How do international crises unfold? We conceptualize international relations as a strategic chess game between adversaries and develop a systematic way to measure pieces, moves, and gambits accurately and consistently over a hundred years of history. We introduce a new ontology and dataset of international events called ICBe based on a very high-quality corpus of narratives from the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) Project. We demonstrate that ICBe has higher coverage, recall, and precision than existing state of the art datasets and conduct two detailed case studies of the Cuban Missile Crisis (1962) and the Crimea-Donbas Crisis (2014). We further introduce two new event visualizations (event iconography and crisis maps), an automated benchmark for measuring event recall using natural language processing (synthetic narratives), and an ontology reconstruction task for objectively measuring event precision. We make the data, supplementary appendix, replication material, and visualizations of every historical episode available at a companion website crisisevents.org.

This chapter introduces work conducted by an interdisciplinary team of academics and policy analysts into the question of how interactions between adversaries in international crises can be managed in such a way as to avoid dangerous escalation. Focused primarily on great power competition in what has come to be called the gray zone, the researchers have sought to identify areas where classical deterrence theory is at odds with the realities of the contemporary conflict environment. Focusing primarily on the examples of Russia, China, and their proxies, the researchers sought to establish the best ways to shape behavior and manage escalation. We evaluate strategies drawn from the theory of immediate deterrence and escalation management through a multi-method approach. Key theoretical arguments are mapped to indicators that show both their overall and relative effectiveness, with a focus on those gray zone conflicts of greatest interest to the U.S. national security community. Where possible, results of analyses are discussed in terms of their relevance to the unfolding conflict in Ukraine.

Chapter 5 notes that international conflict is increasingly characterized by a series of crises in a gray zone between overt war and peacetime competition. In such crises, what prompts states to choose gray/hybrid versus direct violent tools? What may prompt the defender states to escalate in response to such challenges? We use data from the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) Project spanning 1963-2015 to explore the propensity of states to use violence based on the power disparity between adversaries, their regime types, and state capacity. We find that more autocratic challengers are more likely to trigger crises through gray tactics. This preference of gray tools over non-gray violence (but not over non-gray non-violence) points to the strong normative impact against the use of force. Furthermore, our findings suggest that the use of gray/hybrid tools is most likely in near-peer crises, with violence (or escalation more broadly) mainly being the tool of the weak. Overall, state capacity seems to be key in determining propensity to use force to initiate or to escalate a crisis - suggesting a strong state-level explanation for international behavior.

Chapter 4 begins with the presentation of three key features of the contemporary international system: (1) while the yearly rate of interstate conflicts and crises has held relatively steady, intrastate conflicts have shown a steady increase in frequency since the end of World War II; (2) gray zone crises are on the rise, conceptualized as a space between war and peace where major powers spar with each other indirectly or through the actions of their proxies; and (3) an increase in a class of crises arising from transnational threats to human security - climate change, refugee flows, cybersecurity threats, pandemic, and massive inequality within and between nations. The concept of international crisis is discussed in terms of its four stages: onset, escalation, de-escalation, and impact. The chapter concludes with the presentation of summary statistics on key features of crises as identified by the International Crisis Behavior project: polarity, geography, ethnicity, protracted conflict setting, third parties, and outcomes.

How do international crises unfold? We conceptualize of international relations as a strategic chess game between adversaries and develop a systematic way to measure pieces, moves, and gambits accurately and consistently over a hundred years of history. We introduce a new ontology and dataset of international events called ICBe based on a very high-quality corpus of narratives from the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) Project. We demonstrate that ICBe has higher coverage, recall, and precision than existing state of the art datasets and conduct two detailed case studies of the Cuban Missile Crisis (1962) and Crimea-Donbas Crisis (2014). We further introduce two new event visualizations (event icongraphy and crisis maps), an automated benchmark for measuring event recall using natural language processing (sythnetic narratives), and an ontology reconstruction task for objectively measuring event precision. We make the data, online appendix, replication material, and visualizations of every historical episode available at a companion website www.crisisevents.org and the github repository.

This study addresses the dynamics of how states employ proxies to achieve their strategic goals in the so-called gray zone between normal competition and armed conflict. The basic question is whether the use of proxies by the challenger in a crisis decreases the probability that the defender state will respond with violence. We start by examining a broad set of crises where the initial triggering act is either nonviolent or violent, to assess whether defenders respond to proxy triggers or triggers by the challengers themselves with a greater propensity for violence (hypothesis A). We also consider a narrower set of cases, where the triggering act is violent, asking whether the defender is more likely to respond in a tit-for-tat manner to a proxy, or to a state challenger (hypothesis B). We find that proxy use is associated with a higher probability of defender violence, regardless of whether the initial crisis trigger was itself violent. In addition, when the trigger is violent, defenders are more likely to respond in a tit-for-tat manner when a proxy does the triggering. Proxy usage actually leads to violent escalation, potentially questioning the assumption that challengers may minimize damage through the use of proxies. Este estudio aborda la dinamica de como los Estados emplean subsisiarios (proxies) para alcanzar sus objetivos estrategicos en la llamada "zona gris" entre la competencia normal y el conflicto armado. La pregunta basica es si el uso de subsidiarios por parte del retador en una crisis disminuye la probabilidad de que el Estado defensor responda con violencia. Comenzamos examinando un amplio conjunto de crisis en las que el acto inicial desencadenante es no violento o violento, para evaluar si los defensores responden a los desencadenantes de los subsidiarios o a los desencadenantes por parte de los propios atacantes con una mayor propension a la violencia (hipotesis A). Tambien consideramos un conjunto mas reducido de casos, en los que el acto desencadenante es violento, y nos preguntamos si es mas probable que el defensor responda de manera fulminante a un subsidiario o a un estado atacante (hipotesis B). Comprobamos que el uso de subsidiarios se asocia con una mayor probabilidad de violencia por parte del defensor, independientemente de si el desencadenante de la crisis inicial fue en si mismo violento. Ademas, cuando el desencadenante es violento, los subsidiarios son mas propensos a responder en forma de "ojo por ojo" cuando el desencadenante es un subsidiario. El uso de subsidiarios conduce, en realidad, a una escalada violenta, lo que cuestiona potencialmente la suposicion de que los atacantes puedan minimizar los danos mediante el uso de subsidiarios. Cette etude aborde les dynamiques de la facon dont les etats emploient des mandataires pour atteindre leurs objectifs strategiques dans ce que nous qualifions de << zone grise >> entre la concurrence normale et le conflit arme. La question fondamentale est de savoir si le recours a de mandataires par un opposant dans une crise reduit la probabilite que l'etat defenseur reponde par la violence. Nous commencons par examiner un large eventail de crises dont l'acte declencheur initial a ete soit non violent, soit violent, afin d'evaluer si les defenseurs repondent aux declencheurs des mandataires ou aux declencheurs des opposants eux-memes par une plus grande propension a la violence (hypothese A). Nous etudions egalement un eventail plus etroit de cas dont l'acte declencheur a ete violent en nous demandons si le defenseur est davantage susceptible de repondre du tac au tac a un mandataire ou a un opposant etatique (hypothese B). Nous constatons que le recours a des mandataires est associe a une probabilite plus elevee de violence de la part du defenseur, que le declencheur initial de la crise soit lui-meme violent ou non. De plus, lorsque le declencheur est violent, les defenseurs sont davantage susceptibles de reagir du tac au tac lorsqu'un mandataire est a l'origine du declenchement. Le recours a des mandataires mene en realite a une escalade de la violence, ce qui remet potentiellement en question l'hypothese selon laquelle les opposants pourraient minimiser les degats en recourant a des mandataires.

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Over the course of more than four decades the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) Project, a major and ongoing data-gathering enterprise in the social sciences, has compiled data that continues to be accessed heavily in scholarship on conflict processes. ICB holdings consist of full-length qualitative case studies, along with an expanding range of quantitative data sets. Founded in 1975, the ICB Project is among the most visible and influential within the discipline of International Relations (IR). A wide range of studies based either primarily or in part on the ICB’s concepts and data have accumulated and cover subjects that include the causes, processes, and consequences of crises. The breadth of ICB’s contribution has expanded over time to go beyond a purely state-centric approach to include crisis-related activities of transnational actors across a range of categories. ICB also offers depth through, for example, potential resolution of contemporary debates about mediation in crises on the basis of nuanced findings about long- versus short-term impact with regard to conflict resolution.

This chapter explores the potential ramifications of state instability for the global system and regional subsystems, the implications of these possible linkages for regional and global security, and areas where a capacity for early warning may help avoid some of the more dire consequences of this linkage. International crises can be classified according to those that unfold in the context of a protracted conflict, and those that occur as more isolated eruptions. A protracted conflict is characterized by hostile interactions that extend over long periods of time with sporadic outbreaks of open warfare fluctuating in frequency and intensity. The instability-crisis nexus can also be viewed from the perspective of the state as actor. Ethnic wars are episodes of violent conflict between governments and national, ethnic, religious, or other communal minorities (ethnic challengers) in which the challengers seek major changes in their status.

The modern age demands that we think in terms of human security. A concept that acknowledges the inherent linkages between economic and social development, respect for human rights, and peace. Until authors understand and act accordingly, they will not have either national or international security. Terrorism, especially by Islamists, is an existential threat to security in all world regions. This issue of Peace and Conflict reports on two new data collection projects that have already yielded several important generalizations about global and regional patterns of terror. Peace and security are shifting targets. Armed conflicts declined to a historic low of 19 in 2004 only to increase in the following years.

This chapter presents an overview of the findings on both ethnopolitical violence and terrorism that this new research project has generated. It focuses specifically on terrorism, outlining four major theories that explain why organizations choose terrorism as a strategy. The chapter provides a preliminary test of these theories by examining the relationships between terrorism and all organizations representing Kurds in the Middle East. The systematic collection of information on the internal affairs of states and the characteristics of societal conflict is a relatively recent endeavor, made possible by gains in information and communication technologies. A potentially more hopeful element has been the rapid rise in organizations that support democracy, with an increase from 17 in 1980 to 62 in 2004.

This chapter begins by reviewing the well-known International Crisis Behavior definitions of international and foreign policy crises. It then reviews the four crisis phases of onset, escalation, de-escalation, and impact. A theme running through the chapter is the manner in which crises are impacted by the degree to which they are embedded in gray zone conflicts and include both state and non-state actors. The chapter concludes with recommendations on how the practice of mediation must be adapted to the conditions of contemporary international and intrastate crises. These recommendations include adapting mediation to the interplay of domestic and international conditions in the onset and escalation of interstate crises, adapting mediation practices to the multiplicity of issues that state and non-state actors bring to the negotiation table, and a call for the increased employment of domestic mediators on mediation teams.

In this concluding chapter, we pull together the main findings of each of the chapters and group them so as to capture both the central scholarly themes of the Research Handbook and those insights that we believe will be of particular relevance to the policy community. Readers are encouraged to focus in on those themes that pique their interest, and then go to those parts of the Research Handbook, identified by the authors working on those themes, for more detailed explication of these themes. A major theme of this Research Handbook has been that crises in the international system have become increasingly complex over time and are perhaps even more complicated nowadays than during the pinnacle of ethnic conflict during the early to mid-1990s. This is exemplified most clearly by the dizzying array of actors and interests involved in recent crises in Syria, Libya, Yemen, and Ukraine. The trend toward increasing complexity can largely be attributed to a related increase in crises with characteristics of "gray zone" conflicts, a recent term developed to describe crises and conflicts that contain elements of both international rivalry, including among great powers, and domestic conflict, in which actors deliberately keep hostilities at a level short of war and act via proxy in order to avoid attribution and undesirable international attention.

Should the U.S. respond with military means to a limited Russian incursion in the Baltics? This paper explores Western attitudes towards such a hypothetical grey zone crisis. Using survey experiments and crisis simulations we find considerable reluctance to use military tools in order to support a Baltic ally, and surprisingly little variation across the audiences. The underlying reluctance to get the U.S. involved in an armed conflict with Russia in the hopes that such acquiescence may help preserve global stability indicates that the conflict in Ukraine only had a fundamentally limited impact on Western strategic thought on deterring Russia.

This chapter focuses on the mediation of violent, ethnicity-based intrastate crises in Africa for the period 1990–2005. Mediators are classified into three categories: Western, regional, and domestic. Mediators are assessed on their relative impact in terms of four mechanisms through which mediators can influence the outcomes of crises: (1) leverage, (2) decision-making processes, (3) proximity to the disputing parties, and (4) interest/stake in the crisis. The impact of mediation is assessed in terms of short-term crisis management and long-term conflict resolution. Finally, the chapter examines the relative impact of three styles of mediation: manipulation, formulation, and facilitation. Mediation is found to be effective in achieving short-term conflict management, particularly when Western mediators are involved and they employ manipulative techniques. Mediation was found to be generally ineffective in achieving long-term conflict resolution, although the inclusion of domestic mediators alongside other mediators shows some promise. The United Nations was found to be particularly ineffective, appearing to actually have a negative effect on both crisis management and conflict resolution.

This Research Handbook brings together a number of perspectives on the practice of mediation in the international system. A diversity of origins and a wide array of actors typify conflicts and crises today. The widespread availability of lethal weapons at the disposal of parties to conflict have made civilian populations tragically vulnerable as they are often caught in the crossfire. These circumstances require a systematic approach to crisis management whereby we can attempt to match the conditions of conflict with appropriate conflict management mechanisms as we seek more effective control of conflict. Mediation, the subject of this Research Handbook, is but one of a number of tools available for addressing conflict and crisis – others include arbitration, adjudication, and intervention in the form of peacemaking, peacebuilding, and peacekeeping. We focus on mediation because we believe that when applied to the confluence of conditions that typify today's conflict and crisis arena, mediation – either alone or in combination with other intervention mechanisms – can make a crucial difference in whether or not the international community will be successful in limiting conflict and crisis. Let us begin first by clarifying our thoughts on crisis. We feel the best way to think about conflict/crisis is as a continuum. At some point in an ongoing conflict, perhaps over land or resources, control of government, borders between states, and so on, that conflict, whether interstate or intrastate, reaches crisis proportions – widespread protests, threatening troop movements, violations of cease fires, or actual violence. That is, there has been a change in the disruptive interactions between the parties, resulting either in hostilities or in a higher than normal likelihood of violent hostilities. At that point, the conflict has escalated to crisis. It need not entail violence, but the probability that violence will ensue has increased.

This chapter focuses on mediation in the midst of an evolving international system and the ways in which the practice of mediation has changed and could stand to change more in order to increase its effectiveness in managing and resolving crises. Increasingly, when crisis mediation occurs, it will involve multiple attempts. While instances of mediation have declined in recent years, it is actually more likely to occur in crises in which many actors are involved and where there is a mixture of state and non-state actors. The authors find that the ability for mediators to assist the crisis actors in reaching an agreement or otherwise attenuating their hostilities does not decline much under such conditions. This has clear implications for gray zone conflicts, which often involve many actors, including state and non-state ones, and potential spillover of intrastate to interstate crises. Mediation is most likely to occur when these increasingly common gray zone conditions are present. The authors also find that mediators tend to be more effective in crises nested in protracted conflicts.

The article introduces the All Minorities at Risk (AMAR) data, a sample of socially recognized and salient ethnic groups. Fully coded for the forty core Minorities at Risk variables, this AMAR sample provides researchers with data for empirical analysis free from the selection issues known in the study of ethnic politics to date. We describe the distinct selection issues motivating the coding of the data with an emphasis on underexplored selection issues arising with truncation of ethnic group data, especially when moving between levels of data. We then describe our sampling technique and the resulting coded data. Next, we suggest some directions for the future study of ethnicity and conflict using our bias-corrected data. Our preliminary correlations suggest selection bias may have distorted our understanding about both group and country correlates of ethnic violence.