Crisis (2014). We further introduce two new event visualizations (event icongraphy and crisis maps), an automated benchmark for measuring event recall using natural language processing (sythnetic narratives), and an ontology reconstruction task for objectively measuring event precision. We make the data, online appendix, replication material, and visualizations of every historical episode available at a companion website www.crisisevents.org and the github repository.

Critics often accuse Congress of abdicating its constitutional authority in foreign policy. One source of evidence of congressional abdication is the relative lack of legislation authorizing foreign aid and other foreign policy tools. Because of recent gridlock, Congress now authorizes foreign policy the only way it can: in annual appropriations bills. I argue that this change in legislative strategy does not necessarily reflect an abdication by Congress. Instead, an increase in party polarization, which leads to the perceived abdication of foreign policy, simply shifts Congress's legislating abilities to "limitation riders," or legislative provisions written into appropriations bills. I find that an increase in polarization increases Congress's use of these riders. I also find that polarization has encouraged Congress to use limitation riders in new ways. While foreign aid-related limitation riders once only consisted of contract and budget-related issues, they now comprise a wide variety of foreign and domestic policy issues. Congressional reliance on limitation riders has increased due to polarization and has consequences for foreign policy.

Political Science QuarterlyVolume 136, Issue 2 p. 395-397 Book Review Aiding and Abetting: U.S. Foreign Assistance and State Violence by Darden, Jessica Trisko. Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press, 2019. 216 pp. Paper, $30.00. Correction(s) for this article ERRATUM Volume 136Issue 4Political Science Quarterly pages: 809-809 First Published online: December 14, 2021 Shannon P. Carcelli, Shannon P. Carcelli University of Maryland, College ParkSearch for more papers by this author Shannon P. Carcelli, Shannon P. Carcelli University of Maryland, College ParkSearch for more papers by this author First published: 18 June 2021 https://doi.org/10.1002/polq.13178Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditWechat No abstract is available for this article. Volume136, Issue2Summer 2021Pages 395-397 RelatedInformation

Decades of research shows that fragmented foreign aid is less effective than its centralized and streamlined counterpart. Despite this, many country donors continue to thinly delegate their aid money over multiple agencies with overlapping and sometimes conflicting agendas. Why do otherwise rational leaders knowingly deploy foreign aid budgets in an inefficient way? Unlike existing work, I explore foreign aid from a purely domestic perspective, focusing on legislative coalition-building and the role of electoral institutions. I find that foreign aid fragmentation is not a conscious policy choice by the donor government, nor is it completely tied to geopolitical factors. Instead, it is a byproduct of bargaining within donor-government legislatures, much the same as trade protectionism. When domestic political institutions encourage the provision of districtlevel side payments, as is the case in majoritarian electoral systems and incentives for personal campaigns, foreign aid fragmentation will be higher. This suggests that the quality of foreign aid depends upon a combination of institutional and political factors within a donor state.

Costly signaling offers a solution to many foreign policy dilemmas. Though most commonly studied in the context of the bargaining theory of war, signaling can also play an important role in nonzero-sum interactions such as those characterized by chicken (e.g., nuclear deterrence) and the prisoner’s dilemma (e.g., tariff reductions). A rich game theoretic literature explains how actors can signal credibly in these situations. The most prominent strategies are sinking costs (actions that are costly ex ante) or tying hands (actions that are costly ex post). These strategies are theoretically elegant but have generated considerable controversy when studied empirically. One controversy concerns the existence of hand-tying domestic audience costs under different regime types. A second controversy involves the degree to which sinking costs increase or decrease the risk of war. These controversies speak to the inherent tension between theories of strategic interactions and measuring their outcomes in the foreign policy process, where some events are off the equilibrium path and thus unobserved. The limited availability of foreign policy data was a major hindrance in earlier empirical efforts. Even as the quality of this data has improved, focus has been on the outcomes of conflict (crisis onset, escalation to war, victory, defeat) rather than the strategy. This is problematic given that all crises are sequential in nature and understanding the action–reaction cycle is vital to illuminating patterns of war, capitulation, and settlement. The frontier of research in the signaling literature is in bridging this gap. The advent of big data and machine learning has enabled more systematic empirical analysis of strategic moves by various foreign policy actors, including signaling. Some researchers, such as Lindsay & Gartzke, are harnessing these new data and methods to explore the means of signaling. Other scholars are beginning to ask questions about the efficacy of public versus private signaling, the role of ambiguity, and dyadic versus multi-actor signaling. This new wave of research seeks to nudge signaling closer to the concerns of foreign policy practitioners.

Abstract Deterrence theory is slowly beginning to emerge from a long sleep after the Cold War, and from its theoretical origins over half a century ago. New realities have led to a diversification of deterrence in practice, as well as to new avenues for its study and empirical analysis. Three major categories of changes in the international system—new actors, new means of warfare, and new contexts—have led to corresponding changes in the way that deterrence is theorized and studied. First, the field of deterrence has broadened to include nonstate and nonnuclear actors, which has challenged scholars with new types of theories and tests. Second, cyberthreats, terrorism, and diverse nuclear force structures have led scholars to consider means in new ways. Third, the likelihood of an international crisis has shifted as a result of physical, economic, and normative changes in the costs of crisis, which had led scholars to more closely address the crisis context itself. The assumptions of classical deterrence are breaking down, in research as well as in reality. However, more work needs to be done in understanding these international changes and building successful deterrence policy. A better understanding of new modes of deterrence will aid policymakers in managing today’s threats and in preventing future deterrence failures, even as it prompts the so-called virtuous cycle of new theory and additional empirical testing.