Decades of research support the generalization that human males tend to be more aggressive than females. However, most of that research has examined aggression between unrelated individuals. Data drawn from 24 societies around the globe (n = 4,013) indicate that this generalization does not hold in the context of sibling relationships. In retrospective self-reports, females report being at least as aggressive as males toward their siblings, often more so. This holds for direct as well as indirect aggression, and for aggression between adult siblings as well as aggression that occurred during childhood. Consistent with prior research on sex differences, males reported engaging in more direct aggression toward nonkin than did females in the majority of societies. The results suggest that the dynamics of aggression within the family are different from those outside of it, and ultimately that understanding the role of sex in aggressive tendencies depends on context and target.
In six studies, we examined the accuracy and underpinnings of the damaging stereotype that feminists harbor negative attitudes toward men. In Study 1 (n = 1,664), feminist and nonfeminist women displayed similarly positive attitudes toward men. Study 2 (n = 3,892) replicated these results in non-WEIRD countries and among male participants. Study 3 (n = 198) extended them to implicit attitudes. Investigating the mechanisms underlying feminists' actual and perceived attitudes, Studies 4 (n = 2,092) and 5 (nationally representative UK sample, n = 1,953) showed that feminists (vs. nonfeminists) perceived men as more threatening, but also more similar, to women. Participants also underestimated feminists' warmth toward men, an error associated with hostile sexism and a misperception that feminists see men and women as dissimilar. Random-effects meta-analyses of all data (Study 6, n = 9,799) showed that feminists' attitudes toward men were positive in absolute terms and did not differ significantly from nonfeminists'. An important comparative benchmark was established in Study 6, which showed that feminist women's attitudes toward men were no more negative than men's attitudes toward men. We term the focal stereotype the misandry myth in light of the evidence that it is false and widespread, and discuss its implications for the movement.
Throughout the 21st century, economic inequality is predicted to increase as we face new challenges, from changes in the technological landscape to the growing climate crisis. It is crucial we understand how these changes in inequality may affect how people think and behave. We propose that economic inequality threatens the social fabric of society, in turn increasing moralization-that is, the greater tendency to employ or emphasize morality in everyday life-as an attempt to restore order and control. Using longitudinal data from X, formerly known as Twitter, our first study demonstrates that high economic inequality is associated with greater use of moral language online (e.g. the use of words such as "disgust", "hurt", and "respect'). Study 2 then examined data from 41 regions around the world, generally showing that higher inequality has a small association with harsher moral judgments of people's everyday actions. Together these findings demonstrate that economic inequality is linked to the tendency to see the world through a moral lens.
ObjectiveWe investigated the relationship between personal relative deprivation (PRD)-resentment from the belief that one is worse off than people who are similar to oneself-and locus of control.BackgroundResearch has yet to comprehensively investigate whether PRD is associated with a tendency to favor external (vs. internal) explanations for self- and other-relevant outcomes.MethodEight studies (Ntotal = 6729) employed cross-sectional, experimental, and (micro)longitudinal designs and used established trait and state measures of PRD and loci of control.ResultsParticipants higher in PRD adopted more external (vs. internal) explanations for others' outcomes while controlling for socio-demographics (e.g., socioeconomic status; Studies 1-4). This relationship was mediated by a lowered sense of personal control (Study 1) and evident in a cross-national sample of participants in Asia (Study 2). PRD is more robustly associated with external than internal explanations for self and other-relevant outcomes (Studies 5-8), and within-person changes in PRD are positively associated with within-person changes in external explanations (month-to-month and day-to-day; Studies 7-8).ConclusionsPRD is positively associated with external locus of control independent of socioeconomic status, within and between people, and across cultures. This research highlights the implications of PRD for people's construal of the causal forces that govern their lives.
Many have pondered whether happiness is chiefly made of positive feelings and joy (hedonism) or by acquiring meaning via self-actualization (eudaimonism). Drawing on life history theory, we examined if individuals’ early-life experience (i.e., childhood socioeconomic status; SES) colors their notions of well-being. A consistent pattern was found in two studies (Study 1, N = 183; Study 2, N = 168) using MTurk samples; wealthier childhood upbringing predicted stronger endorsement of eudaimonic happiness. This pattern, supporting claims of life history theory, emerged only when perceptions of (economic) instability was salient (chronic, Study 1; experimentally primed, Study 2). Also, only childhood SES, but not current SES, mattered. This research finds novel evidence that childhood experience and current threat perception may interact to shape people’s ideals of happiness.
자녀는 부모 삶과 적응의 핵심적인 요소다. 그동안 많은 연구를 통해 사회적 관계가 행복에서 차지하는 중요성이 밝혀진 바 있지만, 부모-자녀 관계는 상대적으로 큰 관심을 받지 못했다. 이에 본 연구는 기혼자를 대상으로 이들의 자녀 관계 만족도와 주관적 안녕감에 초점을 맞추고, 이 둘 간의 관련성이 양육 동기에 따라 어떻게 달라지는지 살펴보고자 하였다. 특정 영역에서의 성취나 긍정적 경험으로 인한 심리적 혜택이 해당 영역에 부여된 중요성에 좌우된다는 선행문헌들을 고려했을 때, 자녀와의 만족스러운 관계는 높은 양육 동기를 가진 부모의 주관적 안녕감을 더 강하게 예측할 것으로 예상된다. 본 가설을 알아보기 위해 총 2개의 연구를 실시하였다. 연구 결과, 예상대로 자녀와의 관계 만족도와 주관적 안녕감 간 정적 상관은 양육 동기가 높은 개인에게서 더 크게 나타났다. 이러한 양육 동기의 조절 효과는 한국인(연구 1)과 미국인(연구 2) 모두에게서 일관되게 관찰되었으며, 문화에 따른 차이는 나타나지 않았다. 부모나 자녀의 성별, 나이 등을 통제하고서도 유효했으며, 특히 주관적 안녕감의 하위 요인 중 부정 정서에서 두드러지는 경향이 있었다.
Extending the growing literature on adaptive functionality of inner experiential states, we take the approach that life satisfaction functions as a part of a psychological system that monitors current and potential achievement on important goals. From this perspective, life satisfaction is sensitively calibrated to how well one is moving toward success on important goals, thereby providing useful information for, and potentially motivating, subsequent goal-facilitating action. Focusing on mating goals, we investigated whether currently active and important mating goals shape the extent to which life satisfaction is sensitively and selectively calibrated by goal-specific cues of potential mating success—self-perceived mate value. As hypothesized, because most individuals (eventually) seek long-term committed relationships, self-perceived long-term mate value predicted life satisfaction for men and women regardless of relationship status. In contrast, and also as hypothesized, self-perceived short-term mate value predicted life satisfaction only for individuals with short-term casual mating goals—single uncommitted men (Studies 1, 2 A, and 2B), individuals dispositionally motivated toward short-term relationships (Studies 2 A and 2B), and single uncommitted women for whom short-term mating motivation was experimentally engaged, enabling causal inference (Study 3). Results support a functional conceptualization of life satisfaction, showing that currently active mating goals can shape the extent to which goal-specific self-perceived mate value predicts life satisfaction.
While a great deal is known about the individual difference factors associated with conspiracy beliefs, much less is known about the country-level factors that shape people's willingness to believe conspiracy theories. In the current article we discuss the possibility that willingness to believe conspiracy theories might be shaped by the perception (and reality) of poor economic performance at the national level. To test this notion, we surveyed 6723 participants from 36 countries. In line with predictions, propensity to believe conspiracy theories was negatively associated with perceptions of current and future national economic vitality. Furthermore, countries with higher GDP per capita tended to have lower belief in conspiracy theories. The data suggest that conspiracy beliefs are not just caused by intrapsychic factors but are also shaped by difficult economic circumstances for which distrust might have a rational basis.
Besides health consequences, in what subtle ways do mask-wearing affect our psychology? In this research, we explored whether the experience of mask-wearing, like other disruptive visceral states (e.g., hunger), affects our time perspective. In two experiments (total N = 596), we examined if mask-wearing temporarily generates present-mindedness (more focus on present than future). Study 1 found that mask-wearing (vs. no-mask) lowered considerations about the future, which was mediated by a sense of stuffiness. Study 2 extended this finding and examined whether the effect spillovers to other time-relevant judgments, such as ideals about a good life. Again, when experiencing stuffiness because of mask-wearing, people were more likely to favor pleasure in current life than future life meaning. Our finding implies that concrete visceral experience (stuffiness) linked with the pandemic may shape our mind in subtle, unforeseen ways.
There is a growing body of work suggesting that social class stereotypes are amplified when people perceive higher levels of economic inequality-that is, the wealthy are perceived as more competent and assertive and the poor as more incompetent and unassertive. The present study tested this prediction in 32 societies and also examines the role of wealth-based categorization in explaining this relationship. We found that people who perceived higher economic inequality were indeed more likely to consider wealth as a meaningful basis for categorization. Unexpectedly, however, higher levels of perceived inequality were associated with perceiving the wealthy as less competent and assertive and the poor as more competent and assertive. Unpacking this further, exploratory analyses showed that the observed tendency to stereotype the wealthy negatively only emerged in societies with lower social mobility and democracy and higher corruption. This points to the importance of understanding how socio-structural features that co-occur with economic inequality may shape perceptions of the wealthy and the poor.
일반적으로 혼자서 보내는 시간이 많을수록 외로움 수준이 높은 경향이 나타난다. 그러나 홀로 있을 때, 즉 사회적으로 고립되었을 때 외로움을 경험하는지 여부는 사람마다 다르다. 본 연구에서는 홀로 많은 시간을 보내는 사람 중, 누가 외로움을 경험하는지를 예측하는 요인으로 권력감(sense of power)의 역할을 알아보았다. 연구 1은 대규모 설문조사 연구 자료를 이용하여 사회적 시간이 적은 사람들의 외로움을 예측하는 요인을 알아보았다. 판별분석 결과, 권력감이 사회적 활동 시간이 적은 사람들을 높은 외로움과 낮은 외로움 집단으로 판별하는 요인임을 검증하였다. 연구 2는 실험을 통해 권력감의 수준을 조작하여 높은 권력감과 낮은 권력감 집단으로 나누었다. 이후 홀로 있음을 점화한 뒤, 외로움과 소속감 상실의 여부가 권력감 조건에 따라 달라지는지 분석하였다. 그 결과 권력감이 높으면 사회적 외로움을 적게 경험하고 소속감 상실이 완충되는 인과관계를 확인하였다. 현대 사회는 일인 가정이 많아지고 코로나로 인해 사회적 만남이 제한됨으로써 외로움에 취약한 환경에 처한 개인이 전례 없이 많다. 본 연구는 이러한 현 상황에서 외로움 완화의 요인으로써 상황의 변화보다는 개인의 내적 심리적 측면에 주목하였다는 점에서 의의를 지닌다.
How does psychology vary across human societies? The fundamental social motives framework adopts an evolutionary approach to capture the broad range of human social goals within a taxonomy of ancestrally recurring threats and opportunities. These motives-self-protection, disease avoidance, affiliation, status, mate acquisition, mate retention, and kin care-are high in fitness relevance and everyday salience, yet understudied cross-culturally. Here, we gathered data on these motives in 42 countries (N = 15,915) in two cross-sectional waves, including 19 countries (N = 10,907) for which data were gathered in both waves. Wave 1 was collected from mid-2016 through late 2019 (32 countries, N = 8,998; 3,302 male, 5,585 female; Mage = 24.43, SD = 7.91). Wave 2 was collected from April through November 2020, during the COVID-19 pandemic (29 countries, N = 6,917; 2,249 male, 4,218 female; Mage = 28.59, SD = 11.31). These data can be used to assess differences and similarities in people's fundamental social motives both across and within cultures, at different time points, and in relation to other commonly studied cultural indicators and outcomes.
What are the things that we think matter morally, and how do societal factors influence this? To date, research has explored several individual-level and historical factors that influence the size of our ‘moral circles.' There has, however, been less attention focused on which societal factors play a role. We present the first multi-national exploration of moral expansiveness—that is, the size of people’s moral circles across countries. We found low generalized trust, greater perceptions of a breakdown in the social fabric of society, and greater perceived economic inequality were associated with smaller moral circles. Generalized trust also helped explain the effects of perceived inequality on lower levels of moral inclusiveness. Other inequality indicators (i.e., Gini coefficients) were, however, unrelated to moral expansiveness. These findings suggest that societal factors, especially those associated with generalized trust, may influence the size of our moral circles.
People cooperate every day in ways that range from largescale contributions that mitigate climate change to simple actions such as leaving another individual with choice – known as social mindfulness. It is not yet clear whether and how these complex and more simple forms of cooperation relate. Prior work has found that countries with individuals who made more socially mindful choices were linked to a higher country environmental performance – a proxy for complex cooperation. Here we replicated this initial finding in 41 samples around the world, demonstrating the robustness of the association between social mindfulness and environmental performance, and substantially built on it to show this relationship extended to a wide range of complex cooperative indices, tied closely to many current societal issues. We found that greater social mindfulness expressed by an individual was related to living in countries with more social capital, more community participation and reduced prejudice towards immigrants. Our findings speak to the symbiotic relationship between simple and more complex forms of cooperation in societies.