We provide evidence of a positive association between independent directors’ reputation incentives and the magnitude of the CEO pay gap, defined as the difference in compensation between the CEO and lower-ranked executives. The CEO pay gap serves as a proxy for the strength of executive pay tournaments within the firm. Using a sample of S P 1500 firms, we show that independent directors with stronger reputation incentives employ larger pay gaps to encourage executive risk-taking, thereby enhancing firm performance and protecting their own reputation in the labor market. This relationship holds for both short- and long-term pay gaps and is supported by propensity score matching and difference-in-differences analyses. Cross-sectional results indicate that the association is stronger in settings characterized by higher information asymmetry, lower institutional ownership, weaker product-market competition, and smaller firm size, consistent with reputation incentives substituting for weaker external monitoring. Overall, our findings highlight tournament-based compensation as a strategic governance mechanism and demonstrate that directors’ reputation incentives, particularly in opaque information environments, can help align incentives and improve firm outcomes.

This study draws on institutional economics and communicative institutionalism to conceptualise language as an institution which comprises socially shared rules and meanings that govern human interaction and affects country-level foreign direct investment (FDI). Specifically, shared language governs interpretation and coordination in cross-border investment relationships, thereby reducing behavioural and environmental uncertainty. In turn, language differences weaken this institutional function of language. To test this hypothesis, we employ a gravity model of 87,209 bilateral FDI observations comprising equity and debt positions across 246 countries and territories from 2010 to 2019. We find that greater language differences are associated with lower bilateral FDI stocks. We further show that formal institutional proximity and cultural proximity mitigate this negative association, offering alternative mechanisms for uncertainty reduction when language differences are large. In addition, language difference from English is negatively associated with FDI for both source and host countries. Overall, the study demonstrates that language functions as a key institutional determinant of FDI, extending language-sensitive IB research and institutional explanations of cross-border investment.

Microfinance organizations (MFOs) increasingly access global debt and local debt markets. This study investigates whether such access benefits MFOs’ cost efficiency, using agency theory and capital market liability of foreignness theory. Analyzing data from 655 MFOs observed in 88 countries between 1998 and 2015, this study finds that, on average, MFOs with debt tend to be more cost-efficient than MFOs without debt. The study also finds that, on average, MFOs with only international debt are more cost-efficient than MFOs with only local debt. However, the cost efficiency diminishes for MFOs exposed to foreign debtholders from institutionally distant countries. These results offer salient policy implications for debtholders and debt-seeking MFOs by highlighting the cost efficiency benefit of debt, especially international debt, for MFOs while simultaneously underscoring the detrimental moderating effect of institutional distance.

Research Question/IssueThis study investigates the impact of family governance, including founder directors and their ties to family members on the board, on the social performance of microfinance institutions (MFIs), a special kind of social enterprise with dual objectives. Research Findings/InsightsUsing a dataset of 735 MFIs operating in Bangladesh from 2007 to 2017, we find that founder directors and board members with family ties to the founder have an adverse impact on MFIs' social performance. These findings hold when we perform several robustness tests and endogeneity tests. Theoretical/Academic ImplicationsWe contribute to the corporate governance literature on MFIs and social enterprises in two ways. First, our findings suggest that, when MFIs are confronted with dual performance objectives, founder directors may "trade off" social outcomes in favor of economic outcomes and therefore adversely affect MFIs' social performance. Second, our findings extend the literature by showing that the presence of board members with family ties to founder directors also adversely affects MFIs' social performance. Practitioner/Policy ImplicationsThis study suggests that MFIs' board composition influences their governance and ability to oversee their social and financial performance effectively. If MFIs' social performance is a major concern of national policy makers, then regulation should be put in place to limit board recruitment with family ties.

This study addresses multiple-principal-agent power dynamics in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in emerging markets. We investigate under what conditions agents (CEOs) accede to demands of government-linked principals. Our qualitative study in Indonesia advances agency theory by disaggregating and categorizing government-linked principals. We also examine three types of principals' demands (commercial, social, and private) and five types of mechanisms influence agent responses with principals' private demands (collusion among principals, career-ending threats by principals, plausible deniability through CSR, political ties as enabler, political ties as buffer). Based on our findings and on insights from the public administration literature, we develop a conceptual framework that advances multiple agency theory.

Research Question/IssueThis is a study of the relationship between business group ownership and constituent firms' adoption of Anglo-American shareholder value governance in African firms at the undertaking of an initial public offering (IPO). Research Findings/InsightsWe find business group ownership to be associated with lower Anglo-American corporate governance adoption by constituent firms. However, this association is reversed in the institutional context of higher tribalism, while correspondingly being exacerbated in the context of lower tribalism. Theoretical/Academic ImplicationsWe theorize that the influence of business group ownership on firms' adoption of Anglo-American corporate governance is better understood when considering the institutional context. We highlight how informal cultural institutions are heterogeneous and thus shape the indigenous political economy and impact business groups. Specifically, we argue institutional contexts with higher tribalism are associated with more in-group favoritism and nepotism. This association makes it critical for business group constituent firms to escape the constraints of the political economy of tribalism when attracting outside funding, leading to a higher inclination to adopt Anglo-American governance. Contrastingly, in lower tribalism contexts, there is more universal trust across societies and an increased availability of domestic funding. Practitioner/Policy ImplicationsGiven the proliferation of business group ownership within economies worldwide, the study provides a useful framework with which to gauge the influence of business group ownership on a constituent firm's adoption of Anglo-American governance best practice. In particular, the study emphasizes that the interdependence of formal institutional architecture and tribalism-both fundamentally associated with the demographic shape and with the incentive structures embedded within the underlying national political economy-calls for careful considerations when making national corporate governance recommendations.

This study extends the concept of liability of foreignness from for-profit firms to “hybrid” organizations that combine financial and social goals. By using a global dataset of 655 microfinance institutions (MFIs) observed in 77 countries between 1998 and 2015, we investigate the effect of foreignness on the financial and social performance of MFIs. The results suggest a negative effect of foreignness on the financial and social performance of hybrid organizations. Our results also suggest that the negative financial performance effect of foreignness is stronger in organizations with high social performance and in MFIs hosted in institutionally weaker countries. Furthermore, our results emphasize the moderating influence of scaling and longer tenure of MFIs in their host countries. Interestingly, our findings also shed light on the dual nature of scaling, demonstrating both its positive and negative moderating effects. By applying the concept of liability of foreignness this study enriches the understanding of performance in international hybrid organizations.

The paper acknowledges the changed geopolitical map and the new adjacent political mindset and examines the current state of the relationship between MNEs and governments/central banks. The focus is on the implications of these changes for business policy in a sustainable finance perspective. Our analysis reveals that the increased tensions in the post-financial crisis of 2008/2009, the ultra-low interest rates during the Pandemic, and development in geopolitics post-Ukraine, contribute to reducing the assumptions for a well-functioning global value chain. These tensions all need to be addressed by careful adaptation of company strategies and government policies. Five corporate strategies for the reorganization are discussed. Moreover, on the positive side the reorganization of the global value chain provides an opportunity to meet the United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (United Nations, 2015). The reorganization calls for sustainable financial decisions that internalize environmental, social, and governance (ESG) considerations. The paper addresses this call and explores the implications for the practice of sustainable finance in a MNE that considers a reorganization of its global logistic chain because of increased frictions in crossing national borders.

Motivated by agency theory and arguments from linguistic studies, we argue in this paper the internationalization of a firm’s audit committee to be associated with weaker firm-level corporate governance. Based on 2,015 publicly traded European firms from 16 countries over 2000-2018, we find the presence of foreign directors on audit committees to have a significant negative impact on financial reporting quality (FRQ). The effect is found to be weaker in countries with strong investor protection. We find linguistic differences within audit committees an important explanation for the negative influence of foreign directors on FRQ. The results are robust to alternative FRQ measures and model specifications, including difference-in-differences and propensity score matching. While foreign directors on a corporate board may create value for the firm by boosting the advisory capacity of that board, recruiting a foreign director to that firm’s audit committee may compromise the board’s monitoring function and the firm’s FRQ.

Purpose - The purpose of this study is to describe and explain the organisation design antecedents of coordination, learning and trust in an international strategic alliance in a cross-border context characterised by extreme political volatility. Design/methodology/approach - The research was carried out as a single-case study in situ in a humanitarian international strategic alliance in Pyongyang, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea). Findings - In addition to explaining the effects of interface, specialisation, formalisation and centralisation on coordination, learning and trust, the study demonstrates the influence of classic international business (IB) "costs of doing business abroad " (Hymer, 1960/1976) on the same organisational outcomes. Moreover, the study identifies intergovernmental engagement/containment/disengagement as a contextual antecedent of both organisation design and outcomes. Originality/value - The study extends IB theory by indicating that mainstream IB perspectives may not fully explain intraorganisational outcomes in cross-border contexts characterised by extreme political volatility. Notably, the study suggests that complementary constructs such as intergovernmental engagement are needed to account for the additional costs incurred by such settings.

Based on resource dependence theory we argue for an influence of business groups (BGs) on the board composition of constituent offshore financial multinational enterprises (FMNEs). Using a unique sample of 171 Caribbean FMNEs in an inter-island BG setting, we find BGs' control in constituent firms to be indicative of the importance of the internal financing and intermediation within the group network. This control leads to a higher proportion of lawyers hired to the boards of directors in BG-constituent firms and supports the argument that lawyers provide skills in complex offshore regulatory frameworks that facilitate BGs' optimal tax management. Furthermore, we observe that an increased adoption of shareholder rights governance by BG-constituent firms is associated with increased engagement with outside resource providers, increased potential conflicts of interest and hence a need for hiring more lawyers. Our interpretation is that offshore FMNEs have a need for more lawyers, whose legal skill is critical to the competitive advantage of FMNEs.

Ceding ownership to outside investors provides a control dilemma for founders. In less developed capital markets with weaker formal institutions, we argue that retained founder director ownership can lower the transaction costs of external capital. Our argument rests on incomplete contracting and institutional theory, particularly highlighting the elevated status of the founding entrepreneur. Based on a longitudinal study of 179 listed Caribbean firms, we find that retained founder ownership reduces information asymmetry vis-à-vis outside minority investors. The reduced information asymmetry is even stronger for firms with a related party/subsidiary within a tax haven, and for firms with strong shareholder rights

Based on historical analogies, we emphasize a connection between financial crises and technological shifts where the shift calls for a structural economic transformation. We discuss how political pressures related to this structural transformation pave the way for the return of a new form of Mercantilism. This time it is the competition for high-tech jobs that drives politicians to be more nationalistic. Our conclusion is that the race for jobs in a period of technology shift, coupled with experimental efforts by central banks, will lead to the need for a post-COVID19 reorganization of international companies’ global logistics chain. The current pandemic will act as a catalyst to this very transformation.

This study outlines how the corporate governance of emerging market firms is influenced by corporate affiliation and institutional embeddedness. We argue that the stronger the business group affiliation, the less likely is the emerging market firm to adopt shareholder value enhancing corporate governance, and that this relationship is moderated by institutional quality and tribalism. Based on189 initial public offerings (IPOs) from 22 African countries between 2000and 2016, we find a significant negative relationship between business group ownership and IPO firms’ quality of corporate governance. We also find this relationship to be significantly negatively moderated by country-level institutional quality and positively by indigenous tribalism. The result adds to the understanding of barriers to a convergence towards one uniform global corporate governance model.